AESTHETICS

Vasily Sesemann

Translated from Lithuanian by
Mykolas Drunga

Edited and introduced by
Leonidas Donskis

On the Boundary of Two Worlds
Identity, Freedom, and Moral Imagination in the Baltics

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8

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Leonidas Donskis, Professor of Political Science and Philosophy, and Director of the Political Science and Diplomacy School at Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas, Lithuania

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Table of Contents

Leonidas Donskis, Editor's Introduction: Mapping Inter-War Lithuanian Philosophy xi
Acknowledgments xxix

PART I: INTRODUCTION

1. Aesthetics: Definition and Object 1
2. Difficulties for Aesthetics 2
   A. The Criterion of Beauty 2
   B. Aesthetics and Living Art 4
   C. The Peculiarity of Aesthetic Experience 5
3. Immediate Aesthetic Perception—the Material Basis of Aesthetics 7

PART II: METHODS

1. The Optimal Starting Point: Nature or Art? 11
2. Three Starting Points for Aesthetic Analysis 12
   A. The Artist-Creator 12
   B. The Viewer (Listener) 14
   C. The Work of Art Itself 15

PART III: THE ANALYSIS OF AN AESTHETIC OBJECT

1. The Essential Properties of Aesthetic Perception 17
   A. Aesthetic Perception and the Feeling of Pleasure 17
   B. The Significance of the Mind-Set for the Perception of an Aesthetic Object 19
   C. Examples
      Poetic Language 22
      Visual Art 25
      Music 28
2. The Internal Structure of an Aesthetic Object
   A. The Unity of an Aesthetic Object 30
   B. The Components of an Aesthetic Object 31
   C. The Significance of the Dominant 34
   D. Static and Genetic Unity 35
   E. The Aspects of an Aesthetic Object and the Problem of Space in Visual Art 36
   F. The Problem of Time in Art 39

3. The Expressiveness of an Aesthetic Object and its Objective Sense
A. Introduction 40
B. The Objectivity of Aesthetic Feelings 41
C. The Traditional Theory of Analogy and its Criticism 42
D. The Theory of Empathy and its Criticism 44
E. How the Expressiveness of an Aesthetic Object is to be Explained
Intuition is an Act of Understanding 48
The Initial Expressiveness of this Act of Understanding 49
The Significance of the Act of Empathy 50
The Inner Dynamism of Aesthetic Impressions (Vitality) 51
The Relation of Aesthetic Expressiveness to the Contemplative Attitude 54
Invigoration 56
Mental Infection and its Forms. Echoic Feelings 57
Artistic Acts of Re-Creation. Dramatic Acting (Reincarnation) 62
The Relation of the Sensory Image to the Objective Meaning 65
4. Aesthetic Form and Aesthetic Structure
A. Introduction 70
B. Visible and Tangible Forms. Their Organizational Significance 71
C. The Relation between Form and Matter 72
D. The Generalized Significance of Form. Structure 74
E. Form and Content (Subject) 75
F. Examples: Theatre and Film 78
G. Relativization of Form. Hierarchy of Forms 81
H. Aesthetic Form and the Individuality of the Work of Art 82
I. The Concept of Style 83
J. Style and Imitation of Nature 87

PART IV: THE BEAUTY OF NATURE

1. The Relations of Natural and Artistic Beauty with Respect to Origin 89
2. The Aesthetic Criterion of Natural and Artistic Beauty is the Same 90
3. The Conception of Nature's Beauty in The History of European Culture. The Beauty of Wild Nature 91
4. The Beauty of Organic Forms 93
5. Human Beauty. Its Ideal 94
6. Organic Beauty and the Sexual Instinct 98
7. Beauty and Ugliness. Their Relation in Art 99
8. The Peculiarity of Natural Beauty
A. Nature, Beauty's Potential 103
B. The Reality of Nature's Beauty 104
C. The Significance of this Reality 105
D. How Should We Understand the Reality of Natural Beauty? 107

PART V: THE ORIGIN OF ART

1. The Relation of Primitive Art to Other Areas of Culture 109
2. Attempts to Derive the Origin of Art from General Psychological Principles. Criticism 111
3. Stimuli for the Emergence of Representational Art
   A. The Imitative Instinct 113
   B. Play (Free Motor Activity) 118
4. The Origin of Music 123
5. General Conclusions 125
6. The Artist and the Child (Primitive Man) 127

PART VI: THE PROBLEM OF ARTISTIC CREATIVITY

1. A General Characterization of the Creative Process 131
2. The Creative Process: Three Basic Moments
   A. Inner Excitation 132
   B. The Emergence of the Artistic Idea 133
   C. The Realization of the Idea 134
3. Creative Imagination
   A. The Function of the Imagination in Sensory Perception 135
   B. The Connection of the Imagination to Thinking and Memory 137
   C. Imagination and Motor Activity (Play) 139
   D. Inventiveness (Creative Originality) 142
   E. Dynamic Tension (Dramatism) 144
   F. Creative Imagination and the Mechanism of Associations 144
   G. The Role of Abstraction in Creativity
      Abstraction in Initial Perceptual and Recollective Acts. Natural Symbols 146
      Natural Symbols in Representational Art 148
      Abstraction in Music and Architecture 152
      Abstraction in Poetry. Conventional Symbols and Meaning-Connected Feelings 153

PART VII: THE HISTORIC DEVELOPMENT OF ART AND THE FACTORS UNDERLYING IT

1. The Problem: Formulation and Explication 159
2. Taine's "Milieu Theory" and its Critical Appraisal 160
3. The Psychological Theory of "Numbing" and its Critique 163
4. The Relation of the Artist's Individuality and Creativity to the Cultural Environment 164
5. The Relation of the Development of Art to General Cultural Development 167

6. The Historical Changing of Styles and the Theories Explaining it 169
A. The Styles of Youth, Maturity, and Old Age 169
B. The Archaic, Classical, and Baroque Stages in the Evolution of Style 170
C. Is this Schema Associated with the Predominance of a Specific Art Form? 172
D. Does this Schema Apply to the Development of Music and Art? 173
E. Constitutive Elements of Representational Art: Tectonicity, Plasticity, Painterliness, Ornamentality, and their Interrelations 175
F. Theories Recognizing the Evolution of Art as a Process in One Direction 180
G. Theories Grounding the Evolution of Art in the Periodic Alternation of Styles 184
H. In What Sense Can We Speak of Artistic Progress? 185

PART VIII: THE RELATIONS OF BEAUTY TO OTHER CULTURAL VALUES. THE ROLE OF ART IN CULTURAL LIFE

1. Introduction 189
2. Beauty and Morality
A. The Relation Between the Aesthetic and the Ethical Viewpoint 190
B. The Neutrality of the Aesthetic Attitude Toward Ethical Values 192
C. Example: Tragicality 193
D. Art and Tendentiousness 201
E. Art and the Love of Being 201
F. Example: Comicality 203
3. Art (Beauty) and Truth
A. The Problem Formulated 212
B. Theoretical Truth 213
C. The Formal Truth of Art 214
D. The Material Truth of Art
The Subjective Aspect 215
The Objective Aspect
The Genuineness of Emotive Expression 217
The Reality of Objective Representation 218
What is Fantasticality? 221
Aesthetic Reality 226

PART IX: HISTORICAL SURVEY OF AESTHETIC THEORIES
1. The Aesthetics of the Ancient Greeks
A. Introduction 231
B. Kalokagatia 232
C. The Sophists. Plato 232
D. Neoplatonism. Aristotle 234
2. Rationalist Aesthetics in France and Germany
A. Boileau. Buffon 235
B. Leibniz. Baumgarten. Sulzer 236
3. The Empiricist Aesthetics of the English
A. Shaftesbury 238
B. Home and Burke 239
4. The Aesthetics of Kant 240
5. Vico 243
6. German Idealist Aesthetics: Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer 244
7. The Formalists. Fechner 245
8. Contemporary Aesthetic Theories
A. Theories Proceeding from the Art Work (Object) 247
B. Phenomenological Aesthetics 248
C. Theories Proceeding from the Perceiving Subject 249
D. Theories Proceeding from the Creative Subject 249
E. Metaphysical Aesthetics 250
F. Sociological Theories 250
G. Marxist Aesthetics 251

PART X
THE CLASSIFICATION OF TYPES OF ART

1. The Problem 253
2. The Relation of the Art Work to the Subject.
Optical and Acoustic Impressions: Their Difference 254
3. Spatial and Nonspatial Forms of Art 257
4. Objective and Nonobjective Forms of Art 258
5. Representational and Nonrepresentational Art 261

Notes 265
Index 277

Editor's Introduction
Mapping Inter-War Lithuanian Philosophy

A close examination of the emergence of modern Lithuanian philosophy may be most instructive when studying the intellectual and moral sensibilities of Eastern Europe. At the same time, a study of modern Lithuanian theoretical thought may reveal a number of the hitherto concealed nuances of the multicultural and multifaceted character of modern Lithuania. Contrary to the widely accepted, albeit loosely argued, opinion of not a few western scholars of the Baltic countries, viz., that Lithuania came into modern political existence as a homogenous entity that had nothing to do with its multiethnic and multicultural past, an examination of twentieth-century Lithuanian philosophy may prove the opposite.

Although the multicultural character of Renaissance and Baroque Lithuania, indeed, underwent considerable change throughout past centuries, modern Lithuanian philosophy may arguably have originated as a universalistic attempt to bridge distant cultures and create a synthesis of the civilizations of East and West. This reflected not only its initial orientation to Russian philosophy (as we shall see, the similarity between the concept of "a synthesis of civilizations" and that of "Eurasianism" is striking), but also the dynamics of Lithuanian nationalism. Like any other Central or East European nationalism, it had its liberal and conservative phases.

In fact, modern Lithuanian philosophy originated as a response to the questions formulated in Russian philosophy—religious, moral, and social what. Later it turned to Continental European philosophy, preoccupying itself with German and French existentialism, hermeneutics, and phenomenology. In inter-war Lithuania, the philosophy of culture may well be said to have become the principal philosophical discipline.

At that time, the philosophy of culture, as a discipline *sensu stricto*, was fading away in Western Europe giving way to the intrusion of the social sciences in the fields of theory of culture and *Kulturkritik*. Yet it was flourishing in Lithuania where even the Department of the Philosophy of Culture was established at the University of Lithuania in Kaunas (which was renamed, in 1930, Vytautas Magnus University).

Regrettably, the loss of independent political and intellectual existence that Lithuania experienced for five decades isolated and marginalized the then lively and promising intellectual culture. Yet Lithuanian philosophy, in the early 1980s, started recovering and reorienting itself, again, to Western currents of modern theoretical thought. Though Lithuanian philosophy may well be said to have survived into the twenty-first century through the major contribution of Lithuanian émigré thinkers, the second birth of modern Lithuanian philosophy would have been unthinkable without the gradual emancipation of thought that occurred in Lithuania itself.

Interestingly enough, the birth of modern philosophy, in inter-war Lithuania, was instrumental in the search for modes of public discourse, collective identity, and cultural policy, and also for elaborating the national project as a whole.

The Central/East European Concept of Culture

The eminent German sociologist Norbert Elias, in *Über den Prozess der Zivilisation* (a brilliant theoretical study analyzing the impact of etiquette and manners on individual self-control and on the emergence of the modern state), uncovered the sociogenesis of the concepts of *Kultur* and *Zivilisation*. More precisely, Elias traced the sociogenesis and psychogenesis of the distinction between the two concepts and the corresponding terms.

Anglo-American and French-speaking scholars have always tended to use these terms as synonyms. The appearance of a sharp dividing line between them seems a specifically German phenomenon deeply embedded in *Geschichtsphilosophie* and *Kulturphilosophie*, subsequently reinterpreted within Central/East European philosophies of history and culture under the influence of German social philosophy.

Elias, in his surgical analysis of the social processes that brought about the distinction between *Kultur* and *Zivilisation*, provided a discursive map of how the culturally predominant social group contrives to identify itself with the whole of the people. According to Elias, the German middle-class intelligentsia, at the end of the eighteenth century, had come to define and identify itself through the concepts *Kultur* and *Bildung*, in contrast to the specifically French concept *Civilisation*, which had become merely a symbolic reference to German court aristocracy—pro-French and contemptuous of German language and literature.[1]

For the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century German middle-class intelligentsia, politically insignificant and even impotent within the nearly feudal structure of social hierarchy and political power, *Kultur* and *Bildung* began to refer to *das rein Geistige* (the purely spiritual), i.e., the realm of pure spirituality/self-cultivation, and to a notion of creative genius consciously disconnected from the sphere of economic and political power. *Civilisation*, by contrast, was perceived by them as the very essence of the artificiality, superficiality, banality, moral corruption, and empty conventional politeness so characteristic of the court aristocracy and their stances.

Elias succeeded in uncovering further implications for the analysis of the development of these concepts as well as that of collective identities (his hypothesis reveals an important anatomy of the birth of group stereotyping). The German middle-class intelligentsia eventually contrived to generalize its collective identity to cover the entire German people.

The latter was interpreted through the concepts of *Kultur* and *Bildung*, while *Civilisation* was transformed by them into an interpretive framework within which the entire French people could be defined and identified. The Germans, within such a framework, turn out to be *en bloc* thoughtful, spiritual, sincere, and honest, while the French were depicted as hopelessly pompous, pretentious, superficial, and hypocritical.

Thus Elias puts forward and contextualizes the sociological premise that the modern nation-state, as a conjunction between a polity and a shared culture, is nothing but a politico-cultural construct of the new kind of egalitarian elite. Another key implication of his conception is even more striking: the intelligentsia comes to constitute itself only by virtue of the definition and identification of something that stands behind it, namely, an imagined community and a forged common culture.

This is the way that intellectuals come into existence as an agency of consciousness bridging the principle of imagination and the principle of reality. Last but not least, Elias implies that intellectuals as a group are always searching for an enemy, no matter whether imaginary or real, in order to define themselves and experience their collective identity.

Elias further shows how those intellectuals who orchestrated the *Sturm und Drang* movement came to enlarge the concepts of *Kultur* and *Bildung* to constitute a symbolic framework within which writers, philosophers, composers, artists, and university scholars could eventually be replaced by the German people as such—as the bearer of virtue, talent, creative genius, honesty, simplicity, and authenticity.

Analogously, the concept *Civilisation* develops into an alternative symbolic framework within which the entire French people replace the German court aristocracy—as the bearer of all possible vices, including alleged intellectual and creative limitations. Therefore, Elias provides, along with his other insights into the contrasting models of collective self-understanding, an analytically-incisive discursive map of nationalism, that is, the sociogenesis and psychogenesis of the concept of *Volk*.

Louis Dumont's *Essays on Individualism: Modern Ideology in Anthropological Perspective*, by virtue of employing the perspective of the structural history of ideas, sheds new light on the encounter of the Enlightenment and Romanticism, which turns out to have been, in essence, a clash of two contrasting models of self-understanding and of the two intellectual and moral stances. According to Dumont, Johann Gottfried von Herder's *Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte* was but a conscious response to Voltaire's philosophy of history (Voltaire introduced the term "philosophy of history").

For Voltaire, the essence of the philosophy of history lies in reflecting on the liberation of human individuals and their consciousness from the realm of superstition. In contradistinction to Voltaire, Herder assesses the task and the

subject matter of the philosophy of history not in terms of the individual but as the study of historically unique peoples and their cultures.

The point is that Herder takes the *Volk* and its *Kultur* as the collective individual. Like human individuals who have, in their political existence, the inescapable rights of self-determination and self-fulfillment, cultures are—by virtue of being collective individuals—historically unique, autonomous, self-asserting, and self-sufficient. In other words, Herder puts forward, for the first time, the idea of the autonomy of the cultural dimension.

Therefore, individualism ceases to function solely as a political idea and turns into a crucial cultural category. The inner spring of the body politic, once theoretically embraced and articulated by political philosophy, transforms itself both into a mode of historical narrative and into an interpretive framework for the humanities.

We have here two interpretations of individualism and identity. There is no doubt that the Enlightenment provided solid ground for theoretical interpretation of *political individualism* and *civilizational identity* as political principles, but it was Romanticism that forged *cultural individualism* and *ethnic/cultural identity* as cultural constructs. To be sure, theoretical principles precede ideological constructs: theories—as in the cases of liberalism and nationalism—tend to transform themselves into ideologies, but the reverse sequence is, in principle, impossible. As Dumont insightfully points out:

> Herder rehabilitates everything that the French and English eighteenth century rejected or ignored: the barbarous Middle Ages, Ancient Egypt sacrificed to the glory of Greece, and perhaps most important, religion. Instead of history consisting in the accession of reason, a reason disembodied and everywhere identical to itself, Herder sees in history the contrasted interplay of individual cultures or cultural individuals, each constituting a specific human community, or *Volk*, in which an aspect of general humanity is embodied in a unique and irreplaceable manner. The German *Volk*, bearer of western Christian culture, is the modern example of the category. In the flow of history there is not only simply progress (*Fortschritt*) but, within each of the two civilizational complexes, the ancient and the modern, what one may call a succession of "forward strivings" or blossomings (*Fortgang*, *Fortstreben*), all "of equal necessity, equal originality, equal merit, equal happiness."[2]

So Herder seems to have been not only a critic of modern universalistic rationalism, with its one-dimensional faith in never-ending progress, but also an opponent of individualist French culture shaped by Voltaire, the *Encyclopédie*, and the *philosophes*. The Herderian definition of the human being may substantiate this statement.

Contrary to the theoreticians of the Enlightenment, Herder, like Rousseau, speaks of the human being who consciously belongs to and prolongs the existence of his/her cultural community, rather than of the history-free, abstract, logically derived individual—an example of the human species.

Two important implications of Dumont's interpretation of individualism and its national variants (as we have seen, French and German) might be offered. First, Herder came to defend German culture and its natural right of being in the world in the face of the powerful and influential French culture. It was unnecessary to persuade anyone that French culture, even for German intellectuals (from Goethe and Eckermann to Fichte and Hegel), had become the quintessence and even symbol of Europe.

Herder must have perceived economic and political individualism as a specifically French phenomenon, to which he opposed cultural individualism in order to defend the rights of non-French/non-modern cultures and historical epochs, a number of which had been neglected or even despised by the Enlightenment thinkers. Therefore, it is by no means accidental that cultural individualism was constructed in the course of the *Sturm und Drang* movement, that is, in the initial phase of German Romanticism.

Herder's ideas have greatly affected not only theories but also the practice of nationalism. One wonders how a liberal-minded philosopher like Herder succeeded in making such an enormous impact on nineteenth-century racialist and explicitly racist theories, let alone *Blut-und-Boden* nationalism. In all likelihood he owes this "success" to the ambiguity of such concepts as *Volksgeist* and *Volksseele*.

One of Herder's major contributions was his notion of the equality of cultures. It was not only the most humane facet of the upcoming era of nationalism (no wonder that the concept of liberal nationalism makes sense when referred to Herder's legacy), but an important facet of liberalism itself.

Last but not least, Herder's ideas were adopted by Central/East European philosophers of history and culture. They developed Herder's theoretical legacy into an interpretive framework within which modern modes of identity and self-comprehension were articulated.

It was not without reason that Dumont described Herder as the founding father of modern East European thought. The same is true of Herder's impact on Eastern Europe in its search for modes of identity and self-fulfillment.

Lithuanian Philosophy of Culture and the Search for Identity

Vincas Trumpa, an émigré Lithuanian historian who spent much of his life in the United States, once noted that during the inter-war period Lithuania transformed its will-to-power into a will-to-culture, and thus transformed itself from a *Naturvolk* into a *Kulturvolk*.[3]

Trumpa stresses that this might help to explain why and how the philosophy of culture, developed by such Lithuanian philosophers as Stasys

Šalkauskis and Antanas Maceina, flourished in inter-war Lithuania. In fact, the philosophy of culture of the first half of the twentieth century can be considered a specifically Central/East European—in particular a Russian, Romanian, Polish, and Lithuanian—phenomenon, for it sprang from "German subculture," which was related to European culture as a national variant relates to a general cultural model.

However, Trumpa might have added that the principle of culture, and numerous projects for promoting the rise of national culture (and providing it with a theoretical or interpretive framework), was as empirically disconnected from mundane reality in Lithuania as was the nineteenth-century Russian intelligentsia from the common people, or the eighteenth-century German middle-class intelligentsia from the court aristocracy.[4]

At this point, suffice it to mention the Lithuanian intelligentsia who, at the dawn of the emergence of modern Lithuania, described the Polish language and culture precisely in the way the German intelligentsia did with regard to French culture. The similarity of these cases is striking, for the Lithuanian intelligentsia came to regard the Polish-speaking Lithuanian gentry exactly as the German intelligentsia had regarded pro-French German aristocracy.

Vincas Trumpa, then, must have been right—culture (or, in his terms, the "will-to-culture") was the principal driving force behind the politics of inter-war Lithuania. However, while Trumpa must be credited for many interesting insights, he failed to stress that because it was based on religious thinking the concept of culture wielded by inter-war Lithuanian philosophers could not be effectively applied either to modern, secularized—in both religious and ideological terms—society, or to multidimensional reality in general.

Moreover, according to this concept, culture was understood as pure spirituality or as the conscious renunciation of social reality, and, thus, offered no way to process the complex, diverse, and multifaceted nature of human reality.

Experiences of depression and despair usually call for symbolic compensation. For example, the new and allegedly vulnerable nations of Central and Eastern Europe appear to be determined by a kind of inadequacy of self-consciousness and collective identity, and, as a result, tend to look back in time in—though this is not exclusively the case—an obviously messianic manner.

For example, the Third Rome of the Russian Slavophiles or the Athens of the North extolled by Lithuanian neo-Romantics—among them the French poet of Polish-Lithuanian origin, Oscar Miłosz—are both symbolic constructs grounded in a fundamental denial of modern Western civilization and an emphasis on personal heritage. This was evident in the ideological disputes that took place, from the time of Peter the Great, between the anti-Western, antimodern Russian Slavophiles and the Hegelian *Zapadniki* (Westerners), who were sympathetic to Western reforms.

This sort of Central/East European messianism has common roots in a purist, ethnocentric ideology that is inherently wary of modern, in particular Western, conventions. The messianic tendency undoubtedly penetrated Lithuanian consciousness and culture through the works of Adam Mickiewicz—whose poetic vision of Poland as a crucified nation and redeemer of other nations can be considered the climax of messianic thought—and Polish Romanticism in general, not to mention Jules Michelet's revolutionary messianism and Giuseppe Mazzini's vision of *Roma Terza*, which, in turn, grew out of the *Risorgimento*.

The Russian pan-Slavist Nikolai Danilevsky's enormously influential comparative study of civilizations, *Rossia i Evropa* [Russia and Europe] (1869), not only anticipated the morphological conception of culture later elaborated in Leo Frobenius's *Ursprung der Afrikanischen Kulturen und Naturwissenschaftliche Kulturlehre* (1898) and *Paideuma* (1921), and Oswald Spengler's *Der Untergang des Abendlandes* (1918–1922), but also made room for the development of a completely independent Russian culture, which would replace Western civilization after its inevitable collapse.

Instead of using such terms as "culture" and "civilization," Danilevsky proposed a new vocabulary and a new theory of cultural-historical types based on a cyclical theory of history. Unwilling to claim full credit for this new perspective, he acknowledged his debt to Heinrich Rückert's *Lehrbuch der Weltgeschichte in organischer Darstellung* (1857).

From the perspective of Danilevsky's historical analysis and model for the future, the case of modern Lithuania is provocative. Throughout the twentieth century, Lithuania's self-image as the Athens of the North has peacefully coexisted with a moderate messianic construct, casting this small nation as an important bridge between East and West (the former often reduced to Slavic civilization or Russia).

The concept of a synthesis of civilizations—East and West—was elaborated and promoted by the Lithuanian philosopher Stasys Šalkauskis, particularly in *Sur les confins de deux mondes* (1919), a book on Lithuania written in French, in Switzerland. This concept would be repeatedly employed and elaborated in Šalkauskis's book, *Lietuvių tauta ir jos ugdymas* [The Lithuanian People and its Education] (1933). Later it was severely criticized by other Lithuanian philosophers and essayists, including Šalkauskis's disciple Antanas Maceina. Still more negative views of this thesis were expressed by such inter-war Lithuanian nationalists as Vytautas Alantas, in his militant nationalist manifesto, *Žygiuojanti tauta* [The People Marching On] (1940).

An examination of several inter-war Lithuanian philosophical texts reveals just how strongly Lithuanian philosophy was affected by nineteenth- and twentieth-century Russian philosophy. Two key Lithuanian intellectuals—Stasys Šalkauskis and Vincas Mykolaitis-Putinas—wrote their doctoral dissertations at the University of Fribourg in Switzerland (both

written in French), focusing on the prominent Russian religious thinker and social philosopher Vladimir Solovyov.

Šalkauskis studied Solovyov's philosophy of religion, while Putinas analyzed the Russian thinker's aesthetics. Šalkauskis's dissertation was titled *L'âme du monde dans la philosophie de Vl. Soloviev* (1920), Putinas's *L'Esthétique de Vladimir Soloviev* (1923). Šalkauskis and Putinas studied philosophy and wrote their dissertations under the guidance of M. de Munnynck, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Fribourg, whom they both described as their mentor. (Antanas Maceina also studied philosophy at the University of Fribourg, which was widely regarded among young Lithuanian academics as a home away from home.)

During that period, in addition to Solovyov, other Russian thinkers—Nikolai Berdyaev, Fyodor Dostoevsky, Konstantin Leontyev, Vassily Rozanov, the Russian nihilists, among others, influenced many Lithuanian academics and public intellectuals. In addition to other influences of Russian culture on Lithuania, these thinkers' ideas can, in part, be seen as a principal source of Lithuanian messianism.

Roughly speaking, Šalkauskis's vision of Lithuania as a bridge between the civilizations of East and West is nothing but another term for the specifically Russian notion of Eurasia, though this concept is usually reserved exclusively for Russia and its historic mission. A devout reader and follower of Solovyov, Šalkauskis's concept of a synthesis of civilizations is merely a Lithuanian variation on a classic theme in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Russian social philosophy.

Incidentally, "Eurasianism," both as a philosophical tendency and model of cultural/civilizational identity, was quite close to Vasily Sesemann. At the same time, it was a central concept in Lev Karsavin's work and writing—he spent several decades lecturing in Lithuania, and fundamentally influenced the development of Lithuanian philosophy of culture and cultural history. In 1928, Karsavin was offered a professorship at the then newly founded University of Lithuania in Kaunas, where he had arrived from Paris.

An eminent Russian religious thinker and an erudite cultural historian, Karsavin soon became a fluent speaker of Lithuanian and established his reputation as one of the most brilliant lecturers at the University of Lithuania. His five-volume magnum opus, *Europos kultūros istorija* [The Cultural History of Europe] (1931–1937), written in Lithuanian and published in inter-war Lithuania, is a work of European significance and has yet to be surpassed among Lithuanian contributions of the sort. When the Soviet Union repeatedly occupied Lithuania after World War II, Karsavin was exiled to the Komi ASSR, where he died in 1952. A man with several planes of identity, and also of multidimensional spiritual and moral existence, Karsavin converted to Roman Catholicism.

Essentially, the same things can be said about Šalkauskis's disciple and critic, Antanas Maceina—in terms of his commitment to the elaboration and

promotion of the philosophy of culture—who, it appears, was deeply influenced by Nikolai Berdyaev's apocalyptic philosophy of history. It suffices to recall how Berdyaev, in *Smysl istorii* [The Meaning of History] (1923), defines the genesis of the philosophy of history as a painful reflection upon history, rather than in terms of how *Geschichtsphilosophie*, as a philosophical discipline, comes *sui generis* into existence.

> The historic catastrophes and turning points that lead to the crucial moments of world history have always contributed to the development of the philosophy of history, of efforts to reflect upon historical process, the creation of the philosophy of history, regardless of its logic or what direction it might have taken. . . . The first substantial philosophy of history created in the Christian era—that of the Blessed Augustine,[5] which fundamentally influenced the further development of the philosophy of history, coincided with one of the most catastrophic moments in world history—the decline of the Ancient world and the fall of Rome. Another original philosophy of history (it was created in the pre-Christian era, with the first philosophy of history to enlighten humanity) was the Prophet Daniel's Book, which deals solely with the catastrophic events characteristic of the fate of the Jews. After the Great French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars, human thought once again turned to the philosophy of history and its constructions, and attempted to grasp and reflect upon the process of history. In Joseph de Maistre's and Bonald's visions of the world, the philosophy of history is accorded an important role. I do not believe that anyone could radically oppose the statement that not only Russia, but also all of Europe and perhaps the entire world have recently entered a catastrophic period in their development. We live in a time of grand historical collapse. A new epoch of history has certainly begun.[6]

The catastrophic concept of history elaborated in Russian philosophy was eventually adopted by various thinkers representing the speculative approach to the philosophy of history in the first half of the twentieth century. Popular throughout Central and Eastern Europe, it did not bypass Lithuania. In *Asmuo ir istorija* [The Individual and History] (1981), Maceina virtually repeats Berdyaev's principal thesis, agreeing with him that the philosophy of history is a product of historical crises and breakdowns:

> During such historical crises or turning points the philosophy of history emerges as a form of cognitive historical consciousness: the Prophet Daniel in Israel, St. Augustine in Antiquity, Joachim de Fiore in the Middle Ages, Giambattista Vico and Joseph de Maistre in the modern era, Oswald Spengler and Nikolai Berdyaev in our times—all of them theorized in times of historical catastrophe, and all of their theories are

> related to the painful and frightening shifts of history. The philosophy of history is a product of neither wonder nor doubt, but of suffering—both personal and national.[7]

An apocalyptic understanding of history thus led Maceina and other Lithuanian philosophers who followed him, or who continue to follow him in this respect, to conclude that learning—including the acquisition of historical knowledge—occurs through suffering. Philosophies of history and culture are, therefore, inevitably employed as the only appropriate framework within which the genesis and historic mission of a people can be traced.

The people (interpreted in historical and cultural terms) and the nation (understood as a sociocultural phenomenon, though with obvious political implications) accede to a meta-discursive level, and, in that context, the proliferation of the humanities and/or social sciences is explicated. Unlike inter-war Romanian literary and academic intellectuals, who succeeded in promoting not only the humanities but also the social sciences, their Lithuanian counterparts remained locked within philosophies of history and culture as the only relevant way of dealing with the question of where *We* came from.

It was Vytautas Kavolis, a great Lithuanian émigré scholar, who urged his colleagues in Lithuania to make an analytic comparison of Maceina's ideas with those of Romania's "1927 Generation." First of all, the thinking of the 1927 Generation—including Nae Ionescu, Emil Cioran, Mircea Vulcănescu, Constantin Noica, Mircea Eliade, and Eugène Ionesco—can be seen as a model of Central/East European intellectual movements in general.

They provided numerous explanations for the origins of the Romanian nation. They wrote and spoke in the context of never-ending intellectual debates about how to contextualize the nation historically and culturally. While attempting, desperately, to choose between East and West, Romanian intellectuals developed Western, Oriental (i.e., Greek Orthodox theological traditions), Roman, and Dacian, or indigenous, versions and interpretations of the origins of their nation. The 1927 Generation's members conceived of their theories, doctrines, myths, and even their poetry, in terms of the ideological tension between East and West.

Thus, it is possible to identify streams of consciousness that are paradigmatic of Central/East European nationalist movements—structural isomorphisms or, in Raymond Williams' terms, the structures of sentiments inherent in Central/East European consciousness.[8]

As for the young Maceina, he was simultaneously leaning, in the late 1930s, toward Bolshevism and National Socialism, both perceived by him as a perfect alternative to much hated liberalism, capitalism, and the bourgeoisie. In some of his works in social philosophy—such as *Socialinis teisingumas* [Social Justice] (1938), *Buržuazijos žlugimas* [The Downfall of the Bourgeoisie] (1940), and *Prometėjizmo problema* [The Prometheanism

Problem] (1938)—Maceina went so far as to describe the bourgeoisie in terms of an everlasting metaphysical principle. (To Maceina's credit, we have to note that he would later admit his fallacies and reject these somber prophecies.)

The 1927 Generation, for their part, expressed many ideas concerning how to oppose the supposedly deteriorating, liberal-democratic, and cosmopolitan West by focusing on blood-and-soil community building, i.e., *Blut-und-Boden* nationalism, ethnocracy, politically charged religion, and xenophobic sentiment. Last but not least, the 1927 Generation unequivocally supported the Iron Guard, one of the most controversial and problematic movements in Romanian political history. In this respect, the 1927 Generation can be legitimately compared with its counterpart in France, the *Action Française* movement headed by the Generation's French alter egos, Léon Daudet and Charles Maurras, and profoundly influenced by Maurice Barrès.

Notwithstanding obvious structural isomorphisms and almost identical structures of sentiments, inter-war Lithuania's nationalist movement differed in various ways from its counterparts in Romania, Poland, and other Central/East European countries.

Although, as a meta-discourse, the nation in Lithuania emerged from the system of dominant ideas and values, intellectual strategies, moral stances, keywords, and even frameworks for self-interpretation, the development of the humanities and social sciences in Lithuania at that time hardly compares with that in, say, Romania. Recall the debate between two influential inter-war Romanian scholars—Lucian Blaga, the philosopher of culture, and Henri Stahl, one of the founders of Romanian sociology.[9]

Another important difference that needs to be admitted here is that rather schematic and introductory works in philosophy of culture, such as Šalkauskis's *Kultūros filosofijos metmens* [An Outline of the Philosophy of Culture] (1926) or Maceina's *Kultūros filosofijos įvadas* [Introduction to the Philosophy of Culture] (1936), may never have reached the heights of Lucian Blaga's or Constantin Noica's elegant, poetic, and metaphoric essays in philosophy of culture.

In short, for a long time the philosophy of culture was the only theoretical framework for the interpretation of the self, the historical essence of the nation, the nation's past, present, and future, and the nation's cultural achievements.

It is not surprising that, in addition to the philosophers who developed the Lithuanian version of the philosophy of culture—Stasys Šalkauskis, Antanas Maceina, Juozas Girnius, Vasily Sesemann, Bronius Stočkus—a number of Lithuanian writers, journalists, critics, and lay intellectuals also contributed to the philosophy of culture by raising problems and questions related to the vision/project of Lithuanian national culture.[10]

Oswald Spengler's *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, enormously popular among Lithuanian intellectuals of that time, served as a great theoretical challenge and as a reminder of what kind of issues should be raised to keep Lithuania aware of the most symptomatic tendencies of Western civilization.

An ambitious thinker who deserves honorable mention for the breadth and clarity of his thought is Izaokas Donskis. Having studied philosophy at the Universities of St. Petersburg and Berlin, Donskis earned his doctorate from the University of Berlin for his dissertation, *Der Individualbegriff und der Allgemeinbegriff* (1923).

From 1931 to 1933, he studied international law at the University of London. Upon returning to Lithuania, Donskis wrote numerous contributions to scholarly journals, focusing on the ontology of space and time, Henri Bergson's moral and religious philosophy, and also on the problem of the soul. As an essayist, he wrote in Lithuanian, English, and Yiddish. Although Donskis seems to have been undeservedly neglected for a long time by Lithuanian historians of philosophy, he was nevertheless included in the Lithuanian Encyclopedia published by Lithuanian émigrés in Boston, USA.

Various explanations might be offered for why, during this inter-war period in Central/Eastern Europe, essentialist philosophies of history and culture so clearly prevailed over nominalistically oriented social science. First of all, neither Anglo-American nor French social and political philosophy had any significant influence in inter-war Lithuania.

The weakness, if not the absence, of the social sciences in Lithuania might explain why and how, in inter-war Lithuania, entire epistemological and discursive dimensions failed to emerge—why an appropriate interpretative vocabulary for understanding society and culture failed to develop, and how, as a result, modernity and liberal democracy were fundamentally misinterpreted.[11]

It was therefore not only the widespread influence of ideological discourse, but also the absence of an appropriate conceptual and explanatory framework that led to widespread misinterpretations and misconceptions of social reality.

This is not to say, however, that theoretical fallacies may have resulted from the incongruity between, on the one hand, social reality and the ineffective tools for social analysis, and, on the other, the lack of an appropriate analytical language. Lithuanian academics of that period enthused about Oswald Spengler, Leo Frobenius, Ludwig Klages, Eduard Spranger, Anton Hilckman, and Martin Heidegger, as well as, needless to say, the most prominent representatives of *Lebensphilosophie*, *Geschichtsphilosophie*, and *Kulturphilosophie*.

Unfortunately, however, none were very concerned with the thought of John Stuart Mill, let alone of Émile Durkheim or Max Weber. As a result, the conservative nationalism—inclusive of what might be termed philosophic nationalism—that characterized inter-war Lithuanian intellectual culture

sprang from peripheral models of consciousness deeply rooted in Central/East European linguistic and cultural politics and from what might be called the fear of modernity.[12]

The picture of inter-war Lithuanian philosophy would be missing an important aspect, if we passed over the role and place of religious philosophy in the works of Šalkauskis, Maceina, or Girnius. In addition to Solovyov's religious philosophy, Šalkauskis was deeply influenced by modern French Catholic philosophers, such as Étienne Gilson and Jacques Maritain, both sophisticated religious thinkers and renowned interpreters of Thomas Aquinas.

Interestingly enough, Šalkauskis's and Maceina's trinitarian theories of history and culture, based on the crucial concepts of nature, culture, and religion (all conceived of as the phases and realms of being), sprang from Gilson and Maritain.

Girnius, who attended Heidegger's seminar at the University of Freiburg, Germany, and who was particularly interested in existentialism (he defended his doctoral dissertation, *La metaphysique existentielle de K. Jaspers*, at the University of Montreal, Canada, in 1951), contributed to the theme of religion by writing on what he termed the human being without God.

Maceina, whose early thinking was preoccupied with subjects and topics borrowed from Russian and French personalist philosophy—basically, from Nikolai Berdyaev and Emmanuel Mounier—later turned to German existentialism and hermeneutics, focusing on such major figures of twentieth-century philosophy as Martin Heidegger, Karl Jaspers, and Hans Georg Gadamer.

After World War II, Maceina fled to Germany where he established himself as the specialist in Marxism and Russian philosophy, yet remaining a religious philosopher by vocation. He lectured at the University of Freiburg, and was later promoted to Professor of Philosophy at the University of Münster.

A profound religious thinker and a gifted poet, Maceina's works written after World War II, such as *Religijos filosofija* [Philosophy of Religion] (1976), *Dievas ir laisvė* [God and Freedom] (1985), *Filosofijos kilmė ir prasmė* [The Origin and Meaning of Philosophy] (1978), or his great trilogy *Cor Inquietum*—Maceina's magnum opus consisting of *Didysis Inkvizitorius* [The Grand Inquisitor] (1946), *Niekšybės paslaptis* [The Mystery of Turpitude] (1964), and *Jobo drama* [Job's Drama] (1950)—are classics of Lithuanian philosophy.

Maceina's works written in German include *Der Grossinquisitor* (1952), *Das Geheimnis der Bosheit* (1955), *Das Volkslied als Ausdruck der Volksseele: Geist und Charakter der litauischen Dainos* (*Commentationes Balticae* II, 3, 1955), "Der Menschgott Dostojewskijs als Gestalt des östlichen Atheismus" (*Stimmen der Zeit*, 1955), and "A. Mickiewicz als Dichter des Prometheismus" (*Zeitschrift für Ostforschung*, 1956).

Interestingly enough, Maceina's *Das Volkslied als Ausdruck der Volksseele* could be regarded not only as a philosophical interpretation of Lithuanian folksongs and traditional culture, but also as a tribute to Herder, the discoverer of Lithuanian folksongs as an expression of the spirit of the people, and the founding father of Lithuanian and East European *Kulturphilosophie*.

A gradual reorientation of Lithuanian philosophy from Russian to West European philosophical issues and patterns of thought can be instructive when studying the dynamics of inter-war Lithuanian intellectual culture. Being an inescapable part of the search for a new pattern of identity and culture, so characteristic of the newly emerged nations, inter-war Lithuanian philosophy could best be described as an interpretive framework for self-definition and self-comprehension.

If it makes sense at all to speak about such a thing as Lithuanian philosophy, this term can only be justified by referring to modern philosophy as a conscious part of the national project and as a crucial aspect of the search for identity. This is more than true of inter-war Lithuanian philosophy of culture.

Small wonder, then, that Lithuanian philosophy was tinged with ideological dramas and political clashes of that time. At the same time, it was not devoid of some naïve expectations and illusions regarding the ability of philosophy to provide the guidelines for the future national project or the framework for the development of national culture.

This is precisely what we could call the philosophic nationalism of Central and Eastern Europe—if not ideology masquerading as philosophy, then at least a pattern of consciousness that allows room for ideological and political exploitation of culture. Yet Lithuanian philosophy, being nearly a perfect litmus test of inter-war Europe's frame of mind and constant balancing on the boundary of two worlds, succeeded in responding to all major influences and challenges of the time.

Vasily Sesemann

Vasily Sesemann (1884–1963), the most eminent academic philosopher in inter- and post-war Lithuania, merits the title of a Baltic philosopher more than anybody else. The son of the Finnish-Swedish father and Russian-German mother, Sesemann had several planes of identity and was at home in Finnish-Swedish, Russian, German, and Lithuanian linguistic and cultural milieus.

A Finnish and Lithuanian philosopher (Vosylius Sezemanas in Lithuania) who had strong ties with Russian and German intellectual cultures, Sesemann may well be described as a symbolic bridge between Finland and Lithuania, and also as a European thinker in at once the most exclusive and inclusive sense of these words.

Together with his colleague Lev Karsavin, and also with such figures as Swiss-born scholars Erich Senn and Joseph Ehret, all professors at Vytautas Magnus University before the Second World War, Sesemann made a strong intellectual presence in Lithuania internationalizing the academic life of a small country. Influenced by the Marburg School of neo-Kantian philosophy and phenomenology, Sesemann also stood quite close to Russian Formalism, and was ahead of his time in more than one way.

For instance, combining and reconciling Western and Eastern European educational systems and modes of discourse, he anticipated extraordinary changes in philosophy, *Kulturwissenschaften*, and theoretical humanities. Suffice it to recall Eero Tarasti's hypothesis that Sesemann may have stood behind the emergence of modern semiotics, and that he may have provided a methodological and interpretive framework for it.[13]

Born in Finland and brought up in a multicultural background in Russia, Sesemann studied philosophy at the University of St. Petersburg, Russia, and then at the University of Marburg, Germany. In Germany, he discovered the Marburg and Freiburg schools of the neo-Kantians. Nicolai Hartmann, who would become one of the towering figures in modern German philosophy, was Sesemann's classmate in St. Petersburg classical gymnasium. Having spent their young days in Russia, they developed a life-long friendship.

Influenced by Nikolai Lossky's intuitivist philosophy, the neo-Kantians' ideas, Hartmann's ontology and philosophical anthropology, and also by phenomenological philosophy, Sesemann wrote, in German and Russian, numerous articles on philosophical idealism, classical and modern epistemology, logic, and aesthetics.

In 1923, Sesemann was offered a professorship at the University of Lithuania. Sesemann moved to Lithuania and remained a towering figure for decades—in logic, aesthetics, and the history of philosophy. Exiled to Siberia after World War II, he returned to Lithuania after several years and taught philosophy in Vilnius.

A thinker of European stature and a brilliant lecturer, his impact on the younger generation of Lithuanian academics and intellectuals was immense. Sesemann's works in the philosophy of culture, value theory, and aesthetics remain landmarks in modern Lithuanian philosophy. This is especially true of Sesemann's *magnum opus*, *Estetika* [Aesthetics] (1970), a valuable collection of his lectures in aesthetics. Like Karsavin, who may well be regarded as a preeminent Russian and Lithuanian philosopher, Sesemann came to bridge modern German, Russian, and Lithuanian philosophies. In a boundary region known as Eastern Europe, Sesemann, perhaps, comes as the best embodiment of European ideals of cross- and multi-cultural identity (in the philosophical sense, instead of countless worn-out speculations or politically correct and, in effect, empty ideological phrasing that have already devastated the European identity and culture discourse), and also as the living proof that Šalkauskis's

idea of being on the boundary of two worlds as an existential challenge and as a trajectory of East European consciousness was not a sheer fantasy.

What happened to Lithuanian philosophy after the Soviet occupation and annexation of Lithuania in 1940 can only be described in terms of its intellectual captivity and isolation from Europe. In fact, after World War II, ideological Marxism left no room for the development of independent and critical thought. The domination of brutally enforced Marxism-Leninism, a travesty of theoretical and practical philosophy alike, isolated Lithuanian humanities and social sciences from Western theoretical thought. Yet Sesemann proved capable of thinking and writing in such a way as if forced Marxism-Leninism was just an ordinary theory among many other philosophical theories.

Having returned from exile, Sesemann was allowed to lecture at the University of Vilnius, which was nothing short of a miracle, given his background, style, competence, and overall intellectual orientation. Yet his superb lectures, along with his immense personality, long remained a lonely island in the ocean of militant and doctrinaire Marxism.

Aesthetics is a work of great learning, splendid erudition, and theoretical breadth. Here we see Sesemann at his best, making subtle points concerning classical and modern art, penetrating the formal structure of a work of art, and also potently opposing the exaggerated and vulgar sociologism of Soviet Marxism-Leninism through a perceptive interpretation of the formal aspects of art. Subscribing to the aforementioned Eero Tarasti's point of view that Sesemann may have preceded modern semiotics, we could also assume quite safely that Sesemann, along with Russian Formalists, anticipated quite a few aspects of what we know as the morphology of art and of the structuralist analysis of culture.

We are happy to be able to give a second life to a great work of modern philosophy by a major, albeit little known, thinker of the Baltics. Hopefully, this volume will be the beginning of Vasily Sesemann's symbolic return to the undivided Europe, for the thinkers of his stature can never be confined to one country or culture.

Leonidas Donskis

Notes

1. See Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process*, trans. E. Jephcott (Oxford & Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 3–28.
2. Louis Dumont, *Essays on Individualism: Modern Ideology in Anthropological Perspective* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1986), p. 116.
3. See Vincas Trumpa, "Kultūros filosofijos suklestėjimas Lietuvoje" [The Flourishing of the Philosophy of Culture in Lithuania], *Metmenys* [Patterns], 51 (1986), pp. 165–166.
4. For more on this issue, see Isaiah Berlin, *Russian Thinkers* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1979), pp. 114–135; Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process*, *op. cit.*, pp. 1–24.
5. The point here is that St. Augustine is treated by the Greek Orthodox Church as merely Blessed.
6. Nikolai Berdyaev, *Smysl istorii* [The Meaning of History] (Moscow: Mysl', 1990), p. 4.
7. Antanas Maceina, *Asmuo ir istorija* [The Individual and History] (Chicago, IL: Ateitis, 1981), p. 4.
8. For more on this issue, see Vytautas Kavolis, "Centrai ir apytakos kultūros dirbtuvėse" [Centers and Exchanges in the Workshops of Culture], *Metmenys*, 68 (1995), pp. 36–37; Katherine Verdery, "The Production and Defense of 'the Romanian Nation,' 1900 to World War II," in Richard G. Fox, ed., *Nationalist Ideologies and the Production of National Cultures* (Washington, D.C.: American Ethnological Society Monograph Series, No. 2, 1990), pp. 81–111; Vladimir Tismaneanu and Dan Pavel, "Romania's Mystical Revolutionaries: The Generation of Angst and Adventure Revisited," *East European Politics and Societies*, Vol. 8, No. 3 (1994), pp. 402–438.
9. See Verdery, "The Production and Defense," *op. cit.*, pp. 103–104.
10. For more on this issue, see Arūnas Sverdiolas, *Kultūros filosofija Lietuvoje* [The Philosophy of Culture in Lithuania] (Vilnius: Mintis, 1983), pp. 148–189.
11. In inter-war Lithuania, not a single serious sociology monograph or even textbook was published, with the relative exception of vaguely sociological theses in the writings of Mykolas Römeris, a professor of law at Vytautas Magnus University, and an amateurish introduction to a sociology text written by Petras Leonas, a professor of law at the same university.
12. For more on the time-honored Romanian "flight from modernity" and the Central/East European tradition of self-centeredness and lack of concern with political and moral dilemmas, traumas, and even dreams— what Milan Kundera once called "the tragedy of Central Europe,"—see Tismaneanu and Pavel, "Romania's Mystical Revolutionaries," *op. cit.*, p. 409. For more on this issue, see Milan Kundera, "The Tragedy of Central Europe," *The New York Review of Books*, Vol. XXXI, No. 7 (April 26, 1984), pp. 33–38.
13. For more on Sesemann's relations with Russian Formalists, see Thorsten Botz-Bornstein, *Vasily Sesemann: Experience, Formalism, and the Question of Being* (Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi, 2006). On Sesemann's role in laying the foundations for semiotics, see Eero Tarasti's Preface to Botz-Bornstein's book.

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Leonidas Donskis
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Forlì, Italy

PART I

INTRODUCTION

1. Aesthetics: Definition and Object

Aesthetics is that branch of philosophy that analyzes the peculiarity of aesthetic phenomena and elucidates their essence and meaning. Of course, this definition is merely formal and provisional. It indicates that aesthetics is an independent discipline having its own object. And that object is anything to which aesthetic value is ascribed.

The sphere of aesthetics is occupied first of all by works of art, since the artistic quality of man-made objects is nothing other than their aesthetic value. But aesthetic value may also be possessed by various phenomena of nature: a landscape, a sunset, a person's appearance, animal forms, the coloration of butterflies and flowers. That through which the aesthetic value of objects (whether they be works of art or natural phenomena) expresses itself we usually call their *beauty*. It is for this reason that aesthetics may also be defined as the theory of beauty. In this case, the word *beauty* is to be taken in its widest meaning, which coincides with that of *aesthetic value* (aestheticality) and has to be distinguished from a narrower sense of that term denoting only a certain kind of aesthetic value. For example, a caricature may be artistic in character and yet distort a human being's appearance by emphasizing precisely that in it which is unbeautiful. In like manner the aesthetic value of a picture is not lessened by the fact that it may depict someone lacking in beauty or positively ugly. What beauty in the narrower sense (beautifulness) really means and how it relates to aesthetic value is something that will become clearer later. In general, we will, in this course, use the term *beauty* as a synonym for aesthetic value. Thus we can say that the independence of aesthetics is based on the fact that beauty (in the widest sense) is a peculiar value essentially distinct from all the other values—economic, ethical (related to goodness), and theoretical (related to truth)—that condition a human being's cultural life and activity.

The peculiarity of beauty is something that an analysis of aesthetic phenomena should elucidate. One of its essential attributes is shown by the term "aesthetics" itself; it hails from the Greek language and signifies (1) that which belongs to the sphere of sensible objects and (2) the science which studies this sphere. The term "aesthetics" in the sense of theory of beauty was introduced to philosophy in 1754 by Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten,[1] a follower of the rationalistic school of Christian Wolff. In this way, Baumgarten wanted to emphasize that beauty manifested itself only within the confines of the sensible world and thereby distinguished itself from truth and rightfulness (moral goodness).

From these considerations, it follows that the object of aesthetics is essentially valuable, that it is something having a certain value (beauty). In other words, the act of consciousness that perceives an object at the same time evaluates it and recognizes its aesthetic value. However, aesthetics itself, like ethics and logic, is a purely theoretical science; it does not evaluate its object, but only analyzes and elucidates those conditions on which the object's value depends. And just like ethics and logic it is a philosophical discipline because it does not limit itself to the description and study of one or another field of aesthetic phenomena but aims to disclose the essence of beauty, to reveal the foundation that makes beauty what it is.

2. Difficulties for Aesthetics

Since the object of aesthetics is a valuable thing, accessible only to a special act of perception and valuation, there arise a number of difficulties that must be cleared up if we wish to provide aesthetics with a firm scientific foundation.

A. The Criterion of Beauty

If beauty is a certain value ascribed to works of art or phenomena of natural and human life, then it depends not only on the nature of the object itself, but also on the subject who perceiving the object apprehends and appreciates its beauty. But the evaluating subject is an inconstant, changeable factor; it is in all cases an individual human being belonging to a specific historical epoch and culture. His criterion of valuation is determined first of all by the characteristics of that epoch or culture, its social system, its worldview, its customs, and its practical needs and aspirations. When culture changes, so do its criteria of valuation (its standards), and so does its attitude towards morals, the law, and beauty. What one epoch evaluates positively, another does not recognize at all, replacing it with a new and perhaps contrary value. In a word, the history of humankind testifies to the fact that all moral, legal, and artistic criteria are relative and have validity for only one or another historical period, one or another cultural sphere.

However, compared to beauty, moral and legal values appear much more steady and firm because they are closely connected to the needs and interests of society and the individual. Consequently within certain limits they have unquestioned objective validity. Aesthetic values, by contrast, lack such a direct tie to the needs and interests of existence. Artistic creativity seems to be restricted by nothing, it is not subject to norms, and the creator's imagination and inventiveness enjoy unlimited freedom. Therefore the relativity of aesthetic criteria is, so to say, twofold: they depend not only on the worldview of a specific epoch or culture, but also on the evaluating

subject's individuality. *De gustibus non est disputandum*, because aesthetic taste is allegedly a purely subjective matter.

But if so, if not only every cultural period, but also every individual has an aesthetic criterion peculiar to it, him, or her, then to look for a common constitutive element of beauty would be in vain and a science of aesthetics would be impossible. That is a frequently expressed attitude toward aesthetics, especially among those scientists and philosophers who think that every theory pretending to a scientific status must follow in the footsteps of the natural sciences and avail itself of their methods. If these methods cannot be applied to aesthetics, then it will have to be admitted that aesthetics lacks an objective foundation and that it will never succeed in becoming a science in the strict sense of that term. Such an attitude toward aesthetics is seemingly confirmed by its history: one theory of beauty contradicts another, and until now, no conception of it has emerged that would be equally acceptable to all.

On the other hand, artists, too, often regard aesthetics with skepticism. Living art, they say, is foreign to it, and aesthetics is unconcerned with what importantly matters to an artist. It is a theory that either does not contribute anything to artistic practice, or else stipulates norms of beauty of a sort that do not help artistic creativity at all but rather constrict its freedom. To aesthetics especially these words of Mephistopheles apply: "Grau, teurer Freund, is alle Theorie, und grün des Lebens goldner Baum" (All theory, dear friend, is gray, but the golden tree of life springs ever green).

Are these objections to aesthetics justified? Let us examine this question. A scientific aesthetics is impossible, or so it is said, because beauty is a subjective thing. But what does this subjectivity amount to? That beauty reveals itself only to a subject who perceives and appreciates it does not straightaway imply that the act of appreciation depends just on the subject's individual predilections, on his mood and opinion. That which depends on subjective conditions can also be objective, if those conditions lie in the subject's general nature or in his essential relations with the object. In this sense, all of the valuable things of culture are objective, even though they are impossible without the subject who creates and perceives them; they can thus become objects of scientific knowledge.

Of course, the value sciences essentially differ from those that study pure being unrelated to valuation, and this difference depends on the extraordinary nature of their object. For this reason, the methods of the value sciences cannot coincide with those of the natural sciences, as it is not the method that determines the object but rather it is the object that determines the method. To demand that ethics and aesthetics follow the methods of the natural sciences is to investigate aesthetical and ethical phenomena from a standpoint that does not allow the development and grasp of precisely those qualities that are characteristic of these phenomena. In general, it is not possible to judge the value sciences according to the standards of the natural sciences,

and the question of whether aesthetics is a genuine science having an objective foundation cannot be settled by reference to the dependence of beauty on the subject and to the historical relativity of aesthetic criteria.

That the history of art and its development is not conditioned by merely accidental external circumstances and by an unfettered play of the artistic imagination is shown by the existence of an undeniable phenomenon known as *style*. Every epoch has its special style and so does every artist, and every style turns out to be a certain organic unity, which, even if it changes in various ways, can be approximately defined. With regard to the difficulties of method faced by aesthetics, it is in no worse shape than ethics, for instance. Similar difficulties are met with by other sciences, even the natural sciences. Whenever they come upon a new essential quality of the object, it is necessary appropriately to change or to improve the very method of inquiry. All in all, upon a critical examination of those objections that are leveled against aesthetics as a science it appears that there are no circumstances which would make a scientific aesthetics impossible.

B. Aesthetics and Living Art

The considerations that incline artists to regard aesthetics negatively are somewhat different. In part that negative attitude is caused by a misunderstanding for which the aesthetic theorists are primarily responsible themselves insofar as they often impart to the theory of beauty a *normative* character. But aesthetics, as we already remarked, is by its nature a theoretical science which by no means should and could fix the norms or rules that artistic creativity ought to go by. It should only elucidate the general and essential conditions of beauty and cannot foresee all of those specific ways and means by which aesthetic values may be realized.

Of course, the critical evaluation of works of art—to the extent to which it aspires to an objective significance—has to, and in reality does, base itself (consciously or not) on the principles that aesthetics supplies. But that is far from being sufficient for the justification of aesthetic criticism; the latter will be appropriate and fruitful only if it takes cognizance of the artist's creative intentions and the means he uses to realize them, i.e., his artistic style and its unique embodiment in every individual case. This in fact has been the road taken by those artists who having an interest in art theory endeavored to bring to their consciousness the hidden elements of their own creativity and did not apply to aesthetics preconceived philosophical views (e. g., Leonardo da Vinci, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Friedrich von Schiller, and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe).

Nevertheless, it must be admitted that until the most recent times philosophical aesthetics was not intimately and vitally connected with the arts and with aesthetic experience in general. And this deficiency is evidently not accidental but is due to the very nature of the aesthetical object. This can be

explained by comparing how theoretical reflection relates to the primary data of natural or moral knowledge, on the one hand, and to aesthetic perception, on the other.

C. The Peculiarity of Aesthetic Experience

The primary act of natural knowledge is the sense-perception, or intuition, of the object. The next cognitive step is analysis, which determines and registers the content and constitution of the perceived impression. To the extent that this analysis is conscious and governed by the cognitive intention, it is related to reflection (abstract thinking) in the sense that it allows to bring to consciousness and to fix, with respect to the perception, its elements, parts, and the mutual relations between the elements and the parts. Since analysis unfolds and reveals only that which in an unanalyzed form (potentially) exists in the primary perception, the reflection accompanying the analysis is neither alien nor contrary to that perception, but emerges from it in a wholly natural way. In other words, proceeding, in the natural (external world) sciences, from the primary impression to the reflection that analyzes it, the attitude of consciousness does not essentially change and the process of cognition remains on the same level.

We find the same situation in the sphere of morals as well. Even though ethical behavior is based on an act not of reason, but of the will, and the initial motives for ethical behavior are of an emotional sort (the aspiration to implement a certain value), it is still the case that resolving to act this way rather than the other, assenting to the one rather than the other motive, inevitably (should the situation get complicated) leads to thinking about and choosing motives, i.e., falls back on an act of reflection. Reflection in this case becomes an essential moment of moral conduct; and the more conscientious the person is, the more conscious is his conduct, i.e., the more significant does reflection become for him. Therefore, in the ethical sphere too reflection can occur within the limits of the same conscious attitude on which ethical comportment is based.

Aesthetic perception is related to reflection in an entirely different manner. The most characteristic feature of aesthetic perception is doubtless the fact that an active role here belongs apparently not to the subject, but to the object: the aesthetic impression, the beauty attracts us, fascinates us, and forces us to give it our full attention so that we might get a really good look at it. And the deeper this felt impression is, the more powerfully we fall under the object's sway—even to the point of forgetting ourselves and all of our surroundings. It is only with a great effort of the will that we manage to break loose from the spells of beauty and regain that freedom of consciousness without which no reflection is possible.

Consequently, aesthetic perception (intuition) is essentially opposed to reflection, and only when we have left the confines of the former, only when

we have changed our mental attitude, can we become aware of its foundation, i.e., raise the question of what are the features of the perception of beauty on which its aesthetic significance and value depend. As soon as we begin to reflect (think, deliberate), we feel that we can no longer fully give ourselves to delighting in the beauty we perceive and that we are looking at the painting or sculpture, or hearing the poem or musical piece, in a different way. Thus it becomes clear that the aesthetic impression is marked by an exceptional *immediacy*, and that it is this immediacy which is opposed to reflection, which by its very essence is a mediate, indirect act of the mind and which therefore, in contributing to the initial aesthetic perception, essentially changes its nature or even cancels and annihilates it. In this way a pure, i.e., immediate aesthetic impression is *not rational*. Now it is comprehensible why aesthetics meets up with difficulties that are foreign to natural philosophy, logic, and even ethics. As a theoretical science it cannot do without reflection, cannot remain within that framework of mind in which the immediacy of aesthetic perception thrives; its task is not to experience beauty from within, but to observe it from the side. On the other hand, while engaging in reflection aesthetics has to maintain a live and direct contact with that special experience of beauty, for otherwise it will lose sight of the object it investigates.

This passage from the direct apprehension of beauty to its aesthetic reflection and the attendant change in mental attitude may be compared with translating from one language to another. This, as every experienced translator knows, is no easy job; and its difficulty is proportional to the difference in the languages' internal structure and morphology. A good translator must first of all have an excellent command of both languages, the one from which and the one into which he is translating; i.e., he must not only know very well their lexicons but also have a feeling for their spirit and style. It is only then that he will be able to put the text being translated into a garb that best suits the original and that is attuned to the nature of the language being translated into.

A similar task is faced by the scholar who undertakes to analyze the essential characteristics of aesthetic perception and its object. He has to translate, so to speak, the expressive language of immediate aesthetic perception into the logical language of abstract concepts, i.e., to delineate and to define in concepts whatever it is that beauty reveals to us in the direct experience of it. And just like the translator he has to know equally well both languages; in other words, he must combine within himself both sensitivity to beauty and a capacity for theoretical insight and for clarity of reflection. Such a combination of two distinct, not to say contrary, talents occurs rather rarely; usually one of them, being more pronounced, eclipses the other, and this circumstance encumbers the discussion of aesthetic problems and hinders progress in the discipline.[2] A philosopher who is used to soaring in the spheres of abstract thought always tends to explain aesthetic phenomena in

terms of schemes and concepts belonging to purely theoretical thinking and thereby risks missing the distinctive qualities of beauty. Whereas the artist, not having experienced the dangers and temptations of philosophical reflection, too easily submits to a purely subjective interpretation or contents himself with those superficial attributes of the aesthetic impression (object) that first strike the observer's eye.

But all of these difficulties, even if very substantial, are not insuperable. What is needed is a close co-operation among philosophers, artists, and art historians. It is the latter in particular who can contribute much to aesthetics. On the one hand, they dispose of all the concrete material about which philosophers generally possess only fragmentary knowledge; on the other, being used to methodical inquiry, art historians find it easier than the artists themselves to call attention to whatever constitutes the basic peculiarity of works of art and to judge objectively about the aesthetic achievements of every style.

3. Immediate Aesthetic Perception—the Material Basis of Aesthetics

From what has been said so far it begins to emerge that the essence of beauty can be adequately elucidated only by that theory which is grounded on *direct aesthetic perception*, i.e., which takes the materials that it analyzes from a genuine aesthetic experience. But this experience is special; it is identical neither with the experience on which the sciences of nature are grounded nor with ethical experience, since beauty is accessible only to an extraordinary frame of mind. When the mind is oriented in a different way, aesthetic values escape our reach and the perception (experience) of beauty becomes impossible. When that happens, aesthetic reflection, too, loses living contact with its object. Having broken loose from its empirical moorings, it risks getting lost in unwarranted structures and confusing beauty with other values (for instance, goodness, truth, and so on). The historical development of aesthetics throws up many such theories that err precisely because they ignore the distinctive features of aesthetic experience. But even when aesthetics emerges from a living experience of beauty, it can succumb to a certain one-sidedness by orientating itself to just one or another branch of art (say, poetry, or the visual arts), or by giving preference to the beauty of nature, and so on. In other words, it is very important that the range of experience on which aesthetics is based be rather broad and embrace the most various manifestations of beauty.

And if the empirical foundation of aesthetics is firm, then not only does theoretical reflection not impede and hurt the perception of beauty but it can also deepen and correct it and also help us to develop aesthetic taste. For the perception of beauty is not an immobile, as it were rigid, state of consciousness, but a living process, in which the subject not only by one glance takes in the object as a whole, but, guided by the work's dominants,

also ascertains the organic structure of its composition and, proceeding from one part to the other, comprehends the well-tempered interaction of all its components and layers.

In this way aesthetic perception is both an *analytic* and a *synthetic* act; but usually the separate steps of analysis and synthesis are not consciously apprehended by us as long as we are engrossed by the suggestive impression (effect upon us) of beauty. It is this essential feature of aesthetic perception that theoretical reflection must make use of: it has to throw light on what it is that beauty (the artistic composition) reveals as it discloses itself to the perceiving subject's eyes. Of course, in analyzing the object into its separate components, layers, and parts, reflection, at that moment, breaks beauty's spell. But its careful analytical work has not been in vain; it fructifies every further perceptual act, giving reflection a greater clarity and deepening its content.

Finally, aesthetics has to deal with yet one more difficulty arising from the character of aesthetic experience. We saw that in order for aesthetic experience to be possible it is not sufficient to observe the object in which beauty is manifest. Looking at a painting or sculpture, or listening to a piece of music, we may not even feel its aesthetic value. Beauty has to be experienced, lived through in an extraordinary act of perception. That is why aesthetic experience is directly accessible only to the experiencing subject himself. To others it can be communicated only in an indirect way—by words, i.e., through the mediation of reflection, for we can express an aesthetic impression only by becoming aware of what we have experienced. But such a verbal expression is likely to be imperfect, uneven, and ambiguous. Even the word "beauty" itself is used equivocally and often in a very broad and undefined sense (for example, we talk about beautiful weather, beautiful results, a beautiful salary, and so forth). Therefore we can avail ourselves of others' aesthetic experience only by confirming it through our own experience, i.e., by recollecting that aesthetic perception out of which it grew. But that doesn't mean that aesthetics is condemned to subjectivism and relativism. Although aesthetic perception is subjective and is always marked by the individuality of the subject that experiences it, still it has an objective basis—*the aesthetic object itself*. The more the perception devotes itself to the object, the more it follows only the instructions inherent in the structure of the object without yielding to the arbitrary concoctions of subjective fantasy, the greater and firmer will be the objectivity of the perceptual content. In a word, for it to attain to this objectivity, aesthetic perception needs a certain training and discipline. Only in this way can one avoid the greatest threat to aesthetic taste and to the culture of art in general: the falsification of aesthetic experience.

Falsification arises from two sources. One we have already mentioned: it consists in the limitations of the subject himself, the narrowness of his spiritual horizon, his tendency to explain everything by the schemes he is

used to and by his own personal peculiarities. The other is *imitation* or *mimicry*, which in social life plays such an important role, both positive and negative.

In evaluating a thing, we often judge it non-independently, not on the basis of our own experience but following the example of others. We go by the opinion of our social circle, society, or certain authorities. This influence of public opinion asserts itself in almost all fields of cultural life. Its effect is positive insofar as it educates and improves the taste and judgment of the younger generation. But it becomes a negative factor as soon as it turns into a blind and servile aping. And nowhere else does this aping take root so easily and firmly than in the sphere of art and aesthetics. Many a person is disposed to believe that he really enjoy a certain work of art and feel its beauty; but in reality he does not appreciate its aesthetic worth and judges this way only because this work is positively evaluated by others or because it fits the dictates of fashion. In acting this way he is deceiving not only others, but himself too, usually unconsciously. Obviously this falsification of aesthetic experience is highly dangerous to genuine artistic culture. It hinders aesthetic education, distorts artistic taste and reduced the value of beauty to an empty fiction. In aesthetics, just like in all of spiritual culture, genuineness and truth are the most important things. But only those can attain to them who constantly check on and deepen their own aesthetic experience.

PART II

METHODS

1. The Optimal Starting Point: Nature or Art?

Just like any other scientifically grounded theory, aesthetics first of all must address the issue of method. In order to get clear on the aesthetic object's essence and special nature, one must first of all determine what should be the starting point of the investigation. Every scientific or philosophical theory has its factual foundation: the real or ideal phenomena of the object inquired into. Upon reviewing beauty, we find two different areas of its manifestation. One is reality itself, that is, nature and the entire cultural life of man. The second area is comprised of the various branches of art. The beauty of nature, and of reality in general, does not depend on the conscious activity of human beings. We meet up with it as with an objective fact, existing in non-human-created reality itself. Art's beauty, on the contrary, is a result of human creativity; it embodies a certain project of the conscious will. Aesthetics will succeed in bringing out the special character of beauty, if it gives equitable consideration to both the first and the second kind of beauty. But from a methodical point of view, that is, if it wishes to get a handle on its material, it must give priority to the beauty of art over that of nature, and here is why.

At first blush it might seem that aesthetics should proceed in the opposite direction: after all, nature itself, life itself are man's first and foremost teachers. Shouldn't it be acknowledged, therefore, that beauty reveals itself first of all in nature and that it is only the impression that this makes on man that prompts him to recreate that beauty in works of art? And if so, shouldn't one take as the basis for aesthetic analysis precisely this beauty of nature?

However, the mutual relations between natural and artistic beauty are really much more complicated than that.[3] If, on the whole, the former is the primary source which nurtures the latter, then it is also the case that in the evolution of cultural life we often witness a converse dependency as well: to wit, the beauty of art determines our conception of the beauty of nature (for example, it happened more than once that painting or sculpture created a type of male or female beauty that subsequently had an effect on what this or that epoch recognized as the ideal of beauty).

However deep and powerful the impression aroused by the grandeur of a landscape or the nobility of a human face might be, in reality natural beauty appears as an accidental phenomenon, as a side effect of nature and life that lacks strict contours and univocality. If one wishes to highlight beauty and to define it, one must capture one or another aspect of it. And what aspect will that be? Evidently the one through which the beauty of the phenomenon in question manifests itself most fully and clearly and the one that would be chosen as a subject by a creative artist. Consequently, when delving into the

beauty of nature or life, we have to make reference to art anyway and to inquire, on what grounds it recognizes the extraordinary aesthetic value of this or that aspect. And that is easily understood. Only in art does the embodiment of beauty constitute a real goal of the creative process. And only in the internal order of works of art is there a manifestation, in a pure form, of those moments and those conditions on which the aesthetic value of an object depends. In saying this we have pinpointed the starting point of aesthetic inquiry and indicated its general direction: to elucidate the nature of beauty aesthetics must first of all direct its efforts toward the analysis of art. Only the theory of art can provide aesthetics with a firm and objective foundation.

2. Three Starting Points for Aesthetic Analysis

But this general indication is not sufficient. If one wishes to describe the aesthetic method, one must state more precisely from what side the analysis of art should begin. As a matter of fact, art, its emergence, its being, and its effect—all this is determined by a relationship among three factors: the creator of the art; the viewer or the listener, who perceives the art and enjoys it; and the work of art itself, in which beauty is embodied. Therefore, the aesthetic analysis of art can be carried out in three ways: (1) One can choose to start out with the artist himself and analyze that creative process from which the work of art emerges, i.e., analyze that internal psychic state which is the basis of his creativity, and all those reasons, ideas, and experiences that he tries to embody in his work; (2) Or one can start with the perceiver (viewer or listener) of the work and bring out those features of his experience that depend on the perception of the work's aesthetic values; (3) Finally, the starting point of analysis may be the work of art, taken as an objective thing or phenomenon, whose existence depends neither on the creator nor on the perceiver. The question arises: what is the significance of each of these three ways and which is the most suitable as a method of philosophical aesthetics?

A. The Artist-Creator

If one wishes to understand the special nature of some created thing, it is advisable to consult the creator himself. Thus it seems that the artist, or more exactly his creative psychology, can best help us elucidate for ourselves the aesthetic essence of the work of art, since that essence is determined first of all by the task that he had set himself in creating the work, or by the idea that he wanted to embody in it. And that idea and its manner of realization in turn arises from his views and his taste, from the basic tendencies of his creativity, from his temperament and character, in a word, from his entire individuality, as it manifests itself at that moment in a certain special way. Therefore it is understandable that philosophers frequently tried to ground the aesthetics of art in the psychology of artistic creativity. Recollecting in thought the origin

of the work of art seems equivalent to explaining its aesthetic order and value.[4]

But however significant may be the input which aesthetics gets from the psychology and phenomenology of creativity, a closer look makes clear that this method is by no means always and everywhere applicable. First of all this is so because frequently and perhaps even most of the time the creator and his creative process are unknown to us, and the only piece of evidence that we can use is the work of art itself (thus all prehistoric and archaic works of art as well as many medieval ones are anonymous). If we could understand and aesthetically evaluate works of art only upon becoming acquainted with their creators and their output, then the aesthetic value of such works would be totally inaccessible to us. Nevertheless it cannot be doubted that they do leave us with a certain aesthetic impression and that we are able to make sense of their style and get an idea of their worth even if we don't know their origin.

Of course, should we have become knowledgeable about the conditions under which a certain work had been created, about the conjectures and intentions of its author, about the events and factors that *influenced* his creativity, then all of this information would help us to understand that work more deeply and accurately. Still, whatever the case, the significance of this information would only be auxiliary and restrict itself to complementing, deepening, and enriching that aesthetic impression which has come about wholly independently of it.

Moreover, it is important to keep in mind one more crucial moment. An artist's thoughts, feelings, and conjectures acquire aesthetic significance only insofar as they affect his creative process, lead him in a certain direction, and finally in one way or another take shape in the work of art itself. Only then do they become data of importance for aesthetic analysis. Otherwise everything that happens in the artist's soul but doesn't touch on the creative process and doesn't in this or that way affect its result, the work itself, may be of interest to the psychologist, but is entirely irrelevant to aesthetics because it stays outside the limits of that sphere within which is situated the aesthetic object. From this it follows that the psychology of creativity acquires an objective basis and methodical significance for aesthetics only when it ties up not just with the artist's subjective experiences but also with the work that he has created.[5]

Finally it is worth mentioning that this method cannot be used for the analysis of natural beauty, unless we look upon the beauty of nature through the eyes of religion as God's creation in which the creator's perfection is reflected. Nevertheless even in this case our aesthetic arguments would arise out of the appreciation of the beauty of nature itself, whereas everything related to the act of its creation would end in metaphysical speculation, grounded on a hazy analogy with the creativity of human beings. Be that as it may, to a scientific aesthetics, basing itself on an analysis of the aesthetic

phenomena themselves, such a method of inquiry, appealing as it does to non-aesthetic, superempirical considerations, would be unacceptable.

B. The Viewer (Listener)

Those difficulties which aesthetic analysis confronts when it orients itself to the psychology (phenomenology) of creativity can be avoided, if it is begun with the viewer or listener, or more exactly with the impression that the work of art makes on them. This method of investigation has a real justification, too. The creative process ends in the work of art as its outcome. But the work of art cannot subsist by itself. It needs a viewer (listener) who takes pleasure in its beauty. And only from those experiences which the created work affords its observer (the perceiving subject) can one judge about its aesthetic value. The artist himself in creating envisages an "ideal" viewer (listener), and each time that he desires to test the power of his creation he strives to look at it from the side and to ascertain how it will affect the viewer (listener). In this way when the analysis starts from the perceiving subject, the matter under investigation is the sum of those images, thoughts, feelings, and emotions that arise in his consciousness under the influence of that work of art. But these experiences depend not only on the object perceived but also on the perceiving subject, that is, on the ways, processes, and contents of his entire mental life. This means that the impression received from the work of art will vary with the viewer's (listener's) individuality and nature, his interests and tendencies, his sensitivity and mobility, his present state and mood. Delving into the whole complex of experiences that constitutes the impression in question, we find in it a lot of elements (images, thoughts, and feelings) that are connected with the object itself only by external, accidental associations arising from the perceiving subject's individual experience. Besides that there may emerge such elements which, although they concern the perceived object, have nothing to do with its aesthetic side (structure). For example, looking at a portrait or landscape may evoke various associations of similarity that are totally independent of its value as a work of art. Similarly, the psychological response that a march calls forth in a soldier or that a waltz evokes in someone who loves to dance, may contain a multitude of nonaesthetic moments. That is material to be handled by theoretical or applied psychology but irrelevant to aesthetics; in analyzing the aesthetic impression derived from a work of art it has to be ignored. But what is the criterion that will tell us what from the aesthetic point of view is significant and what is not? To rely only on what the viewer or listener himself recognizes as being aesthetically valuable in his experiences, is not enough, for his testimony more often than not is purely subjective and partial. An objective criterion, allowing us to confirm a received aesthetic impression, is provided only by the work of art itself. Only that impression which is

justified by its internal order, its essential qualities, can pretend to a genuine aesthetic significance.

C. The Work of Art Itself

We thus see that the second path of investigation, like the first, eventually leads to the third, which orients itself to the work of art *simpliciter*. The work of art is the central (middle) link of the chain constituted by the artist, his creation, and the viewer (listener). On the one hand, in it the artist's idea is embodied, on the other, it yields aesthetic impressions to the observer. That is why in analyzing the work of art itself we can to a large extent elucidate the creative process (the artist's creative intention) that gave rise to it, as well as the impression that it has to elicit for the viewer (listener). In other words, the third way has the property that in pursuing it we are able not to lose sight of the first two ways as well.

PART III

THE ANALYSIS OF AN AESTHETIC OBJECT

1. The Essential Properties of Aesthetic Perception

A. Aesthetic Perception and the Feeling of Pleasure

Having determined the starting point of aesthetic analysis, the investigator has to take up the next question: How does the aesthetic object (beauty) manifest itself in the work of art? What are the direct data that compel us to recognize it as an *aesthetic* object and to ascribe beauty to it? This question harbors the most important difficulties of aesthetics. Every work of art, whether it be a painting, a poem, or a musical composition, is a certain external thing or process affecting our sense organs (eyes or ears). Nevertheless, the fact that we perceive it with our organs of sight or hearing does not yet guarantee the aesthetic character of this perception. A simple sensory perception of a work of art is by no means yet an aesthetic perception, i.e., a perception of its beauty. It often happens that when we attentively regard a painting or drawing or listen to a piece of music, their beauty remains hidden to us. The work itself stands before our eyes or excites our hearing but even so there is no *aesthetic* perception. Therefore, it is not sufficient that the object be perceived: in its perception a new special moment must emerge for that perception to acquire an aesthetic character.

At first sight it seems that it isn't difficult to describe this moment. A simple sensory perception usually does not arouse in us any feelings or emotional reactions; with regard to it we remain more or less indifferent. And even in those cases where our interest is aroused we are attracted not by the looks of the thing but by the fact that it can be a means to some practical or theoretical end, for example, when we confront its nature (physical, mental, ethical) or its practical significance (utility or disutility). However, there are also those cases, when the object itself, i.e., its direct sensory appearance, is either pleasing to us or not pleasing, regardless of whether it can satisfy one or another of our practical or theoretical needs, in other words, when that appearance itself gives us pleasure or discomfort. This feeling of being pleased or not pleased, depending not on any extraneous interests, but solely on the sensory character of the object, might, it seems, turn out to be exactly that moment that distinguishes the aesthetic perception from all other kinds of perception.

Nonetheless, upon closer inspection, such a definition of the aesthetic impression and aesthetic object appears inadequate. The concept of being pleasing or non-pleasing is so broad and abstract that it can be applied to the most diverse cases and, obviously, not at all in the same way. Putting it briefly, this concept is ambiguous and therefore must first of all be more

precisely defined and investigated for its suitability to characterize aesthetic perception. Usually this pleasantness which sensory impressions afford us is a certain feeling of *pleasure*, arising directly out of that excitation which the perceived object causes in our sensory organs or our body in general. We say that the fragrance of the flower or the taste of the fruit, the temperature or the lights in the room are pleasant, and we ascribe that pleasantness to the object themselves or the phenomena that evoke it; and in the same sense we apparently can talk about the pleasantness of a work of art or of a beautiful thing in general. This view which identifies beauty and pleasantness and holds art to be a means of entertainment is rather widespread. Theoretically it was justified mostly by some 18th century English aestheticists. However, analyzing some concrete cases one can readily convince oneself that beauty and pleasure are different sorts of thing. Not everything that's pleasurable is *ipso facto* beautiful, and, conversely, not every beauty is accompanied by pleasure. The feeling of pleasure, as it is ordinarily understood, is *subjective and relative*. It depends first of all on the qualities of a person's psychophysical organization and on how he actually feels at the moment. What is pleasant to one (for example, a certain odor, taste, or color) may be unpleasant to another. Moreover, the same sensory impression may to the same subject appear pleasant at one time and unpleasant at another because there has been a change in how he feels or in his mood (for example, bright lights become unpleasant when one's eyes have tired).[6]

To beauty, on the contrary, we ascribe an objective significance, one not depending on the perceiving subject's individuality or actual state. A beautiful (aesthetically valuable) thing does not lose its beauty (aesthetic value) just because we are at the moment, for one or another subjective reason, not able to appreciate it properly. How different aesthetic value (beauty) and pleasantness really are can be seen from the fact that works of art (e.g., a musical or painterly composition) often contain elements that taken singly create an unpleasant impression (for example, jarring tones or colors, disharmonious combinations of tones or colors) but that nevertheless not only do not detract from, but positively enhance, the aesthetic force of these works.

Finally, from the fact that the viewer (listener) has gotten a pleasant impression one cannot conclude that he really has perceived the art work's beauty. There exist, for instance, unmusical people who do not understand anything about music (they cannot tell a waltz from a foxtrot or a Beethoven symphony from a military march) but still like to listen to music because they perceive it as pleasant noise. On the other hand, there are also those who hate poetry and who, when they hear a poem, turn away in disgust because it seems to them that everything expressed in poetry can be stated in much simpler and more comprehensible form. These latter examples are particularly telling: they show decisively that aesthetic being coincides neither with the simply sensible reality of a work of art nor with the

emotional reaction (a feeling of pleasure or displeasure) that it evokes. The primary and basic moment of aesthetic perception is a certain special act of perception, an act that opens our eyes to something that constitutes the incomparable peculiarity of aesthetic being.

In this respect every aesthetic impression has a certain *physiological* foundation. That is why aesthetics has to concern itself not only with psychological but also with physiological factors that condition the possibility of aesthetic impressions. That, however, does not mean that aesthetic values can be derived from psychological or physiological data. That cannot be done because the values themselves do not coincide with those conditions on which their realization depends.

When people speak about pleasure, they usually have in mind its purely subjective side: something that is pleasant to that particular subject in that situation and that state. Be that as it may, it is clear that the pleasantness of impressions is not identical with beauty, although in most cases it is related to it. Where the special act of perception we talked about is lacking, no aesthetic perception nor appreciation of beauty is possible. Even though the object is perceived by the viewer, its aesthetic being remains hidden to him.

B. The Significance of the Mind-Set for the Perception of an Aesthetic Object

In order to define aesthetic perception and its object we must first clarify the perceptual act that constitutes its fundamental constitutive moment. To that end we must lay out in more detail the general make-up and structure of sensory perception.

Usually perception is viewed as an altogether passive state of consciousness. An external object, acting on our sense-organs, produces in us a certain impression conditioned only by the quality and quantity (strength) of the physical stimulation. But the psychological analysis of perception does not support this view. Sensory perception is determined by the following factors:

(1) A certain *direct* (visual, aural, tactile, etc.) *impression*. This is only the material basis of the perception and never the whole of it. (2) We perceive not separate sensations or their combinations but *things* and *phenomena*; these things and phenomena always constitute a certain unity of diversities (of different sense-data) and differ from each other in their shape, size, spatial relations, and internal structure. The perception of this external structure of objects is a certain *perceptual act*, for every structure not only consists of a multitude of elements (individual sensations) but also manifests itself as a unity, where each element (each part) is not only what it is when taken separately but also what it means as an element (part) of the whole. Such a perceptual act does not content itself with those data that it gets from the present direct impression; it also uses up all the material, all the data that it

gets from the perceiving subject's past *experience*. The significance of experience for sensory perception is twofold. On the one hand, it is the basis on which the perceptual act subordinates the sensory data to one or another perceptual scheme that determines their relations and their significance for the whole. On the other hand, in accordance with this scheme the perceptual act supplements the received (actual) impression in a certain definite way and in a certain direction.

For example, I hear a ringing telling me that it is time to end the lecture. What I hear immediately is just a certain sound or series of sounds. But knowing from experience that it is a ringing sound and that it functions as a signal I perceive it as a certain significant thing. That the content of our perceptions is determined by a certain perceptual act is clearly evidenced by illusions, i.e., by false perceptions that arise because the received sensory perception is understood, interpreted, and supplemented in an inappropriate and incorrect way. Such illusions arise, for example, when we read proofs or student papers: some word that is incorrectly printed or written nevertheless appears correct to us because we are used to the impression that we have gotten from the right combination of letters. Usually this act of perception and supplementation is unattended to by us because it is unconscious and instinctive. We become conscious of it only in those cases when perception for one or another reason is difficult and a doubt arises as to what the impression received means (for example, when an object is seen indistinctly in the dark, or when we don't hear clearly what a person is saying to us over the phone). In this way we see that in every sensory perception, whether veridical or not, we perceive *more* than we have sensed.

On the other hand, it must simultaneously be acknowledged that we also perceive less, i.e., that not all externally received impressions make it into the perceptual content, and that even those that do are of unequal importance and do not play an equally significant role in it. For, in molding the available sense-data in accordance with a schema re-creating the structure of the perceived object or phenomenon, the perceptual act *ipso facto* picks out from among them those elements that agree with this scheme, and leaves the others aside. And even among the elements chosen it fixes certain differences and a certain hierarchical order, elevating one or the other above all the others.

This act of molding and ordering the perception is also assisted by the appropriate experiential data. Consequently, the act of perception necessarily includes within it a certain *intention*; this act is thereby directed toward the general (essential) structure of the perceived object. In other words, it always depends on the given *attitude of consciousness* or mind-set. This dependence of perceptions on the mind-set is particularly evident in those cases where our attention and expectation is consciously directed towards a certain circumscribed sphere of objects, as when we are collecting or classifying something (for example, picking berries, mushrooms, collecting insects, and

so on).[7] Then only those objects or features of objects that interest us or are significant to us appear in the horizon of our consciousness.

To be sure, usually we notice the influence of our mind-set on the content and structure of our perceptions only in those cases where this mind-set is to some extent conscious, i.e., issues from a conscious act of the will. Nevertheless it is not difficult to ascertain that perceptions, even when they are not determined by a particular interest or expectation, are in one or another way molded by consciousness. This molding proceeds automatically only when the mind-set conditioning these perceptions is habitual for us. People of different professions, interests, or cultural niveaus see the same object differently. For example, a sunset evokes quite different impressions in the peasant and in the painter. But even abstracting from specifically professional interests, we can ascertain the formative activity of the mind-set in all cases of perception whatsoever. The difference lies only therein that in those perceptions that lack a definite (clear) intention the mind-set is not individual but species-wide, i.e., it is common either to all human beings or to those sharing a culture or an epoch of history. It should not be forgotten that our perceptions at first fulfill only a biological function: they enable an organism to orient itself in the surrounding world and to respond appropriately to the impressions obtained. This biological function determines the internal (content) structure of the perceptions. It accentuates just those characteristics of the object that aid in discriminating it from other objects, or that are of great practical significance to the subject (organism). Sometimes this will be the object's color; at other times it will be its shape or the way it moves; a third time it will be the sound or odor it emits; and so on.

Now, having analyzed the general structure of perception and clarified that it is determined by two moments—the direct *sensory impression* and the *perceptual act*, which moulds the impression received and supplements it on the basis of a certain mind-set and using experiential data—we are in a position to throw light on the main question, What is the essential attribute of aesthetic perception? On which of the two moments does it depend?

As to the first moment, the sensory material, it is clear that being dependent on the nature of the senses it is common to all perceptions without exception and cannot influence the structure of one or another kind of perception. The same must be said about the role of experience in the molding of perception. It is constituted by the impressions received earlier, i.e., out of the same material that is also the foundation of the present perception. Although the experience of different people is both quantitatively and qualitatively distinct, these individual differences do not affect the essential structure of perception. Thus there is just one factor left that can condition the features of aesthetic perception; viz. the formative perceptual act. But since this act's direction and horizon (the sphere of objects over which it ranges) depends on the *predominant attitude of consciousness*, it is within the latter that the basis of the peculiarity of aesthetic perception must

be sought. But what is this special aesthetic attitude of consciousness? Or, regarding its objective side: what is that peculiar aspect of the object that aesthetic perception grants us? Let us try to elucidate this by examples drawn from various spheres of art, and let us begin with poetry, which, in general, is perhaps the most accessible of arts and wherein the features of the aesthetic aspect appear especially vividly.

C. Examples

Poetic Language

How does ordinary (spoken) language differ from poetic language? The function of the former is to be a means of mutual communication. The word, being a certain unity of articulated sounds, is an aural (acoustic) sign having a certain circumscribed sense and allowing us to transmit to others our thoughts, wishes, feelings, and so on. Being a sign or signal, the word itself differs from the object it designates or the psychological state expressed by the object; in general, it has nothing in common with what it designates (except the so-called onomatopoetic words, whose importance in language is very limited). In this respect the relation of a word to its designated object is external and unnecessary. Different words can designate the same thing not only in different languages but in the same one as well; on the other hand, the same word often can have not one, but two or more meanings. Furthermore, nothing can hinder us from replacing a word with any other sign or signal (cf. railroad or maritime signals or sign language based on finger movements and their combinations).

Language is unique in that it is the most perfect and flexible means of communication, capable of expressing thoughts, feelings, and wishes in their most diverse nuances and hues usually totally inaccessible to other sign systems. The question now arises: in ordinary language, how do we perceive a word (or words) and what does this perception consist in? Since words first of all serve a purely practical function, i.e., the needs of social life, then in listening to what others say our attention is generally directed not to the word itself (i.e., to its sound), but to that which it refers to and expresses, i.e., to its meaning which, so to speak, hides behind it as a sign. In perceiving the words of a language, the mental intention of the listening subject as it were goes straight through the word, and without stopping at it, grasps the object it signifies. Thus in those perceptions that are the basis of spoken language, the phonic side of the word (the word as sound) is not manifested prominently, but remains in the background. The more familiar the word, the more closely its sound is connected in our mind with its meaning, the less attention do we pay to its sonic (audible) structure. That is evidenced by, among others, the following facts:

1. When one is speaking in one's native language, one doesn't have to attend so carefully to each word that is pronounced as when one is conversing in a foreign language, since the passage from the word (sound) to its meaning in the former case is automatic, without any conscious effort. Having heard one or another sentence fragment, we, taking note of the existing situation, already grasp the meaning of the whole sentence.

2. When we deliberately abstract from the meaning of a word and concentrate on its acoustic side, the word appears entirely differently to us, as if its nature had changed and it had acquired a new aspect unfamiliar to us.

3. Not infrequently we fail to notice the phonetic similarity or affinity of two words if their senses differ … hence, an unexpected effect results when this similarity becomes conscious and visible to us.

4. For children, to whom the connection between sounds and senses is less familiar, a word is not just a means of mutual communication but also an object in its own right that attracts attention in virtue of its sonic nature. From this interest in what words sound alike also stems the child's penchant for creating new words out of the pure joy of sounding without regard to their sense.

Nevertheless these facts do not warrant the conclusion that in spoken language the sonic moment plays no role at all and we never attended to it. On the contrary, it draws our attention whenever the speaker's speech deviates somewhat from the norm and displays some unusual property (for instance, he is very high-voiced or low-voiced; he stutters or whispers; he mispronounces the words).

Besides that, the acoustic side of language plays a direct part in the communication process, i.e., it performs a *semantic* function. The same sentence can have a different meaning depending on where its logical stress falls. Similarly, when the accent moves from one syllable to another, the meaning of a word may change … Moreover, being a natural, organically based means of communication, language differs from all artificially constructed sign systems in that it not only signifies some state of affairs distinct from itself but also directly expresses the speaker's attitude (anger, politeness, doubt, surprise, agitation, joy, sadness, and so on) both towards the one he is speaking with and towards what he is speaking about. In other words, changing and varying the voice, the intonation, expresses the speaker's emotional tonality (tension). The greater its strength and intensity, the clearer and more explicit becomes the expressive significance of the intonation. This is especially convincingly shown by *rhetorical language*, whose task it is not only to convey some thought or other or to transmit to the listener a piece of news but first of all to affect him in a certain way, to convince him of just those thoughts, feelings, and desires that the speaker wants. For this purpose the word as a mere sign of thought is not enough; language has to be permeated by the speaker's mood, his emotions, and his will. In a word, rhetorical language must be *expressive*; and to that end a

good speaker must use all appropriate means, among which picturesqueness and liveliness are first and foremost. Of importance is not only what the speaker says but how he expresses his thoughts and plans. Wishing to elicit a certain emotional reaction from his audience he has to choose an appropriate manner of speaking. In general, a human being is most strongly affected by what he himself sees, hears, or feels; therefore, the speaker should strive to impress the listener so strongly that the latter would think that he himself experienced the things the speaker is talking about. Picturesque language achieves precisely this effect: it stimulates the listener's intellectual and emotive imagination and lends the depicted events the liveliness and perspicuity of reality.

Another factor that boosts the strength and effectiveness of the impression is the *dynamics* of the language. This depends, on the one hand, on the appropriate intonations (semantic and emotional) and, on the other, on the euphony of the individual words, sentences, and their combination. In this way, the word itself achieves a certain weight and value, ceasing to be a mere sign and becoming a pure expression. That is the highest degree of expressiveness that a word attains to in *poetic language*. There the word is simultaneously a means and an end, and thus appears in a new guise under which the decisive role is played by its sensuous nature. All of the linguistic qualities and values that heretofore had remained in the background now step up to the fore and display their powers (rhythm, melody, dynamics, and euphony). That, however, does not mean that the word cuts loose from its meaning entirely. A word without any meaning at all ceases to be a word. Having acquired the value and power of pure expression, a word absorbs into itself its meaning and coalesces so closely with it that the sound and its meaning become a genuine organic unity. Or, differently put, the relation of that word to its meaning becomes *immanent*; the word comes to express its meaning directly in such a way that the meaning not only is expressed through it but also is embodied in it. Ensouled by meaning the sound is transfigured; it awakes to a new independent and intrinsically valuable life; it gets a *magic power*, i.e., an ability *magically* to affect the listener, to enchant him with its sonic and expressive appearance. But the charm of poetic language derives not only from the sonic values of the word, but also from its meaning's picturesqueness, which unites the impression received from the word with the living image of the object itself. Picturesqueness, just like the impressiveness of the sound, determines the qualities of poetic language and the special means that it uses—the similes and the metaphors, on the one hand, and the rhymes, alliterations, the instrumental scoring of the words, and suchlike, on the other.

This survey of the characteristics of poetic language makes it clear that it can be described by such features as are present in ordinary (spoken) language as well. The difference lies only in the fact that, in the latter, rhymes and alliterations arise rather accidentally, while rhythm is free and

independent of any pre-conceived pattern. Thus all of these moments remain irrelevant in ordinary speech and do not express the values inherent in them. In poetic language, by contrast, they are emphasized, displayed, and coordinated in such a fashion that their valuableness is actually felt and acquires predominance. The same may be said of the picturesqueness of the language and the means used to achieve it: they all arise out of the natural structure of the language, but only in poetic language do these factors attain that degree of order and organization that allows their independent value to gain ascendancy.

From this brief description of poetic language we can already see what the mental attitude that is able to grasp and evaluate it is like: it is orientated to the word, to the language as a sensuously meaningful phenomenon. What it has before its eyes is the word's *sensible appearance*. It rests, so to speak, on the word's surface—not because it is superficial and unmindful of the perception's depth but because in the sensible surface of the word it intuitively grasps the whole richness of its internal content and meaning.

What has been said about the features of poetic language and its difference from other ways of can be briefly summarized in the following scheme:

1. *Artificial languages* (systems of signalization). The word is a pure sign; the relation of the word (sign) to the object (meaning) is transcendent.
2. *Spoken language*. The word is (1) a sign and (2) an expression of the subject's emotions; the expressivity is potential, unorganized.
3. *Rhetorical language*. The word is (1) a sign and (2) an expression of the subject's emotions; the expressivity is organized, but dependent on a transcendent goal.
4. *Poetic language*. The word is magical. The expressivity is displayed, the sonic nature of the word is highlighted and ordered. The word, as a sensuously significant phenomenon, becomes a self-sufficient value. Its relation to its meaning is immanent.

Visual Art

Now we must determine whether the definition of the aesthetic object and of the aesthetic mind-set that we got from our analysis of poetic language can also be applied to other branches of art. Let us start with the representational arts (painting, sculpture). At first glance these appear to be considerably different from poetry. In truth, the word and its meaning, or the object it signifies, are different things entirely, and the sensory nature of the word generally has nothing in common with the object itself. It is therefore understandable why, when one has in mind the object itself, no particular attention is paid to the sensible form of the word.

But in the case of representational art, the relation of object to its sensible image is entirely different. In perceiving the outward image of the object, we thereby perceive the object itself; the image (sense-datum) representing the object is nothing other than an aspect of the object itself. Even so, the content and structure of our perception will vary with what we pay attention to and what is important to us: is it the general nature of the object, its practically significant characteristics, or is it its sensory appearance, without regard to our actual situation and the relevant exigencies of our life? Every visible object has a certain spatial form, displays a certain color, appears to us in this or that light, and so on. Usually we notice all of these sensible qualities only to the extent that they allow us to get our bearings in the surrounding world, to distinguish one item from another, and to use them according to the existing circumstances. In seeing an object we do not take a really good look at it, we perceive it but roughly, and therefore our perceptions usually lack precision, completeness, and strict definition. The more familiar to us a certain thing is, the closer its perception resembles a simplified and rather abstract scheme. That is why it not infrequently happens that we are unable to specify precisely the features of some of the things in our everyday environment (for example, whether the numerals on our clock are Arabic or Roman; what is the design of our wallpaper; what color eyes does a good acquaintance of ours have; and so forth). On the other hand, we are often inclined to ascribe to things such qualities that they appear to have only under certain circumstances (for example, we say that leaves are green and that the sea is blue, even though the color both of leaves and of the sea is by no means constant and changes with the light).

Generally speaking, it is much more difficult to notice and judge the beauty of a thing that is familiar to us (for example, the beauty of the architecture of our native city) than that of a new, hitherto unseen object, for the new draws attention to itself in virtue of its sensory qualities. Habit, by contrast, hides the real appearance of a thing beneath the simplified schemes it has created; and effort is needed to rid ourselves of the dulling influence of these schemes. Of course, when we direct attention to the object as a sensory phenomenon it does not for that reason become beautiful. It is only that conscious attitude which concentrates our attention on the object's spatial form, the colors of its contours, and its relations to the light that opens our eyes to its aesthetic strong and weak sides, and only then is the object itself perceived by us as beautiful or not beautiful.

That an aesthetic perception and evaluation of things requires a special mind-set is evident also from the way the painter himself conceives of his task. For him the painting is, first of all, a plane that has to be covered with paint so that the viewer would get the impression of a certain visible unity, i.e., that the variously colored patches on the plane would constitute such a combination that would appear as a finished and balanced whole that can be taken in one glance. That indeed is a point for grasping and appreciating a

painting. A flat surface (canvass, paper, or wall) and paint (colors) are the only material a painter uses in creating his picture—whether it be a portrait, landscape, still-life, or another kind of painting. The thematic subject (the pictured object) acquires aesthetic value only insofar that it enters into this visible unity (harmony) of colors and belongs to it. There is a kind of painting that requires no meaningful (i.e., object-representing) subject, viz. ornamentation; however, there is not and cannot be a sort of painting that would not first of all appear in its aesthetic essence as a colored plane.

In every painting or drawing that depicts a certain subject the colors and lines have a twofold significance: direct and indirect. On the one hand, in the colors (lines) and their combinations there lies a special aesthetic value that is quite independent from whatever is depicted by them. On the other, the individual colors (lines) and their totality have a certain value insofar as they represent some subject, form of objects, their spatial relationships, lighting, and so on. The first of these is the fundamental one. Merely by fulfilling the conditions of purely sensory (non-representative) beauty can a painting (drawing) acquire aesthetic significance with respect to the depicted subject as well. In other words, what is important is not only that it be evident from the picture itself, i.e., from the totality of colors and lines filling the plane, what it means and depicts (rather than from its title), but also and first of all that the beauty of the subject (the depicted object) grow out of the non-representative (purely sensory) beauty and be grounded on the latter. Aesthetic perception, compared to the ordinary (non-aesthetic) variety, has an opposite direction: in ordinary perception the subject determines the structure and significance of the sensory elements; in aesthetic perception, by contrast, the unity of the sensory elements constitutes the basis to which the subject (its significance) has to accommodate. Therefore the aesthetic value of a picture depends first of all on its *composition*, i.e., on the way the subject is subordinated to the visible unity of the picture (drawing).

The crucial role of composition is especially prominent wherever so-called *stylization* is applied to a painting or sculpture. In using human or animal figures as elements of ornamentation or relief (e. g., weaving them into a plant ornament), the artist often distorts or changes their natural form and proportions or gives them an unusual pose because his overriding concern is not to depict faithfully the real shape of a human being or animal but to have the figures fit into the general character of the ornament, its structure, and rhythm. A similar phenomenon of stylization is remarked upon in other branches of art, especially in discussions of their origins and early development. Since at the beginning no kind of art was self-sufficient, but served the needs of practical life or religion (e.g., weaving, clay pottery, and dance), the forms of what they brought into being were primarily adapted to the purpose for which they were intended. For example, the ornament with which weaved objects or clay utensils were embellished originated from the weaving or burning technique itself. Or dances depicted certain magical

actions. But later, with the evolution of art, both the structure of the ornament and the shapes of the utensils were so processed and changed that they not only fulfilled their practical function but, above all, satisfied aesthetic requirements, i.e., constituted a unified and complete composition in the sense mentioned above. In a similar manner, with the gradual fading of the original, symbolic significance of dancing, its place was taken by the rhythmic stylization of the dance motions, emphasizing their sensory dynamics and expressiveness.

Music

But nowhere is the peculiarity of aesthetic perception and the aesthetic mind-set as clearly evident as in music. Among the branches of art music occupies a separate place, for it does not depict anything at all and is not based on any objective subject. If we do relate it to one or another object (for example, a certain event or idea), then such an interpretation is usually purely subjective and does not at all touch upon the aesthetic content of the work of music. One and the same composition may be interpreted both one way and then entirely differently. A piece of music hanging on a certain program or setting itself some purpose (imitation) is an exception. However, the highest achievements in music do not belong to this category. Of course, it is claimed that music depicts human moods, feelings, strivings, passions—in a word, a human being's total inner emotional world. Nevertheless, emotions themselves (agitations of the soul) are not something objective that could be described and depicted in the same way that things, events, and ideas can be. Of course, this doesn't mean that feelings, strivings, and all sorts of psychological experience cannot become the objects of artistic intentions. The internal world of emotions to a certain extent is accessible both to poetry and to representational art. But these branches of art can depict feelings and strivings at best *indirectly*, i.e., through the mediation of some objective subject-matter. To music this road is closed, since the data and impressions of hearing do not yield the materials out of which a picture of the external thing world might be reconstructed. Hence music essentially cannot represent anything; it can only directly express the *inner dynamics* of feelings and experiences; how it does that will be explained later.

Nevertheless we would err if we thought that music was but a special language of the emotions. It is precisely some of the purest kinds of music (for example, the fugue, the prelude) that produce for us an especially profound aesthetic impression but do not excite in us any definite emotions that could be tied to one or another situation in our inner lives. At first blush this is a mysterious fact, which will nevertheless clear up a bit upon acquaintance with the peculiar nature of music. The material that it processes and shapes are tones, tone rows, and chords, i.e., a certain special kind of aural impression. But aural impressions do not belong with those sense data

that condition the structure of the external thing world; they usually perform the function of signs from which one may judge how a certain process is taking place or about the presence (appearance) of certain objects. Hence the connection of aural sense-data to the image of the external world is not as close as is the connection between visual perception and tactile perception. Moreover, one should keep in mind another important circumstance, namely, that tones and their combinations are the product not of nature, but of human creativity. Depending on air waves that are characterized by a steady frequency, tones in their purest form occur in nature only on the rarest of occasions. That is why the sphere of tones constitutes a special world which differs essentially from the surrounding material world and is almost wholly independent of it.[8] From this it can be seen that in music the intention of aesthetic perception is directed towards the tones and their combinations themselves; in other words, that its object is none other than the sensory structure of the tone world. Whoever does not grasp this sensory organization is alien to music. This is not contradicted by the fact that music, like the other branches of art, is characterized by an extraordinary expressiveness. How this expressiveness can coexist with the non-objective nature of music (i.e., with the fact that, generally speaking, it exercises no representative function), will be explained later. That music by its essence has nothing to do with an objective depicting, is confirmed also by what we know about the origins of music. The earliest forms of music in primitive nations are songs, prayers, spells and incantations. It might seem that here the main role is played by the words, whereas the music (melody) is relegated to an accompanying status. But in reality the situation is usually different. Songs, as Karl Bücher explained in his well-known book *Labor and Rhythm* (*Arbeit und Rhythmus*), arose out of the rhythm of those motions that primitive man engaged in while performing a certain labor task or certain religious (magic) rituals. Inasmuch as these motions are rhythmic and often accompanied by rhythmic noise (for example, threshing grain), they stimulate the tendency in human beings to accentuate their rhythm even more since that helps muscular effort and boosts the working spirit. And to strengthen the rhythm of work man often uses his voice, too, especially in those cases when the physical effort itself forces him to adjust his breathing to the beat of his motions and thereby to emit certain noises. This gives rise to rhythmic risings and lowerings of the voice, from which a certain motif is born, the beginnings of a melody. As far as the words of a song are concerned, they at first don't have any meaning and emerge just because a human being is in any case inclined to articulate the sounds he emits; these are simple interjections accompanying a laborer's motions, or cries that encourage work. The text (of a song) itself, expressing a certain thought, mood or feeling, is a secondary element that arises and develops only later. In other words, the organizing principle of a song is not the word as a carrier of meaning but the unity of the rhythm of the motions and of the melody, i.e., a purely sensory factor.[9]

2. The Internal Structure of an Aesthetic Object

A. The Unity of an Aesthetic Object

Thus the analysis of poetry, representational art, and music shows us that the object of aesthetic perception, i.e., the perception arising from an aesthetic mind-set, is always a certain expressive phenomenon, manifesting itself to us as a sensory unity. However, this definition is in need of further elucidation. On the one hand, it is necessary to throw light on the internal structure of the aesthetic object, i.e., to bring out the factors that determine its sensory unity. On the other hand, the expressiveness of the aesthetic object must be more precisely described. We will turn now to the first question.

In analyzing any type of work of art, we find that it is constituted by many moments or factors, and that it appears to us as a unity of diversities. In a musical work, these are rhythm, melody, harmony, tonal dynamics, etc.; in a painting or drawing, they are combinations of colors, lines and planes, contrasts of light and shadows, etc.; in a poem, they are rhythm and instrumentation of the words, rhymes, picturesqueness of language, subject matter, etc. In what way do these moments or factors unite and coalesce so that something new emerges that we conceive as the art work's unity, and how does this unity differ from the object's unity in an ordinary perception? In part even the latter unity is sensory in nature: the object affects our sense organs of sight, touch, and hearing as a certain complete totality that is almost independent of the surroundings. But even here the decisive significance usually belongs to the meaning of the object (insofar as we recognize the latter as a representative of a certain class of objects or phenomena). As soon as the object's meaningfulness is grasped, its purely sensory form and the unity of this sensory form are pushed back into the background. The felt unity of the aesthetic object, on the contrary, always stays at the center of the perception.

This, as was explained earlier, is the essential attribute of aesthetic perception. When its intention strays from the object's sensory unity, the act of perception ceases to be aesthetic. Therefore it may be claimed that the sensory unity of the aesthetic object is in a special way *necessary*; and this necessity depends, on the one hand, on the way the moments, or factors, of the aesthetic object are connected with one another, and on the other, on the nature of those very moments.

B. The Components of an Aesthetic Object

In beginning to discuss these just-mentioned conditions of aesthetic necessity, it is necessary to emphasize that these diversities which in a work of art are conjoined into an expressive unity are not elements but *components* (moments), or factors. Elements are comparatively simple and homogeneous; they do not depend on one another; and they can enter into any combination. For this reason one cannot judge about the structure of a totality from its elements alone. The elements of a work of music are, for example, the individual tones that make it up; in the case of a painting, they are its colors; and the elements of a poem are its words and even their syllables (sounds). But a simple totality of colors do not yet make a painting; an accidental series of tones does not give birth to a piece of music, just like an accidental collection of words does not yet have the significance and value of a poetic phrase (poem). In breaking down a work of art into its elements (a picture into its separate colors and a musical composition into its tones) we are thereby canceling the aesthetic object and stepping out of the framework of the aesthetic mind-set. The elements, even though they constitute the material foundation of the aesthetic object, do not determine its specifically aesthetic structure.[10]

Therefore, if we want to elucidate that structure, we must pay attention just to those data that emerge in the aesthetic perception itself and that are given to us by the aesthetic object. It is in this way that aesthetic analysis differs from all other types of theoretical analysis: it is interested in only those moments on which the object's aesthetic meaning and value are grounded, which condition its structure and thus perform a certain *structural* function. But such a function can be performed only by factors (moments) that are themselves *structural*, i.e., embrace a multiplicity of elements and fix a certain relationship among them. The unity of a factor's (moment's) totality arises solely from the relation and connection of the elements. Take rhythm as it appears in music or poetry: it consists of certain elements (sounds, tones, noises, beats) that succeed one another and of which some are accented and the others aren't (in contemporary European poetry). The alternation of accented and unaccented elements is more or less *regular* and ordered in such a way that one or more unaccented elements depend on one accented element, and they together make up a certain unity; in music this will be the *measure* and in poetry the *foot*. Since every rhythm spreads out in time, the elements of rhythm, too, can differ not only in weight (the degree of accentuation) but also in duration. These temporal differences of the rhythmic elements are also not accidental but depend on a certain regularity (for example, one long element is equivalent to two or three short ones; and all short elements and the spaces between them are almost equal). Finally, the rhythmic elements contain yet a third possibility of alternation: that depending on *intensity*. Differences in intensity may coincide with those of

accentuation but they can also be independent of the latter. Differences in degree of intensity may characterize not only individual tones and syllables (beats), but also measures and feet. These latter differences give rise to the *dynamics* of rhythm.

The tension in a rhythmic series can increase or decrease; in addition, the elementary (main) units (measure, foot) of the rhythm itself can be either rising or falling. Whenever a rising or falling tendency lasts for several measures or feet, there emerges a higher unit, i.e., a rhythmic segment that itself is rising or falling. Two (or more) opposite rhythmic segments form a yet higher unit, constituting a rhythmic *period*, where the falling tendency of one segment compensates for the rising tendency of the second segment. To strengthen the opposition of two segments intervals are used, separating one rhythmic element from another.

By emphasizing or lengthening such an interval, the so-called *caesura* is obtained. Thus the unfolding of a rhythmic totality or composition emerges directly out of the moments that are present already in the basic rhythmic unit (the measure, the foot), but that can fully assert themselves only to the extent that several of these elementary units are joined together to constitute a single rhythmic system (totality). In music (and to some extent in poetry as well), alongside the moments already mentioned, there is yet one more extremely important moment.

Tones and sounds in general differ not only in loudness but also in pitch: they can be higher or deeper. Since tone intervals, i.e., differences in their pitch, follow a certain pattern, they allow the formation of a *musical theme* or *phrase*, which is characterized by a singularity similar to that of a saying (or sentence) in language. The only difference is that the meaning of a saying is at least partly rational, i.e., based on a certain relationship of concepts, whereas the meaning of a musical phrase is, in contradistinction, purely expressive (in a way to be explained subsequently).

The same pattern governing tone intervals underlies still another factor of music (the only one to which nothing corresponds in poetry), i.e., *harmony*, which determines not the unity of tones sounding one after another but that of tones sounding jointly together. When we investigate how all of these factors relate to each other in a work of music or poem, it is easy to convince ourselves that their mutual relations are very diverse and cannot be reduced to a scheme common to all. For instance, in music rhythm and dynamics are the more elementary factors: rhythm depends neither on melody (motif) nor on harmony; it varies only with the differences in the accentuation and length of the elements (sounds, tones, beats). Similarly, the varieties of dynamics can manifest themselves independently of rhythm, melody, and harmony. But every rhythm already harbors a certain dynamics. But as far as the motif (theme) of a musical piece is concerned, its structure is much more complex. Even though the mutual relations of tones (their intervals) depend neither on rhythm nor on dynamics, these moments are rather important to the character

and peculiarity of the motif (melody). If the rhythm and d dynamics are changed, the same motif may acquire such a distinct appearance that its tonal identity may be difficult to recognize. And in general, every particular motif has its special rhythm and dynamics. Though it does not need harmony, it may be harmonized in many different ways, and these differences affect its expressiveness and often change its overall character entirely.

In poetry the relationships among the aesthetic components are not as clear-cut because the material that poetry processes—language, words—is to some extent already formed: in each word, each sentence there is a certain rhythm, a certain dynamics that aesthetic formation has to take into account. But even here the aesthetic components display an interdependence and mutual influence. When one arranges the words in one way or another and changes their "environment," one gives the phrase (sentence) a new rhythm, a new dynamics and "instrumentation," and thereby also changes its meaning, its expressive power and significance.

The same features are manifested by all the factors, or components, that determine the structure of the aesthetic object in representational art as well, whether they be lines, planes, masses, colors or lights. Here, too, aesthetic value emerges only when the said elements constitute a certain unity of diversities, i.e., a composite totality such that its unity is based either on the opposition and balance of two elements (e. g., two colors, planes, masses, varieties of color and shadow), or on the rhythmic and symmetric structure of multiple elements (as exemplified in painting by an ornament; in architecture by rows of columns and/or windows or by the placement of arches and towers), or on the gradual merging of one element into another (as exemplified in drawing by the contours, or in painting by shades of coloring or lighting, and so on). And where rhythm, symmetry, a relationship between opposites (balance), or a certain continuity of changes rules, there also inevitably asserts itself the formative power of dynamics. In general, the interrelationship of aesthetic components is no less close in representational art than it is in music and poetry.

Of course, the relations among the components indicated characterize not only the aesthetic object but also any object constituted out of the same sensory material. Every visible thing is not just a mechanically composed totality of elements, but has its own structure depending on its mass, planes, lines, colors, and their relations. Likewise, every series of sounds or noises has elements of rhythm, dynamics, and even melody. Therefore, the peculiarity of the aesthetic object must derive from the special way its components and their interrelationships are molded. What this molding is like can be gathered from what has been said already.

To begin with, the internal structure of every component belonging to the object's make-up is brought to the fore; that structure is afforded the maximal opportunity to disclose itself, to develop its natural way of decomposition and recomposition, subordinating that way to a stricter regularity. This way the

component becomes meaningful and realizes its expressive power. Moreover, the relations among separate components are ordered in such a way that one component does not constrain the other but strengthens it and helps it to express its pure essence, or, if their tendencies are opposed, they are arranged in such a way that their opposition is felt and the perceptual act acquires a special tension (e. g., in poetry the course of the meter and the structure of the sentence (period); in painting the harmony of colors and lines, the distribution of light and shadows, the thematic significance of the picture, and so on).[11] But, finally, the development and the harmonizing of the separate components are not completely self-sufficient values; they are only those moments through which the expressive significance of the aesthetic object as a totality becomes real. This totality, even though it rises above the individual components, cannot be separated or abstracted from them. It embodies itself on them and through them and can be defined only with their aid.

C. The Significance of the Dominant

In order for the totality to be realized it is not sufficient that the separate components be in tune with each other, for the unity of the object has to be directly reflected in their mutual relations. That means that one of the factors has to represent this unity, that it has to have a priority with respect to the others and play an organizing role in the object's internal structure. This leading factor is called the *dominant* and is the main formative principle of the aesthetic object. The other components are in one way or another subordinated to it and perform an auxiliary function in helping to realize the expressive unity of the totality. It must be noted that the dominant does not always fulfill its organizational role in the same way. Sometimes it constitutes, so to speak, the framework or skeleton of the entire composition on which its organic unity depends (for example, in a drawing this might be the contours, the rhythmic or symmetrical harmony of the lines; in painting, the contrast between light and shadow or a harmonious balance of colors). But at other times the aesthetic object reveals several layers, or planes, making up something like one hierarchical system, so that the dominant determines the front plane, whereas the other components are distributed throughout the back planes. This second type of composition can occur both in painting and in architecture; but it is especially prominent in music, where the dominant function is usually performed by the motif (theme) or melody, and the harmony and, perhaps, the rhythm constitute a background for the motif or melody. But it can also happen that the rhythm or the harmony acquires the decisive voice; thus in the very same composition one component can yield the dominant function to another.

From what has been said about aesthetic components and their relations it is clear that they do not at all coincide with the parts of the aesthetic object.

Parts and components are utterly distinct things. True, they have something in common: they divide and differentiate the aesthetic object, but they do so in entirely different respects.

Components describe the different qualitative directions (measurements) in which the object's aesthetic content fans out. There is no common plane in which they would all fit, except for the specific unity of the object itself. In this respect they are incomparable and each one of them is only one of its kind. Parts, on the other hand, are all of one kind and belong to one plane, whether it be space, time, or a motion happening concurrently in both space and time. However, the parts of an aesthetic object should not be confused with its elements. The latter constitute only that pre-aesthetic material which, with the help of the components, will be organized and reduced into the aesthetic unity. By contrast, every part, embracing many elements already organized, possesses a certain aesthetic significance and is part of the aesthetic object's structure. The connection of one part to another, just like the components' connection, is not mechanical, but internal, organic. Even so, it is depends first of all on those spatial *or* temporal, or spatial *and* temporal relations that condition the existence of the aesthetic object as a felt totality. Of course, the connection of the parts of this totality can be most diverse: all of the parts may have approximately the same significance and be ordered according to a principle of *coordination*, or there may be a central, dominating part to which all the others are somehow subordinated; the latter being a *monarchical* principle of composition. These distinct ways of setting up and ordering the parts of an aesthetic object play, as it will turn out later, an important role in different styles of art, particularly the representational arts (architecture, sculpture, and painting).

However, while noting the essential difference between an aesthetic object's components and its parts, one should not ignore their close connection. That which splits the object's totality into its different parts, differentiates the latter with respect to space and time, and at the same time determines their internal unity, is nothing other than the aesthetic components. The emergence of the separate parts and of their structural differences is precisely a result of the formative power of the components.

D. Static and Genetic Unity

Having briefly discussed the significance of the aesthetic components, we may venture to describe more precisely the unity of an aesthetic object. This unity should not be understood too narrowly, i.e., as if it always could fit into a single perceptual act and be taken in at one glance (one moment). This would not suit those aesthetic phenomena (objects) that occur in time and can be grasped only through several successive perceptual acts (as happens, e.g., in music, poetry, choreography). Here the *objective* unity of the phenomenon itself does not coincide with the subjective unity of the perceptual act.

Nevertheless it has more or less to correspond to the latter for otherwise it would not be accessible to the perceiving subject and would lose its sensory character. But such a correspondence is possible because the reach of present consciousness (even of the sensory consciousness not extending beyond what is sensorily grasped) is greater than that of a single perceptual act. The aesthetic unity of an object manifests itself in the subject's mind even when the contents of successive perceptual acts are so related to one another that a later one literally grows out of and sprouts from an earlier one. The object is not before our eyes as something completely finished but rather is born and becomes something. Its unity is not static, but genetic. Still it has the same picturesqueness and sensuality as static unity does, and is perceived in the same direct manner without any input from reflection (abstract thought).

But even in those branches of art where the unity of an aesthetic object is static and independent of time, the act of perception usually does not end with one momentary perception but goes on through the mediation of several perceptions. The relations among these various mutually complementing perceptions may be various. In painting, for example, the initial perception encompasses the entire object and gives us a general impression in an undifferentiated form. Succeeding perceptions within the limits set by the first impression unfold its contents, highlighting the object's separate parts or sides and emphasizing its inner structure. In sculpture and architecture (when we observe the structure's exterior image) none of the individual perceptions can encompass the whole object; each perception covers only a certain aspect that has to be complemented by other aspects. But each new aspect demands a new point of observation. If we wish to grasp all of the aspects of a sculpture or building, we must walk around it and look at it from all sides. It is true that not all of these aspects are of equal significance. Usually one or sometimes two have priority and govern all the others. Something similar can be said about the aesthetic image of the building's interior. Here, too, the viewer perceives only some partial, incomplete aspects, each of which stands for only a certain side or part of the interior and which depending on the viewpoint chosen may be wider or narrower, richer or not so rich. But even in this case the series of aspects is not accidental; they constitute one organic totality, in which one plan that determines the entire work is manifested. Briefly put, the perception of an aesthetic object is a single act that is constituted by a successive series of merging perceptions.

E. The Aspects of an Aesthetic Object and the Problem of Space in Visual Art

In order to elucidate the structure of an aesthetic object we will make a yet closer acquaintance with representational art, with painting and sculpture. Compared to music, these two arts differ not only in the sensory data they process but also in their *objective* nature, i.e., they represent things and

phenomena that occur in reality or at the very least are similar to real world bodies (objects) that have a place in space. But every bodily object presents itself to vision only under one or another aspect depending on the observation point chosen. This is a circumstance with which painting in particular has to reckon, since the means it uses (plane, colors, lines) allows it to reconstruct only one circumscribed aspect at a time. And that aspect, if the observer doesn't move, is limited to two dimensions. Therefore the problem that the painter must solve may be described thus: a two-dimensional image has to recreate a three-dimensional object. But a sensory image gives us an object's aspect only when it somehow captures the object's totality. That is why a painter can represent bodies and their spatial relations only by using those marks of the two-dimensional visible aspect that indicate its relationship to other complementary aspects representing the third dimension, depth. Hence, all those elements and their combinations that make up a picture (lines, colors and all of their varieties according to quality, intensity, clarity, purity, etc.) have a twofold spatial significance: on the one hand, they are planar elements which separate and differentiate it; on the other, they are signs, by which the third spatial dimension (depth), and the stereometric form which depends on it, are expressed. The first, direct, significance is the foundation of the second, indirect (symbolic) significance. If a picture's composition is flat and does not exceed two dimensions (for example, ornamental painting), then the decisive role is played by the direct signification of the elements. The second, symbolic significance is attended to only to the extent that the composition contains not only combinations of pure lines and colors, but also flat images of certain things (bodies). But as soon as the painter undertakes to depict the depth of real space and the stereometric form of real bodies, the indirect significance of the elements gains ascendancy. The plane of the canvass (or the wall) must represent three-dimensional space as well. The most important difficulty for such a composition lies in the painter's having to harmonize the image of the plane with that of a stereometric form. The plane has to remain what is, a plane, and yet at the same time to represent the extension and structure of depth. This problem can be solved in various ways. The means which a painter chooses to solve it to a large degree determines the style of his work. We will talk in greater detail about this later.

In any case, the most important thing for the painter is to find an aspect of the object that would meet all of the indicated requirements. This means (1) that it must give a clear image of the plane, i.e., an image in which the plane is differentiated according to a certain plan (schema) and in which all of its different parts are put together into a picturesque unity; and (2) that all indicators of depth that lie in the plane image must be so definite and vivid that it would be clear from them what the stereometric form of the object (a form hidden in the additional aspects of the third dimension) is like.[12] In a word, the chosen aspect must be positively *saturated* with these indicators, for then it will have a special richness and significance, and it will manifest

the whole sensible structure of the depicted object (bodies and their spatial relations). But in choosing the aesthetically most suitable aspect, the artist cannot follow the example of nature because the aspects provided by nature are accidental and therefore mostly chaotic, ambiguous, and complicated. In that regard he has to rely on his own sensibility and compositional ability.

It is worth noting that choosing the right aspect is important not only to the painter but to the sculptor as well. Even though the latter creates real images, i.e., three-dimensional figures, and even though those figures, depending on the point of view, can be perceived under an infinite variety of aspects, he nevertheless has to put at the foundation of his work one or several dominant aspects which determine all the rest. Otherwise his sculpture will lack sensible organic unity. Particularly important is the distal aspect, which emerges when the viewer's eyes do not move and their axes are parallel; for it gives a general impression of the statue or monument as a whole. Roughly the same requirements are valid for architecture, too.

From what we have said about the structure of paintings and sculptures it is evident that with respect to them the *problem of space* occupies the same central position as it does in architecture. Therefore their task can also be formulated as follows: they must emphasize the values of the *particular space* using those means that are at their disposal and subordinate these values to one or another systematic unity. It is important to stress that we are talking about a particular space, the nature of which is manifested not only through the geometric relations of lines and planes, but also through the interaction of masses, changes of color, and variations of light. Nearly all of the differences and changes in painterly, sculptural, and architectural style can be explained with reference to how they solve the problem of space. Of course, the space that is of concern to representational art is not identical with the absolute space of physics; rather it is the *phenomenal* and tangible space such as it appears to a perceiving and moving subject. For this reason painting, sculpture, and architecture should never leave out of consideration the object's spatial relation to the perceiver; and out of this relation there follows one more essential requirement that a work in these three branches of art must satisfy: namely, that it depend on a natural coordinate system determined by the viewer's position in space, i.e., a horizontal position of his eyes, on the one hand, and a vertical position of his body, on the other. Only a clear and explicit opposition of the vertical and horizontal direction allows the sensible unity of the chosen aspect.

It would seem that such a requirement would be self-evident, as it depends on the structure of the human body and cannot be of major significance to the aesthetic structure of a work of representational art. More detailed investigations have shown, however, that in Greek sculpture, for example, those qualities that, as is usually thought, express an ideal of human beauty, in reality arise out of purely formal requirements that determine the general spatial structure of the aesthetic object (aspect). The statues' straight nose,

dominant in all of classical sculpture, was chosen by the ancient artists not because it, taken by itself, is the most beautiful of all possible nose forms, but mainly because it best accentuates the vertical axis of the face and emphasizes its opposition to the horizontal lines of the eyes and mouth.

When we define the purpose of representational art as the formation or organization of concrete (phenomenal) space, we come to grasp yet another essential feature that works of that type of art possess: namely, that their aesthetic structure includes, as a structural factor, besides the depicted objects themselves, the air that surrounds them and that separates them from each other, i.e., *phenomenal empty space*. This is especially clearly evidenced in sculpture: the piece of stone or marble from which the sculptor hews his statue circumscribes that portion of space in which the figure potentially exists. Michelangelo described the process of creating a sculpture as follows: one must imagine that the figure being sculpted is submerged in water and that, as the sculptor works, the water level gradually falls—so that the parts of the figure come up one after the other until the whole figure becomes visible.

In architecture the relation between the vertical and horizontal axes (directions) and the formation of empty space has an extra special significance, about which more later.

F. The Problem of Time in Art

In those branches of art that depict temporal phenomena or events and in which the art work itself extends in time (poetry, music, choreography, cinematography), the *problem of time* plays a similar role that the problem of space plays in architecture, sculpture, and painting. Of course, time has only one dimension, and in that respect the task of forming time aesthetically is somewhat simpler; still to the affected branches of art it is no less important. The time that concerns the artist is, again, not the steady physical time measured by clocks, but *phenomenal time*, experienced by us as we act and interact with our environment. In other words, it is not an empty abstract time, but a concrete time in which our lives and the physical and psychical phenomena that we perceive take place; that time where the present instant continuously moves away from the past and towards the future, where at every moment something either begins, or continues, or ends. To form (organize) time means to place the events (phenomena) that are contained in it into an orderly, most often rhythmical, scheme. Such a scheme demands (1) that the course of phenomena directly compose a sensible, completed unity; (2) that this unity be clearly segmented into successive parts; (3) that in each part (or section) the separate elements be grouped around a single (or several) dominant element(s); and (4) that the duration and contentfulness of each part be ordered in accordance with their importance to the whole (for

example, that opposite or correlative musical phrases or parts of a rhythmic period offset each other).

That time is the basis for such an organization of phenomena or events is shown most convincingly by the significance of the rest for musical and poetic rhythm (meter). The rest is an empty interval of time in which nothing happens or nothing is heard, and yet it belongs to the structure of the work of art. Separating one line or phrase from another and at the same time joining them together, it performs an important structural function. Furthermore, the temporal handling of the elements determines and alters the tempo itself. Depending on the rhythm and dynamics of the impressions, it sounds fast or slow, accelerating or decelerating, free or impeded, continuous or intermittent, and so on (for example: andante, allegro, ritardando, accelerando, ritenuto, legato, staccato, etc.) Where there is little or no orderliness with respect to time, where time is not suffused with rhythm and dynamics, the tempo becomes monotonous and the aesthetic impression vanishes, leaving boredom in its place. In order that the composition of a work of music or poetry acquire real aesthetic worth, it is important for the artist to find an appropriate aspect of time, i.e., to choose a rhythmic and dynamic structure of elements (phenomena, events) that would give the composition a special contentfulness. Such contentfulness has nothing to do with fullness and usually is even contrary to it; i.e., it demands that only those elements enter into a composition that are essential to its expressiveness.

To be sure, the treatment of time in works of art depends first of all on the character of the means of representation. Where these means depend *solely* on time (as, for example, in poetry), then whatever is or happens together can only be represented in succession, i.e., one after the other. However, within the limits of the possibilities given to the artist by his material and his means of representation, the most important role belongs to the general requirements of composition. For example, in a novel the course of narration may not coincide with the real sequence of events implied by the objective significance and the chosen temporal perspective of the work; the narration may proceed in a reverse direction—from the present to the past, or substitute for later events those that happened earlier, depending on what moment the author chose for the beginning of his narration.

3. The Expressiveness of an Aesthetic Object and its Objective Sense

A. Introduction

Having established that the structure and unity of the aesthetic object is first of all grounded on its *sensory* (in representational art and architecture, its spatial) structure and unity, we inevitably face the next question: how is this sensory structure related to the aesthetic object's objective sense and

meaning? For art, after all, portrays not only the relations and combinations that sensory elements enter into, but also various important objects (people, animals, plants, houses, ships etc.) or events and phenomena of nature. Furthermore, the range of objects accessible to art is not limited to concrete reality but embraces abstract (ideal) objects, thoughts, and ideas as well. Finally, art is capable of expressing feelings, emotions, moods, and, in general, all of the limitless diversity of man's inner experiences. The objective moment (subject) is not important to all branches of art (for example, it is unimportant for music, ornamentation), but there is no form of art that can entirely make do without a certain *emotional* moment, even if indistinctly expressed. Therefore it is understandable that there emerged aesthetic theories which assign precisely to this moment a decisive importance for aesthetic perception; i.e., they claim not only that it is part of the structure of aesthetic perception, but also that it determines its content and provides it with aesthetic value.

In view of the dissimilar role played in art by the objective subject and the emotional moment, we must split the question raised earlier into two distinct ones: a narrower question concerning the objective subject and a broader question focusing on the emotional factor and its relation to the sensible structure of the aesthetic object. We will start with the second question, the answer to which will open the way for dealing with the first one, too.

B. The Objectivity of Aesthetic Feelings

In the analysis of aesthetic perception usually two moments are distinguished: (1) the *objective* moment, or the content of the perception, i.e., the image of the perceived object or phenomenon itself; and (2) the *subjective* echo of this content in the mind, i.e., the feeling of pleasure or satisfaction that this content arouses in the perceiving subject. However, one cannot limit oneself to distinguishing these two moments in this way, for this distinction is a secondary outcome of a purely theoretical, nonaesthetic reflection. If we analyze the phenomenon itself, we shall find there no such difference and opposition between the objective and subjective sides.[13] On the contrary, they make up an indivisible unity; the aesthetic object itself is closely, indissolubly tied to one or another feeling; it itself immediately expresses a certain mood or emotional excitement, and so forth. Consequently, the emotional factor inherent in the aesthetic perception in no way coincides with the satisfaction felt by the perceiving subject; it belongs to the object (content of perception) itself and is strictly objective. It is the depicted landscape itself that is sad or gay; the melody or series of chords that is full of joy or melancholy, of energy or longing; and the poems itself to express a certain mood or excitement (love, hate, despair, hope etc.). How are these "objective" feelings and experiences to be explained?

It is said that they result from the associations that gradually form between certain images of objects and the feelings customarily accompanying them. But this explanation is insufficient because a purely associative connection does not allows us to understand how these feelings and experiences arising in a perceiving subject's soul could be ascribed to the object itself; in other words, how the object (work of art) itself acquires a self-sufficient vitality manifesting itself in diverse feelings, moods, experiences, and so on.[14]

On the other hand, recognizing the objectivity of "aesthetic" feelings (i.e., of the feelings expressed by the aesthetic object) raises a new difficulty: how can we perceive such "objective" feelings and emotions, well-nigh independent from the perceiving subject? For feelings, moods, passions aren't "objective" phenomena that are conceived as being in front of the subject and separated from him; they are inner experiences that can be felt and lived through only as states of one's own subject, *me*. An answer to this question can only be obtained by getting clear on a more general problem, namely: how do we perceive the life and mental events of other people and organisms? Let us look at how this problem is discussed in philosophy.

C. The Traditional Theory of Analogy and its Criticism

According to the traditional theory, the understanding of other minds is based on *analogy* (reasoning by analogy). Briefly put, this means that when we experience a certain feeling or when we get excited in a certain way, there appear certain accompanying motions or changes in our bodies (especially, but not only, the face and the hands). Since this process is often repeated, there arises between these experiences and the corresponding bodily motions a certain associative connection, on account of which the latter acquire the significance of expressive gestures, i.e., of outward bodily changes such that they express our inner experiences. Observing the behavior of other beings, I discern among their motions such as are similar to my own expressive gestures and, on this basis, I ratiocinate on (reason to) what might be the inner experiences associated with them. The scheme of reasoning by analogy is, roughly, as follows:



This general schema may, of course, in certain particular cases become much more complex. Besides, reasoning by analogy can proceed in the opposite direction as well. Thus, knowing that the sating of hunger is a pleasant thing and observing that a dog just starting to be fed is wagging his tail, we judge that tail wagging is an expressive gesture accompanying the dog's satisfaction, joy, and similar emotions.

Up to the beginning of the 20th century the theory of analogy was predominant in philosophy, and only in recent years critical analysis has shown that it is inadequate and requires, at the very least, major revision and supplementation. To begin with, it confuses and identifies two distinct phenomena: *signs* and *expressions*. A sign is connected with that which it signifies only in an external way; therefore, from the nature of a sign one cannot in general judge about the phenomenon that it signifies. The connection between one and the other is known only through experience; psychologically speaking, it is purely associational. The relation of an expressive gesture with what it expresses, on the other hand, is totally different; rather than being transcendent, it is immanent; i.e., the gesture does not signify or refer to something outside itself, but its meaning lies, and is manifested, within itself.

That is why we say that the facial or bodily expression *directly* and *immediately* expresses sorrow, disappointment, anger, hatred, and so on. In taking the other person's smile as an expression of his contentment or politeness, for example, it is not the case that we first notice only a certain alteration of his face (a motion of the muscles), from which on the basis of our experience we infer that this is a smile that signifies contentment or politeness; rather, the smile is directly perceived as a special and meaningful phenomenon, by which the smiling person's mood or attitude is immediately expressed. No matter how close the associative tie between a sign and its signified object becomes, it can never acquire that immanence which characterizes an expressive gesture's relation to the feeling (the psychological excitation) that it expresses.

But even apart from the fact that the theory of analogy misdescribes the phenomenon of understanding another person's soul, it contains a crucial weakness. It presupposes that a subject grasps the psychological phenomena of other beings in the same way that the subject grasps his own. However, in fact this similarity does not obtain. I perceive the expressive gestures of other people and organisms primarily the visual way (I *see* the other being moving, making certain gestures, and so on), and only in exceptional cases do I grasp them with the help of the sense of touch. And as far as my own facial and other expressions are concerned, I perceive them primarily through my kinesthetic sense. Usually I cannot see them at all, or I see them only indirectly (by looking in the mirror).[15]

If that is so, then the association of similarity on which reasoning by analogy is based fails. It must be acknowledged that the connection between

our kinesthetic sensations and the visible image of our body that is formed in our mind is direct, but this connection is not purely one of association because, in general, it cannot be directly observed. In other words, in view of the analogical theory's shortcomings, it is clear that it is inadequate and must be replaced by another theory or, at the very least, substantially emended and supplemented. Of course, this does not mean that our knowledge of what goes on in another's soul never proceeds by way of analogy. The role of analogical thinking is very important especially in those cases when the process of knowledge-acquisition is for one or another reason difficult and when the expressive gestures are ill defined and thus ambiguous. Nonetheless, an analysis of the phenomena does clearly show one thing, viz., that in order to come to know the psychology (inner life) of other creatures analogy by itself is not enough.

D. The Theory of Empathy and its Criticism

In response to the shortcomings of the theory of analogy there arose at the end of the 19th century another theory, the so-called *theory of empathy*, which soon acquired great popularity. It was expounded and developed at greatest length by the German psychologist *Theodor Lipps*. According to this theory, the knowledge of other minds is first of all grounded on empathy, i.e., on the alleged fact that we ascribe our own feelings and arousals to the bodies of other beings and thereby accord them objective meaning (objectify them). This, according to Lipps, proceeds as follows: we observe the expressive motions of other people or animals, and these visual impressions arouse in us an instinct of imitation, which in turn prompts us to recreate the perceived motions; this creates a certain associative connection between our sense-impressions of the other beings' motions and our own kinaesthetic (motor) sensations. The imitational instinct is an original capacity of the organism that cannot be derived from experience or other instincts. Kinaesthetic sensations, in turn, are connected with certain feelings and internal excitations (experiences). This connection is likewise instinctual, i.e., it arises from an innate tendency to express (embody) one's feelings and emotions. This is why there emerges a certain correspondence between the dynamic manifestation of emotions and the process of expressive motions. In this way my feelings or emotions get *objectified*, i.e., I transfer (or project) the experiences arising from my gestures to that object whose motions I imitate (repeat). This process may be explained thus: the things which the object that I observe communicates to me by his motions, i.e., certain feelings and excitations, are in reality my (the observing subject's) own experiences; but since they depend on the sense-impressions of the observed object, this inner state of mind appears first of all not in myself, but in the object itself. In the words of Lipps, "I am this way, i.e., I have such feelings and experiences, in him." All of the acts constituting empathy are so tightly merged that they are

not apprehended separately. It is just this that makes it possible to achieve *objectification*, which is the unusual phenomenon where I assign my experiences to another object and conceive of them as belonging to it rather than to myself. From the subjective origin of objectified feelings, however, there arises, according to Lipps, yet another quality of empathy; namely, an associated *satisfaction* (pleasure). In acting on my imitative instinct and leading me to imitate its motions, the object observed at the same time arouses my activity (vital energy) and allows me to partake of its own life. And every increase in, and expansion of, vital energy is always accompanied by a certain feeling of pleasure, which in truth is nothing other than taking satisfaction in oneself (one's vital activity). But since my feelings and experiences that were evoked by the object observed are objectified, i.e., ascribed to that object, the feeling of pleasure arising from the imitation also acquires an objective character, i.e., I feel a satisfaction in the object perceived, identifying myself with it.

Lipps illustrates his theory by the following example. In intently watching an acrobat's performance in the circus, the spectator does not remain merely an objective observer who follows the acrobat's motions as if from the side, but to some extent identifies himself with him, with his bodily "I," and as it were participates in all of his acts, and with him and in him experiences his efforts, his breath intake and muscle tension; in a word, he himself feels the acrobat's activities, feels them in the acrobat's body. Consequently, the objectivity of the perceived feelings and emotions is only apparent and has a subjective foundation.

This explication applies not only to aesthetic empathy, but to empathy in general as well, because this is a phenomenon (process) that occurs in other domains of life (that of society, for instance). As far as specifically aesthetic empathy is concerned, it is Lipps' contention that (1) it is marked by *intensity* and perfection insomuch as it proceeds unimpeded, without any obstacles, and that (2) it does not depend at all on the *reality* of the object toward which its intention is directed. In this respect it differs from empathy in the field of morals; here empathy can occur only upon confrontation with a real object. But in both cases the enjoyment afforded by empathy depends on the fact that it extends the limits and power of the subjects "I," letting him participate in the free activities of other beings.

Initially the power of empathy is limited to the world of humans. But gradually its sphere of validity broadens, and the principle of invigoration is equally applied to all organic life, including those phenomena in which something akin to the dynamics of life is manifested (e. g., the blowing of the wind, the flow of the river, the weaving of the waves, and so forth). Ultimately empathy extends to inorganic nature as well. This is aided, first of all, by the activity of the spectator himself, namely, the course of his *apperception*. For example, when we are looking at a high cliff, the perceptual process, following the causal connection, begins from the bottom

and goes to the top (since the cliff lies on the ground and rises upward). Thus the apperceptive course is the opposite of that direction in which I feel the pull of gravity. This opposition between two directions which permeates the perception of the cliff gives to my apperception a special tension and vitality, according to Lipps. But since the intention of the apperception is directed toward the object (the cliff), these features of the perceptual act are objectified, i.e., transferred to the visible object. In this way the cliff acquires, as it were, an independent life and appears as something powerful, full of grandeur, frightening, and so on.

Thus empathy lies at the foundation of a process that in mythology, poetry, and art in general plays a most important role. That process is called *invigoration*, and its special form is anthropomorphization or personification.

From this short description of the empathy theory we can see that it is superior to the analogy theory in that, on the basis of the phenomenological data themselves, it tries to elucidate the source of the objectivity of that emotional moment which is characteristic of aesthetic perception. Empathy, according to Lipps's theory, is an instinctive and, therefore, unconscious act (process) that occurs without the mediation of thought. In this respect the empathy theory has discarded the intellectualism that constitutes an important shortcoming of the analogy theory. Also, it takes into account the fact that by no means all of the relations among psychic phenomena or, in particular, perception can be derived from associations. On the other hand, even the empathy theory cannot be deemed perfect and adequately grounded. When it is applied to all those cases in which the psychic life of other beings is perceived, quite a few insurmountable problems crop up.

Lipps's example of the spectator's empathy with the acrobat's experiences and emotions is unsuitable for explaining aesthetic empathy, for, in general, the observer (subject) identifies himself with his object (the creature observed) only in those cases where the object is conceived as real (regardless of whether its reality is genuine or only alleged, imagined). But in order to secure an aesthetic impression in the sphere of art, it is in no wise necessary that the object be or appear real. The illusion of reality can contribute to the aesthetic impression and even strengthen it somewhat, but it is by no means a necessary condition of it.

To be sure, in defense of Lipps's theory it might be said that acts of identification and of the objectification of feelings take place unconsciously (in the sphere of the subconscious) and are therefore inaccessible to observation. However, in this case it must be admitted that the theory of empathy is based not an analysis of facts but has only a hypothetical significance that must in some way or another be checked or proven. Such a proof or confirmation would be successful if the consequences flowing from Lipps's theory corresponded to the facts. But in reality they do not.

If empathy and the objectification of feelings worked like Lipps says they do, then those experiences of the subject that are caused by his perception of

the object and his imitation of its motions should recreate precisely those feelings or emotions that the object expresses. For example, in looking at the famous statue of Laocoon and appreciating it, we perceive that emotional agitation that is embodied in it, and this perception of Laocoon's agitation constitutes no doubt an essential moment of the aesthetic impression. Yet our personal experiences (a certain sympathy and compassion, a tremor in our soul) by no means coincide with that extraordinary suffering and agitation that Laocoon's statue evinces. Moreover, if I ascribed to Laocoon my experiences or, conversely, if I were to be overtaken by his feelings, then such a coincidence of subjective experiences with the object's expression would only disturb the aesthetic impression or entirely subdue it. But even if the empathy theory managed to meet this objection its principal fault would remain uncorrected.

For according to it the perception of the psychological life of other beings is based on an instinctive imitation which usually does not manifest itself in outer motions but issues in certain motor enervations (tendencies, the so-called inner imitation). However, upon a closer look it becomes evident that the dependency relation between these two phenomena is precisely the converse. The inner imitation of the object's motions in the subject (spectator) can give rise to the appropriate feelings only in case he has perceived the expressiveness of the observed motions. This is shown by the difference between simple mechanical imitation occurring in the absence of any comprehension and meaningful imitation connected with an understanding of the gestures being imitated. Mechanical mimicking is frequent in the world of animals (apes, parrots, and others); it also occurs with children, who are wont to reproduce perceived motions or sounds without understanding what they signify. Therefore, the reproduction of gestures that is called forth by the imitative instinct does not guarantee a perception of their expressive significance. Inner mimicry plays only an auxiliary function in the understanding of other minds; it can make this act easier and increase its richness and liveliness, but only after the act itself has already occurred.

Finally, there is another important circumstance that must be kept in mind. In reality we do not perceive expressive motions *independently of their surroundings*, i.e., apart from the phenomena that accompany those notions and that are in one way or another connected to them. A perceptual always occurs subject to the existing situation out of which the perceived gesture arises. Taken separately, an expressive gesture is not unambiguous and strictly defined. It acquires a more or less circumscribed meaning only when it is noticed who makes it and under what circumstances. For example, the same smile can, depending on the situation, express satisfaction, civility, disdain, confusion, humility, a comic sense, and so on, or even a purely physiological state, etc. If that is so, then out of a simple imitation of gestures there can arise no understanding. The life of the psyche as well as life in

general is characterized by an organic structure, and its individual manifestations can be perceived and understood only by comprehending the nature of the totality to which they belong and on which they depend, that totality being the individual or the personality and its behavior or state at a certain moment.

E. How the Expressiveness of an Aesthetic Object is to be Explained

Intuition is an Act of Understanding

As this critical analysis of Lipps's theory makes clear, the perception of the life and psychology of others cannot be derived from empathy. This allows us to conjecture that it is an *original and self-dependent act of consciousness*. This conclusion is supported by general epistemological considerations.

Until the most recent times epistemology and psychology was dominated by the view that the first form of knowledge was intuition, i.e., a simple (passive) perception of certain objective data that by themselves do not mean and do not express anything.

The perception of phenomena or objects, by contrast, was regarded as a secondary act, i.e., as the formation or interpretation of the original intuition with the help of experience or categories native to consciousness. A deeper analysis of the problem of knowledge revealed a twofold error in this view.

First of all it is not true that the foundation of knowledge consists of the simplest elements (individual sensations) and that complex epistemic phenomena (for example, the sensible perception of objects) are but combinations of those elements. The development of knowledge proceeds in exactly the reverse direction. It starts from rather complex perceptions, while elementary phenomena (individual sensations) are separately grasped and apprehended only later, the initial complex impression having been taken apart. In other words, that which is simple and unanalyzable can be perceived only through the differentiation of complex impressions (representations).

Moreover, it turned out that there is no principled difference between intuition and understanding, for even in the original intuitive cognition of objects and phenomena there already *is a certain act of understanding*. This is so, first, because even the simplest thing or phenomenon constitutes a certain unity of diversities, which can be perceived as a whole only to the extent that the interrelations and structure of its parts or moments are perceived; and second, because even the initial sensible perception goes beyond the limits of those direct data on which it is based, and through the given incomplete and imperfect aspect of the object embraces the object itself as a real whole. Therefore, simple intuitive knowledge is characterized by the same general structure as is the knowledge that we call understanding. Consequently, in analyzing how the psyche and life of other beings is perceived it is necessary to explain not how understanding arises from such

intuitive data in which there is as yet no understanding at all but how the understanding of other lives differs from that understanding which is inherent in any sensible perception (intuition).

The Initial Expressiveness of this Act of Understanding

Answering this question requires keeping in mind that cognition initially performs a purely biological function, allowing the organism to get its bearings in the surrounding world and to react appropriately to the impressions (stimuli) received from the outside. Thus sensory perception first of all plays the part of a *sign* or signal indicating how to react in every particular case. Of course, such a signal can perform its function only when the organism has *adapted* itself to its surroundings, i.e., when it is able to react to the given signal in a biologically purposive manner. Initially such reactions are purely instinctual. But in the higher organisms that are endowed with consciousness all behaviors become more or less conscious and therefore the signals they receive from the outside are perceived as something meaningful, as instructions to respond in one way or another. Otherwise, i.e., if the organism did not understand the signal's meaning its response could not be purposeful. As to the meaning of the impression signals, that depends on the organism's interaction with its environment and the main factors of its life: food, sex, and foes. That is why all of the stimuli affecting the organism aren't neutral but either attract or repel it, seem either pleasant or unpleasant to it, cause it to feel either satisfaction and safety or dissatisfaction, fear, pain, and so on. Such an emotional character of external impressions remains even when, with the realm consciousness getting stronger and wider, the initial impressions gradually gain independence and, separating themselves from the motor response in which they initially terminated, turn into representations of the external object and the entire external environment generally. In this respect it must be admitted that the whole environment of conscious organisms is *meaningful*, i.e., is made up of "expressive" phenomena that afford the organism pleasure or displeasure and thus determine its behavior. As consciousness is initially directed toward the external world, the stuff of emotions and feelings appears to it in its objective rather than subjective guise. That which threatens me or, alternately, beckons to me is by that same token *horrible* or *pleasurable*, and the object's horribleness or pleasurableness arouses in me a similar emotional response.

The Significance of the Act of Empathy

Among the significant phenomena affecting an organism are those that are expressive in the strict sense, i.e., those belonging to living beings and express life or psychical excitations. Therefore, the question, How is the life and psychology of other beings perceived? gives rise to another, How do we learn to distinguish manifestations of life and psychology from significant phenomena of non-living nature? Raising the question this way allows it to become clear that the capacity for making such a distinction has its origin in the differentiation and flowering of primary perception (cognition of expressive phenomena). And this process is helped along most especially by our internal (psychical) experience and act of *empathy*. These two factors are closely connected: one stimulates and reinforces the other's action.

Although a certain (clear or less clear) self-consciousness accompanies all our actions and acts, the first object of our knowledge is not our "I," but the surroundings affecting us. Self-knowledge arises only when we begin to notice how the world around us responds to our activity. In this way the knowledge both of our social and material environment allows us to get acquainted with our "I" as well, with its strengths and weaknesses. On the other hand, as soon as we get used to delving into our interior and not only to become aware of what is happing there at any given moment but also to imagine what we would experience in one or another possible situation, we gain the ability to appreciate the state and behavior of other people and creatures from within. Of course, this can happen only provided cognition has attained genuine self-sufficiency and objectivity and freed itself from dependency on existing practical needs. In other words, a person must have attained to somewhat of a contemplative orientation of the mind. And the emergence and development of cognitive contemplativeness is greatly helped by *internal imitation*, which allows not only to conceive of the other being as something other and opposite, but also more or less to fuse and identify with it.

Every conscious organism has a certain innate conception of the environment in which it lives and acts. This environment also includes those beings (relatives, foes) with which its vital instincts are associated. Its grasp of their behaviors is at the beginning inchoate and only approximate; only with the growth of experience does it become clearer and wider. Generally speaking, the domain of expressive phenomena that can be comprehended by animals is rather limited; it is restricted to their natural (biological) environment. Only human beings, having the ability of looking contemplatively at surrounding phenomena and things and of empathizing with their "life," are capable of understanding any and all expressive phenomena that are accessible to their sense-organs.

The Inner Dynamism of Aesthetic Impressions (Vitality)

It is not necessary here to dig deeper into this question. Besides, what has been said here already suffices for making clear the grounds of the emotional nature of aesthetic phenomena or, more exactly, of their *vital expressiveness*.

The traditional view, according to which this emotionality (expressiveness) is a secondary moment joined to a primary perception which doesn't mean or express anything, turned out to be false. On the contrary, aesthetic phenomena witness the resuscitation and extraordinary intensification of that which is present in all primary impressions but which has been almost entirely lost to those perceptions that are guided by a purely practical or theoretical attitude. We must only determine as accurately as possible what the fundamental moment of this emotionality, or tonality, is. It is not the direct pleasantness or unpleasantness of the impression, which in general is not constant and varies with the individual nature of the subject as well as his current state. But neither is it a perception of mental life in the strict sense. The anthropomorphization of external phenomena is a secondary act which is presupposed by the perception of the initial expressiveness of phenomena. It is just one thing that has decisive significance, namely, that we perceive sensory phenomena as being active, as a certain play of forces that brings forth, in the external world, an unlimited variety of motions and changes. In a word, it is important and essential only that we perceive a certain *inner vital dynamism* manifesting itself in the phenomena.[16] This is shown to us by the impressions we get from any number of different kinds of motion. Comparing the motion of a train with that of a ship, a bird's flight with an airplane's, the undulation of the sea with the flow of a river, the swing of a pendulum with the freefall of a body, an animal's running with its jumping, and a multitude of other things, we see the immensely large variety and variability of motions, and this variety hinges on the variety of the forces acting on them and their mutual relations. Motions are and can be strong and weak, soft and coarse, free and impeded, steady and intermittent, powerful and slight, active and inert, rhythmic and non-rhythmic, and so forth. True, the immediate perception of the action of physical forces is accessible only to touch in conjunction with the motor senses, since that sensation is experienced only upon the direct contact of an external thing with our body. But it is just the sense of touch that cannot by itself yield aesthetic perceptions (impressions); it can only make somewhat stronger the aesthetic impressions of sight and hearing. The connection of touch and kinesthesia with images and sounds depends not merely, as is usually believed, on associations that become stronger by dint of repetition. One should not forget that all the senses are with respect of their organic development of common origin, i.e., the result of a process of differentiation. They defined themselves out of an ability of organisms to respond to external stimulation with certain purposive bodily motions. In this evolution the proximal senses represent the

earlier stages, and the distal the later. Therefore, keeping in mind the internal unity of an organism, it is not surprising that one or another excitation of a specific sense (e.g., sight or hearing) to some extent affects the whole sensory nerve system and causes a certain innervation in other sensory spheres. In this way there arises such a close tie between different senses that one can, to a certain extent, substitute for another and give us impressions which contain, in potential form, the data of other senses.

The organism reacts primarily as a whole and not just through the excitation of individual sense-organs. That is why visual images seen and sensations heard, even though they do not allow us to feel immediately the action of external forces, nevertheless are able to show us that action or express it to us. To put it differently, they have a special vital *dynamism*. The perception of this dynamism is aided by the fact that in perceiving the action of external forces we by the same token feel the activity of our body, feel how it responds to that action. The visual and aural senses are not at all bereft of bodily activity, which, for example, manifests itself in eye movements that follow the observed object's passage through space, or its contours, and in the overall accommodation of the sense organ to the stimulus received. Even though this activity is subjective in origin and can be ascribed to the object only with the assistance of empathy, nonetheless its objectification has a certain objective foundation. After all, in reality all the shapes that objects have and the lines delimiting them arise out of the interaction of various physical forces that are clearly reflected in them. For example, we usually interpret lines and combinations of lines *dynamically*, as if they had a certain definite direction and were governed by a tendency of motion leading our eyes in that direction. There are lines rising upwards or falling downwards; lines that lead away from the observer or towards him, and so on. In reproducing a certain motion lines at the same time represent and express the dynamical properties of these motions (viz., the variety of especially bent lines).[17]

A similar dynamic moment is exhibited by light phenomena. These are most clearly perceived not in the form of various degrees of brightness but as irradiance; in other words, as the action of a certain energy flowing from one or more sources and endowing not only the atmosphere but the things in it with a specific vitality. Furthermore, varieties of light appear not as simple differences in quantity but also as degrees of *intensity*, thus as changes in a certain force. Therefore the painters and drawers who in their works assign to light a dominant role particularly accentuate and highlight the dynamism and effectiveness of light.

Lastly, a certain dynamism also characterizes the realm of colors. In part this depends on the fact that coloration and the play of colors are often due to the effect of light. But even in those cases where the source of coloration is not the radiance of light or the glow of the atmosphere but where the object surface itself looks colored, the varieties of color unfold before our eyes as

degrees of intensity of various properties, that is as various manifestations of a certain energy (no matter whether it is the lucidity of colors, their clearness, saturation, etc.) Colors in this respect are somewhat akin to musical tones; they can be harmonious or discordant; they strengthen and complement or soften and even mute one another, and so on.

Besides, color relations bring up another important moment, namely, that the dynamism of sensible phenomena manifests itself not just through motions, that it can be not only kinetic, but static as well; in other words, it can be conceived as an inner tension of the phenomenon, as a balancing of opposing forces (energies). In general, kinetic dynamism in its pure form is applicable only to those kinds of art in which the aesthetic phenomenon occurs in real time (that is in music, poetry, choreography, cinematography). By contrast, in representational art, the structure of which depends solely on space (rather than time), the dynamism is essentially static. If that weren't the case, a work of painting, sculpture, or architecture would not possess the character of a finished totality. Hence, motion here can be represented only as tendency of an atemporal moment or rudiment, and kinetic dynamism remains subordinated to the static variety.

Of course, the recognition that the expressiveness of aesthetic phenomena is founded on a certain dynamism should not be understood as implying that it always depends on real physical forces manifesting themselves. This would be an artificial interpretation—one which wouldn't fit, for example, the aesthetic impressions that can be gotten from geometric (schematic) figures and drawings. Here the dynamism is in part derivative; lines are conceived as traces of motions that have been caused by certain forces. Besides, any geometric figure is conceived by us as an element that forms and organizes both space itself and the material masses that fill it; thus it is held to possess a certain capacity for action, an ability to form something.

It is usually said that this forming activity reflects nothing other than the apperceptive power of the perceiving subject; but this interpretation forgets that apperception, as a capacity to get to know one's surroundings, is applied to the structure of the external world, i.e., to the forms of external things and phenomena. And since these forms depend on the forces acting in the physical world, the dynamism ascribed to geometric forms (schemata) is ultimately derived from objective factors. Of course, we perceive the forms (structure) of external phenomena and objects in a special way, a way that is dependent on human nature and on how humans in general perceive their environment. In this regard all external impressions, including the aesthetic ones, are determined by the features of the subject as well. But this subjective feature can only change, in one direction or another, the forms of the sensorily perceived objects, only impose a special stamp, but it can by no means create them *simpliciter*. This conclusion is also urged upon us by considering the structure of those senses that are the first ones to supply us with aesthetic impressions. Our organs of both hearing and vision are

organized in such a way that they respond only to stimuli whose physical nature corresponds to the internal structure of the organs. Therefore the excitation of the visual or auditory nerves in a certain way reproduces the dynamism of the corresponding stimulation (its rhythmicity, changes in intensity), and this dynamism of the physiological processes gets reflected in the perceptual act connected with them.

Up to now we've talked only about the expressive significance of dynamism in representational art. As to music, the exceptional importance of dynamism here is obvious and raises no doubts. But the structure of language (especially that of poetry) also yields a most convincing example in this respect. Its dynamism first of all manifests itself in the manner of accentuation; the rise and fall of the voice; various changes in intonation as expressing a question, an order, a statement, a doubt, an emotion, etc.; the quickening or lengthening of the pace of speech; the repetition of words and phrases; and similar things; it is only the syntax that is not affected by the dynamics of language. The latter is doubtless prior to the objective significance of language; initially, language comprehension is entirely limited to it (*Lautgebärde*). An infant first of all perceives its mother's voice intonations (and facial gestures) before it learns to pair words (sound combinations) with a certain definite objective meaning.

Higher animals that can be trained also respond well to expressive changes in voice, even though their grasp of the objective significance of words is highly limited. Change but the intonation, and the same expression is usually perceived differently by them. For the same reason we can comprehend the emotional dynamism of a language whose lexicon is entirely foreign to us.

The Relation of Aesthetic Expressiveness to the Contemplative Attitude

The general conclusion of our analysis may be summarized thus: all of our sensory impressions (the visual and auditory perceptions in particular) are characterized by an immediately perceptible dynamism. This dynamism is neither secondary nor given or lent by the subject to an object in which it had not been there before; on the contrary, if the observer's attitude is purely contemplative (as in doing scientific observations), the dynamism of external impressions fades. The latter effect is a result of abstracting—taking away from the perceptions something which was present in them originally. Yielding to theoretical contemplation (pure observation), the subject abstracts himself from his activity, his real interaction with the surrounding world, and looks upon it sideways, as if the phenomena and events around him could not affect him at all.

But it isn't only theoretical observation that deflects attention from the sensual dynamics (effectiveness) of things and phenomena. In practical life it can be overwhelmed or even totally obliterated by *habit*. In actively working

on a certain task a person does not linger over the sensory appearance of the phenomena or things with which he comes into contact; he pays attention to them only to the extent that they are a sign indicating to him what he should do at the moment in question, what motion he should perform, and so on.[18] But even in those cases where a person isn't doing anything in particular these simplified schemata, which form in the mind as a result of practical activity, suppress the direct efficacy of the sensory impressions.

As long as the sensory impressions are dynamic, as long as they are perceived as manifestations of forces asserting themselves in the surrounding world, they are by their very nature expressive. The picturesque dynamism of perceptions is the only form in which the psychological excitations and experiences of other beings is felt. Hence aesthetic perceptions, too, are grounded on nothing other than immediate dynamic and *ipso facto* expressive impressions. And this objective emotionality of which the latter are full and which appears so mysterious (paradoxical) is just a product or consequence of their expressiveness. It is just here that the special character of the aesthetic mind-set manifests itself: this mind-set, paying no attention to the actual practical significance of things or phenomena and looking back again on their sensory appearance, resuscitates their primal expressiveness that habit had suppressed. Herein lies the foundation on which aesthetic contemplation is grounded and also the starting point that allows it to descry and to highlight the aesthetic values borne by the object. Thus the aesthetic view (contemplation) not only creates anew the qualitative character of the first impression but also actualizes, unfolds, and brings to flowering that which had only inchoately germinated in it.

That the expressiveness of sensory dynamism is extremely rich and comprehends the most diverse phenomena of life—from an elemental physical shake-up to the most subtle and profound psychic experiences—is amply shown to us by *music*, in which this dynamism appears in pure and self-sufficient form and which therefore represents emotional art *par excellence*. The expressiveness of music is non-objective; it depends on no objective (objectively depicted or verbally expressed) subject matter.

Of course, the independent expressiveness of sensory dynamism, even though it is characterized by an unlimited variety of possible alterations, determines only the general structure and process of life and mind. Consequently, in order that the general dynamic schema, manifesting itself in expressive gestures, mime, changes in vocal color, and so on, become univocal, i.e., that it express not only the flow of life in general but also a specific emotion, passion, or mood, it must acquire a certain objective moment—or, in the case of art—a certain subject matter. Only in that case will the expression of psychic excitations and experiences acquire a well-delineated specific character—so that it becomes clear that these are a person's feelings and experiences arising out of a certain specific or typical

situation, or out of his mind-set, or out of his relations with other people, and so on.

Of course, this connection of the dynamical schema with one or another objective subject or story influences the former in turn, i.e., helps it to differentiate itself (attain a concrete shape) in a certain indicated direction. But even in this case the general dynamic schema does not achieve the definition and univocality that is characteristic of the subject or story. That is why the schema can be applied to diverse subjects and interpreted in different ways, as is evident, among other things, from the way music relates to poetry or, in general, to any verbally expressed text (for example, in a song, opera, or oratorio). It is not the melody or the recitative that illustrates the text; rather, it is the words that illustrate the music, giving it a definite objective significance. And if the composer sets a certain text (for example, poems) to music, he does not thereby explicate the objective meaning of the words, but only devises an appropriate *dynamic background* for them. Therefore, every objective interpretation of a musical work will be to some extent arbitrary and subjective, and there are never any objective grounds for asserting that the composer had in mind—and wanted to describe—just this rather than another objective story.

From this it becomes clear how we should regard so-called program music, which sets itself the task of describing or even depicting, by musical means, either an historical event, or a natural phenomenon, or a certain dramatic situation, etc. As long as it remains music in the proper sense, i.e., music that follows its own characteristic rules, it can represent in tones only a general dynamic schema for these events or phenomena. And even in those cases when it reproduces (imitates) all kinds of noise (the roar of a tempest, the wash of the waves, the chirping of birds, the clap of thunder, etc.), it never portrays the objective cause of these noises, but only the noise itself, adjusting it to a certain musical form. The greater the differentiation of this form, the greater the quantity of its nuances and shadings, the more accurately it will express the dynamism of its objective subject. Nevertheless, it will never coincide with the subject itself because the dynamism it creates essentially lacks an objective character.

Invigoration

Now, having defined the expressiveness of an aesthetic object, we can explain more exactly what is meant by invigoration (personification, anthropomorphization) in art and what role is played by empathy in this. Invigoration should not be understood as something whereby we give vitality to something that by its nature is non-vital, i.e., whereby we ascribe to non-living things a property that is foreign to them and has no objective basis in them. Of course, such invigoration is possible, but not being natural it will inevitably create an artificial impression. The sort of invigoration that is used

by art and of which mythological creations are full is different: it is based on the dynamism inherent in natural phenomena and in the things of the surrounding world, and in bringing it to the fore it displays to us that aspect of the thing or phenomenon which

Mental Infection and its Forms. Echoic Feelings

But the foregoing does not yet suffice for resolving the issue of aesthetic emotionality. Our analysis of aesthetic impressions only allowed us to determine that they contained a certain objective emotional moment, i.e., an emotional moment related to the object's appearance, and that this moment cannot be reduced to the feelings which the subject has in perceiving the aesthetic object. But how is this "objective" emotionality to be understood? How can a subject directly, intuitively feel another being's vitality or experiences? This question cannot be answered as follows: we only imagine these feelings or emotions—because feelings and emotions are not objective images that can rise up in consciousness without touching our "I"; they are non-objective experiences accessible to the subject only to such a degree as he himself experiences them. Consequently, the feelings of other beings (people) can be directly experienced by us only when they become the experiences of our own "I" as well. But in that case, it seems, the specific difference between my own feelings and those that I have when ascribing them to another human being vanishes. And it is just this incontestable fact (namely, that feelings and emotions are indissolubly tied to our "I") that compels psychologists to recognize that their objectivity is only an illusion arising from an unconscious (instinctive) act of objectification. The subject ascribes to the object itself that emotional excitation that the object kindles in him, the subject. This, as we have seen, is how objective feelings are explained by the empathy theory. Its shortcomings have been pointed out earlier.

Other scholars (for example, Carl Lange) deem these experiences themselves to be alleged (illusory) feelings. But what is meant by alleged feelings? If you really do not experience a certain feeling but only imagine that you experience it, you are fooling yourself. This undoubtedly does happen to people sometimes; nevertheless, such types of self-deception clearly differ from cases where you really participate in another human being's pain, joy, or similar things. And if we dub as alleged a feeling that is ascribed to an unreal object, e. g. a character in a work of art, then again the question arises, How does this feeling differ from one that is associated with a real object? The difference cannot lie merely in quantity, as Lange believes; it must be *qualitative* as well, for otherwise it is hard to understand where the impression of the objectivity of these feelings comes from. That can only be explained, it seems, by presuming that the subject in those cases somehow identifies himself with the object. Then another's feelings will be my feelings

as well. Undoubtedly, when one empathizes with another person (e. g., the hero of a play or novel), the distinction between subject and object seems to vanish and the subject totally submerges himself into the life of the object. The identification may not be complete; still, in my mind (for example, when I feel another's misery or follow the action in a play) there arise "objective" feelings that I clearly distinguish from my personal experiences (i.e., those that arise from my "I").[19] Be that as it may, the phenomenon of identification requires explication or at least a more precise phenomenological description. Only when we answer the general question, How are we able to feel directly and specifically the mental state of other beings? can we hope to understand the function that "objective" feelings perform in aesthetic contemplation.

As we have established, all sensory perceptions that in one way or another possess significance for an animal are by the same token expressive, i.e., possess a certain emotional coloring that sticks to the very object (the object itself is horrible, tempting, pleasant, repulsive, etc.). But this affective appearance of the object is so closely connected with the subject's emotional reaction that it seems to be nothing other than the objective correlate (representation) of that subjective reaction and does not show what the inner state of the object itself is like (the object is horrible insofar and because it scares me, or charming because it enchants me, and so on). But if the object is an animal or even a human being, I experience not only his effect on my "I," but also his own feelings, his mood, and his vitality in general. This is exactly the phenomenon which must be explained.

To this end let us direct our attention to an extraordinary feature in which the objectivity of that emotional and vital experience comes up particularly clearly. This is the so-called *mental infection*. Thus when I see that another person has injured himself in the leg to the point of bleeding or cut himself in the finger with a knife, I feel that person's pain myself—it hurts and affects me. In the same way, I can be affected by another's fear, sorrow, joy, and other feelings. Particularly favorable for mental infection are circumstances in which the individual feels himself part of a collective, especially one that is overtaken by a common emotional attitude (e.g. fear, anger, enthusiasm, and so on). From the fact that the beings most susceptible to mental infection are animals in a herd and primitive (aboriginal) men, i.e., creatures whose life is governed by a natural social environment, it may follow that this infection has something to do with the *familial instinct*, which subjects an individual to his family (biological collective) and equips him with a special sensitivity to everything that touches upon that collective's positive or negative welfare. The more closely an individual is biologically tied to his family, the more strongly this mental infection is manifested (in the relation of the young to their parents in the case of animals; in the familial way of life in the case of humans). The forms of the familial instinct and mental infection vary with the degree of the being's consciousness (rationality): the higher that degree is, the more the former shed their initial inchoate character and submit to the

influence of the individual's self-sufficiency. In general, we can differentiate three forms of this emotional phenomenon—forms that characterize distinct phases of its development which do not cancel one another out even in the highest degree of evolution (in the human being).

(1) Having noticed that another member of the collective is emotionally agitated, the individual experiences the same (or at least a similar) feeling. The fact that this feeling is caused by another individual's agitation does not make itself felt separately in the mind of the first and does not afford that feeling any special color. For instance, the fear that had swept over another individual is felt by him as *his own* fear that has arisen in a certain instinctively felt social atmosphere. In this atmosphere the emotional states of separate individuals are similar and parallel. But to each his physical and social environment is first of all a field of action and reaction, rather than a world of independently existing objects. This is a case of *simple instinctive infection*.

(2) The psychological infection acquires a different character in those cases where within the emotional experience itself its provenance from the agitation of another subject becomes evident. Now even in my own eyes my feeling is just a response to another person's (or animal's) feeling—not in the sense that I understand or become aware of this causal relation but in the sense that I just feel ("dig") the fact that I harmoniously "groove" in another's emotional state. This is an *echoic* feeling, which is not merely motivated by an act of direct perception but together with it constitutes an indissoluble inner unity (emotional cognition). The focus or center of mass of the experience has moved: another individual's feeling occupies the centre stage of my consciousness; I only second that feeling.

In order better to understand the nature of echoic feelings we must recognize that not all sensory impressions have the same or a similar objective structure as visual phenomena do. A tone, for example, does not rise up in front of me as a visible image discrete from me. Although it comes from the outside and sounds in my environment, it also makes a sound in my ears, which respond to it as an instrument responds to the consonant tone of another instrument. The auditory sense, as it now turns out, is closely related to the so-called *vibratory* perceptions which arise when the vibrations in the air get communicated to our body (that's why even a deaf person can feel music and appreciate it). Of course, the body's response to external undulation is a purely physiological process; however, because the consonance of the vibrations is felt here, it is accompanied by a special perceptual act. This shows that even sensory perception is based in certain cases on infection and explains how imitation can occur. Imitation is a type of response that issues not in a reaction distinct from the external stimulus, but in an analogical inner excitement. It is no accident that the most important and potent form of human communication is sound. Words, as has already been indicated, do not merely express a sensory, objective meaning;

their very sensory nature evinces a suggestive power that infects the subject perceiving them and evokes in his soul a consonant repercussion.

The form of mental infection just described corresponds to a different image of the surrounding world: that world is not only a field for the subject to act upon but it also confronts him as a totality of independent objects, which insinuates upon the subject its own way of being and acting.

(3) Yet infection can reach a still higher or more intense degree, taking on the form of *devotion* to the object. The intention toward the perceived object is here accentuated to such an extent that it fills the whole field of consciousness, pushing out any other content, and concentrating attention exclusively on that single object. The act of perception gets livelier and richer; the subject's consciousness as it were unfolds itself and opens up to the object and becomes extraordinarily sensitive to all its qualities. And if the object itself is expressive, that sensitivity of the subject gives rise in the latter to an especially lively emotional echo because devoting himself to the object he attunes his inner state to the expression embodied in the object's appearance. The more intense the devotion, the deeper and more pure will be the emotional reverberation arising in him. In this sense we may indeed talk about a certain fusion or identification of the subject with the object. But even in those cases when the object is a living being it would hardly be justified to claim that the subject's emotional echo is totally identical with the feeling to which it responds. Even the instrument's response to a consonant tone is characterized by a special hue peculiar to that instrument. In like wise a human being's emotional echo varies with his individual temperament, sensitivity, experience, and the general direction of his psychological life; therefore its objectivity (correspondence to the object's expressiveness) is uneven. On the one hand, the echoic reaction is basic to all the purely *subjective* feelings through which the attitude (sympathy, antipathy, compassion, pity, fascination, etc.) of our "I" towards the perceived object is expressed. On the other hand, when the emotional reverberation is caused by devotion to the object, the echoic reaction underlies the empathy that is equally significant both to the moral and to the aesthetic life. Thus, empathy is not the cause of echoic excitement but only reveals it, makes it clearer and richer. Echoic feelings are objective also in that they do not depend on the will of the subject; they sometimes even storm him though he tries to resist them. There are people who avoid all strong and sad impressions (for example, tragic ones) because they are easily susceptible to mental infection.

On the basis of what has been said we must deem false or at least inaccurate the view that a person can understand the experiences of others only to the extent that he has himself felt similar emotions. This view would be justified only if emotional comprehension were in fact based on empathy or analogical reasoning—for in that case its only source would be my own experience. But in reality that experience, as was already shown, performs but an auxiliary function—it only deepens and revises (differentiates) the

echoic excitation. The decisive role belong to the subject's sensitivity, his ability to devote himself to the object, and to match his perception to the latter's expressive appearance. And it is just because of this sensitivity that he is touched not only by other people but also by fictional characters in a novel or play—touched by their fate and adventures as if they had happened to him.[20] This is the foundation of the extraordinary educative influence that art has on the human mind: it forms, deepens, and broadens the life of the feelings, enabling us to experience, in the form of echoic emotions, things that in reality are simply inaccessible to us. To be sure, emotive reverberations lose their vitality and clarity in those cases where we confront another (animal's or person's) mind which is alien to us and does not fit our own (and always limited) emotionality. Even so the latter possesses possibilities of sensitivity that are broader than the emotional experiences deriving solely from the circumstances of real life.

However, devotion to an object does not always guarantee a truly aesthetic perception of it. The perception may be *egocentrically* oriented, when the spectator or auditor does not delve into the object's structure and expressiveness but delights in the sensations that the perceived object arouses in him. In that case the object is first of all an occasion for him to indulge in pleasant feelings, images, and fantasies, and clothe them in an objective and forceful form. Thus a young reader immerses himself into a novel's plot not because he cares about the hero's character and fate but because he sees in him the embodiment of his own fancied ideal and identifies him with his own (idealized) personality. Or a concertgoer does not closely attend to the expressive language of the composition and the development of its themes but delights in the elation and in the play of feelings and associations that arise within him as an effect of the music. At the center of these experience there stands not the aesthetic object but the *"I" of the perceiving subject*, who uses the work of art as a way of indulging in his feelings and as a means of self-adulation. In that case the aesthetic perception remains subjective and superficial. The subject by his echoic sensations responds only to those features of the object that correspond to his individual needs and interprets the art work in accordance with a certain scheme adjusted to his own attitudes and interests.

Sometimes there can also occur a certain *pseudomorphosis* of feelings. When the subject's feelings are as yet unpronounced and undifferentiated because they have not yet had a proper chance to assert (objectify) themselves and the subject himself does not know to deal with them, then in reading a novel or watching a film it may seem to him that the emotional experiences embodied in them are identical to those that he himself has, and this impression leads him not only to ascribe to his feelings a significance and a motivation (moral or aesthetic) that they in reality do not have but also to steer their development in a direction unsuitable to their nature.

That devotion in which a true aesthetic contemplation is rooted is, by contrast, not egocentric but *object-centered*. It is that *ecstatic* mind-set wherein the subject forgets himself and experiences only the meaning embodied in the object itself. In this sense the aesthetic attitude is subjectively disinterested.

Thus the conclusions of our analysis show that (1) aesthetic contemplation differs from a purely theoretical one in that the former not only does not discount the object's sensory expressiveness but positively places it at the perception's center; (2) that the emotionality or vitality of which the object is full is perceived and experienced by the subject under the guise of echoic feelings; and (3) that these echoic feelings acquire an aesthetic significance and become an essential (constitutive) moment of the aesthetic impression to the extent that the sensibly perceived structure of the object speaks through them.

Artistic Acts of Re-Creation. Dramatic Acting (Reincarnation)

Before we conclude with our characterization of aesthetic contemplation, we should note that the latter is not a passive state ruling out the subject's external activity. We can understand this if we keep in mind that (1) aesthetic contemplation is a *synthetic* act of conception embracing the object's structure and expressiveness and (2) that it contains an emotive moment which tends not only to preserve[21] but also to assert (objectify) itself in the appropriate manner. That is shown both by the creative act itself, depending as it does on a certain aesthetic perception, and by the *re-creating* of works of art (the copying of pictures or statues; the performing of musical works, dances, or plays). These acts of re-creation differ from each other insofar as the structure of the work of art itself leaves more or less room for the independent activity of the re-creating subject. If for the making of an accurate copy of a painting it almost (but not quite!) suffices to have the appropriate technical proficiency, then performing a musical work demands a certain personal creative initiative. The written score of a musical piece is but a *potentiality* that is actualized only in and through the performance. This potentiality does not determine all of the aesthetically significant details of the performance; therefore, it contains various possibilities of performance. It is up to the performing subject to realize one or another possibility and to re-create the work under the guise of a chosen aspect. To be sure, such a re-creation cannot base itself on an approximate idea of the work and indistinct echoic feelings but requires a conscious immersion into the aesthetic intention of the composition and an ability to realize it with the appropriate motions. And this job of realizing (embodying) it is by no means merely external and aesthetically neutral; it contributes importantly to the work's re-creation, bringing out its initial perception together with the emotional reverberations accompanying it and giving the intention a finished and

precisely differentiated form. And this job of realizing (embodying) it is by no means only external and aesthetically neutral; it contributes substantially to the work's re-creation, developing its initial perception together with the accompanying emotional reverberations and giving it a finished and precisely differentiated form.

Among the forms of re-creation dramatic acting is especially interesting. Here the subject's identification with the aesthetic object achieves the highest tension because it requires not only empathy with but reincarnation in that other human being (the object) whose role the subject is taking on. Reincarnation is possible only if the actor not only empathically takes on the dramatic character's personality and temperament but also puts himself into the concrete situation in which that character lives and acts. This is grounded on a certain imaginative (positing) act allowing one to answer to the following question: What would I do if I were in that person's place and had to act under his circumstances? Thus the intention of this act is not purely contemplative but directed towards *action*.[22] Therefore reincarnation cannot base itself solely on sense-data and echoic feelings; it must utilize and activate the *imitative* motions arising from those sense-data and feelings. Inner imitation must become *outer*; it must result in the appropriate gestures and actions.

Similar acts of imagination and transference are performed not only by the actor on stage but by every ordinary person in day-to-day life. Whenever we wish to turn events to our favor and consider ways of behaving, we endeavor to foresee all possible outcomes. And for this reason we must delve into the way other people think and feel, and try to estimate how they might behave in certain circumstances, how they might react to our behavior, and so on. Still closer to the actor's reincarnation is the behavior of those people who in their social life attempt to act out a role that does not correspond to their nature or situation. However, the stage actor's case differs from those just mentioned in that being beholden only to an aesthetic purpose and oriented towards the spectator, acting must present the latter with a *show* in which the meaning and significance of the acted-out role would be manifested in the most convincing and impressive way. And acting will achieve its goal if the taking on of another's personality is truly concrete and deep, i.e., if it takes in all of the external and internal conditions that matter to that person's actions and expressive gestures, and if it penetrates to the very center of that person, the fundamental attitude that governs all of his behavior.

This is the goal towards which are oriented the specific educational methods and exercises that are used in acting schools to train and strengthen both the actor's memory and his imagination (sensory and emotional); to teach him to concentrate and either to expand or to narrow his field of attention, and to precisely calibrate his actions and gestures with that internal condition that is supposed to be expressed by them.

Thus the analysis in this chapter leads to the conclusion that the explication of the emotional moment of the aesthetic object finally needs no other principle than that sufficient to measure formal beauty. It is based just like the latter on the sensory structure of the object or, more accurately, on the vital dynamism manifested in that structure. But since the task of art is to make prominent the object's sensory appearance by showing its most significant and contentful aspect, it thereby also highlights and actualizes its inherent dynamism.

Note that the thesis according to which beauty is the sensory expression of a spiritual content or manifests itself in the expressiveness of the sensory image is, though accepted by many aesthetic theorists, very differently explained by them. Take the aesthetics of Benedetto Croce. For him aesthetic perception is nothing other than an act of cognition which differs from a scientific one only in that it is sensory, picturesque, and uses no abstract concepts. Because in this perception the subject does not just passively obtain an external impression but spontaneously responds to it by imprinting it with a special seal corresponding to its individuality, the perception is at the same time an act of expression, too. However, Croce sharply distinguishes this inner expression from its objectification in the external image, holding the latter to be but a *practical* or *technical* act that adds nothing to the aesthetic perception and is therefore neutral with respect to it. Consequently, artistic creativity is, in Croce's opinion, a purely spiritual process, which ends in the artist's interior and is in no wise determined by the external realization of the created image. This interpretation of artistic perception and expression appears to us unsatisfactory on two counts.

(1) It fails to distinguish aesthetic from non-aesthetic perception and identifies the aesthetic mind-set with a purely theoretical one. One can hardly concur with the idea that every sensory perception, whatever it might be, is of an aesthetic nature. (2) In describing artistic creativity we should by no means separate the internal perception from its embodiment in the external image, for both of these moments constitute an indissoluble unity. The perception is the starting point of the realization process, but it itself is also formed and enhanced by that act. In denying the essential connection of spiritual perception with its external realization, Croce apparently fails to assign an aesthetic significance to the problem of form. Thus the analysis of literary forms (genres), in his view, is useless because it does not explain anything aesthetically. In other words, the literary form itself in no way determines the aesthetic impression derived from a work of art. This thesis is true only in the sense that an analysis of form cannot explain all of the work's individual artistic content. But, on the other hand, it is precisely stylistic analyses, which are based on the concept of form (structure), that abundantly show the one-sidedness of Croce's view.

The Relation of the Sensory Image to the Objective Meaning

Having clarified the foundation of the emotional factor inherent in the aesthetic object, we still must show (1) how a pure sensory form that by itself is without a subject can so coalesce with an objective meaning (subject) that it forms an organic unity with it, and (2) how the non-objective dynamism of the aesthetic object can concretely reveal itself in those vital phenomena that are connected to a certain objective significance and can be endowed with meaning? These questions directly affect only representational art, i.e., painting and sculpture, for other arts do not depict objects in a direct fashion. Music, insofar as it is independent, is not typically subject-related, whereas in poetry the sensory appearance of the word is insufficient: its significance depends wholly on its relation to the objective meaning of the word (object).

As far as architecture is concerned, it itself creates forms of buildings rather than depicting such as already exist; and the form of a building is determined by its practical function. Therefore we will further discuss only the representational arts.

At first sight it might seem that pure sensible form and objective significance are two totally distinct things belonging to different levels of reality and unable to coalesce into an organic unity, and that in acquiring objective significance the sensory form gets added on to it something new, something beyond its limits. And in truth objective significance is a special component of the aesthetic object, a component incomparable to purely sensory impressions and accessible only to a specific act of the understanding (reason).

Even so we have already convinced ourselves of the fact that understanding cannot be strictly separated from perception and that in even the simplest sensory perception there is a certain understanding, for perceptual objects are phenomena which usually consist of numerous non-homogeneous sensory impressions and are connected with other things or processes, i.e., with the entire environment and various spatial and temporal relations. To perceive a phenomenon is to perceive the special unity of its sensory structure. This structure emerges in the world of visible objects from (1) a certain spatial (plane or stereometric) form, which directly or in a subsequent act can be thematized and defined either by indicating that geometric figure to which it has an affinity or by comparing it to the appearance of another object known to us, and from (2) a variety of optical data (colors, lights and shadows, etc.), characterizing not only the object's spatial form and coloration but also its surface, in which its material constitution and some of its qualities are to some extent manifest. For example, we see that it is solid, fluid or gaseous, that the solid is hard or soft, and so on. Consequently, these optic data inform us about such qualities that can be directly perceived only by other senses (especially touch). In other words, they indicate or *signify* that to which sight, by itself alone, would not

have access. However, the nature of an object is not exhausted by what directly affects one or the other organ of sense. It also embraces all those of its qualities that we perceive by in one or another way doing something with it or by observing its relations and interactions with other objects. These qualities also get reflected in the object's visible appearance. When we perceive the latter, we thereby perceive all of the object's nature insofar as it is accessible or known to us, i.e., we comprehend its objective significance. For example, if we see that it is an apple, then we perceive not only its special round form and color, but also potentially the other data relating to its nature: we think that it a tree fruit, that it is edible, tasty, sweet, and so forth. This is shown *inter alia* by the fact that when needed we know what to do with it. Consequently, the thing's objective significance is not an independent component adjoined to its sensory form and requiring a separate act of perception. The direct object of vision is only the visible (sensory) appearance of things and processes, and it is only in and through this appearance that their significance (the totality of their nature that is inaccessible to sight) can be vividly and concretely perceived.

That is why in representational art objective significance does not pose new challenges for the artist: for it to be perceived just one condition must be met: in the depicted sensory form the *object's nature*, its essential and characteristic features must, make themselves *manifest*. Thus in the content of the sensory perception the objective significance appears only as a *variation* or *specification* of the visible *appearance*, which, however, can considerably alter the expressiveness of the sensible form. The more expressive the nature or essence of a depicted object and the more values there are in it, the more it enriches and deepens the expressiveness of the visible appearance. In any case, the means used by an artist to bring out objective meaning are *the same* that he uses to bring out the sensible form.

Remarks that do not arise out of the image of the object itself (for example, explanatory captions) do not contribute anything to the art work's aesthetic value. Neither do those features of the subject (objective significance) that affect the viewer outside the framework of the aesthetic appearance, i.e., those that are not expressed through the latter or are not in tune with it (for example, the subject's sensationalism or attractiveness). And if the artist is inclined to choose only effective subjects, one has to conclude that he is not primarily concerned with the embodiment of aesthetic values, but is guided by extraneous considerations having nothing to do with art.

The relation of objective significance to aesthetic form can also be explained as follows: a composition with a subject (i.e., one having a certain objective meaning) must meet the same aesthetic requirements as the composition for which the expressiveness of non-representing forms suffices. But it must be appropriate for objective significance, i.e., it must be so arranged that the story and its meaning are manifested in it. In this respect, the objective meaning carries out the function of a higher, organizing factor,

which subordinates the aesthetic form to a new principle that gives meaning to it. Most often the subject (the objective sense) plays the role of the supreme dominant, determining the structure of the entire composition.

Nevertheless, there are also cases, especially in decorative art, where the organizing function belongs solely to the harmoniousness and dynamism of the pure sensory forms, to which the subject or certain subject elements (human, animal, plant, thing shapes) is adapted. From this subordination of the subject to a purely sensory structure (form) there arises the *stylization* of things and organic creatures; i.e., such a treatment of their forms that corresponds to a certain style of composition but at the same time departs somewhat from their natural or real appearance. Thus in representational art a composition with a subject consists of as it were two (or more) layers or planes interrelates in such a way that the upper depends on the lower and that its aesthetic designs can be implemented only insofar as the aesthetic requirements of the underlying layer are satisfied. The general schema of a composition in this case would be as follows:

3. *Symbolic (general or historical) meaning*. Indirect objective meaning.	And its valuational and emotive content.
2. *Direct objective significance* (action, event, state).	And its inner emotional side.
1. *Purely sensory structure (form*). The plane and its elements (lines, colors, light, shadows), three-dimensional space and bodies (the spatial function, i.e., depth-representation, of lines, colors, light, shadows).	And its special expressiveness (harmony, dynamism, and so on).

In this schema, the mutual relations of the separate layers or planes can be very diverse; with respect to expressiveness, for instance, it can be either full (perfect) correspondence or a certain opposition. The decisive significance can be accorded to one or the other depending on the general aesthetic plan (project) of the composition and so on. Of course, the scheme indicated fits the structure of a thematic composition only if the latter is looked upon as a completed whole; the scheme cannot be applied toward explicating the genesis, i.e., the creative process, of the composition. In other words, it should not be thought that the starting point of a composition always has to be a certain subjectless sensory form to which the artist subsequently, in processing and modeling its separate parts, imparts an objective signification. The theme of the composition most often is the objective subject itself, and the goal of the creative process is to re-create and record that sensory aspect of the subject which best meets the demands of aesthetic expressiveness.

An example of this is provided by the sculptural composition with which Michelangelo adorned the Medici chapel and tombs in Florence. In front of the chapel wall constituting the composition's architectural background there are two sarcophagi, on each of which recline two nude figures. Above them in two corresponding niches in the wall are placed two seated figures of the dukes Lorenzo and Giuliano. All of these sculptures together with the tombs constitute a purely formal compositional totality (ensemble), which they fit regardless of their objective signification. (The plane in which the composition unfolds is separated according to a unified symmetric plan, and the distribution of masses is governed by a harmonious equilibrium.) Similarly composed is each of the two groups of figures (the sarcophagus with two reclining figures and, above them, the seated figure in the niche) that make up the overall composition. That is the fundamental purely sensory plan of the entire work, determining it in respect of the spatial composition. This plan's framework circumscribes the subject itself: on the one hand, the idealized statues of the counts with knightly amour; on the other, the reclining figures, whose poses (positions) are chosen and varied in such a way that most vividly displays the characteristics of the human body and its parts: the inner dynamism, harmony, and expressiveness. However, the positions (poses), mimicry, and gestures of these figures simultaneously express their various inner states. One is asleep, the other lies there tiredly, the third awakens, the fourth is already awake and seems about to arise. Finally, from the vital expressiveness of these figures there emerges their twofold symbolic significance: they represent both the cyclical nature of life (the constant changing of Evening, Night, Morning, and Day) and its transience. That life is doomed to perdition is even more emphatically brought home by the sarcophagi, which form the basis of the figures: they symbolize death. In the entire composition, the horizontal direction has precedence over the vertical. In addition, this feature helps accentuate the significance of its symbolic meaning.

Another example is provided by the series of Čiurlionis paintings that he called sonatas. To begin with, we should note that these are self-sufficient, completed pictures. They are not subordinated to any larger tectonic totality. The general impression that one gets from the canvasses even before attending to the subject of the paintings reveals a clearly delineated plane, i.e., a plane composition in which the distribution and arrangement of the elements or parts is governed by certain well-defined coordinates or directions. The "sonatas" are not purely painterly works in the sense that their aesthetic impression is conditioned only by the values of their colors and their combinations. That is why they do lose none of their effectiveness even in a graphic (uncolored) reproduction. In this respect, they harbor a certain graphic ornamentality, which is especially strengthened by the schematic treatment of individual motifs and by regular repetition.

Even so the principal compositional intention in these works is not ornamental (as it is, for example, in some of Čiurlionis's later works). Looking more closely at them one sees that Čiurlionis not only is forming the canvas's plane but also depicting a three-dimensional space. A spectator usually sees some landscape from a far-away and rather high-up point—so that a very broad horizon unfolds before his eyes. This is the reason for the small size of the separate objects depicted and their schematicity; they are usually not more than silhouettes, purely optical images lacking any material massiveness. Colors are treated accordingly: they are soft, transparent, and display only a few nuances (variations) that characterize not so much the individual things but the atmosphere that envelops and suffuses them, thereby according an extraordinary lightness to the objects themselves. From this it is clear that these compositions, even though depth is not explicitly emphasized in them, allow us to feel immediately the boundlessness of space—so that even a limited picture, it appears, stands in for the entire cosmos (for example, the Spring Sonata Allegro).

To produce this impression of limitlessness Čiurlionis often uses a special technique: in one composition he conjoins several independent spatial planes, or composes them in such a way that the upper one rises up like a second story above the lower one (for example, the Allegro and Finale of the Serpent Sonata), or in such a way that from the front plane there opens up like in a window a view of more distant planes (for example, the Spring Sonata Allegro). Yet all of these formal features and techniques have no independent meaning for Čiurlionis: he uses them only to bring out to a maximum extent the mood and symbolic significance that he wants embodied in the painting. It ought to be remarked that although the image of nature is here schematicized and often shows a certain fantasticality it does not lack a certain naturalism: the landscape breathes a peculiar Lithuanian natural beauty and tenderness (for example, in the Spring Sonata).

Nevertheless, in the Sonatas Čiurlionis is not concerned so much with the accurate depiction of one or another locality of his beloved homeland; rather, he is concerned above all to show how in that landscape the organic vitality and elemental action of its forces asserts itself. This is the key motif of Čiulionis's creativity, and it determines the Sonatas' composition, as their titles clearly show: Spring, Sun, and Sea Sonata. In order to express the dynamism of life Čiurlionis does not content himself with one painting but spreads out his chosen subject in several canvasses portraying different phases or aspects of the same phenomenon or process. But even in the paintings taken singly the dynamic moment is unmistakably emphasized: the distinct compositional elements are governed by one powerful motion and depend on the same vital rhythm. The dominant diagonal lines along which the separate objects are laid out creates the impression of motion. Rhythm is created by the regular repetition of the same or similar elements; and it is particularly vivid in a motif well liked by Čiurlionis: the reflection of things

on the surface of the water (the Allegro and Fugue of the Spring Sonata offer examples of this). Dynamism and rhythmicality endow the composition with a special expressiveness, which make it akin to a work of music. The structure of the painting as a whole is similar to a polyphonic orchestral composition, in which every instrument responds with its voice to the voices of the other instruments, and they all make up a powerful, harmonious sound.

Carrying this comparison further, we may say that the melody is represented by the broad sweep of the dominant lines; and the tonality and modulations are stood in for by the general coloration of the background and its variations. Nevertheless, decisive significance attaches not to these separate structural analogies, but to the picture's general musical atmosphere, which, in addition, is supported and strengthened by the "optical metaphors" that Čiurlionis uses. The simplified forms of things come to resemble those of other things and become ambiguous. One and the same form appears together as a star, blossom, flame, and snowflake; or the water surface is also an aperture in the earth through which you see another landscape (Spring Sonata Allegro). Just as the expressiveness of music can be explained in different ways, so do Čiurlionis's painted sonatas harbor different meanings. Moreover, this multiplicity of significations weakens the objective definiteness of each separate signification and thus prevents any one of them from becoming preponderant. The dematerialization of colors mentioned earlier tends in the same direction. Together with the optical metaphors, it allows the colors and the shapes of things so to interflow and blend as the consonant tones intermingle in a many-voiced orchestra.

Thus, the peculiarity of the sonatas does not rely on any application to painting of musical forms alien to it. Čiurlionis does not pass beyond the possibilities accessible to painting itself, but only utilizes the potentialities or values of painting that are kindred to music. Therefore, the musical atmosphere of the sonata paintings grows organically out of the formal features described above.

The symbolic meaning of these paintings also is not ratiocinated but truly suggests itself to a viewer sensitive to nature and delving into the subject and the special way it is treated: nature is ruled by the same vital force that governs man's existence and creativity.

4. Aesthetic Form and Aesthetic Structure

A. Introduction

The main features of aesthetic being have now been to a certain extent defined: they are determined, on the one hand, by the sensory structure of the aesthetic object, and on the other, by the special attitude of consciousness (mind-set) that enables the subject to perceive this structure. However, before going further with our analysis, we must stop to reflect on the results we have

achieved and compare them with the conclusions that have been reached by the most important aesthetic theories of our time.

The term *sensory structure* used in our analysis replaces another term, that of *form*, which in our view is less appropriate. Thus we will have to show why this replacement is justified or, in other words, why the concept of structure is to be preferred to that of form. The clarification of this issue requires an exact definition of the content (meaning) of both concepts. We shall begin with form.

At first blush, form appears to be a rather clear concept, not presenting any great difficulties for its analysis. It is not a creature of scientific or scholarly reflection but already made its appearance in pre-scientific thought and plays a very important part in man's everyday life. However, it is precisely this circumstance that makes a precise definition of form difficult, for this concept is applied to the most diverse kinds and spheres of objects not having anything essentially in common and receiving a new, distinct sense in every separate field of application. Thus we speak not only about the form (meaning: shape) of sensible things and phenomena but also about logical and grammatical form of thoughts. Similarly, we distinguish by their special form the various historical manifestations of religion, morality, law, language, and culture in general. In a word, there is no area of the physical or spiritual world in which the concept of form would not be somehow applied. Although we are here concerned only to determine what significance is ascribed to form in art and in aesthetics, for that we must clarify to ourselves the original meaning of that concept and its principal variations, since even the term "artistic or aesthetic form" is by no means always used in one and the same sense.

B. Visible and Tangible Forms. Their Organizational Significance

Since our (human) cognition starts from the external environment with which we interact and since it initially bases itself on the data gained from vision and touch, form to begin with means nothing other than sensible or, to be more exact, visible and tangible form. Of these two, *visible* form has priority. It is independent and determines the external appearance of things; data from other senses, i.e., kinesthetic sensations, depending on eye movements, and impressions from touching, are assimilated by the visible form and go into it as supplementary elements (especially in the proximal image of a thing, having a three-dimensional stereometric form). The tangible form, by contrast, is inextricably tied up with the optical appearance of the thing. In any case, a normal (seeing) person is always inclined to translate tangible impressions into corresponding impressions of visible form.

Visible form, whether it consists only of optical impressions or is supplemented and fortified by tactile and kinesthetic data, constitutes the principal spatial determination of objects: circumscribing the object, it marks

it off from other objects and the whole environment. An object appears to us as a definite and complete totality only insofar as it has a certain form (shape). But a thing's shape does not coincide with the thing itself. It only determines its geometric side, delineating its contours or surface without giving any information about its internal structure and material constitution. It is also unconnected with the object's coloring. Although color brings forth and accentuates a thing's form, the latter is very independent of the color's quality. Therefore, geometric form is opposed (1) to the thing's material nature and (2) to its color as a special and independent moment (aspect) of the thing. The form can remain the same while the material and color changes. In speaking about the form, we primarily have in mind the form of *solid* bodies, i.e., those that in practical life possess especial importance. Solid bodies supply the external world with a firm foundation or skeleton and also perform the function of those instruments or tools with the help of which man affects and changes the environment. The solidity of a thing also makes possible the relative constancy of its shape, i.e., precisely that quality of the form that enables us to *recognize* the object under a variety of circumstances and use it for practical purposes.

From the qualities of the geometric form just indicated there emerges a certain variety of it that is especially important to cultural life as a whole; it may be called the casting form. In truth, not depending on other determinations of a thing, visible form can not only be conceived and thought of as an independent factor in sensible objects, but also reproduced as a draft or model by a variety of means and in any material. Therefore, abstracted from its material substratum form turns into an image, an *idea,* which can guide human activity and can be embodied by this activity in the physical world. It asserts itself as an active element that changes and organizes matter. The latter, by contrast, appears passive; it can be formed but by nature it itself is neutral with respect to form. Casting form is a motor of creative activity. Humans create material culture, managing and organizing the environment in accordance with a certain plan or project, i.e., giving it one or another purposive form. Form, as an organizing principle, is subjective in origin; it arises in the creative subject's consciousness. But having been embodied in the external world, it becomes objective and turns into a real visible (and tangible) form.

C. The Relation between Form and Matter

The two indicated senses of sensible form can in part also be applied to aesthetics, at the very least to representational art. What the viewer perceives and aesthetically evaluates is the visible form of the aesthetic (art) object. On the other hand, the artist's creative project is expressed in the casting form, to which he subordinates the matter he processes and which he embodies in his work. Thus it seems that in art the dichotomy of the visible form and the

casting form reflects the difference between the viewer's and the creator's attitude to form. Can one conclude from this that, in general, geometric form coincides with aesthetic form and that visible and casting form are just two different aspects of aesthetic form?

It is enough to raise this question to realize that purely geometric determinations are insufficient for defining aesthetic form. Even in ornaments, where composition is limited to combinations of lines and simple figures, aesthetic form outstrips geometric delineation, for the former's specificity depends primarily on the relation of the lines and figures to the plane in which they appear: either the plane performs the function of a background from which the ornament and its elements emerge, or, alternately, it is as it were the material which is differentiated and molded by the ornament and its elements. Moreover, the aesthetic form also includes, as important elements, colors, lights, and shadows, i.e., precisely those factors that have no significance for geometric form. Furthermore, in painting, particularly the so-called painterly style, variations of color and light are not only ancillary means for emphasizing the geometric or bodily form; they become independent aesthetic components that act on the viewer with a special verve independent of their objective form. Consequently, it seems, in aesthetics form can be set in opposition only to the material being worked on.

Nevertheless, a closer look also reveals that form cannot be strictly separated from matter. Form is not bestowed on matter externally, and it is not really foreign to it, for in truth form, taken concretely, as we have seen, brings out and actualizes those aesthetic possibilities that are inherent in matter itself (for example, in poetry, it is the special rhythmicity, dynamics, and euphony of speech; in painting, the harmoniousness and contrast of colors; in music, the harmony of tones, the rhythmicity of their series, their dynamics, etc.). Thus it turns out that all the physical characteristics that determine the sensory nature of the material being processed are absorbed into the form, i.e., they become its components and in one way or another go into the composition of the artwork. It cannot be otherwise; the work of art is an organic totality the unity of which permeates all of its parts and rejects all external or alien elements. Of course, matter is not everywhere equally differentiated and molded: in poetry the matter itself—language—is characterized by a very high degree of differentiation; in representational art and music, on the contrary, matter becomes differentiated only in the creative process. Still the material being processed, insofar as it is defined, always possesses, in potential or actual form, certain characteristics that in an artistic composition acquire the significance of formal components.

In short, the opposition of form and matter, in its initial, absolute sense,[23] is unsuitable for the description of the aesthetic object. It can be used only for distinguishing the artistic design or conception from the real material elements that the artist uses up to implement this design; these elements themselves, taken separately, have no aesthetic value whatsoever.

D. The Generalized Significance of Form. Structure

Finally, it should not be forgotten that the concept of form originated from the data of vision and touch (together with kinesthesia) and was initially applied only to spatial objects. Only a body or a body's projection on a plane can possess form in the strict sense of the word. Thus, passing on to other sensory phenomena, the question arises: in what sense may form be ascribed to them? Neither in pure colors nor in sounds (tones) do we find attributes corresponding to the form (in the strict sense) of visible and tangible things. Colors, to be sure, are extended, but their quality and quantitative relations, and the aesthetic expressiveness arising therefrom, are very independent of the spatial function that they fulfill in determining and modeling the surfaces and spatial structure of bodies. As for sounds and tones, their spatiality is even less significant to their nature; for even though they spread out in space, all of their aesthetically valuable qualities (degrees of height, intensity, coloration, rhythmicity, dynamics et al.) have no connection with spatial determination. In addition, if, regardless of this dissimilarity to bodies or things, form is ascribed to combinations of colors and of sounds, this can be justified by the consideration that every such combination is arranged or organized in some way and therefore constitutes a certain unity of diversities. And form, understood in the sense of casting form, is regarded as an element that organizes or arranges. In a word, the concept of form is used here in an inexact, broader sense that does duty for a wider concept, namely, that of an ordering principle which can be applied indifferently both to spatial and to non-spatial things. In the field of aesthetics, the organizing element asserts itself through the unity of the art works' composition in such a way that this unity is not only abstractly apprehended but is directly perceived in the sensory impression itself. That is why it is important, for the purpose of bringing out and denoting the orderliness of an aesthetic object (work of art), to use a term that, on the one hand, would not be as closely tied to the impressions of vision and touch as the concept of form is and, on the other, would emphasize the *picturesqueness* or *vividness* of the artistic composition (aesthetic object). These two requirements are, in our estimation, roughly satisfied by the term *structure*. Talk of structure pays equal attention both to the arrangement of elements (or parts) and to their nature, for structure is an internal, or organic, totality, in which the relations among the elements are closely tied to their essential qualities; it embraces not only that which is usually called form but also the matter that is being formed. From this, it is clear that form, understood as the ordering principle of an aesthetic object, is nothing other than its sensible structure. After all, we have seen that the aesthetic form includes the sensory qualities of the processed material elements. This was also confirmed for us by an analysis of visual perceptions: the visible image of things (especially the proximal image), based on optic and kinesthetic (eye movement) data, is to some extent

modeled, i.e., it doesn't end just with the body's contours (its geometric delineation), but also reveals somewhat the relations of its parts or elements and their material nature (hardness or softness, tenderness or roughness, lightness or heaviness, and so forth).

That is why in painting the artist, if he is not content with a plane geometric delineation of things, reproduces to some extent their sensory structure. The difference is only that in a work of art not only the structure of the represented object gets reflected but also the material nature of the means (canvas, paint, marble, bronze, and so on) used by the artist.

E. Form and Content (Subject)

But the concept of form is also used in a somewhat different sense: it is opposed not only to matter, but also to *content*. The latter opposition derives from the fact that there is a difference between a human being's inner life (his thoughts, desires, feelings, etc.) and his manifestations in the external world (words, gestures, motions, and consequences of actions). Content in this case is understood as the *meaning* realized and expressed by the form. Since content (meaning) and form belong to entirely different spheres, it seems that there is not and cannot be any necessary internal connection between them. The same thought can be expressed by different words, and the same words or the same gesture can have a different meaning. In a similar way, we can understand the relation of form to the subject (content) in poetry and representational art. It is said that the same subject can be embodied in different forms, and the difference of forms depends either on the material means that the artist uses to implement his conception or on how he imagines the subject in the framework of a certain art form. Painting, or sculpture, or poetry can chose one and the same subject. But even within the limits of each of these art forms the same subject can be treated differently. Therefore we must strictly distinguish between *what* is represented or depicted (subject, content) and *how* it is represented or depicted (form).

This understanding of form and content (subject) played a very important role in theories of aesthetics until the most recent times. Which moment—content or form—should be considered to have decisive significance? On the basis of how this question is answered two leading currents in aesthetics may be distinguished. According to *idealist* aesthetics, which became dominant at the beginning of the 19th century and was based above all on the philosophy of Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, the aesthetic value of a work of art depends primarily on the idea embodied in it. Beauty is nothing but the manifestation of an idea in the sensory world. Although idealist aesthetics does not deny the importance of form, it places the most weight on content and evaluates the latter on a certain general ideational criterion. The sensible form acquires aesthetic value only insofar

as it expresses one or another idea with moral, social, or other philosophical content.

In opposition to this conception of art, there emerged in the second half of the 19th century a *formalist* aesthetics, which proclaims the *suit generic* nature of aesthetic values and their independence from other cultural values. According to the formalist theory, purely aesthetic values inhere in the sensory form itself and can be apprehended only in it and through it. A subject in and of itself is, from an aesthetic viewpoint, indifferent; and, therefore, even the slightest subject is suitable for a work of art provided the form embodying it fulfills aesthetic requirements.

If we wish critically to evaluate these opposed theories, we must first ascertain whether their understanding of the relation between form and content, an understanding from which both theories start, is appropriate for the description of an aesthetic object. Is it really the case that in a work of art *what* is presented can be radically separated from *how* it is presented? What does it mean to say that a poet, painter, and sculptor can choose the same subject? Only the fact that that in creating they have in mind the same event, phenomenon, or thing. However, in this sense the identity of the subject is left entirely abstract and indefinite; it does not determine or indicate what the representation (image) through which the envisioned subject is to be manifested is like. Yet we can speak of a subject in the aesthetic sense only insofar as the manner of its *representation* or *realization* is indicated at least approximately. That means that a particular subject can be conceived only be a subject for a specific form of art as determined by the *special nature* of that art. Consequently, a concrete aspect of the subject varies according to the material that serves to realize it or, otherwise put, the content varies together with the form embodying it.

For example, poetry, basing itself on attributes of language, is capable of representing the temporal sequence of events and actions and to describe their development from moment to moment. Sculpture and painting, on the contrary, are static arts to which the passage of time is inaccessible. They can register only one definite moment, which has to represent the entire action or whole event. But even between sculpture and painting, there are essential differences that force them to portray the same subject in a different manner. For example, making use of distinctive varieties of color and light, painting can show under what circumstances a certain scene takes place (in the evening, during the day or in the morning), under what lighting and accompanied by what events or phenomena. On the other hand, painting is limited to one plane (canvas or wall) and thus can provide the viewer with but one aspect of the subject. Sculpture, by contrast, because it creates three-dimensional bodies in real space, is able so produce a composition in such a way that a spectator walking around a sculptural group or single figure can take in several meaningful aspects of it. Nevertheless, just because it spreads out in three dimensions, sculpture can achieve clarity and unity of aesthetic

impression only by confining itself to comparatively simple and uncomplicated subjects. Most of the details and circumstances with which painting describes and enhances its pictured scene cannot be re-created by sculptural means. Thus, we see that to the special mode of representation of every form of art there corresponds a certain aspect of the chosen subject. The first to call attention to this dependence of the aesthetic subject on the form of its realization was *Gotthold Ephraim Lessing*.

In his famous critical treatise *Laocoon*, he compares how the subject of Laocoon's death was handled in ancient sculpture and in ancient poetry (Virgil's *Aeneid*) and attempts to explain the reasons for the difference in portrayals. According to Virgil's account, Laocoon screamed and moaned horribly in struggling with the sea creatures attacking him. The sculptor, on the other hand, depicts him with a somewhat opened mouth, as if he was just lamenting lightly rather than fully screaming. Neither the poet nor the sculptor reproduces Laocoon's cry itself but represent it only indirectly, though by entirely different means. The poet describes it in expressive words, thereby accentuating the horror and torment that has engulfed Laocoon. The sculptor is concerned primarily with his nobility and grandeur; therefore, he softens the expression of the mouth, since if that were depicted wide-open it would impair the whole composition's noble beauty by creating the unpleasant impression of a formless black hole.

In addition, Lessing points out that sculpture, as a static form of art, can depict not the whole motion but just one or another moment of it. Furthermore, not just any moment can stand in for the whole process of motion. Therefore, the sculptor has to choose the depicted moment in such a way that it would preserve the motion's dynamism even if only in potential form. This task, in Lessing's view, has been admirably performed in the ancient sculpture of the *discus thrower*, capturing precisely the moment at which one motion flows into another opposed to it, and the athlete's body as it were freezes in a dynamic equilibrium.

Pursuing Lessing's critical analysis further, it is not difficult to conclude not only that the same subject varies with the form of implementation in different branches of art but also that even in the same branch it can appear under various aspects. These aspectual changes always correspond to special ways of representation or styles. For example, in Christian ecclesiastical art the subjects have remained pretty much the same from antiquity to our times. But in comparing medieval painting with that of the Renaissance or Baroque periods we see that along with the manner of formal treatment the interpretation of the subject also changes, i.e., that in every style it acquires a special aspect and nature. The concept of style will be explained in more detail later. For now, it is only important to nail down the point that the aesthetic content (subject) of every work of art is indissolubly tied to its form and together with it constitutes a unitary organic totality or structure. Within this totality one can, as we have seen, distinguish various planes, but these

are arranged in such a way that all the higher planes are entrenched in the main plane, i.e., in the sensory guise of the aesthetic object. That is why in aesthetics the opposition of content and form can be acknowledged only to the extent that it arises from the internal differentiation of the art work's structure.

F. Examples: Theatre and Film

We will elucidate the indissoluble bond, within the structure of a work of art, of form and content (subject) by one more example, which is relevant to the art of our times. What is the relation between *theatre* and *cinema*? Both are dynamic in character; in both the action spreads out in time, one scene following the other. The fact that in the theatre the spectator observes the acting of real people in real space, whereas in the movies he looks at picture, on a screen, of that acting, makes no essential difference; it does not affect the aesthetic effectiveness of the spectacle. The cinema not only competes with the theatre but also partially takes its place in contemporary culture. This extraordinary success of the cinema is due not only to the fact the movies are generally more accessible to the public than is the drama theatre but also to their special artistic values. Can one conclude from this that a motion picture can substitute for a theatre drama and leave the viewer with the same aesthetic impression? Alternatively, are the same subjects suitable for film as are suitable for the drama theatre, and are the subjects treated in the same way?

Ever since films became equipped with sound and began to use speech as a means of representation, it appears that there is nothing in the theatre arts that would not be accessible to film. However, it is becoming obvious that the best films from an artistic perspective are not at all those that follow the example of theatrical drama and dramatic technique. This becomes understandable in view of the fact that drama and film are governed by distinct dominants (i.e., those factors that in the compositional structure play the crucial role). Drama belongs to the language (vocal) arts, to poetry. Therefore, drama (whether it is ancient, or classical French, or Shakespearean drama, or a modern play by Ibsen or Maeterlinck) makes an aesthetic impression on us even when it is not acted out, but read out. Of course, gestures and bodily expressions go into dramatic art as essential factors, but the center of gravity is to be found in word and dialogue; expressive gestures, accentuating the expressiveness of the word, only accompany and complement it, and only in rare cases take over its function. Drama without words is impossible, for then it turns into pantomime. True "dramatism" manifests itself not in the variety and effectiveness of the acted-out events but in the tension of the dialogue that creates new, unexpected situations and goads people into action. Therefore, drama prefers those subjects that can be

rendered in words and where the action springs from the words and is pushed by them.

The cinema, by contrast, is akin to pantomime. It is no accident that its initial form was the silent movie, comprising actions and expressive motions that are self-explanatory without the aid of any words. This type of motion picture attains true artistic quality only when the significance of the action is clear from the actors' gestures and mimicry. The captions have to indicate only the main subject matter, the direction in which the alternating pictures are to be interpreted. But if the direction of the action cannot be grasped in the absence of more explicit captions, the motion picture ceases to be a self-sufficient, completed work of art. In this respect the topics suitable for silent films are limited to those that are extraordinarily picturesque and persuasive; for example, farces, romantic and criminal adventures, and so on. Thus this type of motion picture cannot depict topics in which the decisive events happen in people's interiors and are not reflected and expressively in their actions. These subjects can be treated only by that art form for which the most important means of representation are words. For it is they that can express the things that outstrip the expressive capabilities of gestures and mimicry (thoughts, projects, intentions, moods, and nuances of feeling).

On the other hand, a motion picture, as regards its composition, is much less constrained than a theatrical play. As its formative material is constituted not by real actions and events in physical space, but by images of actions and events on the plane of the screen, the cinema is not forced to adhere strictly to the order and connections on which real phenomena depend and is therefore able to make use of such possibilities of representation as are unavailable and impossible in the drama theatre. For example, a theatre play can depict only events that belong to a certain definite plane (reality, dream, fantasy); i.e., the theatre arts do not have available such means of representation as would allow a viewer immediately to distinguish what really exists from those images that emerge in the actor's consciousness when he is dreaming or fantasizing. But in the cinema, this difference of levels can be brought out by blurry, indistinct, and not very well-defined shots of unrelated things that come up and disappear chaotically, as happens in dreaming and daydreaming.

In a film one can also call emphatic attention to details that vividly characterize or symbolize a certain event, action, human feature, tendency, or habit (e.g., showing a close-up of someone's feet, hands, or of a thing left behind, or of a clock whose hands are approaching a decisive hour, and so on). In order to isolate such details the cinema can, without regard to the spatial relations between real things, so change the size of significant objects that the viewer's attention is immediately seized. Besides, not being dependent on real space or real time cinematic techniques can widen or narrow the viewpoint; transfer the action from one place to another without interruption; and so quicken or slow the pace of that action that it achieves its most expressive dynamics. The most important attribute of a motion picture

is that it harmonizes the features of painting and theatre, i.e., independence of the conditions of real being and kinetic dynamics; and it is just this attribute that makes it akin to music. The development of action dynamics, the rise and fall of its tension, the quickening or slowing of its pace gives the film a certain rhythm that can be accentuated by the appropriate musical accompaniment. The movie's connection with music becomes still tighter and more organic if this accompaniment grows out of the musical processing of those noises and sounds that accompany the action or are created by it. This gives rise to the *sound film*, wherein the expressiveness of the sounds deepens and strengthens the impression gained from the images. Along with sounds and noises, words can be used, too, insofar as these constitute an essential and inalienable moment of the action itself. Thus, we get the *talking picture*, as a special case of the sound film. Here we must distinguish two cases.

Because they can express not only man's thoughts and reflections, but also his plans, feelings, inclinations, and desires, words can be treated as expressive motions that start and action or, accompanying it, supplement, explain, and top off the actor's gestures and mimicry. In that case, the film comes close to theatrical drama and even turns into a species of it. Although recently film has started to evolve in just this direction, it may be doubted whether such an adjustment of the cinema to theatrical drama techniques and tasks should be evaluated positively as artistic progress. After all, in following the example of drama, the motion picture loses self-sufficiency and distinctness, and will hardly be able to fulfill the task that is demanded of an art whose main means of representation is the dynamism of expressive gestures.

This concrete example—the analysis of the essential characteristics—confirms for us what has been asserted earlier, viz., that in a work of art one cannot radically separate content (subject) and form; that these two things constitute an indissoluble unity; and that in the process of being realized they merge into each other. The content (subject) determines its appropriate form and, becoming embodied in it, itself turns into a component of form. On the other hand, form also delimits the sphere of those subjects (and aspects thereof) that can be artistically objectified in it. However, in molding the subject form coalesces with the specific image realizing that subject. Nevertheless, since the individuality of every art work depends primarily on its means of representation, the decisive significance is depends on the sensory form of the work of art. Using the terminology we have adopted, this means that the structure of a work of art with a subject consists of at the very least two levels, the higher of which depends on the lower and acquires an aesthetic reality just to the extent that it manifests itself in the latter, i.e., in the sensory representation embodying it. Therefore, the sensory structure of this representation must be the starting point for aesthetic analysis.

G. Relativization of Form. Hierarchy of Forms

Thus we see that the opposition of form and content in the aesthetic sense is ultimately grounded in the opposition of form and material; but as the qualities of material are also connected with artistic form, this latter opposition becomes quite *relative* (in aesthetics). This is shown to us by the concept of artistic structure, which lays down the internal unity of form and material. It would be wrong, however, to assert that in art the opposition of form and matter disappears or ceases to be significant. The nature of the material is a necessary but not sufficient condition of any specific artistic form. Form adds to material something new, something that cannot be derived from the nature of the material.

This becomes evident when we compare artistic form with organic (biological) form. The statue does not lie potentially in the marble in the same sense that a mature individual lies potentially in the egg. In the latter case, the organism develops out of the egg in accordance with the inherent causality that is typical for the organism, whereas the statue emerges from the marble only upon the action of an outside force, the artist. In other words, organic form is *immanent* to matter, while artistic form is *transcendent*. In that respect the latter is no different from any *technical* form.

In general, the significance and function of transcendent form can be defined as follows: (1) It transforms the mechanical (and thus accidental) unity of the material into an ordered totality that determines its own parts and their composition[24]; (2) it gives that totality a certain objective significance (the shape of a human being, animal, building, or tool; and (3) because of it this totality acquires a certain aesthetic worth (objective or nonobjective). All the different forms belonging to an art work's structure constitute, as was mentioned, a hierarchical structure, which encompasses both the purely sensory level and the level of objective significance. The lower and simpler sensory forms are subordinated to the higher and more complex ones, and their totality is adjusted to the objective or nonobjective significance of the work of art. Although all the different forms in a work of art coalesce into an unbreakable unity, in an analysis of the work's structure their layers or levels clearly separate. The lower ones condition the higher ones but do not determine their structure. Thus, conversely, the higher levels, taken separately, as structural types, can be realized in different ways, with the help of the lower ones, but only within certain limits that are set by the general properties of that structural type. This variety of possibilities of individualization depends on those variable elements that inhere in every structural type.[25] In other words, each such type is not so rigid that it could be realized in only *one* defined way; on the contrary, it is *flexible* and can become embodied in different individual shapes. Therefore the passage from higher to lower forms, just like the reverse passage from lower to higher forms, is not point-blank unambiguous, but determines a *new* formative plan

every time. In a word, in the hierarchical order of forms the higher form correlates with the lower as form correlates with the material it moulds. That is why even in the aesthetic sphere the opposition of form and matter does not vanish, though matter, making an entrance into the art work's very structure, here itself turns into a moment of form.[26] It (the structure) truly becomes *relative,* determining within the limits of the world of forms, the mutual interrelations of the diverse plans for molding. In this relative sense, the correlativity of form and material characterizes every aesthetic *structure* of the least complexity.

H. Aesthetic Form and the Individuality of the Work of Art

Before concluding our analysis of the relation of form to content and matter, we must pause at another important aspect of this issue. We saw that the opposition of form and content (or matter) emerges whenever these concepts are analyzed abstractly without reference to the inner unity of the work of art. It loses its rigor and becomes relative as soon as we pay attention to the concrete conditions whereby this unity is actualized. However, taken concretely, each work of art (aesthetic object) is an inimitable *sui generis* individuality, characterized by a special, unique structure. Now what is individual cannot be wholly determined down to the last detail. Cognition, even the most accurate one, can only approach that individuality, circumscribing it in a network of approximate ideal schemata and general determinations. However, between these schemata and determinations, be they ever so finely honed, and the individuality itself, there always remains a certain gap. Scientific knowledge is in its essence conceptual; it grasps its object by means of concepts; but these, even the most specialized ones, are general and never coincide with the concrete reality itself.

Aesthetics, as a science, also makes use of concepts to delimit its object. But a work of art (and every aesthetic object in general) is by its nature individual and accessible only to direct perception. Basing itself upon that perception scientific reflection creates the concepts that ground aesthetic theory. Reflection, however, changes the mind-set, turning an aesthetic attitude into a theoretical one. Consequently, all the concepts with the help of which the aesthetic object is described, including the concept of aesthetic form or structure, no longer belong to the aesthetic sphere (aesthetic being) itself.

When we talk in general about the form or structure of a work of art then, to be sure, we do not apprehend that very form (structure) itself, but only indicate the *possible kinds* of aesthetic form that there are, or define the main conditions that must be satisfied by all aesthetic compositions or all those that belong to a specific formal kind, e. g., drama, poetry, or sonata or ballad form, etc. Theoretical reflection can never substitute for direct perception; it can only point out and conceptually express this or that moment of the

immediately apprehended concrete totality. From this, it is clear why there is a certain unclarity or ambiguity in a term such as aesthetic idea. For an idea, being something general, is abstract and cannot be represented concretely (in a sensory fashion). It can only indicate the main direction in which the process of aesthetic objectification proceeds. Hence even the most thorough analysis of structures is incapable of exhausting the content of a work of art in its entirety.

I. The Concept of Style

As our analysis proceeds it is becoming ever more apparent that aesthetic theory must be guided by two fundamental, correlative concepts: on the one hand, the aesthetic object's (the work of art's) internal *structure* (ordinarily called *form*), and on the other, the special *mind-set* that perceives and judges this structure. The correlativity of these concepts determines the essential connection between the objective and the subjective sides of aesthetic being. The structure of the aesthetic object appears as a certain specific unity of diversities, a unity consisting of components harmonized in a special way. These components bring out the aesthetic potencies inherent in the sensory material (words, tones, bodily motions, shapes, colors, etc.) that is being molded. The aesthetic structure, as turned out later, is characterized thus:

(1) The components constituting it, and the harmony and unity of these components, are *graphic*. The structure is directly apprehended in the aesthetic intuition or perception, whether visual or aural.

(2) The structure is expressive. Expressiveness determines the significance and value of the aesthetic structure and *ipso facto* conditions the harmoniousness and unity of its components.

(3) Being graphic and expressive, the structure is essentially individual, and its value is indissolubly linked with this individuality. The peculiarity of the aesthetic structure fits the special nature of aesthetic intuition, which is based on sensory perception and is characterized by a contemplative mind-set. But this contemplativity does not destroy the emotional elements of the initial perception, as happens in theoretical reflection, but instead maintains them. It is this feature of the aesthetic intuition that enables the apprehension of the aesthetic object's vividness.

The further development of the theory of aesthetics (beauty) must take off from the interrelationship between the object's aesthetic structure and the aesthetic intuition.

The first question that arises is this: How can one elucidate the nature of a specific and concrete work of art based on a general characterization of the structure of the aesthetic object? This structure determines only the conditions for the possibility of a work of art, i.e., its general constitute elements. But the art work itself is an individual thing. Though such a theoretical explanation, as already stated, can never exhaust the unbounded

contentfulness of individuality, it at the very least has to trace out the road that leads from an ideal abstraction toward the concrete reality. But to trace out this road is to show what possibilities lie in the general structure of the aesthetic object and how that structure can specifically change when one way or another its components and their relations change. Thus the task of aesthetics is to explain how the process of the concretization of aesthetic structure can and does take place. The qualities and relations of the components depend first on the *nature of that sensory material* in which the aesthetic object manifests itself, and each instance of such material is distinguished by a special order of components.

Nevertheless this order does not determine the componential relations in an unambiguous way, and within certain limits allows them a certain degree of freedom (of change). In the aesthetic object, as we have seen, some of these changes acquire a special importance: these are the changes that relate to the components' *hierarchical* order. The structure and the entire appearance of an object change essentially depending on which component gets to exercise the function of the dominant. Having become the dominant, a component does the job of a managing or organizing principle determining a certain aspect of the delimited aesthetic object, and each component does the job differently in accordance with its own special nature.

If we wish to describe these aspects more precisely and specifically, we must first take note of the representational means of the art in question and the material being molded as well as the technical possibilities of the former, since the aesthetic structure can be concretized only within the framework of a specific branch of art. However, the indicated moments or conditions (the nature of the material being molded, the hierarchical order of the components) are not yet sufficient for describing the specific aspects of the object because by far not all of the possibilities inherent in the object's general structure possess aesthetic value. Therefore, we also need a principle or viewpoint that would allow us to *pick out* the aesthetically valuable possibilities from all the others. The *expressiveness* of an aspect is such a criterion; it does not arise from certain natural changes in the object or phenomenon, but presupposes an appropriate mind-set, i.e., an act of perception that finds or creates an expressive aspect of the object by highlighting one or another of its side or moments according to their expressive value.

It should not be forgotten that aesthetic perception is directed not to the object's real essence, hidden behind its outward appearance, but to its *surface*; what matters to this perception is the object's sensible appearance, which depends both on objective and subjective factors, i.e., on the subject's relation to the object. For example, in the fields of vision the object appears under different aspects depending on changes in distance and lighting. A distal image is flat and hides the object's bodily figure; in a proximal image, by contrast, the third dimension (depth), and even the body's mass and

certain of its material qualities, become manifest. Similarly, constant daylight bring out the silhouettes and relief of bodies and sharply separates them from the surrounding atmosphere; whereas a separate light source in the dark, by contrast, accords a decisive formative significance to the varieties of color and light and shadows, and turns the bodies (figures) into creatures of the light space (atmosphere). Of course, these differences are relative; many transitional degrees lie between the opposite aspects; and therefore the actualization of a certain definite image depends ultimately on the subject's emphasizing one or another structural moment. Anyway, it is clear that together with the aspect of the object and the corresponding perceptual act there vary the aesthetic possibilities inherent in the object, and there also varies the significance of the structural factors as well as their capacity to become the organizing dominant.

Nevertheless, besides these external circumstances that depend on the object's relation to the subject, the quality and, in particular, the expressiveness of the aspect is also affected by purely *internal factors,* such as the subject's psychophysical condition, his activeness or passiveness, his mood, and the like. The effect of all these moments manifests itself in the fact that the subject yields himself to the sequence and dynamism of his experiences; is inclined to objectify them by finding in the exterior world or surrounding phenomena those things that are close to, and chime with, his own interior life, or by himself creating sensory forms concretely and appropriately reflecting his own moods and attitudes.

Thus the artist's approach and creativity does not put into external phenomena any sort of subjective elements that would be foreign to them, but rather *picks out* and realizes those objective aspects the inner structure and dynamism of which displays a fitting expressiveness, i.e., one that is attuned to his own design and mood. This is the only way in which an artist's individuality can manifest itself in his works. His sensitivity to the expressiveness of the various phenomena is what determines the selection of the images to be realized and of the dominants that guide them. Selecting the aspects of the object in accordance with their aesthetic expressiveness, he *ipso facto* fixes the element that organizes the art work's composition and gives that element a certain well-defined aesthetic significance. The special compositional order wherein this significance is objectified and embodied and which arises out of the interaction of all the objective and subjective factors indicated, is called the *style* of the work of art. The style characterizes that managing principle that grounds the concretization and objectification of artistic ideas. From this it follows that style changes when people and the forms and tendencies of their cultural life changes; in other words, style is an *historical* phenomenon capable of emerging and manifesting itself only under certain historical conditions.

Representing one or another creative tendency, each style belongs to a certain epoch, culture, nation, or social stratum. With regard to the special

connection that style has to one or another of these forms of social life, the term style can be used in a wider or narrower sense. We speak, for instance, of the Renaissance style, i.e., the style that characterizes Renaissance art, and oppose it to the Baroque or Rococo style. But even within the limits of each epoch we distinguish varieties of the same style in different nations (for example, Italian, French, or German Gothic or Baroque) or in different branches of art (architecture, sculpture, painting, music and so on). Finally, even in every sort of art we discern special changes in style that have received a unique seal from this or that artist and that have been furthered by the school that he has founded (for example, in 15th–16th century Italy, the Umbrian, Florentine, Venetian, and other painterly schools).

In short, the concept of style can change with respect to both range and content, beginning with the widest sense, embracing the artistic characteristics of a certain culture or epoch, and ending with the narrowest, indicating the typical features of the work of just one artist. And this is understandable, for the various senses of style just given denote different degrees or phases of concretization, going from general aesthetic tendencies and projects to be found in the evolution of culture down to their realization in a distinct, separate, and individual work of art.

The style of an epoch or culture is related to changes in style according to the type of art or according to the characteristics predominant in a certain current of art or in the work of its individual representatives, as family is related to species or to specific varieties of these species. In the individual style of Raphael or Leonardo da Vinci there assert themselves general features typical of the Renaissance, but they do so in different ways, since they play out individually in their creators' artistic personalities and therefore acquire a very distinctive and personal touch. In any case, whether we understand style in a broader or narrower sense, it is always determined by a certain organizing principle; and it is this principle that gives style aesthetic value and aesthetic vividness.

Usually art historians in describing a certain style content themselves with mentioning those features that distinguish it from other styles in that same branch of art (for example, they mention those qualities that characterize Renaissance or Baroque architecture, or impressionist painting in the latter half of the 19th century, and so on). But the aesthetic analysis of style cannot end with this. It has to explain the connection between these features, explain on what the inner unity of the style is based. If such connection were absent, if style consisted only of separate elements tied together externally, one could not comprehend from where the aesthetic value of style arises and why one or another of its elements could not be replaced by any other. But every true artist or connoisseur of art can obviously tell apart what fits a certain style from what is incompatible with it, since he feels (even though he may not be able to articulate it clearly) the style's organic unity, its living spirit.

That every style truly is a unity characterized by a certain delimited typical structure or arrangement of components, is also testified to by the history of art. The historical evolution of style is subject to the influence of the most diverse external circumstances (economic, social, political, climatological, and others). All of them are able to affect style only within certain limits; they can somewhat direct or re-direct its development; and accelerate or slow down the emergence of certain of its varieties. But the fundamental line of its evolution cannot be derived from these circumstances; it grows out of the unique nature of the style itself, out of its controlling elements, and out of the structural potentialities within it. A similar situation obtains with the embryo of an organism or the seed of a plant: from it, there can grow only an animal or plant of a certain definite form; and that growth is determined by the nature of that embryo or seed and by the potentialities inherent in it. To be sure, the limits within which it is possible for style to change and diversify are much broader than the range for the possibilities of organismic change; in this respect, man's artistic creativity possesses greater freedom than nature's. Therefore, when comparing style and organism, we ought not to forget that this is only an analogy whose significance and accuracy should not be overstated. Nonetheless it explains precisely that essential characteristic of style that determines its historical diffusion and development; namely, the internal unity of its structure and structural opportunities. That is why the concept of style must be the *most important* principle of art history.

J. Style and Imitation of Nature

From the constitutive significance, to art, of style it follows that the naturalist view of art, according to which art's purpose is to *imitate* or *copy* nature (reality), is false. The sole measure of imitation is the accuracy of the re-creation (picturing). A copy is perfect to the extent that it is exactly like the original. But this criterion yields no instructions as to what aspect of the object to choose for re-creation. Every aspect that permits us to recognize a thing or phenomenon and to distinguish it clearly from similar things or phenomena is equally worth copying. Style, by contrast, is essentially an element of *selection*. It recognizes as worthy to be copied only that aspect which, besides clarity, also possesses explicit expressiveness. Therefore naturalism in art can signify only a certain deviation or tendency of style that reveals just those features of man and the physical and social world around him that determine the direction and progress of real life; this deviation or tendency pays no heed to whether these features do or do not correspond to certain aesthetic, ethical, or other demands. (In speaking of naturalism, we have in mind primarily representational art and poetry).

How significant and essential is the difference between artistic, i.e., style-based, representation and simple imitation or copying, can best be

appreciated in photography. Artistic and ordinary photography have different objectives. The latter endeavors to re-create an object as accurately and similarly as possible. And if the photographer deviates somewhat from the original by using retouch and other such methods, he does so only to remove one or another facial or bodily defect (skin blemishes, redness of the nose, wrinkles on the forehead, and so on), without any regard to enhancing or diminishing the object's expressiveness.

It is otherwise with artistic photography, which first of all pays attention to the overall structure of the face or body and endeavors to identify its aesthetic potencies. To actualize the latter, it selects not only the most expressive aspect (pose) but also the background and lighting that would best enhance it. Artistic photography "stylizes" its object but not in the sense that it "beautifies" it by retouching or that it is unconcerned with the picture's resemblance to the original. In the selected aspect the demands of sensible form and of objective significance must be in tune with each other (if the photograph is of a human being, then the most fitting aspect will be the one in which the essential features of his personality are especially vividly reflected). To the extent that photography is guided by certain stylistic principles, it is representative of a special branch of authentic art.

PART IV

THE BEAUTY OF NATURE

1. The Relations of Natural and Artistic Beauty with Respect to Origin

So far, we have spoken only about beauty in the field of art. The reason for this was a consideration of method. The structure of an aesthetic object and the peculiarity of aesthetic contemplation are especially prominent in works of art and in their perception. But the sphere of beauty does not end with the art world. We notice beauty in nature to as well as in the entire surrounding world. Thus, the question arises, What is the beauty that emerges outside art and how is it related to the beauty of art?

It seems that the beauty of nature should be deemed to have priority in the development of our aesthetic experiences. Is it not in our real environment that the first phenomena of beauty arouse man's attention and awaken his creative forces, his desire to re-create and record in works of art things that he has observed in nature, or even to surpass with his own creations the impressive effects of nature? The imagination of even the greatest artistic genius cannot rest content with itself, with those images that well up from the depths of his spirit. It is nourished sooner or later by some external source, i.e., by impressions gotten from outside.

Nevertheless, no matter how clear it is that artistic creativity springs from external stimulations, this fact alone is not sufficient to resolve the issue of the relations between the beauty of nature and that of art. First of all, it can be doubted whether those impressions that initially stimulated the artistic creativity of primitive man were of an aesthetic character in the strict sense of that word. For after all, we discern the beginnings of art already in prehistoric times, at the very dawn of civilization, i.e., when man was at an intellectual level that had hardly yet equipped him for aesthetic contemplation, for taking up an aesthetic point of view. Neither in the imitative instincts nor in the spontaneous, expressive movements from which artistic activities are held to have arisen are there any aesthetic moments or tendencies to be discerned. Primitive art itself initially seeks no purely aesthetic objectives; that is why its works cannot be adequately understood and judged by strictly aesthetic standards. It seems that a truly aesthetic attitude emerges only in the process of re-creation, and its further development and fostering is essentially tied to the artistic activity itself. Therefore, with respect to genetics we cannot give an absolutely clear answer to the question, What comes first in a human life and its aesthetic development: the beauty of nature or that of art? On delving into man's historical existence it turns out that both kinds of beauty are in a constant mutual interaction, with one deepening and perfecting the apprehension of the other. As far as the aesthetic training of the separate cultural individual is concerned, the impressions of beauty received from the

outside are, generally speaking, prior to artistic creativity.[27] Be that as it may, for the elucidation of the peculiarity of natural beauty the question of priority has no decisive significance: it is much more important to inquire whether it is subject to the same criteria of apprehension and evaluation as govern the beauty of art.

2. The Aesthetic Criterion of Natural and Artistic Beauty is the Same

When we make aware to ourselves what is it that that delights us in a sunset, a moon-illuminated nightscape, the billow and roar of the sea, a young person's body, the swiftness of an animal, the shapes and colors of insects or plants, we realize that the aesthetic impressions caused by these things and phenomena ultimately present the same structure as do works of the corresponding representational art: we assign them an aesthetic valuation on account of the expressiveness of their sensory appearance and, in attempting to re-create them in one or another way, we aim to bring out and fix on precisely that feature of their nature that is grounded on a certain harmonious cohesion of sensuous elements and complexes. Consequently, as regards structure, the difference between artistic and natural beauty is inessential and not qualitative. The task of representational art, as we have seen, is first to select and develop one or another aesthetic possibility that lies in the phenomena of nature.

The beauty of nature relates to that of art as real potency, embracing a multitude of possibilities, relates to one or another possibility drawn from it and completely actualized. Potency is always richer than actuality because in it inhere all the other possibilities not drawn out; to the observer potency gives more freedom to direct attention to one or the other aspect that subsists in it. On the other hand, it lacks the unity and unambiguous orderedness that shows up in every separate aspect that has been consistently actualized in accordance with some well-defined principle of organization. For this reason natural beauty usually fails to meet the formal or structural requirements that are set for works of art; and the artist, in depicting a subject suggested by nature, processes and works it up in such a way that it achieves a strict unity and the most explicit vividness. From this it becomes evident that art, depicting, in one way or another, the phenomena of nature, concurrently teaches the observer to discover in it new aesthetically valuable aspects, i.e., to see nature through the eyes of a stylistically creative artist. Thus art brings us closer to nature and helps us to appreciate more deeply and fully its beauty.

We would be wrong, however, if we regarded nature's beauty as being of a lower and imperfect degree, one that only prepares for the beauty of art and possesses no value independently. When we review everything to which, in nature, beauty is assigned, we see that the areas of natural and artistic beauty coincide only in part. In reality there are aesthetic phenomena that cannot be

re-created by art in the appropriate manner; on the other hand, there are kinds of art that do not represent anything at all and that bring forth an entirely new world of forms and objects, a world that has almost nothing in common with the phenomena of nature (for example, in music and architecture).

The difference between beauty in nature and art is by no means exhausted by the fact in the former there lie, in an impure, undeveloped, and undifferentiated form, those aspects of things and phenomena that works of art bring out and actualize. The beauty of nature has, additionally, an independent value and is characterized by such positive qualities as are inaccessible to art (especially of the representational kind) at all.

Finally it must be remarked that the beauty of nature, insofar as nature is opposed to culture, to the products of human activity, has not been equally understood and appreciated in all historical epochs and therefore has not been reflected equally in their works of art. We will discuss these topics by starting with the former.

3. The Conception of Nature's Beauty in the History of European Culture. The Beauty of Wild Nature

If we look at the ancient culture that had such a decisive influence on the development of European art, we will notice that the ancient Greeks saw the beauty of nature differently than we do. In their view, natural beauty was first and foremost the beauty of man himself or that of the universe or cosmos, a beauty manifest in the world-governing order and harmony, the regular and unchanging motion of the heavenly lights, the periodic rising and setting of the sun and moon, the continuous changing of night and day, the cyclical dying and rebirth of nature as a whole. The aesthetic moment constituted an essential mark of the cosmos, which itself meant not only an ordered totality, but also an ornament.

Of course, this concept highlights the rational side (moment) of beauty, which grows out of the universe's rationality, the Logos that rules the world and manages it according to its laws. This general feature of the ancient worldview had become predominant already in Greek mythology.

Keeping in mind both the pantheistic nature of Greek religion with its tendency to deify all phenomena of nature and the Greeks' extraordinary predilection for art, one might have thought that their art would have responded equally to all phenomena of nature's beauty. But in fact the range of ancient representational art and poetry is rather limited. Pride of place belongs to the human being (the beauty, agility, and grace of his body), followed by the things and animals of the environment with which he interacts; but there are hardly any images or descriptions of wild nature. Of course, this does not warrant the conclusion that the ancient Greeks were insensitive to the grandeur of savage nature or to its beauty as still untouched by human hands. Ancient poetry hints quite the opposite. Even so, these

poets usually contented themselves with brief (though very accurate) characterizations of this or that natural phenomenon and used them in poetic comparisons describing human events, actions, or experiences that were similar in their dynamism and expressiveness to phenomena of nature. And in those cases when the natural phenomena themselves became objects of artistic depiction, they were spiritualized (humanized), i.e., not described as they appear directly and self-sufficiently in reality but draped in features and qualities borrowed from the sphere of human action and life. Only during the Hellenistic Period do there appear, in poetry, more detailed descriptions of nature, and the landscape becomes a special subject in painting; but even here it provides the background to the scene depicted, and this background is usually an orchard, i.e., a bit of nature affected and cultivated by man. Besides, the portrayal is not naturalistic: the painter is not concerned to depict nature faithfully with all its real qualities; he stylizes the landscape, giving both the over-all composition and the details (objects) going into it a certain simplified shape akin to geometrical forms. The landscape was treated in a similar way in the Byzantine and Western Europe painting of the Middle Ages. A major break occurs in the Renaissance, when people, enchanted with the ancient ideal of beauty, learned to appreciate the body anew and began to take an interest in the organic vitality of nature.

The landscape acquires a major place in Italian and Dutch painting. But only in the 17th and especially the 18th century does wild nature become an independent and even popular theme of painting and poetry. A new cultural current and worldview makes itself felt; its most famous champions were Lord Shaftesbury in England and Jean-Jacques Rousseau in France. They declared that the foundation of religion and morality is not reason (as rationalism had proclaimed) but feeling and sympathy, which bring man closer to nature and allow him to experience directly his kinship with the life of the organic and inorganic world.

The historical circumstances that helped this sensitivity to the beauty of nature to blossom forth are various, but the most important ones might be characterized as follows. The Renaissance, as we know, is an epoch during which individualism began to thrive. Personalities got out from under the protection of the Church and other medieval institutions and secured some independence. Man was no longer afraid to be alone; what's more, he began to appreciate solitude because it allowed him to concentrate and to conceive more clearly and to feel the peculiarity of his inner life. This was not the solitude of an ascetic hermit who despised the value of the sensible world and endeavored to sever all ties with it. Rather, it was the loneliness of a personality capable of devoting itself to contemplation and communication with nature, trying to experience more deeply its affinity to the rhythm and dynamism of natural life without entirely giving up its social duties and concerns. That is why in solitude a person becomes more sensitive to nature's beauty.

But the love of nature is stimulated by another significant factor. Man begins to value nature consciously when his way of life distances him from it and he loses some of the goods that he had when in its full embrace. Hence a keenness for a landscape's beauty grows stronger in the soul of a city-dweller. Atmospheric phenomena, changes in weather, sunsets, and the appearance and motion of clouds do not remind him, as they do the land-tiller, of the practical business of life and do not excite in him thoughts about the utility or harmfulness attendant upon these phenomena. This distance that separates his daily labors and life from nature allows him to regard it freely and to devote himself undisturbed to the contemplation of its various prodigies. It is from this "disinterested" (in Kant's term) contemplation that poetry and painting, depicting the beauty of savage nature, arise;[28] and, having arisen, they nurture the aesthetic taste, accustom the spectator to a contemplative mind-set in the face of nature, and instruct him in the discovery of the aesthetic potentialities inherent in it.

Of course, the sensitivity to natural beauty fostered by art is *ipso facto* influenced by the prevailing style, since the painter or poet, depicting a landscape or some other natural phenomena, always follows a certain organizing principle, to wit, adheres to a certain set style. Thus those natural phenomena and aspects that best satisfy the aesthetic taste vary according to the dominant stylistic orientation. The landscape peculiar to romantic poetry and painting, for example, differs essentially from the impressionist landscape of the latter half of the 19th century or the rococo landscape of the 18th.

4. The Beauty of Organic Forms

Besides landscape and atmospheric phenomena, natural beauty manifests itself in a variety of organic forms as well. To this kind of beauty man is especially sensitive for it embodies itself first of all in human beings themselves and affects their most powerful instincts—the sexual and the social urge. Hence, the beauty of the human body always was one of the principal motives for artistic creativity. But other organic creatures also command humans' attention and delight them with their gracefulness, tenderness, harmony, power, and so on. Here we have in mind mainly those forms of wild and domestic animal life that play a large role in a hunter's or peasant's existence or amaze him with their extraordinary features. Observing the behavior of wild animals in a hunt or rearing domestic animals on a farm, man becomes aware of their appearance and plugs into their vital dynamism, thereby learning to appreciate their corporeal strength and agility, the grace and precision of their movements not only practically, but also aesthetically.

The same can be said about the organic forms of plants and trees. Life circumstances lead man to observe the surrounding flora and take an interest

in the differences of its forms and structures and in their suitability to this or that practical purpose (including, incidentally, decoration). Already in primitive art we find representations of animals and plants, often remarkable in their accuracy and showing that primitive (aboriginal) man was extraordinarily proficient at apprehending and recording the characteristic features of organic forms.

How might the beauty of organic forms be more precisely defined, and how is it related to the represented beauty in art? We shall analyze this issue orienting ourselves, first, to human beauty, occupying as it does an exceptional position among all aspects of organic beauty.

Organic beauty is substantial and independent rather than relational in the sense that it belongs to the organic structure (totality) itself and does not depend on the relations of the organism to the environment.[29] It stays the same no matter what the surrounding world is like. Belonging to the organism, insofar as it constitutes a certain definite and complete unity, organic beauty is always *specific*. It is ascribed to a human or other kind of being because its sensible form meets not only general ("formal") aesthetic conditions, but also those corresponding to the organism's special nature and the significance of that nature. A man is characterized by a specific human beauty; a horse, by a corresponding equine beauty, and so on. In a word, organic beauty is by its essence, *objective*; the dominant determining its peculiarity and putting a special seal on it is the objective significance of the object (organism) itself.

Such an explanation, to be sure, does not wholly settle the issue of organic beauty, for it gives rise to the question, How should we understand the specific objective significance of each organism? With respect to human beauty, the question is even more complex: Is human beauty limited to the organic nature of man, or does it also include, as an inseparable moment, certain spiritual qualities?

5. Human Beauty. Its Ideal

This problem was raised and extensively discussed by *Immanuel Kant*. He attempts to answer it by his theory of human *beauty's ideal*. According to him, the content of the latter is determined by two moments. The first is what Kant calls the idea of normalcy (*Normalidee*), namely, the totality of those specific features or qualities that characterize the sensible appearance of a normal (unimpaired) organism, or, in other words, the common or *average* type. The idea of this is based on an empirical generalization describing the average size, structure, and proportions of a typical representative of that organic type. But normality in this sense is only a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition of ideal beauty. The essence of man (his objective significance) is not limited to his organism; man is also an ethical personality, the owner and executor of moral elements. Thus beauty can be

ascribed only to that normal human form in which an ethical vocation asserts itself.

This Kantian characterization of beauty's ideal, though not sufficient, gives important hints about how the concept under discussion might be described more precisely. Let us delve into Kant's definition more closely. The idea of normalcy indicates the norm that a healthy organism, capable of life, must satisfy: it must not lack any organ necessary for life, and all its parts must be attuned in such a way that each is able to perform its assigned function. This dynamic balance and harmony of the separate parts to a certain degree is reflected in the organism's external appearance; it determines its overall structure and the proportions and forms of certain of its parts.

However these "normal" proportions and forms, as experience shows, are not rigidly defined. In the various human races and types they vary within rather broad limits; and from a purely biological perspective it cannot be maintained that certain of the proportions and forms are more appropriate or suitable than others (for example, the length of feet and hands or head size compared to the size of the whole body; the shape of the nose or mouth). But from the aesthetic point of view these proportions and forms are of unequal value, and someone with an educated aesthetic taste will doubtless prefer some of them to the others. And on what is such an aesthetic discrimination based? Clearly, it cannot be an average, because the type deemed to the most beautiful is not the one that occurs most often in reality. Consequently, in evaluations of human beauty, there operates, besides normalcy and the average, another criterion not arising from a simple empirical generalization and not identical with a quantitative average. This is the criterion of choice, which first of all takes into consideration the direct harmony and expressiveness of the sensible forms (structures) without regard to their objective significance (recall what was said about the straight nose shape in the sculptures of antiquity). Hence only that human type may be deemed to be the ideal of beauty which satisfies the demands of sensory harmony and expressivity (in the sense indicated above).

Of course, from this it does not follow that there is but one ideal of beauty or, in other words, that only a certain kind of proportionality of bodily parts or only one kind of combination of their forms satisfies the demands of an educated aesthetic taste. No, there are many possible ways beauty can be embodied; they vary according to age, sex, racial and ethnic qualities, and even according to distinct types within the same racial or ethnic group. To be sure, during the Renaissance the opinion gained ascendancy that only the type created by ancient sculpture was the only true ideal of beauty; and this opinion was dominant among the European intelligentsia until the most recent times. But this view is one-sided and cannot be adequately justified. A more detailed acquaintance with the cultures of other continents and races has now made it clear to us that Western European culture is not the only valuable form of culture and that there are other prominent cultures that have

created their own special values less emphasized by European nations. This pertains to art as well. We have now learned somewhat to judge correctly Chinese, Indian, or Negro art (for example, painting, sculpture, ornamentation, poetry) and its peculiar virtues, and we must acknowledge that in all of those nations' types a special beauty may be embodied and that the yellow, black, and red races have their own ideal of beauty.[30]

Of course, these various types of beauty are not based exclusively on the formal harmony and expressiveness of the sensible shape. They are also determined by the way the objective significance of human appearance is conceived. In order to clarify the significance of this moment of beauty let us analyze the further Kantian claim to the effect that the second constitutive condition of the ideal of beauty is man's ethical nature (function). This can be understood in two senses, a narrower and a broader one.

In the former case beauty is nothing other than an expression of human spirituality. In other words, it is subordinated to moral goodness (morality) and *ipso facto* ceases to be an independent value. The task of beauty is to serve the ends of morality, i.e., to give it a sensory form through which morality can directly and unimpededly assert itself. Such a viewpoint, according to which beauty is akin or even identical to virtuousness, took hold in ancient philosophy (particularly platonism and neoplatonism) and had many adherents later, during the Middle Ages and in modern times, as well. Doubtless it fits in with a tendency in Kant's philosophy, since the moral rigorism with which Kant's worldview is replete made it difficult for him to recognize other autonomous values besides morality. Still, such an understanding of the ideal of beauty is compatible with neither the real state of affairs nor the fundamentals of Kant's aesthetics itself. Those qualities that according to his theory determine the special nature of beauty do not at all depend on the fundamentals of morality (see Chapter Nine, Section Four, where Kant's aesthetic theory is briefly presented). And in acknowledging the ideal of beauty to be derived from morality, Kant substantially diverges from the road projected by his autonomous aesthetics. It is the case, of course, that in beauty a person's ethical attitude, among other things, can be reflected, but the connection between morality and sensible beauty is not necessary.

But interpreting Kant's theory more broadly it cannot be denied that it has a certain real foundation, since in man's external appearance his *ethical potential*, his capacity to act morally or immorally, is to some extent manifest. Man by his nature appears to us as an ethical personality, with which one can interact (relate to) only within the framework of certain ethical norms or customs. Therefore this ethical potentiality enters, as an essential moment, into the objective significance of the human form; and precisely because this objective significance plays the role of the dominant for the ideal of beauty, the ethical potentiality enters into the general structure of that ideal as well. In this sense Kant's theory is justifiable. Its main weakness is that it

defines the ideal of beauty too narrowly and assigns morality an exceptional role, whereas in truth the objective meaning of human appearance embraces equally all of man's organic and psychical capacities, and it is only the manifestation of the totality of these capacities that gives that appearance a seal of genuine humanity. The fundamental layer is constituted by purely physical (material) qualities (material mass and structure), on which the organic characteristics of the body are based; and only through the mediation of the latter do the psychical (spiritual) potencies get reflected, especially in the features of the face. That is why the shape, contours, and expression of the face possess decisive significance for human beauty. Therefore, the ideal of beauty, in its general structure, is not different from any other beauty with respect to which the dominant is the thing's objective significance.

What has been said about human beauty can be applied, *mutatis mutandis*, to the explication of the beauty of other animal organisms. Here, too, objective significance plays the part of the dominant. The only difference is that in animals the objective significance is determined by purely biological factors or moments because the abilities of animals, even the higher ones (their memory and intellect), serve only to meet the needs of maintaining life. But even in this sphere beauty can by no means be reduced to the normal, the average, particularly in case of the higher ones. This is shown, among other things, by our having concept of a pure breed. We especially value pure-breed horses, dogs, and other animals not just for their utility but also for their special beauty, the peculiar harmony and expressiveness of their appearance. The breeding of new animal species not only aims toward practical utility but is also often based on aesthetic considerations.

Displaying a limitless variety of vital forms, organic beauty can be static or kinetic (the harmonic unity of shape and contours; the gracefulness and fluidity of motions, and so on). It is important to note that the inner structure of the aspects through which organic beauty manifests itself is by no means uniform. The higher the animal's development and the closer its psychophysical organization to ours, the greater will be the part played by the animal's objective significance in our appreciation of the its beauty. In the case of lower animals (fish, insects, etc.) and plants, their objective significance loses its contentfulness and significance; it issues in an indistinct and undifferentiated perception of organic life, whereupon the dominant function in the structure of beauty passes on to the non-objective sensible form or structure itself.[31]

The fact that ideals of beauty vary and change in time, just as artistic styles do, does not at all mean that these ideals or styles are relative in the sense that they are valid and have aesthetic value for only a one epoch, nation, culture, etc. If this were the case, we in the contemporary European culture would not be able to admire, for example, the beauty ideal of the ancient Egyptians or Chinese, for the worldview and spiritual life of these peoples and cultures is essentially alien to us. The fact that the emergence of

any ideal of beauty or style depends on certain historical circumstances shows no more than that the aspect of beauty represented by that ideal or style is, with respect to its origin, indistinguishably tied to the nature of the relevant culture. But this historical conditionedness of the style or ideal of beauty is in no way incompatible with its non-historical, non-relative (absolute) aesthetic value.

Finally, we will note that one should not confuse a thing's objective significance with its logical concept. Objective significance belongs to prescientific knowledge and is grasped by us intuitively (directly). We judge how this or that person grasps the objective significance of a thing by the way he behaves toward it and by the extent to which this behavior corresponds to that thing's special nature. The logical concept of the thing emerges only when one becomes aware of the content of the objective significance and that content is logically defined. That is why the objective significance—in practical life no less that in aesthetic contemplation as well as in artistic creativity—is grasped entirely independently of its logical determination by precisely defined concepts.

6. Organic Beauty and the Sexual Instinct

Human sensitivity to organic and, particularly, human beauty is doubtless related to the sexual instinct. The qualities which distinguish a man's or a woman's beauty depend on external characteristics that arouse that interest and that attract individuals of the opposite sex. From this some sociologists and aestheticians have drawn the conclusion that the idea of organic beauty in general was sexual in origin and that all its manifestations performed the function of a sexual stimulus. Darwin already had pointed out that the beauty of animals (their clear colors, the ornamentation of their exterior coverings, the feathers of birds, etc.) is of great importance to so-called *sexual selection*. This innate tendency to favor the good-looking individuals of the opposite sex becomes conscious in people, thereby acquiring a still greater intensity. Therefore, the followers of Darwin claim, it may be thought that the sexual instinct is the foundation of artistic creativity as well.

We will not discuss this theory any further, being concerned only with the question of whether the relation of organic beauty to the sexual instinct allows us to understand more deeply the essence of human ideal beauty. Even if we acknowledge that certain organismic forms and properties that appear beautiful to us affect sexual selection, it cannot be claimed that animals really perceive this beauty. To do so would mean impermissibly to anthropomorphize, ascribing to animals a contemplative mind-set that is available only to human consciousness. But even restricting our attention to humans, it would be false to think that organic beauty could be wholly derived from the tendencies of the sexual instinct. The latter, like any other instinct, compels an organism *to act* and not to rest until its need is satisfied.

However, it is only when the mind is somewhat freed from instinctual compulsion and is able to control it that there can arise the contemplative attitude on which the discrimination of beauty is based. This does not mean that contemplation is completely cut off from instinct. The former receives its impulse from the latter, but, having received it, it turns off the motor reaction and dedicates itself to the object perceived. The more the sensitivity to organic beauty has been educated and differentiated, the more self-sufficient it becomes and its direct connection to the sexual instinct weakens. This is evident from the fact that the criteria of beauty and of sex appeal frequently do not coincide and that in sexual selection priority is often given to a different individual from the one that aesthetic taste would deem to be the most beautiful.

Since the sexual instinct is one of the most important in people's lives, it is clear that a certain sexual moment must also enter into the objective significance of human physical beauty. It does not follow, however, that the sexual moment always plays the weightiest part and that it alone determines the special nature of organic beauty.

7. Beauty and Ugliness. Their Relation in Art

The analysis of natural and particularly organic beauty enables us to appraise critically the theories that radically separate natural and artistic beauty, going so far as to entirely banish the concept of beauty from art theory. These theories start out from the fact that ugliness is the antithesis of beauty. If the object of art were beauty, then, according to them, art should not and could not depict anything that is not beautiful. But in reality we see that the representational arts as well as poetry are far from avoiding unbeautiful and even repulsive subjects. Music likewise makes ample use of dissonant chords that sound disharmonious and make an unpleasant impression on the ears. Consequently, the sphere of art admits both beauty and its contrary, ugliness; and ugliness is compatible with artistic creativity in just the same way that beauty is. It follows, according to these theories, that the specifically aesthetic values generated by art have essentially nothing in common with this opposition; they are equally indifferent to both beauty and ugliness.

Moreover, these theorists go on to say, if the beauty or values of art were in no way different from natural beauty, art would have to be purely imitative and its task would only be to follow nature's example as closely as possible. But in reality this is not the case. Art never contents itself with depicting the beauty observed in nature; and even in those cases where natural beauty is the chosen theme, it applies to it one or another mode of stylization, i.e., art always changes that beauty in accordance with its own autonomous aesthetic norms. Ought one not, therefore, to acknowledge that the object of aesthetics, if this is paramountly the theory of art, cannot be beauty and that aesthetics should occupy itself only with those values that artistic creativity brings into

being? But if we limit aesthetics to the sphere of beauty, then we should strictly separate it from the theory of art. Thus, taking note of these considerations, we must investigate yet more thoroughly the question, Can one deem beauty to be the sole object of aesthetics, and if so, then in what sense?

This issue is in no wise merely terminological and cannot be settled by cordoning natural beauty off from artistic beauty and taking the latter out of the jurisdiction of aesthetics. On the contrary, the issue touches on the very soul of aesthetics. We must clearly ascertain to ourselves whether the beauty of nature and that of art are related by their very nature or whether, on the contrary, they have in common only a name (the term beauty). If the former is the case, it has to be shown that art can include in its sphere ugliness as well; if the latter, it has to be explained whence the illusion arose that the beauties of nature and art can be allied or even identified and how this illusion could gain ascendancy during times when art thrived.

Human beauty was the central theme in the representational art of the ancients. Their aim was first of all to find—and to embody in sculptures and paintings—the ideal of human bodily beauty. A similar attitude towards art's purpose was entertained by Renaissance painters and sculptors, who walked in the footsteps of ancient classicism. But even later, each time that ancient traditions of art revived, artists returned anew to the topic of human beauty. And if from the Baroque onwards (especially in the 19th century) West European painting considerably departed from the path of ancient classicism, this fact, of course, does not at all diminish what the latter had achieved nor prove that it was heading in the wrong direction. But from the aforesaid it can already be seen that this view that opposes natural beauty to artistic beauty lacks objective justification. Analysis reveals that natural beauty, by its very nature, harbors the same elements that artistic beauty does. Therefore, it must be recognized that organic beauty (hence, human beauty, too) is just a special variety of that idea of beauty on which artistic creation rests. A problem arises only because the concept of beauty is used in two senses: one narrower, the other wider.

Actually, we regard as naturally beautiful those objects which we take to be self-standing unities capable of existing outside the realm of art. Furthermore, they are determined as being beautiful on the basis of their objective significance. Consequently, in these cases beauty is understood in a narrow sense delimited, on the one hand, by the object's nature (its independent existence in reality) and, on the other, by the dominant determining it (its objective significance). But in addition to this sort of beauty there are possible other kinds, differing either in the objects in which they are embodied or in the dominants that determine them. Now, to art all of these manifestations of beauty are of equal value. Therefore, in aesthetics, which analyzes the elements of beauty, the latter is understood in a wider sense. But ordinarily in everyday life human beings first of all notices natural

beauty and beauty connected with an item's objective significance, because to the ordinary (practical) mind-set that aspect of things or phenomena is the most familiar that shows what the item does or may mean to people in reality. This is the reason why natural beauty, and objective beauty in general, usually is set apart and acknowledged to be beauty in the strict sense of that word.

Now it remains for us to elucidate the question, How can art depict ugly things, if its purpose is to create aesthetic values and those values coincide with beauty? Ugliness is the denial of beauty or its lack. It asserts itself only where beauty might be or where we expect to find it. To be sure, since beauty resides in the sensible nature of the world, almost every sensible phenomenon contains one or another "beautiful" aspect. Nevertheless, this aspect must be discovered and noticed, and noticing it means to perceive its inner structure, the relations among its determinant components, and the dominants governing that aspect's unity. Consequently, beauty can be assigned to a thing only in view of one or another structural aspect of it.

This dependence of beauty upon the aspect perceived and its structure applies in like measure to its opposite, ugliness. A thing can be evaluated negatively only in view of a certain definite aspect of it as well. It is unbeautiful (ugly), if the organizing principle that manages the mutual relations among its components is weak and does not connect the variety of elements (parts) into a single expressive totality. Therefore when judging the aesthetic value of a work of art one must first of all identify that aspect of the subject that the artist intended to portray (capture) in his work. If it is not identified, the very criterion of aesthetic evaluation also becomes murky. To every expressive aspect there corresponds a special concrete criterion of beauty or ugliness.

From this it follows that beauty and ugliness acquire an absolute significance only with respect to a certain defined aspect. When the aspect changes, the criterion of evaluation or attitude must also change. What is inappropriate for one aspect may fit another, i.e., it may become a factor or moment that either suppresses or enhances the aesthetic object's expressiveness. Thus ugliness can be used in art as a *means* to evoke an aesthetic impression, though it never becomes an end of aesthetic creation. Therefore, the compositional plan or its part where ugliness is manifest cannot be the main moment of the work of art.

The cases in which the contrary of beauty has an aesthetic function are varied. If, for example, a painter portrays a homely man, his choice may be motivated by his desire to give the role of the dominant not to organic beauty but to some other expressive features of face or figure—features that either define a racial, ethnic or class type, or explicitly express an individual human character or a certain inner state or disposition (cleverness, cruelty, lasciviousness, anger, jealousy, joy, disappointment, and the like). The

absence of beauty may here be an essential factor contributing to the expressivity of the entire figure.

It may also happen, however, that the composition is governed not by the figure's objective significance but by other components; as, for example, when the artist cares not about the harmony of the body itself but about the extraordinary color combination or the play of light and shadows that arises under certain lighting conditions on the body's surface. That is why those artists to whom the most important thing is to highlight the values and vividness of the material that is being worked upon, or of the technical means of representation that are being used, so often are indifferent to the subject's natural beauty or even shy away from it—in the fear that it might overwhelm the purely "formal," non-objective beauty of the composition.

Finally, in a complex artistic composition there may occur parts or elements that, taken separately, are aesthetically neutral or even negative in value, but which do belong to the inner structure and dynamism of the composition. They are set off by other parts or elements and so attuned to them that the totality created thereby achieves an exceedingly persuasive harmoniousness and expressiveness. An aesthetic function of this kind can be performed, within the framework of a certain composition, by both an objective (thematic) and a non-objective ugliness: in music, by dissonant chords; in painting, by jarring colors and lines, and the ghastliness of individual figures; in poetry, by the abruptness of words or by metaphors describing horrible people, acts, events, and the like. And here it becomes evident that contrast is one of the most effective means of aesthetic dynamism.

Introducing the opposite of beauty into its sphere of action, art immensely extends and deepens creative possibilities. This is most clearly evidenced by the development of music. Its impressive flourishing in the most recent times (beginning with the 16^{th}–17^{th} centuries) would not have been possible if composers had not dared to expand ever more the boundaries of permissible sounds (chords) and use even the most extreme dissonance as a means of musical expressiveness. But the other arts (painting, poetry, etc.) are proceeding in the same direction. As the ways of composition differentiate and disperse, that which used to be judged negatively and ruled out of art now acquires a positive significance and is used to create new aesthetic values. Here we can see certain *dialectic* of beauty unfolding. Beauty can freely expand and develop only by negating itself, i.e., by stepping over the boundary that separates it from non-beauty. But that does not mean that this boundary is totally obliterated. The opposition of beauty and ugliness does not at all lose its strictness; it only becomes relative and changeable not in the quantitative sense that ugliness means a lesser degree of beauty but in the sense that beauty annexes the ugliness, takes it over, and makes it an element or part of itself, the beauty. In this way from the negation of beauty and its union with non-beauty a higher and richer species of beauty is born. What

this means in relation to the function of art in the life of culture will be seen below.

Summarizing our analysis, we may say that the concept of ugliness or non-beauty is used in a twofold sense—*absolute* and *relative*. In the first sense, it is applied to those objects that ought to be beautiful but lack beauty and therefore are left beyond the pale. In the second sense, it denotes non-beautiful things such that in virtue of being parts or moments within a certain totality (composition) they together with other elements or moments constitute and determine that totality's aesthetic value. This difference does not coincide with the difference between natural and artistic ugliness, but cuts across it.

8. The Peculiarity of Natural Beauty

A. Nature, Beauty's Potential

Having more closely defined the significance of beauty and its contrary, let us return to analyzing natural beauty. We see that structurally there is no essential difference between the beauty of nature and that of art. Nature (organic and inorganic) is the source and potency of all aesthetic values; and this potency is not only passive, yielding the artist raw material suitable for aesthetic molding, but *active* as well in that it itself constitutes a limitless variety of aesthetic forms and structures. With the exception of music and architecture, all branches of art depict things that can materialize one way or another in the order of nature; or, at the very least, their output is based on data that artists can discover and observe in the surrounding world. That is why many a painter accepts a naturalistic view of art. Realizing that his creations are nourished by phenomena of the sensible world, he recognizes nature as his teacher and guide. He who sees and observes can also create—and recreate only that which he has found and perceived in nature. On the other hand, there are those artists who claim that nature gives them nothing; their sole concern is to embody in the sensory material those inner images that rise up from the depths of their soul.

In part this difference of attitudes may be explained by different stylistic orientations: the aspect of things or phenomena brought to life by works of art may be either closer to reality or further, even very far from it, i.e., from the image of the surrounding world that is dominant in real life. Here the deciding factor lies in the artist's individuality, his temperament, and the general tendency of his creativity: is his first concern to depict the thing's objective nature or to find the best way to express his subjective impressions caused by this nature (the objective and subjective direction of artistic creation)? However, both of these views are in essence correct and just reflect the same state of affairs from opposite sides, the first emphasizing art's dependence on nature and the latter's aesthetic potentiality (in the

passive and active senses), the other the spontaneity of the creative process, its ability to select the right aspect, to actualize its special expressiveness, and to give it independent existence.

B. The Reality of Nature's Beauty

However, even if natural beauty is governed by the same factors that ground the beauty of art, the impression made by the former displays a sort of peculiarity that we do not find in art. And this peculiarity has an objective foundation. In fact, if nature were just a passive potentiality of aesthetic values, we would think that every beauty, whether natural or created by art, is subjective in origin, that it, like the products of technology, is the result of human creative power. In this case natural phenomena would be raw material that man orders and moulds according to norms or principles inherent in his nature; and nature's beauty would arise from the fact that under certain favorable circumstances were are able to put data from the external world into a vivid unity that meets our aesthetic requirements.

Nevertheless, nature turns out to be not only a passive, but also an active potentiality of beauty. It embodies within itself many more aesthetic values than one might guess it does if natural beauty were only accidental, i.e., if it emerged from an accidental configuration of circumstances. This fact allows us to recognize that beauty is not alien to nature, that it is rooted in the structure of the sensible world and manifests itself in the form of natural beauty. In a word, beauty of nature is objective; it is connected with reality; and it is just this reality that gives it special weight and significance. Although the value of values essentially is independent of reality, every value is a value of being and becomes valid only in reality. Beauty, like virtue, does not cease to be a value, even though it is never perfectly realized. Therefore, the realization of a value is itself valuable, and it is a good.

That is true of aesthetic values, too. These are equally exemplified by phenomena of nature and by works of art. However, there is a noteworthy difference here. In the case of natural beauty, aesthetic reality coincides with reality *simpliciter*. The real object itself is beautiful. This is not always the case with art. Here there may not always be a coincidence of aesthetic reality with reality. Architectural creations, for example, are themselves real; i.e., real buildings (palaces, churches) themselves have beauty. Nevertheless, in painting and representational art in general beauty is not realized in the same sense, in the same plane as in nature or architecture. Here beauty is embodied in the created image of the object rather than in the real object itself. Thus if we deem a picture, i.e., a certain real object, to be beautiful, then that is primarily because we deem the thing that it represents, the thing it is of, to be beautiful. (Of course, the picture itself, as a picture, may be considered beautiful; but in this case it is valued for what it is, and not for what it is of, not for what it represents, not for its "subject." This feature of

representational art—the fact that the realization of aesthetic values does not bestow reality on the object being re-created and hence that beauty in this case is not the beauty of a real thing—may in no way be deemed a shortcoming. That would mean making demands on representational art that contradict its essence and purpose. Even so, it cannot be denied that natural beauty acquires a special and unique significance for us precisely because aesthetic reality here coincides with reality itself, i.e., with the reality in which we live and act.

C. The Significance of this Reality

To be sure, beauty itself does not depend on where it manifests itself: in a work of art or in a creation of nature, in a human face or in a picture drawn of it by an artist. The value of beauty remains the same in any plane of realization. When things and phenomena are judged from a purely aesthetic point of view, natural beauty will not appear superior in value to its depiction in a work of art. But the aesthetic viewpoint, taken in itself, is one-sided. It cannot encompass all the aspects and manifestations of being, all the relations of human life to the surrounding world. Therefore, it is insensitive to the difference in reality's levels. Someone who measures everything in aesthetic terms also looks upon the most important even in life as a sight from which he can derive aesthetic satisfaction. This is an indubitable fact: whenever art totally dissolves its connection to other spheres or sides of life and pays no heed to other values of being, sooner or later it degenerates and loses its depth and universality.

Therefore, it is crucially important for art and for any authentic, unfettered perception of beauty not to lose contact with everything that is significant for human existence and that determines a human life's direction and content. But, though keeping in mind the necessity of this contact, we should not disregard the differences of levels of reality nor forget that the objective level has priority over other levels of reality in that to it alone belongs the weight of reality in the strict sense and, moreover, the subjective levels of reality (created by thought or by imagination) are valued only for what they mean and what they give to the real level of life. But if so, then the beauty of nature becomes particularly meaningful and valuable to us precisely in virtue of the fact that it arises out of reality itself.

Besides—and this has to be emphasized—natural beauty arises out of the reality to which man himself belongs and in which his "I," his personality is rooted. The beauty of nature in its own way draws man closer to all of the organic and inorganic world, all of his social environment, in that it allows him to sense his own affinity to that which is real. If beauty embodied itself only in what man creates and if natural beauty were created only in an act of perception guided by those principles and norms that the artist puts into his creative work's foundation, then man would be the *only* creator of beauty and

this would separate and alienate him from the whole non-human world. In that case nature, aesthetically speaking, would be for him what it is for technology: raw material indifferent to form to be processed in accordance with his intentions. But, actually, natural beauty affects us precisely the opposite way. In being delighted by it we do not retreat into the loneliness of our human individuality but step out of the narrow confines of our "I" and into the life of the surrounding world, in a certain way appropriating the richness and intensity of being that manifests itself in landscapes, phenomena of nature, organic forms, and other natural beauties.

Some 17th and 18th century English philosophers who were the first to call attention to the subjective (psychological) side of an aesthetic impression thought that the peculiar emotional tonality of beauty arose from a feeling of sympathy. We deem beautiful those objects that not only please us but also excite in us a feeling of compassion and enable us to empathize with their special state. This theory errs in two respects. First, it leaves out of account the objective side of beauty and does not explain what type of object it must be for it to arouse sympathy in us. Secondly, by no means every object toward which we feel sympathy is one to which we ascribe aesthetic value.

On the other hand, this theory is not without a certain foundation in fact. Shaftesbury correctly observed that the perception of natural beauty is attended by a feeling of sympathy, but this feeling is not a cause of beauty but only enters into the aesthetic impression; and it does so only because the beauty perceived is real, is a phenomenon of reality testifying to the inner relation of man's physical and spiritual nature to sensible nature and to their unity. It would be a mistake to believe with these philosophers that sympathy born of the delightfulness of natural beauty coincides with the moral sense in general and that it can be the only foundation of human morality. This feeling of sympathy says nothing yet about the difference between good and evil. Nevertheless, it is true that it creates favorable conditions for the emergence of an ethical attitude, but that is all.

As long as this feeling is directly connected with the impression of beauty, it is directed only to the appearance of the sensible object and stops there. It is no less intense or effective for that, since its sensory foundation is rather wide. It is nourished not only by visual impressions but also by the sense-data (and our bodies' organic responses to them) of all the other external senses (touch, smell, taste, the thermal sense) as well. Hence, sensitivity to natural beauty is closely tied to the sense of one's own body, to the bodily component of how one feels.[32] In sensing how our body responds to the beauty of nature we grasp our affinity to nature, we feel ourselves sharing in life's rhythm, we not only perceive beauty but experience and live through it. And because this feeling is aroused precisely by beauty, by this absolute and incomparable value, nature, which encompasses all of man, appears like something divine. This makes it understandable why the beauty of nature is one of the most powerful reasons for pantheism and why, in particular, those

artists and poets who have been inspired by a contemplation of nature have been attracted to pantheism.

It is likewise understandable that the extraordinary impressiveness of natural beauty exerted a decisive influence on certain currents of representational art. We have already mentioned naturalist realism with its demand that art always follow the example of nature. Nevertheless, romanticism, which has an entirely different conception of art's essence and tasks, also ascribes a great significance to natural beauty and the reality thereof, even though it relegates sensible reality to the world of appearances beyond which there exists a higher and more certain reality. The beauty that we find, if we are suitably disposed, everywhere—in nature and in human life—opens our eyes to this more perfect reality, which through beauty's intercession manifests itself even in this lower level of being in which human life takes place. That is why true art, according to the romanticists, neither distances man from reality nor submerges him into a world of unrealizable fancies and dreams. Its purpose, rather, is the opposite: in creating beauty it must merge with life itself, transforming it in such a way as to lift it into towards a higher sphere of being. We not merely see beauty but also experience—live through—it.

This romantic conception of beauty transcends the framework of pure aesthetics (the theory of beauty). It attempts to throw light on the role of beauty in the life of man and the world and thereby broaches a problem by which aesthetics makes contact with other philosophical disciplines, particularly ethics.

D. How Should We Understand the Reality of Natural Beauty?

Nevertheless, even if we leave aside this problem, there is an issue that still requires clarification. How are we to understand the reality of the beauty of nature? Is it real in the same sense that the object embodying it is real; i.e., is that beauty entirely independent of the act of perception, does it exist by itself even if no one ever sees and perceives it? In order to answer this question we must first remember that beauty is accessible only to a certain attitude of mind. As colors and lights can be perceived only by the eye, i.e., an organ capable of receiving a stimulus of light-rays and reacting to it, so the mind becomes sensitive to beauty only when it is contemplatively attuned to it. But from the fact colors can be perceived only by an organ attuned to light we cannot conclude that in colors there do not manifest themselves certain qualities of the external world and that visual impressions inform us only about a specific excitation of our body (nervous system).

Similarly, we have no right, based on the dependence of aesthetic impressions on a contemplative mind-set, to assert that beauty is created by the very act of contemplation and is ascribed to the object itself only because the aesthetic synthesis takes place unconsciously. An aesthetic impression is

anyway always based on the object structure affecting us or on some aspect of that structure. On the other hand, the objectivity of colors (or other external sensations) does not mean that they themselves exist as colors outside the confines of the perceptual act. It only permits to assert that the human body, especially the nervous system, is organized in such a way that the physical processes described by physics as a certain specified type of radiant energy appear to it in the guise of colors and light. What sensations light rays cause in beings having a different organization from ours and whether they are similar to our visual impressions is something we do not know. In any case, the sensory qualities that constitute our image of the external world are determined by the structure of the human body. But since beauty is manifest in the sensory appearance of external objects, in this respect aesthetic impressions, too, are indissolubly linked to our psychophysical organization.

Nevertheless, calling attention to analogies with specific sensory qualities is not sufficient for describing the special reality or objectivity of beauty. The solidity or weight of an external thing, its ability to emit light or to reflect and absorb it—all these are physical realities equally affecting our own or any other body. Their effect can be observed on other things or phenomena even when they do not excite any impressions in us. For beauty is not a physical quality, although it asserts itself in physical phenomena. It cannot be the cause of a physical change. It affects only a subject capable of feeling, i.e., of receiving sensory impressions from the environment and of construing them as independently existing objects (things, processes) that belong to the same world governed by space and time. The only such subject, as far as we know, is man, and thus it is only to him that beauty is accessible. A plant, insect, or animal, however beautiful it might be, has no inkling of its beauty; it means nothing to it and does not enter into its sphere of existence at all. For beauty to appear and assert itself, a conscious subject is required—and one that is capable of contemplation. In this respect the reality and objectivity of natural beauty is inseparable from the existence of a human being. It belongs to that aspect of the world that acquires reality (is actualized) only thanks to man. Since man himself is a creature of the world and partakes in its life, it may be said that only in man does the world become conscious of its beauty and its aesthetic potentialities. Man not only creates beauty himself but also serves as that organ thanks to which the world becomes cognizant of the aesthetic values lying within it.

PART V

THE ORIGIN OF ART

1. The Relation of Primitive Art to Other Areas of Culture

In discussing the origin of art, we must clarify the external circumstances and the internal factors that stimulated man's artistic creativity and empowered him to appreciate the beauty of his creations. Beauty, as we saw, is accessible only to a contemplative mind-set directed toward the sensory order of the thing or phenomenon. For aesthetic contemplation, this order itself is expressive and in virtue of its expressiveness acquires a special independent value. How and whence could such an attitude of consciousness arise, an attitude so essentially different both from the one dominant in practical life and from the one that determines scientific knowledge?

Initially (a primitive man's, a child's) consciousness performs only a vital (biological) function; it is closely connected to the basic instincts; in broadening and correcting their activities, consciousness replaces those innate motor automatisms that suffice for the vitality of the lower organisms. It allows primitive men or children to orient themselves in the surrounding world, to adapt to external circumstances, and to make use of past experience. Of course, this initial attitude of consciousness is not favorable either to aesthetic or to theoretic contemplation. Therefore, creation of art, like acquisition of knowledge, does not constitute a separate sphere of independent human activity, but gradually emerges out of the practical exigencies of life. In this respect, we brush up against a certain parallelism of artistic and scientific development. Thus, astronomy arose from astrology, which was based on natural religion's take on the world. The heavenly lights gave men material to speculate on the gods' attitudes towards them; men also tried to divine from those lights what fate had in store for them. At the same time, astronomical information subserved ordinary purposes: by observing the changing position of stars in the heavens, seamen got their bearings in dangerous journeys since the earliest times.

In similar fashion geometry got is start from geodesy (the measuring of land plots), mechanics from building, and so on. Looking at primitive art we find that all of its forms (sculpture, painting, drawing, architecture, music, poetry, choreography, body ornamentation) are closely tied to religion and human practice. Primitive religion is dominated by magic; and the magical worldview, which permeates all of primitive life, is distinguished by two features: (1) all events in life and nature operate not in accordance with necessary laws but depend on the whim of certain spirits, demons, or gods who may be disposed favorably or unfavorably towards men; (2) the latter are capable of affecting the will of those spirits or demons and turn it towards men's favor by behaving in proper fashion towards those things and

phenomena that are deemed to be mysteriously associated with the demons or gods and in which their power resides. This belief undergirds the magic rituals characteristic of primitive religion as well as the so-called fetishism, which ascribes to certain objects a magical ability to protect their owner from evil spirits or the influence of other people and even to subordinate them. The fetishes may be statues and pictures of demons, people, or animals. The ornamentation of bodies with amulets and tattoos had a similar significance.

All these were magic signs that joined all the members of the kinship and granted them the succor of certain powerful spirits. Certain forms of music and poetry were also connected with religion and magic: these were the songs, chants, and other rhythmic or rhymed sayings that accompanied the magic rituals of primitive peoples and by which they expressed their prayers, curses, and spells. Finally, magic included dances, games, and plays, usually imitations of real and significant actions, by which demons or gods were meant to be forced to provide assistance to the kinship's labors, plans, or actions.

At the same time all these examples of primitive art performed a different, a practical function: martial plays, dances, and songs had to raise the warriors' spirits, to inspire them with courage and brilliance. Work songs, by emphasizing and managing the rhythmic course of motions, had to stimulate labor efforts and to increase productivity. Yet the rudiments of epic poetry, stories, legends, and myths performed another function. In them there crystallized the bits of knowledge that the collectives of primitive man (kinships, tribes, nations) acquired and passed on from generation to generation. The epic tales preserved bits of primeval historical information, remembrances of the nation's or tribe's past, stories about ancestral deeds and adventures. Other myths were more philosophical in nature, and contained the earliest attempts to explain the appearance or creation of the world, its physical and moral structure, the fate of man, etc. Finally, in his stories or fairy-tales primitive man recorded his recollections of one or another remarkable incident, his thoughts about the ways of the animals important to his existence, their habits and relations to man, or recounted the rules of common sense and practical wisdom.

In almost all these cases, the main stimuli for artistic creativity were the interests and needs of society rather than those of the individual.

The latter primarily felt himself to be a member of the collective in whose life he participated; therefore it was important to him that the psychic states expressed by him find a response in the other members of the collective and that he himself respond appropriately to social activities and moods. On the other hand, because of that he wanted to please and impress others by presenting to them a pleasant exterior of himself: in this way body ornamentation as well as colorfulness and variety of clothing attained a special significance. In this respect, it seems, a certain aesthetic moment insubordinate to the external aim begins to assert itself; after all, ornaments

were valued not for their practical significance. Moreover, with the progress of civilization and knowledge getting broader and more exact, the role of magic in people's lives decreased. Hence, the magic significance of tattooing and other ornamentation was eventually forgotten, and their only function remained the embellishing of the body, i.e., making it more impressive. Nevertheless, it is impossible to derive all art forms from the predilection for ornamentation. Therefore, scholars investigating the origins of art attempted to find a more general factor that would apply to all branches of art and could elucidate how the practical mind-set gives rise to the aesthetic.

2. Attempts to Derive the Origin of Art from General Psychological Principles. Criticism

The development of culture and its differentiation features a certain law-like process called *heterogony of purposes* by Wilhelm Wundt and transference of values by other authors. This means that things and actions that initially were just means for reaching some end or fulfilling some need eventually acquire a special worth, cease to become means dependent on an external purpose, and become values in their own right. Usually such transference occurs in cases where the intended purpose cannot be attained directly and requires considerable preparatory activity, which thereby acquires a value that is called functional. Thus handwork, whereby a certain useful thing is made, or any other undertaking in aim of a practical purpose, comes to be pleasurable and affords satisfaction regardless of the final result. Similarly, gymnastics or sports, which a man engages in for reasons of health or other practical considerations, gradually becomes independently valuable and gets to be attended by feelings of pleasure. In all these cases the activity itself is positively evaluated. The depth to which the predilection for activity is rooted in man's psychological nature is evidenced by children's games. The satisfaction that they arouse in children is first of all purely functional. However, there occur cases in which the independent value is ascribed not to the activity itself but to its result, even though the latter is essentially just a means to reach a desirable goal. Thus, to the miser money becomes the most valuable thing in life; he forgets entirely that money is valuable only insofar as it enables one to acquire one or another necessary good.

Can the heterogony of purposes (transference of values) also explain the emergence of pure science and art? It cannot be doubted that in the development of scientific knowledge and artistic creativity functional satisfaction plays a major role. Man is attracted not only by attaining the truth but also by the seeking of it—this, in fact, motivates him to devote all his powers to scholarly activity. Likewise, the creative process itself and not just its result is accompanied from the very beginning by functional satisfaction, which stimulates the growth and development of further creative endeavors. In this regard, art is truly akin to play and, as we shall see later, the essential

features of the creative process partially determine the structure of the art work itself.

Nevertheless, both in science and in art the result is of value in itself regardless of the satisfaction that the exercise of reason or of the creative imagination affords. With respect to knowledge, the valuation of the result itself can be understood in view of the result's vital significance and its utility to the organism (subject). The exigencies of life itself compel the expansion of knowledge towards theoretical knowledge, towards meeting not only present needs but also predicting the future, i.e., forecasting what can happen in accordance with the general and law-like pattern of things or phenomena. In other words, theory, theoretical knowledge becomes a necessary condition of the development of practical knowledge and *eo ipso* attains a more or less independent value. Thus, from the role of knowledge in human life we can gather why objective truth itself was eventually recognized as an autonomous value, for even the most abstract scientific theory does not lose touch with the requirements of life and contains within itself the possibility of this or that practical application.

The situation of art in this respect is entirely different. Beauty in itself has no internal relation to utility. The greater the truth of a theory, the better it can be used for practical purposes. This cannot be doubted. But it can in no wise be asserted that the more beauty there is in a thing, the more utility it has. Thus, none of those vital needs that primitive art satisfies can help us to understand the emergence of beauty as an independent criterion. It also will not suffice to refer to that general psychical rule whereby man, like the higher animals, tends to express his internal agitation or emotional state exteriorly through gestures, mimicry, sounds, and words. To be sure, artistic creativity does depend on this general property of psychical life. It is likewise indisputable that the satisfaction accompanying the creative process is in part grounded on the feeling of release and pleasure that arises when inner tension is relieved during an outward manifestation. This is a special kind of functional satisfaction caused by the instinctive issuing of feelings and affects in bodily motions. Still there is no aesthetic value in this manifestation of the emotions itself. It, this manifestation, acquires aesthetic value only when it meets certain special requirements, which cannot be derived from the course of the manifestation itself and does not depend on the qualitative nature or intensity of the feelings manifested. In other words, emotional manifestation does not suffice to explain the origin of art. It is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of artistic creativity. If we take account of the great differences among the separate branches of art with respect to both the material being processed and the method of processing, it would perhaps be too presumptuous to claim that we might find a common causal factor for their emergence by merely analyzing the mentality of primitive man. It might be more suitable and cautious to analyze the separate branches with a view

toward looking to see whether their origins disclose a causal order shared by all of them.

3. Stimuli for the Emergence of Representational Art

A. The Imitative Instinct

We shall begin our analysis with representational art. Already in the prehistoric period, we find two types of art: on the one hand, depictions of animals and humans (statues made of bone, horn, clay or stone, and drawings) remarkable for their precision and lifelikeness; on the other, ornaments for decorating the human body and all types of practical items: utensils, tools, weapons, and so on. Therefore, we can distinguish two styles of prehistoric art: the *naturalist* and the *ornamental*. Which of them came first is a disputed question, and it is doubtful whether it can be conclusively answered in general. In any case, it is clear that their origins are distinct: initially they have nothing in common and develop separately. The naturalist style is represented by the drawings and statues found in southern France, Spain, and Africa; these objects belong to the so-called Paleolithic Period, when primitive man lived in caves and survived by hunting.

The first question posed for us by this primitive art is the following: What is the stimulus that goads primitive man into drawing, molding, carving, and chiseling? Magic rituals and spells only clarify for us the meaning that he attached to his creations. However, they do not tell us where the inclination to represent animals and humans by drawing or molding came from and what quality of human nature grounds this activity of representation. Looking over the innate instincts and tendencies of man, we find only one candidate for an answer, and that is the imitative instinct.

Besides man, this instinct is found in certain higher animals that can be trained (for example, parrots) and in apes. This is a non-accidental and highly significant fact. The imitative instinct truly has a special place among the instincts. Like many other instinctive actions, imitation is aroused by external stimulation; consequently, it is a reaction, but of a very unusual sort. Usually every reaction corresponds to an action but is not identical with it. The teleology of an instinctive action consists in this: it responds appropriately to the impression received in accordance with the positive or negative significance of the situation, but it never repeats that impression; if it did, it wouldn't be a reaction and would lose its vital significance (its purposiveness). With an imitative action the opposite is true: it repeats the motion or sound that the animal has perceived. From this we may not conclude, of course, that imitation has no significance for the animal's life. There are not and cannot be any useless or insignificant instincts. But besides the instincts that directly satisfy the animal's needs there are those that support the vitality of the organism as a whole, that foster its physical and

psychical forces, its resilience, its ability to make sense of its situation and to adapt to it. It is to this second group that the instincts of play and imitation belong. Both of them are particularly important for an organism that is still developing and maturing, and play a decisive role in the early years. When the child plays and imitates its elders, its entire psychophysical nature, its body, mind, memory, imagination, feelings, and will mature and grow. These are the social instincts that prepare a child for life in a society. Therefore, they are the starting points in the process of education as well.

But the appearance of the imitative instinct marks an important period in the development of the life of the psyche in another respect as well. We know that an organism's initial reaction to an outward stimulus is a reflex. The impression received performs the function of a signal, a signal that puts in motion a motor mechanism that depends on the structure of the affected nerve and muscle system. The reflex reaction is necessary and invariable. The sensation causing it performs only an auxiliary, preparatory role and inevitably ends in a certain circumscribed action (motion). As long as the sensation remains a simple sign, indissolubly linked to the motor reaction, it cannot expand into a complete image of the object and become a conscious perception. Only when it detaches itself from the reflexive action does the impression become independent and conscious. This means that the organism becomes capable of inhibiting the motor reaction, concentrating on the impression received and choosing an appropriate type of action according to the existing situation. Having gained a certain independence, the images in the mind substitute for the external world and play a normative role by determining the organism's behavior, i.e., not only its manner and direction, but also whether it is proceeds or stops at the given moment. Among all the possible ways of acting there is one that differs essentially from all the others in that it seeks no goal beyond the image itself, and that is *imitation*, the rehearsal of the impression received itself. Here the image or impression does not lead the organism to just the satisfaction of an existing need. It itself independently governs the action: the latter is the image's or impression's recreation, its realization. The motor reaction gets this character only when the mind orients itself in a certain way, when the thing or phenomenon perceived thoroughly takes over the subject (child, animal), drawing the latter's attention to itself and forcing it to devote itself to its observation and investigation. This is the so-called *ecstatic* mind-set, which can manifest itself in one of two ways. Either the devotion to the object's view so engages and overwhelms the attention that the motor reaction is totally inhibited and the subject, so to speak, drowns in the object's image; or the motions caused by the impression received adjust to the image of the object and recreate it, giving rise to an imitative action (mimicry). Thus apes mimic the actions of people and other apes, and children imitate not only the behavior and speech of grown-ups, but other types of sounds as well (the barking of dogs, the neighing of horses, the blowing of winds, the whistling of locomotives).

These two ways that the ecstatic mind-set manifests itself are at first not much different, but the more they develop, the more clearly their distinct direction emerges. The devotion to the observation of the object (inhibiting the motor reaction) gradually brings forth the practice of *objective* theoretical (scientific) *analysis* (*theoretic contemplation*). The concentration on the object's view, accompanied by the imitative action, gives rise to empathy and re-creative activities (creativity). But let us analyze the imitative action in greater detail.

That it is born of an ecstatic concentration on the object, is shown to us by experience, for often the attentive observation of an action or process ends in imitation. Having seen something that amazes and tempts it, a child or monkey is initially dazed and can't take its eyes off it, and eventually begins to imitate it by its own motions. Even the act of observation itself contains a certain motor moment. When we observe a phenomenon, we follow it by appropriate eye movements. In a reflexive and instinctive action, vision is closely tied to a motor mechanism; if this weren't so a visual impression could not elicit the appropriate motor reaction. This connection survives in imitation as well. The only difference is that here the organism responds not with a reaction but with movements recreating the impression. If animals didn't have an innate ability to react to aural and visual impressions by motions of their own, mimicry would be impossible. The child hears a noise or a cry; it sees the movements of another creature or thing. But these things that he perceives he can recreate not with his ears or eyes, but only with the appropriate muscle movements of his body. Experience only perfects, differentiates, and corrects the harmony of the motor apparatus and the aural and visual perceptions, but it doesn't create it. The elements of this harmony lie deep within the animals' psychophysical organization and its unity.

These points make it clear that the imitative instinct allows us to explain the origin of all those art forms that are based on the act of imitation; for example, the enactments and dances so widespread among primitive peoples. As we mentioned, these dances and plays constitute an essential element of early religion and magic, and depict a cult action or one anyhow important to that society's life (besides purely religious ones there are also dances and plays of a martial and sexual nature). It may be surmised that the imitative instinct helped the emergence of music, too. It is entirely possible that some musical motives arose out of the imitation of birdsong or the noises emitted by other animals. Still it is doubtful whether such imitative motifs provided the basis for primitive music as a whole. In any case, its main structural features cannot be derived from imitation alone.

The origin of representational art is somewhat more complicated. Of course, here, too, the imitative instinct is one of the original stimuli. Nevertheless, portrayal in visual art is not a simple imitative activity. In mimicry, it is either the entire body or a certain muscle group that is suitable for performing the imitative actions. In either case, it is the imitator's body

that is both the means and the material of the process of depiction: he re-creates the image by, in virtue of, and using, himself. In representational art, on the contrary, the material that is processed does not coincide with the acting subject's body. The image is incarnated in the material by the use of means that exist in the external world independently of the creative subject's body. Consequently, if art arises out of imitation, there must be a factor that mediates between the body's imitative action and the representation in the external material. This function is performed by the human *hand*.

The development and perfecting of the hand played a most significant part in human development and is no less closely tied to the development of the brain (the center of consciousness) than is the language mechanism. Just like man, with the aid of, and through the intercession of, language, interacts with the social environment, so does he, with the help especially of his hands, mould the physical world according to his needs and discretion. The hand, so to speak, is the most "intelligent" member of his body: on the one hand, it provides the mind with the most accurate information (perceptions, impressions) about the shape, hardness or softness, and so on, of various bodies; on the other, it is able to execute, in the most fitting manner, the mind's designs and intentions. Intimately cooperating, the hand and the eyes acquaint man with the basic features of the physical world. The hand, just like the eyes, possesses a special sensitivity to the shapes and motions of external bodies. Keeping in mind these facts, viz., that interaction with the environment accustoms the hands to strictly coordinate their movements with the impressions from the visual sense and that it is primarily through the hands that human bodily activity is realized, one can readily understand why man, upon seeing an attractive phenomenon, first of all responds with an imitative motion of the hand. This hand movement can substitute for an imitation with the whole body because the latter often does not take the form of a true motor reaction but only issues in appropriate movement tendencies (body innervations), the so-called internal imitation (*innere Nachahmung*). Each time a visual impression is accompanied by an imitative act, an ever-stronger associative connection is established between them, and this is of great significance for the development of memory. Motor images strengthen and enhance visual images, and vice versa. It has been shown that in the memory systems of children and primitive people the motor moment plays an especially decisive role. Thus the Indian, wishing to commit to memory the curve of a path or a river or the layout of a certain location, traces it out, with his hand, in the air or on the sand. In the latter case, there remain the traces of the imitative gesture that had delineated the shape or contours of the remembered object. In recreating the image, the imitative motion turned into a *representing*. The exterior image now acquires the function of an internal image and the imitative gesture associated with it and substitutes for them in memory. And as soon as this image acquires this practical significance, man attempts to commit it to a more durable material (a tree, a bone, a rock) for

greater longevity. Of course, such a fixed image of a thing, assisting memory or subserving another practical function (e.g., magic) is not yet a manifestation of artistic activity. One can begin talking about its aesthetic significance only when the image itself, the peculiarity of its form attracts man's attention and gives him satisfaction. It is highly likely that, in representing, initially only the imitative motor action (hand movements), and not its result, is emotionally positively charged. On the other, it seems entirely natural that the fixed image, remaining as it does even after the imitative action is over, soon becomes significant in itself just because of its objectivity and self-sufficiency, and thereby elicits man's attention. Then there arise those circumstances in which an aesthetic evaluation of the image can emerge.

It must be observed, further, that the act of representing differs essentially from the primeval instinctive imitation precisely in that it possesses for the subject a certain definite and consciously apprehended meaning (significance). In this regard, it performs a function analogous to that of language. Just as a word refers to a certain object, so does an object's image substitute for the object.

Only if we recognize that the primeval stimulus for depicting animals and humans was the imitative instinct, is it possible to explain why the Paleolithic drawings and sculptural artifacts in the so-called Naturalist style are distinguished by such precision and vitality. Paleolithic man, as we mentioned, subsisted by hunting. Tracking and pursuing his prey, and fighting with it, he had to condition himself to these animals' (for example, the bison's) way of life, their habits, their bodily characteristics, and the ways they reacted to such an extent that the live image of each such animal imprinted itself deeply in his memory and aroused his instinct to imitate. And when the repetition of imitative acts gave rise to the representation of animals, then the latter, too, had to reflect the entire optical and motor experience gained in the course of observing, imitating, and variously interacting with these animals. In a similar way there emerged another subject of Paleolithic drawing and sculpture—man. It should be remarked that all of these drawings, both of animals and of men, are purely linear, i.e., they trace contours (shapes). This depends primarily on the method and means of drawing; but it also shows the decisive significance of the motor moment (hand movements, recreating the object's shape). We find the same characteristics in the games and drawings of contemporary primitive peoples. Recent Soviet studies show that the children of Eskimos and other Northern peoples living in Polar Regions have an exceptional gift for linear drawing and in this respect surpass the children of highly civilized peoples. Here too the liveliness and life-likeness of the drawing stems not only from the optic vividness and precision of the recollected image (children always draw from memory) but also from the undisturbed connection to motor images.

The emergence and development of naturalistic representation might have been abetted by yet another circumstance. We often find in nature things (rocks, stones, bones, branches, trunks) whose shape reminds us of a human or animal body or a certain bodily part (beak, tail, foot, hand, claw, head, horn, etc.). Noticing this similarity man will want to make it more obvious, i.e., to process the found object in such a way that it corresponds even better to the animal's or human being's real appearance. Here too the imitative instinct asserts itself, actuated by the recognized similarity. If the processed thing, furthermore, has a practical use (i.e., is suitable for this or that task, such as sticks, arrows, knives, and weapons are), then carved or engraved images of animals or men acquire a decorative significance as well. However, having turned into means of decoration, creations in naturalistic style coalesce with another branch of primitive art, ornamentation, and become influenced by it. Ornamentation, however, cannot be derived from the imitative instinct, because the primary ornamental forms are of an abstract, geometric nature and consist of lines that simply do not represent anything. Therefore, it is plausible to think that ornamental art hails from another source. What might this source be?

B. Play (Free Motor Activity)

An answer to this question is given by the so-called *play* theory, first formulated by the German poet and thinker Friedrich von Schiller, later (in the 19th c.) expanded and biologically grounded by the English philosopher Herbert Spencer and by Professor *Karl Groos*. Though the aims of this theory are much broader (according to Schiller and Spencer, it has to explain the origin of all branches of art), more detailed and deeper research from the most recent times on the life and psychology of primitive peoples as well as data from contemporary child psychology allow the conclusion that the appearance of art is a rather complex process which depends on the interaction of many factors and cannot be derived from just one source. Making due allowance for this qualification it must nevertheless be recognized that the play instinct played a large role in the development of art and that certain kinds of artistic creativity had their roots in play. One of these seems to be ornamentation.

Schiller was right to call attention to the affinity between playing and creating art in one highly essential respect: both fail to satisfy any vital or practical need and therefore do not depend on any external goal beyond themselves. Both playing and art making are self-sufficient; their value lies in the process (activity) itself, and in this respect they are functionally similar. In this independence of the art-making instinct from purely biological demands Schiller saw a manifestation of human *freedom*, i.e., that feature of his nature that grounded his moral purpose, his morality. Consequently, art

(and by the same token, the primeval art form—playing) and morality grow out of the same root.

Spencer takes an entirely different route to a similar conclusion. Basing himself on the biological theory of evolution, he tries to explain the origin of play in purely physiological terms. His story is that the normal organism accumulates more energy than it needs for the satisfaction of its existing vital needs; therefore, its tendency is to dissipate this surplus energy through movements that have no definite purpose. This gives rise to play, which in turn brings forth artistic creativity. In childhood the play instinct manifests itself particularly intensively precisely because children (and the young of higher animals) get from their elders all that they need and thus can use up all their excess energy in free movement, i.e., play.

This theory, however, is not quite compatible with the facts. To be sure, animals, children, and primitive people engage in playing and dancing only when their most essential vital needs have been satisfied. But in playing they usually dissipate not only their surplus energy but all its reserves: they do not cease playing or dancing before they are tired and have no more energy left. Therefore, it stands to reason that the fundamental cause of playing is not a surplus of energy but the functional satisfaction attendant upon playing. In other words, the theory[33] of Schiller, Spencer, and their followers is correct insofar as it discerns the origins of play in a type of *activity innate to animals and man*, an activity that arises spontaneously and is not connected to direct organismic needs. Infants already exhibit such motor activity, especially after their hunger or thirst has been satisfied. This includes leg, hand, or entire body movements in which initially there is no order or purpose. Apparently, these movements (called *automatic* to distinguish them from reflexive, instinctive, and conscious movements) manifest a certain inner excitation of the nervous system. When the child grows and gains in consciousness this motor activity becomes more purposive and allows him to affect things in his surroundings. In touching, throwing, and bashing them against each other the child tests the mobility and agility of his body (above all, his hands) and acquaints itself with the attributes of external objects. It takes an important step forward when it begins to interest itself in the outcomes of its activities, when it repeats those movements the results of which are to his liking or amaze him and which he tries to adjust to the sought-after effect.

In this way the child learns, e.g., to throw and catch a ball, to whistle, sing, and so on. Of course, he is encouraged toward such activities by the imitative instinct, by his desire to do as adults do. The earliest attempts of a child to draw, mould, or build something arise in a similar way. In all these cases the result is initially not distinguished from the movements producing it and is conjointly invested with a positive feeling. Only gradually does the outcome itself acquire a decisive significance, whereupon it begins to manage and regulate the entire process. Neither doodling nor its accidental result give the child the pleasure they once did; the movements of its hand

begin to be governed by a certain (even if not fully conscious) design or intention. This doesn't mean that there arises in its mind a definite and clear image that it tries to re-create in what it is drawing. Usually this optical image is formed, corrected, and clarified, with the hand movements assisting, only during the process of drawing itself.

But from what has been said it is still not clear what idea the child is trying to realize in his drawings, or what motivates him to adjust the latter to a certain order or plan. This question concerns primarily the provenance of ornamental drawings, since for naturalistic depiction the very thing that is being depicted is what indicates the order.

An ornament is described by two principal moments: (1) rhythm, i.e., the regular repetition of the same elements or their combinations (lines, dots, figures), and (2) the grouping or distribution of these elements in a plane such that the latter is conceived as a complete spatial unity. The fact that in almost all branches of art rhythm asserts itself as a formative factor is no accident, since it is grounded on the organic nature of man itself. The key organic processes are rhythmic, including those on which human motor activity depends, e.g., heartbeat, breathing, the contracting and relaxing of muscles. Consequently, the movements of both the body and its separate parts attain maximum purposiveness and best perform their job when they are rhythmic and the movements of one member are rhythmically coordinated with those of another. That is evident not only from such actions as walking, running, swimming, jumping, etc., but also from all manual labor tasks that consist of various repetitive and alternating motions (e.g., weaving, knitting, sawing, woodcutting, and so on). Hence it is clear why rhythm and rhythmization manifest themselves in man's first attempts to draw, and why in drawing the simplest movements of the hand are rhythmic in nature and tend to be repetitive. Thus the drawings of the Paleolithic period are limited to the repetition of the same lines (mostly crooked) and dots. Here one can clearly see that the rhythm of spatial elements is founded on the motor (temporal) rhythm of the hand movements.

Being innate to the human psychophysical organization, rhythm is highly infectious. As soon as he notices something rhythmically repeated (be it movements, sounds, or spatial elements), man is impelled to carry on—to re-create this rhythm and in the re-creation to emphasize it even further. This is how primitive arts and crafts might have arisen. The forms of the various baskets, throws, and carvings are purposive in the sense that they are fit for the practical purpose these implements serve. But at the same time their form is determined by the movements of the hands that shape the material, and by the motor sensations that accompany these movements, whereas the visible spatial image of the object gets clearer and better only as the production process gets perfected.

Nevertheless, these Paleolithic drawings cannot yet be regarded as ornamental in the strict sense of that word, since they lack the second

essential feature—an orderly grouping of the elements in a plane. Lines and dots are here thrown together accidentally on the surface of the rock or wall without any regard to the spatial relationships among each other and particularly to the plane that they cover. An ornamental composition comes into being only when the picture is so related to the plane that it forms it in a certain methodical way, i.e., segments it into separate parts and simultaneously connects these parts into a picturesque unity of spatial diversity. Only then does the temporal rhythm of manual motions turn into a true spatial (visible) rhythm, which itself becomes an essential structural factor of the composition and therefore acquires a greater precision and vividness. In other words, when the picture becomes an ornament, the motor moment relinquishes the most important job to the optical image, which by its nature determines the spatial organization of the composition.

The most elementary organizing element of a spatial composition is *symmetry*, which gives the latter completeness and subordinates all of its elements to a static balance. Symmetry, like rhythm, is not an artificial or factitious construction. It is an essential feature of nearly all organic forms. Plant forms are usually symmetric, as is the body of animals and human beings and its separate parts. Re-creating these forms in naturalistic drawings and sculptures, primitive man gets accustomed to them and in descrying their qualities slowly learns to appreciate the regulative significance of symmetry. No wonder then that symmetry comes to seem appropriate to him for ornamental drawings as well, especially because he makes them to decorate his own body first of all. That is why the symmetric form of the human body had to be reflected in the ornament gracing it.

Besides his body, primitive man decorated all kinds of things that had a practical use for him: dishes, boxes, weapons, clothes, the walls of his adobe. Here the composition of the ornament depends on a multitude of moments: the shape of the ornamented thing, the techniques of its production and processing, and its practical or magical meanings. Often one or another objective theme makes its way into the composition, such as plant, animal, or human images that are accommodated to the general ornamentation plan. In this way, there at first make contact and later (in part) converge two initially distinct and independent tendencies of representation: the ornamental and the naturalist. Their interaction determines the further development of representational art. Depending on which tendency gets the upper hand, artistic style changes, too: either the figures of living and non-living things are simplified, geometrically schematized; or, contrariwise, the ornamental elements are likened to naturalistic pictures and become means of representing and clarifying objective themes. But it is very important to notice that it is ornamental composition that attunes man, even when he depicts naturalistic scenes, to pay attention to the spatial relations among the separate figures and to group the latter in such a way that they constitute a completed, visible, and significant unity.

The development of primitive art was markedly affected by the progress of the whole material culture and technology (especially during the transitions from the Stone Age to the Bronze and Iron Ages). Having mastered the processing of the most various materials and using them to fashion household items, man becomes acquainted with the properties of gold, bronze, iron, and other metals and learns to use them for artistic effect. In this, he is aided by the pictorial qualities (colorfulness, color varieties and contrasts) of his materials.

Paints are used already in prehistoric art. At first painting is monochromatic and graphic in nature: lines, dots, silhouettes are painted in black or red color. Later it becomes polychromatic; besides, the interior of the delineated silhouettes is also covered with paint (black, yellow, red, etc.). Colors now perform not only a graphic function but also depict body mass or the inner structure of the body parts. It is noteworthy that in using various colors prehistoric man usually does not mimic nature, i.e., does not attempt to give the thing depicted the same color that it has in reality, or even a similar one. That is not only because of the limited technical means available to primitive art but also primarily because human attention is riveted from the beginning not on the objective meaning of the colors, but on their direct sensory impressiveness and their decorative power. Primitive nations, as is well known, especially value and appreciate the things that catch their attention by the boldness and variety of their colors. For them colors in the first instance embellish, rather than represent, things. This is strikingly illustrated by the previously mentioned studies of the children of the Siberian North. Where the nations subsist by hunting and are still untouched by European civilization, children display an unusual talent for graphic representation, whereas colors have only decorative significance in their naturalistic silhouette drawings. By contrast, a predilection for natural colors and colored subjects (landscapes) appears in those nations that have attained a higher level of civilization and that engage in agriculture. But their graphic arts abilities are much less pronounced.

Architecture is of later origin than painting and sculpture. Paleolithic man, being a hunter and nomad, lived in caves or in hastily rigged up abodes. Sturdier edifices appeared only in the Neolithic period, when man began working the land and became sedentary. That a primitive construction whose sole purpose was to protect man from the elements and ferocious beasts also paid attention to artistic values may be doubted. Certain rudiments of artistry may instead be found in ritual monuments to the dead—and not only in their shape but also in the way they are grouped (menhirs and dolmens).

Nevertheless, architecture becomes an art only in the historic period, when both the life of society and science and technology achieve a high level of organization and man learns to master freely (sovereignly) the construction materials necessary for architecture. Only then does he manage to subordinate to his artistic plans the geometric forms of buildings as well as

their mechanic moments (the marshalling and analysis of masses, the opposition and tension of leverage and pressure).

4. The Origin of Music

It must be admitted that the question of how music originated has received little clarification. The structure of music is based on two moments: one is rhythm, the other is the definition of intervals and the differences among the intervals. The latter moment also determines harmony (the consonance of tones) and the melodic succession of tones. Melody, furthermore, is also influenced by rhythm. Since folk music, i.e., the simplest musical form known to us, is comprised of songs, where the melody is associated with a verbal text, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and later *Johann Gottfried Herder* thought that music is descended from language. This theory, however, has met with insuperable difficulties. Even though language does contain all of the basic musical moments (rhythm, tone intervals with respect to high and low, and changes in sound dynamics), the intervals between the tones are neither constant nor strictly defined (mostly they are intervals close to the fourth or the fifth). That's why it is impossible explain from the facts of language why it's precisely this moment that is so crucial to music. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether singing emerged later than language did. The historical evolution of folk songs fails to confirm this. It turns out that their oldest elements are the refrains, where the melody is accompanied by meaningless words and sound combinations that carry no objective meaning.

Other scholars (*Karl Bücher*) try to derive music from rhythm. This theory seems plausible in virtue of the fact that rhythm is a general regulative principle that plays an essential role in virtually all branches of art. Can one not speculate that from the development and differentiation of the rhythmic sense there arose all kinds of artistic creativity as the forms of its objectification? For from the very beginning musical rhythm is closely connected to the rhythm of movements and of words. Songs accompany either a dance or a theatrical play or a labor task or a cult ritual. Moreover, in the music of all primitive nations rhythm plays the crucial role. This applies also to ancient Greek music, characterized as it was by an exceptional rhythmic variety—a feature responsible for its peculiar effectiveness and impressiveness. On the other hand, the melodic moment was very poorly developed and contented itself with a seriously limited number of intervals. Moreover, harmony (the simultaneous combination of tones of different pitch) and polyphony (the coordination of different melodic lines or voices) were alien to ancient music, which was monophonic. Even choral songs were sung with one voice. Instrumental music (guitar, flute) accompanied the singing voice, repeating its melody and only occasionally adding a few embellishing tones (fioritura). The interval theory created by ancient musicians fixed only the rules for sequencing the intervals and did not touch

on harmony. The only permitted simultaneous combination of tones was the octave. Finally, a point in favor of Bücher's theory is the historical evolution of musical instruments. The earliest instruments were percussive; they had been used since the Stone and Iron Ages and were precisely the ones intended to mark out rhythm and give it an effective sensible form.

But even though this theory correctly highlights the importance of rhythm in the process of musical evolution, it is subject to the same objection that was raised against the earlier theory. It fails to answer the basic question, Whence came the well-defined intervals and why did these acquire an independent value in music?

This is a question that cannot be answered by appeal to the imitative instinct, either. As we have said, a human being, receiving all kinds of noises and aural impressions from the surrounding world, is impelled to re-create them in his own voice. The song of birds is especially infectious in this regard. Yet even here pure tone intervals occur only accidentally. Bird songs, after all, are not melodies in the exact sense of the word, i.e., they do not constitute a tonal sequence whose unified structure, not depending on either the color of the individual tones nor on their absolute pitch, is determined only by the relations among the intervals. Each melody can be transposed; i.e., it can begin on any tone and still be recognized as the same melody, provided the same interval sequence is preserved. Birds, as the experiments of Abraham have shown, lack this ability. They repeat their song or learned motive automatically at the same pitch and do not perceive melodic structure (relations between intervals).

Therefore the German psychologist *Karl Stumf*, relying on these findings, proposed another hypothesis to explain the origins of music. He thought that music grew out of the simplest motifs, consisting of two or three tones, which primitive people used among themselves for signaling purposes (e.g., whistles). When two or more people produced these sounds together and their voices were not pitched at the same height, certain tonal combinations (chords) resulted. In those cases, they had occasion to notice that sometimes different tones as it were melded into a unity, producing a pleasing combination (consonance), and at other times seemingly clashed with each other, producing an unpleasant combination (dissonance). Repeating the former and noticing them man eventually became so accustomed to consonance that he instinctively connected all his self-created tonal combinations to it. Later the sensitivity of the ears to consonance was much heightened by the discovery of instruments (first wind, then strings), as they are tuned in accordance with certain well-defined intervals. Besides, instruments gave tones an objective independence; tones came to depend primarily on the instruments' structure. The later evolution of music was guided by the mutual interaction between the development of the human voice and the perfecting of the instruments.

Stumf's hypothesis is markedly superior to the others in that it shows the way toward explaining just that feature of music (the well-definedness of instrumental intervals and the regularity of their relations) that distinguishes it from other closely related branches of art. But whether it is the only way is still debatable. In any case, Stumf's theory is difficult to square with the fact that, e.g., European music was, at the beginning and for a long time thereafter, monophonic; polyphony (the use of harmony) came into vogue only later, towards the end of the Middle Ages.[34] Stumf's hypothesis, on the other hand, would suggest that polyphony should have been there right from the very beginning, since the thing that directed primitive man's attention to tone intervals and their relations was nothing other than the differences between tonal combinations (consonances and dissonances).

5. General Conclusions

What we have said leads to the conclusion that the peculiar attitude of consciousness on which aesthetic contemplation and artistic creativity are founded cannot be wholly derived from, or fully explained by, either the innate instincts of man or the practical exigencies of life. It is a special stage in the evolution of consciousness, one that contributes something essentially new to man's relationship with the surrounding world, something that enables him to perceive a new, independent value, beauty, and to place that value at the foundation of a new form of activity, the creation of art. The only task of those inquiries that undertake to elucidate the origins of art must be this: to highlight the conditions that make art possible and to determine the special historical circumstances that prepare the ground for the appearance of this attitude and that help it become predominant. These factors are partly internal and partly external. Among the former the most important one is man's innate instinct for activity, which differs from the other instincts by not being there to satisfy certain well-defined vital needs. Already in the higher animals this activity instinct comes in two forms: imitation and playing. Both are characterized by the same property: their action is not constrained by any external goal and they provide the organism with functional satisfaction. In this sense the activity is free. Only this type of activity can nurture the special attitude of consciousness (mind-set) that allows the individual to devote himself to the activity itself and later to the result of the activity and to the processing of that result. This is the contemplative attitude of consciousness, on which both the creation of art and the perception of art works depends, for it is possible to perceive beauty only by re-creating it from the pointers inherent in the object itself. Initially this attitude is purely instinctual, as if keeping the subject in thrall. Later, when man learns to master his instincts somewhat, this attitude is subjected to the conscious will and enables the subject not only to perceive and appreciate beauty, but also to judge the degree of its perfection, to become aware of the conditions on which it

depends, and to tally with them the process of creation. This contemplation, however, never completely breaks contact with its instinctual base and does not lose touch with the emotional excitations arising from it. Beauty is not just observed but also experienced.

But these instinctive elements explain only the general possibility of creative activity. The branch in which that activity first asserts itself and the direction in which it proceeds are things that depend on the general evolution of culture and the concrete historical circumstances influencing it. In some cases the principal role is played initially by imitation (e.g., in naturalistic painting, sculpture), in others by free motor activity (e.g., in ornamental art, music, choreography), in others still by strictly practical needs (e.g., in architecture). But in all cases artistic activity moulds and processes material within the limits set by man's psychophysical organization, i.e., the motor capabilities of his body and the structure and qualities of his sense-perceptions. Eventually these limits widen somewhat as man, with the development of material culture, begins to use all kinds of implements and tools to process his chosen materials.

In addition, those principles too (e.g., rhythm, dynamic changes and contrasts, symmetry, the balance of opposing elements, and so on) in accordance with which the molding process takes place, derive from human nature, his physical and psychical organization. Hence, even in those cases in which creative activity is stimulated by imitation it not only re-creates the object that serves it as an example but also re-forms and changes the object, adjusting it to human nature. Therefore, the molding and processing of material is indissolubly linked to a certain rationalizing, simplifying, or schematizing of the object produced or depicted, in other words, to its subordination to some regulative point of view (principle). This applies equally to both technology and to art. When this point of view hails from the contemplative mind-set, i.e., when it aesthetic in nature, it acquires the form of *stylization*.

Since all of the just-mentioned conditions determining creative activity are general and nearly constant, it stands to reason that their mode of manifestation is everywhere similar and that the historical antecedents of art—even among different nations—exhibit a certain uniformity. The differences that we find within this uniformity all depend on changing external circumstances; for example, on what sort of stimulus the nation's life and customs give to artistic creativity; on the type of the material found in the surrounding physical world; on the impressions that man gets from the nature around him; and so on. All of these circumstances affect man's physical and psychical nature and help cause a predilection for one or another kind of artistic activity which may flower into a definite artistic talent. This leads to a new problem related to the historical evolution of art and its regularities.

6. The Artist and the Child (Primitive Man)

The problem of art's origins is related to another question that we cannot evade: Is the progress of culture in all respects favorable to artistic creativity? As the human spirit differentiates itself, don't there appear factors that hinder and thwart creative potency in the field of art? This question is justified by indications that the artist's psyche has much in common with that of the child and primitive (aboriginal) man: both are particularly sensitive to sensory impressions and not only respond to them with an extraordinary emotional excitement, but also are capable of concentrating on them utterly directly and naively. On the other hand, both children and primitive peoples have a much higher incidence of manifest artistic talent than do adults and moderately civilized people. The language of the former is often supremely vivid; it is full of expressions and similes (metaphors), the felicity of which takes one's breath away. Likewise, the drawings of children and the handicraft of primitive people display a singular artistic verve; in this regard, they need fear no comparison with the best artistic work of the cultured nations. Finally, the history of culture shows that art and scientific scholarship do not develop in parallel.

Visual art and poetry often reach a very high degree of perfection in those nations whose intellectual level (rational knowledge) is rather low. This fact led the Italian thinker *Giambattista Vico* to the conclusion that art belongs to an earlier period of culture than science and philosophy do, and that art inevitably slumps when cultural life starts to be dominated by reason. Somewhat later *Johann Gottfried von Herder* expressed the opinion that primitive man was by his nature an artist. This claim came to be a foundation stone for the cultural philosophy of the romantics and was further developed by *Friedrich von Schlegel*, the most famous theoretician of their school. According to him, the art of all nations and times is nourished by two sources. One of them is the treasury of language, in which primitive man's worldview, the way he thinks and feels, is reflected. The second is mythology, from which grow and branch out the various forms of culture—not only art, but religion, philosophy, science, and the social system. However, both primitive language and mythology are, in essence, most closely linked to art or, more precisely, to that form of art that the romanticists think is most important: poetry. Therefore, Schlegel says, poetry must be regarded as the root of all spiritual culture.

Based on this theory the Romanticists tried by their own works to resuscitate the mythologically inspired poetry that would bring together into an organic unity all the separated and disconnected branches of culture. But by transferring the cultural ideal to the past and acknowledging art as the dominant factor of spiritual being, the romanticists idealized the nature of primitive man (and with it, of the child) and exaggerated the role of artistic creativity in his life. Neither the latest ethnological investigations nor

contemporary child psychology corroborates the opinion that primitive man or the child was/is an artist by nature. The struggle for existence during the initial phases of human culture was no less fierce than in later periods of civilization; it always forced man first of all to attend to the satisfaction of his vital needs. But such a practical orientation of consciousness is favorable neither to aesthetic contemplation nor the creation of art. Moreover, the social order of primitive peoples subjects the life and activities of every member of the collective to strictly fixed customs that prevent the individual from manifesting creative initiative. The child, of course, is not yet yoked, in his thinking and feeling, to practical cares, but it would be a mistake to hold that the instincts guiding him impel him primarily toward the aesthetic perception and processing of the world that surrounds him.

Still it cannot be denied that the Romanticists' theory has a certain foundation in reality: those data on which it is based clearly show that the progress of civilization does not guarantee a growth in artistic capabilities. Moreover, the general development of culture can, and often does, proceed in a direction that hinders and weakens that growth. Similarly, an individual, in growing and maturing, not only unfolds all of his talents but also loses some of the positive characteristics that he had as a child. Among these qualities there may be such that truly make it plausible to claim a resemblance between the ways a child or primitive man perceives and reacts, on the one hand, and the psyche of an artist, on the other.

(1) First of all, we must emphasize here the imitative instinct, playing such a great role not only in children's but also in primitive people's lives. This instinct itself does not yet harbor any aesthetic tendencies. But, not being tied to any actual vital interests, it prepares the ground for both the creation of art and aesthetic contemplation. Imitation, as we saw, gives rise to the naturalist style of primitive art.

(2) The imitative instinct (particularly its later compacted form, internal imitation) is closely connected to the aesthetic mind-set, toward which both children and primitive people are similarly inclined. In scrutinizing some object they plunge into it so deeply that they forget their surroundings and themselves, too.

(3) As long as sensory perception in childhood and, generally, in the initial phases of psychological development is not yet penetrated by abstract thinking, not yet determined by the usual perceptual schemata, all the external impressions (the ones at least minimally strong) preserve their pristine liveliness and the attention is not primarily directed to the symbolic meaning of the perceived image but fastens on the image itself with all its sensible characteristics.

(4) This explains children's and primitive peoples' peculiar *acuteness of eye*, which doesn't miss the smallest details or most minuscule changes, as well as the *eidetism* peculiar to them (this is the ability to commit to memory a clear picture of an object and accurately to recollect it in words, drawings,

or movements). But sensory acuteness of eye and a certain eidetism are just those psychically conditioned qualities on which an artist's talent primarily depends and which equally manifest themselves, e.g., both in the singular liveliness and peculiarity of drawings and in the vividness and felicity of language.

(5) In addition, we must note that childhood and the dawn of culture are those periods in a man's and humankind's life when imagination is relatively self-sufficient and its activities are not hampered by the constraining influence of critical reflection. When the horizon of consciousness expands towards the past and future, emerging images of past and future events enable man to envisage things that are distant in space and time. He is not restricted by the limitations of his sense organs and begins to take an interest in whatever memory and imagination offer him, i.e., in things that are immaterial, incorporeal, unrelated to extant vital needs. His imagination is roused by such internal phenomena as dreams and other images unexpectedly cropping up in his consciousness. But since everything that touches and startles a primitive man seems vivacious and efficacious to him, his earliest endeavors to elucidate the meaning and connection of things are conditioned by his instinctively active imagination, freely submitting to those analogies and associations which control the course of his images. This internal play of the imagination develops similarly to an external play manifested in visible motions and born of the body's spontaneous (automatic) activity. Its outcome is the germ of mythology, where creatures of fantasy have inseparably coalesced with images of the real world. And the mythological worldview not only unites the child and primitive man but also influences the artist, for he, too, experiences the sensible world as alive and expressive; finally, aesthetically considered, the difference between what is real and what has been fabricated by the imagination has no significance.[35]

The job of criticism that reason does in separating the products of fantasy from the output of reality suppresses mythological creativity in two ways. Since knowledge is directed by practical motives, the aspiration to subjugate and utilize forces of nature, reason places the imagination on a track that doesn't allow any diversion from purely technical or scientific tasks. On the other hand, rational reflection, separating the human "I' into two parts, one acting and feeling, the other observing the first from the side, brings forth the critical attitude that prevents a man from naively concentrating on his impressions and experiences and from embodying them in outer images. In this respect, civilized man has to overcome internal barriers unknown to the child and primitive man: he has to rid himself of all those habits of thought and perception that distort or impair the immediacy and liveliness of his sensing and feeling. However, it would be a mistake to believe that the effect of critical reflection on aesthetic contemplation and artistic creativity is only negative. As long as reflection is immanent to the perceptual act, as long as it is directed to the impression received and only highlights the structure of the

object and the interrelationship of its parts, it is a necessary factor in the conscious aesthetic viewpoint and creativity, since it not only enriches and revises the aesthetic perception but also educates aesthetic taste (the faculty of judgment). Growing out of contemplation itself, this reflection enables the artist to become aware of the necessary conditions for molding material and to embody his design in an appropriate composition. As long as it has not yet been formed (i.e., in the case of children and primitives), there's also no ability to solve more complex compositional tasks. Reflection becomes deleterious only when it doesn't arise from aesthetic perception itself and undertakes to regulate creative work, so to speak, from the side, supported only by purely theoretical considerations.[36]

Finally, it must not be forgotten that the inner life of children and primitive people is not yet so differentiated that it would be possible in every separate case to clearly define the regulative intention of a certain act or attitude. The origin of art indisputably shows that the aesthetic value of what children and primitive people create initially emerges as a *collateral* effect of acts whose purpose is not artistic. Therefore it may happen that the civilized man of our age, looking at the creations of primordial culture and taking delight in their artistry, ascribes to them an aesthetic value which they did not have to their creators.

PART VI

THE PROBLEM OF ARTISTIC CREATIVITY

1. A General Characterization of the Creative Process

All works of art are man's creations in which certain aesthetic values are realized. In addition, artistic activity is creative. It doesn't re-create or copy, it (chiefly) produces something new. In judging a work of art this moment is crucial. This is why our attitude towards art differs essentially from our attitude towards natural beauty and the way we judge it. We do not ascribe the same value to even the most perfect copy or representation that we do to the original. A phenomenon of nature, by contrast, does not lose its aesthetic value even upon multiple repetition. Hence it is evident that aesthetics must occupy itself with the question, What is the creative process that issues in a work of art like? Since there is creation not only in art but in all other areas of culture (science, philosophy, societal life, technology) as well, aesthetics cannot content itself with describing the general features of creativity but must, in addition, focus on those features that are proprietary to the creation of art.

Analyzing the course and constitution of the creative process, we find that it is not homogeneous but mixed; it is a psychophysical process consisting of an inner and outer activity. A certain event or impression excites the artist and prompts him to objectify, to express in an artistically meaningful way what he has experienced. Thus, the creative process begins with an inner (psychical) excitation from which the artistic idea arises and ends with an outer realization of that idea in one or another art field.

Nevertheless, the psychic activity (idea) not only spurs the motor process of realization but also continuously attends it, regulating and processing its course and structure. Howsoever different the psychical and physical moments may be, in the creative act they are organically associated and constitute an indissoluble unity, so that we cannot investigate one moment without taking into account the other, since the idea and all its internal content acquires aesthetic value only to the extent that it is realized and is manifested, in an adequate form, in the work of art.[37] This is especially important to note when determining the criterion that aesthetics must follow in describing the beginning and development of creative activity.

The impressions and events stimulating creativity are various, as are the psychic states that attend a creative act and give rise to it. They depend on the artist's individuality, his character and temperament, his sensitivity and predominant inclinations. Multifarious, too, are the external circumstances that galvanize and embolden creative efforts. All these factors that in one way or another condition an artist's activity and in every concrete instance give it a special color, must be elucidated and classified by the psychology of

creativity; they are of interest to aesthetics only insofar they explain the process whereby the work of art came about and insofar as they affect its aesthetic structure. Therefore, generally speaking, preparatory sketches, first drafts, all those initial trials and steps that the artist undertakes in creating and processing his work yield more data for aesthetics to throw light on the creative process than do biographical facts or the artists' own statements about what they felt and experienced while creating. For it is precisely in those trials and sketches that the artist's intentions; the things that are important and significant to him; and the ways and means whereby he attempts, and knows how, to reach his goal, manifest themselves most clearly.

2. The Creative Process: Three Basic Moments

A. Inner Excitation

In the creative process one can, generally speaking, discern three moments or stages that partially succeed one another and partially coincide and coalesce. There is first of all a certain *psychic excitation*, provoked by one or another external (impression, event) or internal (spiritual experience) cause. This embraces all of the artist's personality and arouses in it a peculiar mood, in which there is as yet no emotional or objective clarity, but which spurs the artist to action and which just demands to be externally expressed (objectified). Out of this mood artistic *inspiration* is born. These feelings, emotions, thoughts, and images are truly various and often are not initially associated with that phenomenal area in which the artist's idea conception is ultimately embodied. Just like a natural scene often awakens a composer's creative powers or a musical piece affects the poet's imagination, so these emotionally charged images that rise up in the artist's soul after he has been inspired often are not of the same kind at all as the ones he creates in his images. Thus, Friedrich Schiller and other poets relate that inspiration, for them, begins with a certain special *musical* mood, which it is impossible to express in words and in which there are no determinate poetic images or story moments. In other cases, poetic inspiration is governed by certain color or olfactory images. There are many such examples in the history of art and literature. In any case, it is important to note that the psychic state out of which creative activity unfolds often is not clearly differentiated and, it seems, does not adumbrate the direction in which the artist's work will take shape. It only displays a singular inner *tension* and an agitation (activity) of the entire psyche. Meanwhile the objective (sensory) images accompanying it are indeterminate and chaotic; they entangle themselves and get confused before images of one kind insensibly cross over into images of another kind (colors into tones, visual images into words, and so forth). This feature of the creative mood has a significance even for the products of the creative process

(works of art); it shows clearly that in the depths of the psyche, where artistic inspiration matures, not only do sensations organically coalesce with feelings but different kinds of sensations (and their representatives, the images) are at first not rigidly separated from each other: on the contrary, they are marked by a certain inner affinity that allows one of them to merge with another or one to represent the other.

B. The Emergence of the Artistic Idea

The second moment of inspiration and of the creative process, a moment growing out of the first (the creative mood), is the *appearance of the artistic idea* itself. In the artist's consciousness there arise certain images or combinations of images, fraught with emotion and meaning: they subordinate all the other images to themselves, pushing out everything that is alien to them, and thereby determine the activity and direction of the imagination. These images already belong to one determinate kind of sensation and in this way determine the form in which artistic creativity will be objectified. This second moment is crucial; with it, creation in the true sense of the word begins. It is characterized by a certain suddenness and unexpectedness. It is as if the artist's spiritual eyes were suddenly opened, and he sees and grasps that which is so indescribably dear to him and through which his inner excitation becomes palpable. It seems that in the artist's interior there awaken mysterious forces, independent of his conscious will; they enable and even compel him to comprehend and to execute things that ordinarily are inaccessible to him. This feeling is the source for the word *inspiration*. It seems that a higher power than man's animates the artist with an idea that he proceeds to embody in his creation. He feels himself to be just an organ or instrument through which that power executes its plans. He expresses only that which he gets from it. But it is precisely from this passivity that his creative activity flows. Hence it is understandable why the state of inspiration is often compared to *daydreaming* and *dreaming*.

The similarity here is twofold. First, in the latter two states, too, images arise and group themselves spontaneously, the will not consciously participating. Second, in dreaming and daydreaming the consciousness is somewhat detached from the external world. Man is submerged into his interior and totally directed on whatever plays out to his internal sense. It even happens that the initial artistic idea originates in a dream (for example, this is the way the opening motif of Wagner's *Rheingold* appeared). These marks of inspiration clearly reveal that in this state, like in those of daydreaming and dreaming, the *subconscious* plays a decisive role.

Mental life doesn't end with what we observe and perceive in the field of consciousness (attention). A large part of it happens, so to speak, in the dark, in secret, beneath the threshold of consciousness. That's why the images, thoughts, feelings, and inclinations that rise up out of the subconscious into

the sphere of consciousness seems often so unexpected, strange, and alien, as if they had come from an entirely different psychical world. Yet the phenomenon of creative inspiration is significant precisely because it shows that the subconscious automatisms not only perform vital functions that do not require conscious direction and not only service our ordinary behavioral sphere, but also underlie the spiritual activity that holds up and actualizes the highest values of cultural being in the fields of morality, science, philosophy and art.

C. The Realization of the Idea

The second moment of creativity is inseparably linked to the third, the *realization of the idea* or *conception*. That's why it would be a mistake to think that artistic inspiration wholly coincides with daydreaming or dreaming. In creating, the artist cannot remain just passive and abandon himself to the play of images arising in his soul. In daydreams and dreams this play is unrestrained and free of any criterion that distinguishes the valuable from the valueless, the aesthetically relevant from the irrelevant. To the extent that inspiration is restricted to such kinds of state, it isn't yet creative in the true sense. Frequently those images that in a dream appear significant and contentful upon awakening lose their charm and impressiveness, and turn out to be froth. The power of judgment is weak or even totally absent in a dream state. In order to eschew such illusions, the artist has to view the outcomes of his inspiration with a critical eye. What's more, it isn't sufficient that the inspired image (and idea) be good and aesthetically valuable—its implementation requires that it properly unfold and attain concrete shape and that all elements and components of the finished work be in harmony with the main creative idea.

The moment of inspiration is experienced by the artist not only as an unexpected gift of happiness and joy; he also often feels the pains of creation, and those pains start precisely when the artist begins to implement his idea, to actualize his conception. This process is by no means always smooth and unimpeded.

The artist first has to select from the images bidding for his attention those that fit the general composition of his creation and reject those that don't. In addition, in starting with the implementation he encounters the resistance of the material being processed. He must carefully consider its properties and values, and adjust his ideas to its nature. Thus, creating something is impossible without evaluating each step taken, without thinking over the various possibilities of realization. The artist must experiment; often the very first trials already lead nowhere. Then he has to start anew, and possibly look long and hard and in anguish before he finds a suitable form of realization. In a word, creating demands—and this is where it essentially differs from daydreaming and dreaming—an extraordinary inner concentration of all

spiritual powers on the sphere of the work being created. The artist himself is the first spectator and critic of his work. Hence, into the creative work there inevitably enters aesthetic contemplation, too, for it supports the critical work of revision and perfection that regulates the further process of creation.

But this is still not the end of the realization process. The latter not only unfolds and details the conception (plan) of the work envisaged in the initial idea, but also sometimes considerably alters it. It may happen that this or that secondary motive comes, in the process of creation, to play a primary role and becomes the centre of the composition. In any case, creation is always constrained by two factors: on the one hand, by an idea arising from the subconscious and enlightening the artist's spirit; on the other, by intensive conscious work that critically selects, processes, and fits together the intuitively derived material. It depends on the artist's individuality to which of these two factors he accords decisive significance. For some, the initial idea settles everything—its realization grows organically out of it and the artist only embodies whatever is already potentially present in the idea. For others, the idea itself and the work's composition become tangibly clear only in the course of the embodiment. A closer analysis of how the creative idea originates shows that this is not the result of just one specific moment: it is connected in one way or another with the artist's whole experience and activity. The only difference is that in some cases the preparatory work takes place surreptitiously and unnoticed, and the idea itself bursts upon consciousness at the moment of inspiration as a well-nigh completed and fully matured compositional plan; while in others the creative idea emerges in an inchoate, indeterminate, fragmentary form, and only the deliberate efforts of the artist and his thorough processing work enable the embryo of the work to grow into a completed, harmonious whole.

3. Creative Imagination

A. The Function of the Imagination in Sensory Perception

Everything that has been said about the creative process and its most important moments applies, *mutatis mutandis*, not only to art but also to other fields of culture: science, philosophy, technology, and so on. In order to throw light on the features of artistic creativity, we must analyze more fully the nature of the imagination, the creative power that governs artistic activity. To that end it is important to get clear on the relationship of the imagination to other psychic factors, namely, sensory perception, memory, thinking, feeling, and motor mechanisms.

Let us begin with the relation between imagination and sensory perception. It is usually thought that sensory perception is not connected to the activity of the imagination. The former consists of just those data that our exteroceptive organs give us. But that is not really the case. The structure of

perception includes, in addition, those supplements and relationships of elements that are gotten from previous experience and from categorial schemata innate to, or acquired by, us (e.g., schemata of spatial forms and relations, object schemata). Thus perception is not just the passive reception of external impressions; it is a *constructive act* that synthesizes the given with what is not, and it is only this synthesis that determines the image of the sensible world in our consciousness. So it may be said that in every perception there already lies a certain interpretation of the external impressions. To be sure, the synthetic act on which the sensory perception is based usually (i.e., in normal circumstances, when nothing impedes it) occurs by itself, unconsciously, and is therefore inaccessible to introspection. Only a deeper analysis (partially relying on experiments) of normal and illusory perception reveals the structure of the perceived image and the significance of those components that contribute to the existing external impressions.[38]

But it is not only the synthetic character of external perception that compels us recognize that imagination takes part in the formation of that perception; it is also the relation of the image perceived to the real object appearing to us in that image that does this. To the organs of our distance perception (especially vision) things and events always appear in a certain perspective. At any given moment we do not see the whole thing, but only a certain aspect of it, depending on the mutual relation of subject and object in space, on lighting, and on other external and internal circumstances. Consequently, the aspect does not wholly coincide with the thing itself; it does not encompass all of its elements and qualities, and does not show all their mutual relations. Thus in a perspectival image there are always certain *empty places (Leerstellen)*, not filled by sensory data but nonetheless belonging in a certain special way to the aspect's structure (e.g., the unseen back side of the thing, its interior, or the part covered by a shadow). It is just this quality of the visible image that allows it stand in for the real object itself, to be its phenomenon in the sense that it carries more meaning than there immediately is in it (i.e., with respect to its sensory elements).

Furthermore, it must be remembered that in our experience the visible images of things generally are not separate and isolated but connected with other sensory data. First, they do not consist just of pure visual impressions but are also determined by motor sensations arising from eye movements. And these latter are in turn associated with other motor sensations that accompany those bodily movements that allow us to inspect the given object more closely (to supplement one perspectival image with another) and sometimes to touch, smell, or taste it. With experience expanding and developing, different sense impressions establish such close associative connections among each other, that some can as it were incorporate others and in this way stand in for them. For example, a thing's visual image enables us not only to perceive its spatial form and coloring, but to some extent also to feel its hardness or softness, the smoothness or roughness of its

surface, its lightness or heaviness, etc. In this case, too, there is more in the image than direct sensory impressions give us, and this would be impossible if the synthetic activity of the imagination had not intervened in the perceptual act. This activity grounds the *representative* function of the image, which especially in the field of art is of great significance.

Of course, this description of the imagination's importance to the formation of sensory perception might invite the objection that the imagination is being assigned a job that really belongs to memory; after all, it is on the latter that the experience of the past that determines the structure of perception relies., But this objection is mistaken. That is so, first of all, because it is usually not the case that in perception there initially appear in our consciousness certain recollections that only later mingle with present sensory impressions; on the contrary, the image of an object appears to us as a complete totality right from the start, a totality in which the supplementary elements have already been conjoined with the direct sensory data into an objective unity. In other words, the synthesis that takes place in perception, even though it gets its material from the reserves of memory, is nevertheless a special act of construction. Secondly, even those recollections, which arise in consciousness only after a certain amount of time has elapsed since the impression, are not, on the whole, accurate copies of the original (the thing itself), and they change with time: not only in the sense that they get weaker, fade, and develop gaps in them, but also in the sense that the form and contents of the remembered image change and even get enriched with such marks that were not there at the beginning. This shows that memory images, too, are affected and re-formed by the imagination. Consequently, the recollection of images, just like perception itself, cannot do without a certain assistance from the memory.[39]

B. The Connection of the Imagination to Thinking and Memory

The importance of the imagination to the life of the psyche becomes even more apparent when we consider human activity. Man, like any other living being, is first of all an active being. His knowledge is at first indissolubly linked to action and serves it. And action arising from an extant need aims to satisfy it, i.e., to attain a certain goal. It doesn't fit into the limits of what is but pushes toward that which isn't yet—towards the future. However, the horizon of the future is open; it harbors many possibilities only some of which fit the goal sought. A conscious act differs from a purely instinctive one in that it is *plastic* (flexible), i.e., capable of adjusting to the variety and variability of real circumstances. But an active accommodation depends on certain conditions.

First of all, the active subject has to grasp the objective (general and necessary) relations that things have to one another, since such an understanding enables him to find suitable means for reaching his goal and to

remove the impediments that hinder its realization. But this is impossible if he doesn't take note of the existing possibilities and anticipate which of them are favorable to reaching that goal and which aren't. In a word, an action is conscious only insofar as it is guided by thought and that thought is supported by the imagination. Already in the simplest conscious acts the activity of the imagination is inseparably tied to thought, and can be separated from it only with the help of abstraction. Thus, even the further development of imagination and thought, even though it may not coincide fully, nonetheless proceeds in parallel, and does so in such a way that the connection between these two capabilities is never sundered. What unites them from the outset in practical life is the consanguinity of their objects: both of them are directed upon the *sphere of the possible*.

Indeed, the form of thought, the concept, denotes not that which is or happens now and here, but the general nature of the thing or event: what it can be like in general, under various concrete circumstances. In thinking a concept, the subject at once takes in an unlimited quantity of possible cases but doesn't envisage any of them separately; realizing in consciousness one or another concrete possibility is something that only the *imagination* can do. Therefore, thought can direct conscious activity and accommodate the act to the given circumstances only through the mediation of the imagination.

As the sphere of possibility unfolds in human consciousness, so does thought expand and grow richer—and with it, the imagination. On the one hand, there arises purely theoretical knowledge, which doesn't serve existing needs and reveals what depends on the nature of things and on their necessary and essential connections. On the other, the imagination, too, gains its freedom and creates the world of fantasy, dreams, and ideals. Just as thought becomes independent when it doesn't end with an action, and the subject can concentrate on, and devote himself to, the elucidation of the nature and lawlikeness of things, so the imagination burgeons and thrives only when the exterior action is for one reason or another blocked and postponed, and the inner energy lying in the subject's yearnings and desires, unable to spill out exteriorly, blossoms forth into the images of the sought-after goal (waited-for good).

In general, the inner activity of consciousness (no matter whether it is thinking or imagining), its concentration and direction inwards, towards the sphere of the possible, grows stronger, when man confronts hindrances that block or slow the realization of his dreams. For unrealized yearnings and aspirations, far from abating, take on new strength and invigorate the imagination even more. Not finding satisfaction in real life, man throws himself into the world of dreams, utopias, and ideals, and seeks his solace there. Then the process of imagining itself becomes pleasurable and acquires a self-sufficient value for him. In the fantasy sphere he has created for himself, man does not have to submit to the inexorable demands of reality: here he meets no difficulties compelling him renounce what is dear to him

and to adjust to reality's cruel circumstances. And just because here he can, unrestrained by anyone or anything, live out and experience all his secret desires, yearnings, and dreams, this ideal world becomes extremely attractive to him and a powerful motor for his creative forces, particularly in the field of art; for art allows him to embody all his dreams and to give them a special verisimilitude totally independently of real life conditions. Thus in the yearning for all the things man did not await or achieve in reality—in that yearning the artist and poet finds one of the deepest wellsprings for the sustenance of his creative inspiration.

However, having thrown off the shackles of existing vital needs, the imagination not only reveals and fashions the sphere of possibility (the future), but also invigorates and brightens the image of the past. The latter is then no longer just a repository of experiences that man makes use of when choosing the most appropriate action for the present situation. He finds it pleasing to turn back to the past and to dwell on those things that he had then experienced and accomplished. Here again it is important to emphasize that the recreation of the past in memory is not a purely reproductive act; it is also a process of interpretation and of giving sense, a process that puts the impressions and experiences in order, highlights their meaning and value, and thereby ensures their deeper impact. Thus, in this case as well memory does not act independently but is guided by the imagination and shaped by acts of comprehension and evaluation.

Finally, in encompassing and controlling the future and the past, the free imagination remarkably broadens the horizon of emotional life; enriches it; and deepens man's sensibility. This holds equally for both positive and negative emotions. With the development of the imagination, man's sufferings grow just as much as his joys do. It nourishes his optimism, his hopes, his aspirations, his takings of satisfaction in what he has achieved; but it also wakens his pessimism, his disappointments, his fears, his pangs of conscience, and his acts of contrition. And not infrequently the joy or anxiety aroused by the fancy of an expected good or evil greatly surpasses, in its intensity, the feelings that man experiences on account of a success or failure in real life. All this is likewise to the benefit of artistic creativity, for the closer the life of the emotions and the world created by the imagination have coalesced, the greater is the chance for the innate tendency of feelings to assert and express itself exteriorly; namely, to realization in ideal forms of artistic creation.

C. Imagination and Motor Activity (Play)

Even so, the development and maturation toward independence of the sphere of possibility and recollection cannot yet fully elucidate the appearance and efflorescence of the free imagination. It is particularly insufficient for the explication of the creative activity of the imagination in the field of art. This

activity grows out of another root as well; namely, man's motor activity, which appears by itself and is unconditioned by any definite existing needs or cravings. We notice this motor activity in infants already, and in particular, when all their direct physiological needs (hunger, thirst, etc.) have been satisfied. Initially these are irregular movements of the hands, legs, mouth, and the whole body, motions that do not serve any purpose and seemingly constitute just the eruption of an inner (spontaneous) agitation. Later, when the baby begins to take an interest in its surroundings and to react to the impressions it gets, these automatic movements become more orderly and apply themselves to one or another action directed upon surrounding objects (one of them being the child's own body). The baby grasps things, sucks on them, hurls them, tries to coax various sounds out of them, and so on. If initially it is entertained by the motions themselves, eventually it begins to care about their results. That's why it is not only inclined to repeat the same movements but also aims to correct them to make the result more commanding. In this way the child begins to play; this is also how he first attempts to sing, whistle, draw, mold, and build. In all these cases the process of realization gratifies him. The result is not distinguished from the actions giving rise to it and together with them gets a positive emotional valuation. It is in virtue of this that play is distinguished, on the one hand, from instinctive action that satisfies a definite vital need and, on the other, from purposeful work, which is a means to produce a certain good or to reach a certain goal. Play is its own goal and the gratification accompanying it is *functional* in nature. And it is just this feature that makes it similar to the creative process in art. We might even say that in its earliest phases the making of art is nothing other than a kind of playing. The inner connection of play to creativity is betokened by the following moments.

(1) In both cases the action is spontaneous: it is not a simple response to a received stimulus or impression, but an issuing forth of internally accumulated energy and its transformation into an external activity that shapes something. This is a creative act in the true sense of the word.

(2) In both playing and art-making the motor impulse has pride of place. It bears the intention of the action within itself; it is not determined, at least not initially, by a determinate sensory image (visual, aural, tactual) or by a pre-conceived idea. Otherwise put, *the motor imagination is prior to all other kinds of imagination*. Thus in drawing the child at the outset derives pleasure from the process of hatching and scratching lines itself. Only in the course of this process does it begin to wonder about the results of its hand movements; and then the optical images of these results gradually take on decisive significance and guide the further process of drawing.

The arts and crafts of primitive peoples develop, it seems, in the same way. Of course, the forms of various baskets, dishes, boxes, and tools are first determined by the practical purpose that they serve. On the other hand, their concrete shape and special processing is also—and from the outset—

determined by the movements that do the shaping and by the motor sensations that attend those movements, while the visible compositional image emerges and is corrected only in the course of the production process. But a similar way the creative process unfolds is often observed in the case of a mature and conscious artist, especially when he tries to open up a new way for himself that he hasn't tried before.

And here it often happens that the creative work goes in a certain direction and is guided by a certain intention that gives it meaning, but there appears in consciousness no image that is associated with it; it as it were lurks in the very motor impulses themselves and is net yet independent of them. In addition, as to the visual (or auditory) impressions that accompany the creative work, they at first perform a negative selective function; they as it were control and oversee the act of realization by indicating what is missing in it and what is not adequate. In observing the work he has started the artist sees that one or the other part hasn't turned out the way it was supposed to, although it isn't yet clear to him what the determinate form of the finished creation should be like. It is only by repeating and changing his tries that he can finally hit upon the solution that satisfies him and corresponds to the demands of his idea. In other words, a conception that itself is not yet fully conscious, determinate, and clearly apprehended guides and regulates the process of creation. Arthur Schopenhauer rightly noted this significant fact. The ideal of beauty, he says, does not emerge in fine art (painting, sculpture) because the artist selects from all the faces and shapes he has seen the finest nose, the softest mouth, the most graceful neck or hand and then puts together all the selected parts into a harmonious whole. Rather, the ideal of beauty is an indivisible totality that cannot be composed of separate elements and appears in full clarity only after the creative process has ended; nevertheless, it still is the norm (criterion) for the latter. In Schopenhauer's view, the artist is unconsciously guided by the idea of beauty (i.e., the prototype of organic life representing a certain objectification of the will), an idea that during creation appears in an unclear, unlimpid guise. This is an interpretation that in light of contemporary psychology must be understood thus: the initial creative idea is motoric; it coincides with the act of realization itself; and it is only in the course of this act that the visible shape (image) of the work becomes clear.

(3) In connection with this feature of creative work, we must mention one more moment common to playing and art-making: just like playing familiarizes the child with what his body can do and the sensory nature of things, so the process of realization in art forces the creator to get used to the material he works with and teaches him how to handle it. And since he is not coerced by any external or vital force, he can freely experiment with the possibilities inherent in the nature of the sensory material, and to look at, listen to, and otherwise delve into the impressions gained from these experiments while also gauging their effectiveness. In such experiments,

which already the child engages in, we can discern a certain playing around with material (colors, light, marble, clay, voice, tones and their combinations), but it is a playing that opens man's eyes to the aesthetic values of the sensible world and enables a true artistic (aesthetic) contemplation.

4. Finally, following the step-by-step development of children's play, we discover an interesting fact: at first the child amuses itself with repeating the same movements and actions over and over again. However, later this no longer satisfies him, and he tries to *diversify* his playing by introducing something new; and it is precisely these novelty effects that afford him special satisfaction. He is now most drawn to playing that requires a certain *exertion of physical force and attention.* Whatever is humdrum and fully automatic no longer interests him; he prefers those tasks that he has to get a handle on and which challenge him. This is a very important phenomenon. The difficulty and complexity of a task (play) increase the functional gratification derived from undertaking it. This allows the child realistically to feel its own potential: not only its corporeal strength and agility, but also its will power and brainpower—in a word, all the creative capacities of its personality. This is the way that not only children's games develop, but also those activities that in the life of grown-ups take the place of games, viz., artistic creativity and all creative work in general. For it is possible to diversify activity and increase the capacity and gratification accompanying it only by creating such conditions to which it is always necessary to adjust anew and in novel ways. Thus, the basis for activity must be a certain idea or plan that requires special and quite complex means of implementation. But to fashion this plan and to find fitting means for its implementation is a job for the imagination.

D. Inventiveness (Creative Originality)

This suggests one of the most important principles on which artistic creation and work akin to it depends: the satisfaction that the creative act arouses and the delectation in its result is in direct proportion to the difficulty of achieving that result. This principle governs not only the creative process itself but also the aesthetic perception and valuation of the resultant creation. What determines the value of an artistic creation is, above all, its *originality*; i.e., the idea that the artist embodies in his creation must call attention to a new and significant aspect of the object.

But in embodying his idea the artist must take into special consideration the material that he is working on, for its natural properties to some extent limit the possibilities of realizing the idea that the artist has set for himself; therefore, he must show some inventiveness if he wishes to harmonize his idea with the technical and aesthetic demands of his material. Thus in poetry the creator has to adjust his chosen meter to the natural rhythm of the

language and to the stress of the separate words; in sculpture he has to take account of the hardness, malleability, elasticity of his material (marble, clay, bronze) and of its ability to reflect or absorb light rays; in music he cannot ignore the sonority, color, and mutual harmony of tones, etc.

Moreover, intimately connected with the peculiarity of the material worked on are the means of representation or realization themselves. In poetry, where this material, the language, already has its special form, they, the means and the form, coincide. The poet only uses the structure and natural qualities of the language to express his idea. But in other branches of art, where the artist processes raw, unformed material, the means of representation depend, additionally, on the technique of realization, i.e., on the nature and manner of the tools used. Each such technique (hammering, molding, carving, drawing, painting, etc.) has its special potentialities and is marked by a characteristic style; and each permits the artist, when uses the appropriate means, to imprint the work with his individual seal (e.g., when he makes lines in a drawing or covers the canvas with colors). The idea's originality manifests itself in the introduction of new means of representation (for example, in painting, of a new way of producing and mixing colors; in music, of new instruments), or in a new use of existing means (thus in music the human voice is treated as a special instrument together with other instruments, or in poetry words and phrases are used in an unusual sense).

It would be a mistake to suppose that this development of technique perfects only art's exterior, its form, but does not affect its inner core, the content. The latter, as we have seen, is inseparably tied to the form of its embodiment; hence the development of form enriches the content, too. Only a new form can suitably express a new content. However, an artist's creativity can also manifest itself in the fact that he uses only a strictly limited system of means or subordinates his composition to prior formal requirements (for instance, a painter may use only certain color combinations or use no color at all in his drawings; or a poet may strictly adhere to only a certain lyric form, e.g., sonnet, madrigal, and so on). Of course, in thus restricting his instrumentalities, the artist restricts the freedom of his imagination and substantially narrows its field of activity. But, on the other hand, such an aggravation of his task forces him to concentrate his creative powers and utilize in the best way possible all the possibilities inherent in these self-limited means.[40] In this way artistic imagination is akin to that imagination which manifests itself in games with precisely defined rules (e.g., chess). Here too the player is expected to show a certain inventiveness, i.e., the ability to make a mental note of the possibilities inherent in the given situation and to chose the very best available.

E. Dynamic Tension (Dramatism)

Nevertheless, this principle that demands making work more difficult not only governs the development of a creation (work) and the act of valuing a creation of art, but also determines the internal structure of the work—especially in those cases where that work unfolds in time and manifests itself as a process (musical composition, poem, drama, ballet, cinema film). Here the inner tension of the process, compelling the viewer or listener to follow it with abated breath, stems from things not going completely smoothly on the simplest and shortest path. The on-going process is hampered by obstacles arising from external circumstances or the nature of the people involved themselves. The dynamics of the dramatic process rely on the on the clash of opposing forces, on a conflict in which now one, now the other side gains ascendancy and which is resolved only after a succession of abrupt changes.

Likewise, similes, metaphors, metonymies, and similar modes of expression used in poetry do not express thoughts or feelings in a direct and simple way; they do not make comprehension easier, but sometimes even impede it by requiring that two distinct images (ideas) be combined and one be understood through the mediation of the other. Here too there appears something similar to dramatic conflict. The difference reveals that which is in common and essential in this case. And it is just such twists of expression that stimulate the activity of the imagination and thereby enrich and augment the impressiveness and articulateness of the language.

A similar structure is displayed by verbal humor. Aristotle remarked that humor associates things that are opposed or very distant and at first blush do not seem to have anything in common. Thus the oppositeness of juxtaposed images amazes and astonishes us, but then we realize that it is just this contrariety that accentuates and brings to view a certain significant affinity that we had previously not noticed between these things. In general, nearly all thinkers analyzing this problem remark that a humorous impression is born of amazement or of a suspenseful expectation that is resolved in an unexpected way. Thus here, too, the contrast between two moments (that which really is or happens and that which was expected or was supposed to happen) creates a certain dramatic dynamism that enlivens our imagination and strengthens the attendant functional gratification. All this pointedly shows that in these cases the inner structure of the creations is organically connected with the process and course of creation. The same dynamical principle governs the one and the other.

F. Creative Imagination and the Mechanism of Associations

In our analysis of artistic creativity we have not yet discussed one important question, How does the creative imagination relate to the *mechanism of associations*? The psychological school created by the English and

predominant in the 19th century attributes to ties of association a key role in an artist's inner life. The succession of impressions and experiences in time and space, their similarity or dissimilarity (contrast) is what unites images and feelings into somewhat more stable combinations and thereby determines and regulates the process of psychic life. Associationist theory primarily appeals to those data that are given to observation by the processes of recollection (of images or feelings) and by the emergence of psychic habits, but it attempts to explain the activity of the productive imagination in a similar way. And it is just here that it encounters insuperable difficulties. Not speaking of the fact that consistently adhering to this theory would require denying the activity of reason and the imagination (and thus contradicting the data of inner experience), it just cannot be that the formation of new combinations of images is derived solely from an associative (accidental) tie of impressions, since the association involves not only whole images of objects but also their separate and non-independent elements. But these elements can be separated only by an abstractive act, which by its nature is contrary to association, because it severs or at least weakens the initial connection of elements. The stronger and the more accustomed the associative tie is, the more it resists fracturing and the separating of its elements. Therefore, there is no place for either scientific or artistic creativity wherever psychical life falls into a rut of ingrained associations.

That associations alone are not enough to explain the creative work of the imagination was well understood by the noted French psychologist *Théodule Ribot*. [41] Although not rejecting the principle of associationism, he nonetheless acknowledges that (1) the activity of the imagination is based on the dissociation of images and that (2) a novel combination of images depends on a certain "tractive center," i.e., a dominant idea-emotion that regulates and manages the course of associations. The causes of dissociation or dismantling of images are twofold: internal and external. The subject selects certain marks of the object with reference to what he intends to do with it. In addition, he also commits to memory those object features that arouse an emotional reaction in him and thereby especially draw his attention. Finally, the subject also goes by the so-called principle of "intellectual inertia," or of the least effort, which permits consideration of only those objective marks that suffice to distinguish that object from all the others and to use it appropriately.

Besides these internal causes there is an external one; namely, a change in experience. The same object sometimes appears as having a certain mark and at other times as lacking it. But that which is associated with one object here and another one there tends to get independent. Elements separated by dissociation form new structures under the influence of the three internal factors just mentioned. The first is intellectual; it is our ability to think, perhaps with the help of analogies (i.e., imperfect similarities). The second is emotional: here there join such mental images and ideas as have a common

basis in feeling; moreover, a feeling accompanying a certain impression or thought tends to link with ideas that are associatively tied to that impression or thought. The third factor differs from the first two only in that it is unconscious. If truth be told, this moment does not add anything new to the earlier two, since we really do not consciously notice the processes described by Ribot. We only affirm their results.

This theory calls forth one serious objection: it has not yet extricated itself fully from the erroneous view, maintained by associationist psychology, that the mental images arising in consciousness resemble external things. Just like the latter seem to us to exist independently of their environment, so we tend to think that the mental images, too, are independent things (objects) that joining together or separating according to the laws of psychical mechanism determine the course of our inner life. But in fact mental images are only dependent mental (psychic) phenomena that are inseparably connected with the whole process and dynamism of mental life and that are contingent not only on the objective data of sensations but also on the state and attitude of the experiencing subject. Therefore, the substantiality and persistent identity of mental images is only alleged; identical and persistent are only those objects that the images stand for in consciousness.

But in this theory something else id important: Ribot holds *dissociation* to be a necessary and essential moment of the creative process. But dissociation is nothing other than *abstraction*. Thus, if we wish to throw light on what the creative imagination does, we must analyze more thoroughly the function that abstraction performs in creation. Only then will the relation of the imagination to thought become fully clear.

G. The Role of Abstraction in Creation

Abstraction in Initial Perceptual and Recollective Acts. Natural Symbols

The sphere of abstractive activity is not limited to pure thought. It sets in during the first phases of knowledge where it doesn't yet venture beyond the limits of sensory imagery. Delving into the content of visual perception, we see that not all of its elements are equally clear; one or the other protrudes and demands our attention. In this respect, the objectual image has "depth": some elements occupy the front plane; others remain in the background. That depends partly on the object's structure, but partly also on the fact that some of its features are particularly significant for us and attract the subject's attention better than the others do. These privileged features register more deeply in the memory and therefore acquire a yet greater weight in the recollected images. In this way the main (objective and subjective) circumstances under which the perceptual act takes place help the picture to become different or specialized by being modified and help certain elements or features to stand out from the rest. This doesn't mean that the latter

become self-sufficient and can be recollected separately. Their connection with the object's totality is not severed. But, in any case, they determine the content and structure of the images, and it is from them that, provided the perception is repeated, the object is recognized.

This is shown by (1) *facts of language*, insofar as many names for humans, animals, and other things refer precisely to that quality of objects that first catches they eye or is especially significant (beard, fatso, hump); and (2) the *psychology of children*. The initial images that appear in a child's consciousness are undifferentiated and yet fully determinate. An object appears to it as having some quality or other that particularly amazes and attracts him. This quality dominates; all the others stay in the background in a potential, not yet fully revealed form. Hence, the child is inclined to call that new thing, more or less similar to the known object precisely with respect to that dominant quality, by the same name. We can see from this that children's sense-perceptions, just like the mental images they give rise to, even though lively and laden with emotions, are by no means as contentful and accurate as is often claimed.

The process of knowledge begins with indeterminate and undifferentiated impressions in which one or another objective mark important to the child comes to the fore. The further development of knowledge is a stepwise differentiation allowing ever-new features and qualities of objects to emerge. Thus, the mental images, on the one hand, become richer, more accurate, more concrete and individual; on the other, they give rise to those general schemata or primary concepts that denote a certain somewhat determinate class (group) of objects. But what does it mean to say that, with the assistance of a certain mark or complex of marks, the whole nature of an object is apprehended, even though it is not exhausted by those marks? It means that that vivid schema, which is delineated by the combination of those marks, does duty, in the subject's consciousness, for the whole thing, that it performs a *representative* function. In other words, this schema means more than it really is. This is the most important and, we may say, decisive achievement of thought. All the further steps of abstraction—the isolating of separate marks and their transformation into abstract, independent concepts—are based on this primary act, vouchsafing to the schematic image a generalized, *symbolic* significance.

Constructing schemata symbols the child goes not just by its instincts, but also by those instructions that it finds in the phenomenal structure of the sensible world. Just those impressions that give knowledge its most abundant materials—optic images—are perspectival and contingent on various external circumstances (spatial relations between subject and object, lighting, etc.). When these circumstances change, so does the object's aspect, which never exhausts or encompasses the object's concrete totality. But each aspect represents the object and can serve as the symbolic schema's foundation. Furthermore, since knowledge of the external world draws its material from

various sensory data of all kinds and since, with the growth of experience, associative connections between different impressions form; therefore, one impression (e.g., the visible shape of a thing) can represent all the others and *eo ipso* the thing itself, i.e., the objective unity of all sensory impressions. In this way the first elements of abstraction get formed, those simplified schemata of things and phenomena that we may call *natural* (innate) *symbols*. With the help of these symbols-schemata, the child recognizes objects belonging to the same class. However, it goes by them even when it represents something, say, in drawing. From all the possible aspects of the object the child most often picks the one in which most clearly appear the qualities that it has noticed. Of course, at first these schemata are imperfect and inaccurate. A child loves to combine very different aspects in the same picture, taking from each aspect just those qualities of the object that seem to it especially characteristic and significant. Thus, in drawing a man, it combines the facial profile with the front side of the vest; or together with a building's façade also draws the interior furniture; and so on. In general, the drawings of children and primitives are rather abstract schemata. Of course, such a schematism can also be due to the limitations imposed by the available drawing materials and the hand movements of the artist. With a pencil one can only hatch and circumscribe with lines the forms (contours) of things. However, the technique itself cannot explain why schemata can refer to real things and represent them. Furthermore, we find a similar schematism in other kinds of representation, for example, molding, carving, and so on. In any case, the important thing is that in representing something the child is from the very beginning using *natural symbols*, i.e., the results of a certain abstraction. The symbolic nature of the drawing is also apparent from the fact that the child is not at first concerned with the picture's accuracy and resemblance to the depicted object; it is satisfied by schemata that only approximately show what he wishes to portray. We may say that it looks at its drawings about the same way that it regards the things it plays with. Just as it imagines that the stick on which it rides is a horse or the chair on which it sits is an automobile, and it represents its riding with appropriate movements and sounds, so in its drawings it is satisfied with rather simple-minded and inaccurate schemata to depict things. Thus it is a necessary condition for playing and drawing that the child somehow endows his toys and pictures with *meaning* and acts accordingly. But such an imparting of meaning is impossible without using natural symbols and a certain way of abstracting.

Natural Symbols in Representational Art

All of the indicated acts of abstraction have in common the essential property of not straying outside the limits of the sensible. Natural symbols are expressive. In this they differ strictly from the sphere of pure thinking (a

higher degree of abstraction), which is inaccessible to sensation. Natural symbols can be very diverse. This variety is first of all conditioned by those sensible spheres to which they belong. There are visual, aural, tactual symbols. But even within the limits of any specific sense the variety of symbols is unlimited; their nature and internal structure varies with the *direction and degree* of abstraction. For example, drawing is indifferent to color variety, reducing it to shades of one color and its contrast to the material background. But it can also abstract completely from color and lighting and restrict itself to the object's outline (contour). This outline can in turn be rather accurate and differentiated or simplified and indicated only in general. Finally, the drawing may depict either the object's stereometric (three-dimensional) form or just its projective form in a plain. The same can be said of other branches of representational art. In all cases it is the direction of abstraction that determines which component (the bodily shape of the object or its flat form) gets to be the dominant, which is what determines the object's general structure as well as the role of other dependent components and their mutual interrelationships.

The nature of the branch also sets the degrees of abstraction, i.e., the possibilities of simplification or schematization inherent in that branch. Of course, in representational art the creator chooses the direction of abstraction on the basis of not only the aspects that he gets from sensory perception but also the relevant means of representation. Hence, the way of schematization varies with the nature and technique of the given kind of art. Thus in sculpture it is not the same as in painting. But it varies within the same kind of art, too, depending on the dominant chosen by the artist, since the dominant determines also the mode of representation. Thus in painting the main role may be assigned to combinations of lines or colors. And colors, too, can be treated differently depending on whether the artist wants to call attention to the surface colors of various things or to emphasize the varieties and reflections of the atmosphere surrounding the things.

It emerges from these examples that the variety of abstraction's directions and degrees afford representational art unlimited possibilities for the creation of symbolic schemata. But they also reveal that the most important abstractive moment isn't negative, but *positive*: it isn't what it omits or destroys in the object's picture, but how it perceives the object and shapes its symbolic form according to the way the object is perceived. For it is the latter that determines the choice of the dominant and the entire structure of the picture—and with that the direction and degree of simplification (schematization). What does this mean for artistic creativity, and how does the perception and formative act that creates symbols-representations throw light on the activity of the creative imagination? This question can be more accurately answered if we compare natural symbols or representations with artificial or conventional symbols.

Conventional symbols, on which all optical and acoustical signaling systems are based, just like all natural[42] and artificial languages, are pure signs that have nothing in common with that which they denote. Their meaning is fixed by the subjects that use them for mutual communication. Their power is intersubjective and lacks an objective grounding. For the sake of convenience, every sign can be replaced by any other. That's why the bestowal of meaning on signs is totally unrelated to the act and means of their realization.

Natural or objective symbols, on the contrary, are pictures of objects and are based on the represented object itself. The act that gives them meaning, even though it is performed by a subject, does not at all depend on the latter, but is first of all determined by the nature and significance of the object itself. Hence, the realization of these symbols is inseparable from the act that gives them meaning. On the other hand, pictorially to represent an object means to objectify its picture, i.e., to embody it in such a material and by such means as in no way depend on the represented object.[43] In virtue of that, the objectified representation acquires a kind of real independence; it becomes a drawing, picture, or statue, a separate thing that is really not connected with its original. Yet for the same reason the picture as it were comes together and fuses with the material that embodies it and adapts to its nature and the technique of its processing. Thus, the realization of a natural symbol is contingent on three main moments: the sensory structure of the represented object itself; the special way in which the subject perceives the object; and the qualities of the material worked on and of the techniques used. These moments also condition the activity of the artistic imagination. It is not enough that the artist be fascinated by the object's sensory appearance and breathe the spirit of his *Weltgefühl* into it; he has to have a live contact with his material, get familiar with its properties, and feel the aesthetic possibilities inherent in it.

To be sure, these three moments can be separated only in theoretical abstraction; in the creative process they make up an indissoluble unity. Hence, the abstracting process that conditions the creation of the symbol (representation) is not a purely inner psychic process, but also an action, and namely that action which embodies the representation in the chosen material. Thus, in analyzing that side of the creative imagination that relates it to thinking/abstraction we arrive at the same conclusion that we reached when analyzing the origin of the imagination: the two moments of *intuition* and *action* are so amalgamated in it that one always contains the other. We can describe it equally well as both an active intuition and an intuitive action (cf. Benedetto Croce).

Of course, not all natural or thing-like symbols have an aesthetic value. Often they are used for purely practical purposes (e.g., as advertising props or brand-name signs, and so on). The label "artistic" applies only to a picture that not only represents the object but also reveals the special significance

and expressiveness of its sensory appearance and thereby acquires independent value. From all the possible aspects of an object the artist selects just the one that under the given circumstances (the intended composition) best answers to those requirements. Hence, an artistic representation must be *characteristic*. This quality, however, may be conceived and implemented in different ways depending on which structural component of the object gets to be the dominant or which features of the dominant get pride of place. And in realizing a symbol the artist has to square its characteristic peculiarity with the possibilities that inhere in the nature of the material and in the technique appropriate for working on it. In all these acts—selecting the aspect, choosing the dominant, focusing on the material, and using the technical means in a certain way—the artist's creative individuality, his approach, his attitude toward the surrounding world come to the fore: how he conceives and appraises it and what values he perceives in its sensual conformation. In other words, all these moments (factors) determine the artist's style (in the widest sense)[44]; thus it is only on the basis of a stylistic analysis that we can judge about the employment and peculiarity of his creative imagination and about those creative means with which the artist endows his creations with their effectiveness and power.

What then enables the artist to turn up new aspects of an object and find new ways of symbolization? It is doubtful whether we can give this question a clear-cut answer applicable to all specific cases. This is a mystery of the creative potentiality that cannot be solved once and for all. The facts show only this much: something new is created not only by taking the object out of its surroundings and delving into its unadulterated sensual nature, but also, conversely, by exploring its relations and connections to its environment. When the latter changes, new aspects and features of the object emerge.

But, speaking of the creative act, what matters is the environment not only in the objective but also the subjective sense. The subject assimilates or incorporates the perceptual impression into his experience by tying it one way or another to his past data. In this way, the object gets not only into a new objective environment but also into a special emotive atmosphere that gives it a new color and brings it closer to such images that in reality seem very distant from it. Thus there appear in the artist's mind the *analogies* on which all comparisons and metaphors are based and which disclose to him entirely new perspectives on the inner structure, nature, and meaning of the sensory world. It appears that the significance of analogy (or, more precisely, analogy-based thinking) to creativity verifies the associationist theory, i.e., that artistic (like scientific) creation is based on the association of similarity, since analogy is nothing other than similarity with respect especially to the relations and structure of objects or phenomena.

But the mechanism of associations alone cannot explain how analogy arises in consciousness. After all, the quantity of possible similarities is endless. Any object can in one or another regard be similar to any other. It all

depends on how it is conceived and conception proceeds by abstracting that which is essential to, and characteristic of, the conceived object. Hence analogy (metaphor, comparison), revealing a new and significant aspect of the object, can arise only from a new way of conceiving, i.e., a conception that cancels the customary associations of images and breaks up the ingrained conceptual forms. This is the creative act through which the imagination's fullness and breadth is manifest.[45]

Abstraction in Music and Architecture

Now the further question arises: if symbol-creating abstraction is what the imagination does in the representational arts, is its job the same in other branches of art—those that do not represent anything (music, architecture) or those that utilize not natural (objective) but conventional symbols (poetry)? Let us examine these two different cases separately.

As far as music and architecture are concerned, their works, it seems, are not symbols that from a certain aspect stand in for the represented object. Hence, abstraction here cannot have the same significance as in representational art. Nevertheless, both in music and in architecture the realization of an artistic idea requires abstraction and a certain symbolization. First, the world of pure tones itself the result of abstracting. It becomes independent insofar as the sense of hearing isolates tones—things which sound and have a determinate pitch—from the reverberations or noises caused by the human voice or other external sources. Similarly, music selects well-sounding tone combinations and those chordal sequences that depend on a certain consistency. In developing, it expands its creative sphere, deals with ever-new sound material, and highlights the *tonal* and *harmonic elements* it harbors. But in addition to the general lawlikeness on which the essence of tones and their combinations, the structure of a musical composition is determined by what it signifies and expresses, and this meaning and expressiveness derives from human experience; in other words, music, being expressive, symbolizes or represents a meaningful even if verbally ineffable content, for a symbol's meaning can be non-objective and emotional. Abstraction can assert itself in the world not only of things and phenomena, but of feelings (inner states and moods) as well.

No less clear is the role of abstraction in architecture: all of its compositions are based on geometrical forms embodying the action and reaction of mechanical forces and their static balance, i.e., forms that subject the relations of material masses to certain common schemata. In addition, since every building has its function, which depends on the needs and lifestyle of human beings, it thereby acquires a certain symbolic function.

Abstraction in Poetry. Conventional Symbols and Meaning-Connected Feelings

An exceptional place in art is occupied by poetry: the material that it works on is language, i.e., a system of conventional symbols. Of course, language organically grows out of man's psychophysical nature, and its general structure (lexicon, morphology, syntax, semantic) is characterized by a certain objective necessity. In this regard, it differs essentially from artificial, contrived symbol or sign systems. But in its essence a word is a conventional symbol because its phonetic make-up, generally speaking, does not picture the object referred to. On the other hand, poetry is a representational art; so how can it represent a world of objects and its significance if it uses only conventional (non-objective) symbols?

Clearly, the method of symbolizing and abstracting must be somewhat different here because it is based on the nature of the word, i.e., a sign that mediates between an object and a subject that comprehends it. In the word art (poetry) that we are analyzing we may distinguish two sides that in the creative process are closely connected and constrain each other: first, the processing of the language's *sensory nature* and second, the processing of its meaning.

The first act concentrates on *phonetic* values. The poet so arranges words that they fall into a certain rhythmic dynamism and that their sound reaches the highest possible level of impressiveness. This is the so-called *instrumentation* of words, which transforms simple signs, the means of mutual communication, into self-contained aural values. Compared to the word in ordinary spoken language, the word under this new aspect is richer and more distinct. In this regard, the processing of words in poetry is not essentially different from the treatment of material in any other art: it boosts and vivifies its sensuous effect. The distinctive peculiarity of poetry becomes evident only when we turn to the second side of poetic formation—the semantic processing of words, for here their meaning is the foundation of objective representation.

The poet, just like the painter, tries to solve the problem he has set for himself by choosing the most vivid (under the given circumstances) aspect of the thing, event, or situation. In painting, only the sensory appearance of the object can be vivid. Hence, it is said that poetic language must be expressive, telling, and vivid; that it must evoke in our minds tangible and animated images of things. *Ut pictura poesis* (poetry like painting). The only difference is that poetry paints with words, i.e., that through the mediation of words it achieves the same effect that painting does directly. Nevertheless, when we consider this more deeply, it becomes clear that the picturesqueness of poetry can in no way compete with that of fine art.

The first reason is that words denote concepts that because of their generality and abstractness do not give the imagination sufficient material to

reproduce concrete images. Even combinations of words, howsoever put together, cannot do away with this essential unvividness of language. Compared with the images of fine art, those of poetry are fragmentary and imperfect. Secondly, poetic images gradually unfold in time and do not appear to our spiritual eyes at once as full totalities. In this respect, work that is much more complicated is demanded from the conceiving subject's imagination in poetry than in fine art, and its freedom in recreating the represented objects is much less limited. But if poetry (with the exception of drama) cannot represent external things in the same concrete and direct way as painting and sculpture do, it can, by contrast, reproduce much more deeply and broadly all of man's inner life, not limiting itself to just those experiences that are expressed in body language and (facial) looks. Therefore, poetic language is expressive not only in the sense that it arouses lively sensory impressions in a person's mind but also in the sense that it allows him directly to experience and feel all those inclinations, excitations, and tendencies that characterize the psyche and the process of organic life in general. In a word, poetry, as Hegel correctly observed, is that art in which the *spiritual* moment most acutely expresses itself. But if this is the case, if poetry uses only symbols that have an abstract meaning and *eo ipso* moves away from sensory vividness, how then is its extraordinary aesthetic impact to be understood? How does it manage to achieve no less impressiveness than other arts do? This can be gathered only from an appreciation of the unique nature of language.

The spoken word performs three distinct functions:[46] (1) it expresses the state or attitude of the speaker; (2) it represents the object talked about; and (3) it directs itself to another person who is being talked to in order that his mind, will, and feelings be affected in a certain way. One or another of these functions has the principal role depending on the existing situation or the speaker's intention. It is evident that the poet, generally speaking, is first of all concerned to represent (depict, portray) something; and it is by what he represents and how he represents it that he expresses his inner attitude and excites in the reader's mind the appropriate response. Thus the poet must so pick and arrange his words that not only is it clear what he is talking about but also that the words do duty for the very thing or event they represent. For only then will the impression gotten from grasping the words' meaning be picturesque and effective, i.e., constitute a direct, live contact between the comprehending subject and the verbally represented object.

However, this doesn't mean that the main goal of poetic language is to produce concrete images of the object in the subject's soul and that one can make judgments about the aesthetic value of a language only on the basis of the vivacity and perfection of these images. We have already noted that with respect to objective picturesqueness language cannot compete with fine art. But, in addition, the nature of language itself does not allow the application to it of the same aesthetic criterion that is appropriate to fine art. This is so

primarily because poetic language does not realize directly, as does painting or sculpture, the sensory image of its object but only gives the subject very general information about it. Consequently, the realization of the image is entrusted to the subject and depends totally on the character and capacity of his imagination. From this it becomes clear that if poetry aimed at picturesqueness in the same sense that fine art does, then, to be sure, aesthetic values would be created not by the artist, but by the listener or the reader who realizes in his mind the images of the verbally represented objects. And since such an act of realization wouldn't go beyond the confines of an individual mind, poetry couldn't be acknowledged to be an art in the strict sense of that word, i.e., an art having an objective (intersubjective) significance, and a work of poetry would lose any autonomous value; it would just be an outward means for energizing our imagination (arousing lively mental pictures), a means that could be replaced by any other, even of a physical nature. Such a conception of poetry is totally blind to the fact that it is a verbal art which realizes (embodies) aesthetic values in the verbal structure itself. Furthermore, it is inconsistent with what we truly experience in appreciating a poetic work. Introspection clearly shows that in such cases (e.g., when reading poems) our attention is focused on the words themselves, both on their objective meaning and on their sound structure (rhythm, dynamics, instrumentation); for language attains aesthetic expressiveness only inasmuch as it becomes *magical*, i.e., to the extent that its semantic side so intimately merges with its phonetic aspect that words cease to be simple conventional signs indicating what is beyond language and start to personify themselves the objective significance of things. If we confine ourselves to just those images that are stirred up in our mind by the poetic work and pay no attention to its verbal incarnation, we leave the poetry behind and delight only in the response it awakens in our interior.

The mistaken conception of poetic picturesqueness that likens it to the picturesqueness of fine art arises from a mistaken explanation of linguistic comprehension. If the objects that are talked about are somewhat known, it isn't necessary for comprehension that in the comprehending subject's mind there appear the appropriate objective images. In those cases when the thought expressed concerns the general state of things (*Sachverhalt*), such imagining would be impossible in principle; for the concrete objective images arising in the mind could at best be elucidatory examples and would in no way represent the general intention of the thought. But even in those cases when during a conversation one has in mind things accessible to the imagination, the act of comprehension usually relies on the images of the words heard and is not contingent on the accidental and fragmentary images of objects that may accompany that act. The latter ends when the subject feels able to make real the appropriate images in his mind or at least to indicate what things, events, or experiences the speaker has in his mind. Even so there is in language a certain vividness not only in the sense that only a suitable

choice and arrangement of words can call forth the realization of object-related mental images but also in the sense that it can evoke in the subject that *mood* or *emotional attitude* that is associated with the subject represented.

Here it must be repeated once more that sensory perception is initially not a purely theoretical act but an externally caused excitation flowing out into a motor reaction. Out of this initially indistinct excitation (sensation, feeling) a sensory image of the object itself gradually emerges, an image that with the internal differentiation of consciousness becomes ever more independent and more or less gets separated from its emotional base and the accompanying motor tendencies. Aesthetic perception, as we have seen, is distinguished by the fact that it revitalizes the connection of the image with the perception's initial emotional background, but simultaneously maintains the mind's contemplative attitude. In virtue of this, the image acquires a singular impressiveness and effectiveness. The words in language substitute for the images of the objects and their relationships. The success of language is based on the close relation of the words' meaning to their sensuous nature. Hence, an artistically tempered language can rejuvenate in a comprehending subject that initial excitation on which the vivid sensory perception of objects is founded. And just as in the process of perceptual formation this undifferentiated excitation is prior to a clear and determinate objective image, so in those cases where words denote something vitally significant, the perceptual act just links up with a certain emotional impression, even though there are as yet no images in the mind corresponding to the objective sense of the words. On hearing the cries: Watch out! Fire! Help! we get agitated and the inclination to do something, although the first second or two we might have no idea at all of what actually happened. Consequently, the perceptual act initially is *empty*, not backed up by objective images, and confined to a certain emotive reaction. Yet it would be wrong to describe this emotional reaction merely subjectively, as a feeling of pleasure or displeasure that the subject experiences as a consequence of the words uttered, since it depends not only on its relation to the subject's "I," but also on the object denoted by these words. This is a feeling arising from the act of verbal comprehension, an *object-related* or *meaning-related* feeling[47] (*Bedeutungsgefühl*) whose singular character hinges on the nature of the object and its significance for the subject. In addition, it is just because of this that this feeling has a tendency to blossom into appropriate reflections of the object itself. Nevertheless, in the aesthetic experience that the poetic work affords us this tendency cannot manifest itself completely, as the mind's intention here is directed to the meaning of the words themselves. The objective images do not arise in consciousness clearly and emphatically but remain *potential* and as it were *folded up*; but at the same time they give the comprehended words a special tension and persuasiveness that likens their comprehension to a direct sensory perception of the things.

The instruments that a poet uses to awaken these sense-related feelings are diverse. They can be *metaphors*, which juxtapose or even compare things and events belonging to different areas of being and thereby underline just that quality or feature of the represented object that can affect or touch us particularly powerfully. Alternatively, they can be *metonymies*, where the denoted object is stood for by one or another of its parts or qualities in a way that emphasizes an especially impressive or significant aspect of the object. However, they can also be rather general or even abstract allusions to a certain mood, state, or thought, embodied in the phenomena or events the poet describes or represents; for in certain cases it is the generality of language that is best suited for describing an imprecise mood (attitude) and bringing out its indistinct (vague) emotional background. It is important to remark that the abstractness of the words' meaning need not detract from the aesthetic effect of a poetic work, for this may be compensated by the sensual expressiveness of the language (rhythm, dynamism, instrumentation) giving it a spirited coloration that can transform the most wide-ranging thought into a specific living experience.[48] In this respect, as we have already mentioned, poetry has a wider range of possibilities than fine art does, for it can artistically represent a spiritual life inaccessible to the senses.

Therefore, we see that even though poetry only deals with conventional symbols, words, the interaction of the meaningfulness of language with its sensory expressiveness gives rise to an aesthetic forcefulness not inferior to that of art forms using natural (object-related) symbols. But since language not only does a job of representing (depicting), but is also an instrument of spiritual communication, it affords a poet the opportunity—not possessed by any other art—to enunciate clearly his own attitudes, thoughts, feelings, and aspirations, and to convey them to the listener or reader. But picturesqueness in the art of language is only *potential*, emerging only in sense-related feelings.

In assessing the significance of the imagination in poetry, we must remember that its being a means of mutual communication and a necessary support for thinking does not exhaust the function of language. Language is also the most essential factor in all of psychical life, one indissolubly linked with human consciousness. It is the principal form of objectification, putting its seal on the whole of spiritual culture. Hence the creative imagination manifests itself with remarkable clarity and explicitness in the symbolic world constituted by language.

PART VII

THE HISTORIC DEVELOPMENT OF ART AND THE FACTORS UNDERLYING IT

1. The Problem: Formulation and Explication

In connection with the problem of art's origins there arises another, no less important one: How must the historical development of art in different cultural epochs be explicated from an *aesthetic* point of view? This question can be approached in two ways.

First, since art is a phenomenon of the general material and spiritual culture, we can discuss how it has been related in the course of history to other manifestations of culture, and what factors have shaped the direction of art's development—its growth and flourishing, on the one hand, or its decline, on the other. In this sense the history of art is just a part of general cultural history not to be taken separately from that totality (culture in general) to which it belongs. But taking such an approach urgently requires us to answer the following questions: How should we look upon the unity of culture? Does the latter depend on certain independent and constantly operative factors, and can it be derived from the interaction and cooperation of these factors? Or is it a peculiar organic totality not consisting of separate elements but itself determining through its internal structure the relations between any elements or parts? Are all the fundamental areas of culture (economics, social structure, morality, philosophy, science, art) of equal significance in the historical development of culture; i.e., does each of them have its own special structure incomparably distinct from any other? Or is one of them (or several of them) *the foundation of the whole culture*,[49] while the others are just derived from this initial sector (or sectors) as the results of its development and differentiation? The approach to the question of art's evolution will depend on how these questions are answered.

Secondly, only if the independence of art is recognized and it is accorded a structure peculiar to itself—a structure that cannot be derived from other cultural factors—does this problem acquire an *aesthetic aspect* to be discussed from an aesthetic point of view. This second approach is not concerned with how art in fact developed from the very beginning up to our own times and how this process was connected with other phenomena of cultural life. Its interest is entirely different: its aim is to elucidate the *developmental possibilities* inherent in the very nature of art and how those possibilities got realized in the course of history?

Now, that aesthetic form through which art manifests itself in the process of history is, as we have said, called *style*. Consequently, the problem of artistic evolution, aesthetically speaking, can also be put as follows: what determines the inner evolution of each style and what are the factors on

which the historical alteration of styles depends? Do these processes occur according to some immanent regularity peculiar to art, or are they primarily contingent upon external, non-aesthetic circumstances?

The importance of the question about the historical evolution of art was realized only in the time of romanticism. *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich von Hegel* was perhaps the first to try to trace a general schema of this process. In Hegel's hands this schema was purely constructive, and it wedged the development of art into the general framework of his dialectical philosophy. He sees art as a special stage in the self-evolution of the subjective (i.e., conscious) spirit, a stage that dialectically passes into a higher stage, namely, religion. Thus it is unsurprising that those specific qualities of art that do not fit into this logical schema are not attended to by Hegel and that he portrays the historical development of art in a rather simplified and rationalist manner. Nevertheless, it is to the immense credit of his philosophy of art that style is accorded a central place in the historical development of art and that he connects style with the general cultural spirit, which in every historical epoch manifests itself similarly in all the sectors of cultural life. In this regard Hegel first raised the idea whose fundamental significance begins to take clear shape only in the light of our present-day investigations.

2. Taine's "Milieu Theory" and its Critical Appraisal

Still, in the second half of the 19th century neither the history nor the philosophy of art took the road broached by Hegel. Under the influence of the natural sciences ascendancy was gained by that method of research according to which all complex phenomena had to be analyzed into simple elements or factors and explained by the causal interplay of the latter. An example of this type of approach to art is provided by the well-known theory of the French historian and philosopher *Hippolyte Taine*, a theory that decisively influenced later historical investigations of art. It is most clearly expounded in his *Philosophie de l'art*.

In analyzing works of art one must begin from the undeniable truth that no creation is an isolated thing but always enters into a group (ensemble) or totality on which it depends and with reference to which it must be explained. It is first of all the whole work of the artist himself and his individuality that condition the creation being analyzed. But this latter set of facts also is not isolated but is part of a wider totality, to wit, a school or group of artists to which the creator of the work in question belongs. Yet the story doesn't end there, for this latter totality is also just an extract from the environment (*milieu*) in which the artist lives and works. Now it is just this setting that it is important to get a grasp on if one wishes to understand a work of art and to get clear on its essential qualities and traits. In Taine's view, creations of the human spirit, just like creatures of nature, can be explained only with

reference to their environment. This is the fundamental thesis of his famous "milieu theory."

The environment, according to Taine's broad sense of that word, is both *physical* and *social*. It includes the climate and geophysical peculiarities of the country in which the artist lives; the foods that he eats; the material on which he works; the physical nature of the people or race to which he belongs; their psychological traits; the circumstances of economic life; the social and political system; the dominant moral and philosophical views of the time; the prevailing customs, interests, and tastes, in a word, everything that influences the way people of a certain period live, think, and feel. Let us give a few examples.

The nature of the material in which the artist embodies his conceptions is highly important to both sculpture and architecture. In every kind of material there are special aesthetic possibilities that the artist has to draw attention to, and each demands such a technique of handling it as suits its properties (hardness, softness, resilience, cohesion). A marble statue creates a different aesthetic impression than one made of wood or cast of bronze. Hence the style of any country's architecture or sculpture adapts somewhat to the material that the artist finds in that country's nature[50] (basalt in Egypt; marble in Greece; slate in Northern Germany, etc.). But architects must also take into account the region's climate and geophysical traits; this is illustrated, for instance, by the difference in roof constructions typical for northern and southern countries. In the north, where precipitation is intense, the roof is usually high and steep so as to allow water to flow to the ground unimpededly. In the south where the climate is dry the roof is often flat so that it can serve as a balcony. Or in Japan, where earthquakes occur frequently, people cannot construct tall brick buildings. In general, architectural style more or less accommodates to the surrounding nature, and this accommodation is significant both practically and aesthetically. That is why the style of houses in a mountainous region, for example, is unsuitable in the lowlands.

Climate and idiosyncrasies of nature have an influence on *painting* as well. The bright hues of the southern landscape doubtless heighten the local artists' sensitivity to color. The fact that in Venice the air is saturated with mist—so that the contours of things seem unclear and hazy and, when the sun sets, various nuances and degrees (transitions) of color emerge—helps explain why it is just there that a purely painterly (pictorial) style (the Venetian school of painting) arose. Or in southern lands the climate permits people to bare themselves, therefore the naked body is favored there as a subject of sculpture and painting.

The familiar beauty of a country's nature also provides inspiration to local poets.

As far as music is concerned, the influence of the physical environment on that branch of art can only be indirect and assert itself to the extent that it affects the composer's way of feeling.

We need not linger on the influence of the social environment on artistic creativity. Any monograph devoted to one or another artist can depict this fully. Suffice it to say here that this influence can be direct or indirect. It will be the former when the interests, tastes, and views predominant in a certain social environment induce the artist to select precisely this rather than another subject for treatment. It will be the other when the things mentioned just shape the creator's personality and in virtue of this determine the nature and direction of his artistic work.[51] It's worth remarking that artists' national (ethnic) peculiarities make themselves felt even within the framework of the same cultural epoch or even style. For example, in Europe the essential difference between the architecture and painting of northern (Germanic) and southern (Romance, especially Italian) peoples is evident at first blush. Having taken over the Baroque style, which originated in Italy, German architects impressed their own national seal on it. Gothic architecture in Germany or England received a somewhat different expression than in France. Pictorial painting in Holland achieved aesthetic effects deeply distinct from the brilliance of the analogous style in Holland, and so on.

All the same, no matter how thoroughly we enumerate all the influences of the surrounding world on an artist, is that enough to explain his creative work? Is it true that an artist's individuality is just a product of his environment? To answer this question positively would mean to fail to recognize personality as an independent factor actively and uniquely reacting to external stimuli—and also to negate its natural creativity, i.e., that ability which so evidently manifests itself in every truly original work of art.

Moreover, we can point to many cases when the artist went against the current, when he chose for his creative work a different road from the one prescribed to him by his environment (his training, society, the prevailing artistic tendencies, and so on). That is why Taine and his followers (the sociological school of aesthetics) face the justifiable objection that they underestimate the independent role of individuality in artistic creation. To be sure, Taine ardently stresses that the artist's personality and activity constitute an organic unity, which he attempts to describe as a dominant trait or ability (*faculte dominatrice)*. But, according to Taine's explanations, it seems that compared to the environment the artist's individuality is a secondary, derivative factor.

This feature of his theory is connected to the fact that he doesn't clearly define the concept of the environment. If it is understood so broadly that it embraces all of an individual's psychophysical nature and the process of the formation of his way of thinking and feeling, then the very difference between an individual and his environment, i.e., the quality that sets apart organic and spiritual being from physical (inanimate) being, vanishes. In

identifying the connection of organic phenomena or the motivation of spiritual acts with physical causality, one loses sight of precisely what is individual to and characteristic of those phenomena and acts. Therefore, in the explication of artistic creativity and evolution, one can speak of the impact of the environment only insofar as this is clearly distinguished from those stimuli and drives that spontaneously arise out of the spiritual depths of the individual. In a certain respect this internal factor even deserves priority over the external factor. The environment, after all, affects the creation and evolution of art only in virtue of, first of all, affecting the artist-creator himself. Thus it seems that not only the creation of art but also its historical development can be explained psychologically, on the basis of those principles that govern man's inner world.

3. The Psychological Theory of "Numbing" and its Critique

There is a psychological theory according to which every impression that interests us, if frequently repeated, gets weaker. The more we get used to it, the less effective and attractive it becomes to us; and we can even tire of it to the point of finding it a nuisance. Applying this principle to the field of art, we may seem to be able to explain the historical changing of styles. When a certain style becomes fixed and then exhausts all of its modifications and possibilities of development, our sensitivity gets accustomed to it and anaesthetized to its beauty. Thus there arises the need to change this style for another, the novelty of which would excite us and satisfy us aesthetically. And the more radically this new style differs from the old, the more persuasive it is. Hence it usually appears as a contrary of the latter. For example, a constructive or linear style is replaced by one emphasizing painterly or decorative effects (e.g., in art, high renaissance/ baroque, impressionism/cubism; in music, harmonism/melodism); or, conversely, the former replaces the latter. It was even thought that this psychological law helps to understand the periodic recurrence of styles in art history.

Such an explication, however, can hardly be deemed sufficient, for it is *too abstract* and doesn't take into account the fact that change of style is a *historical* phenomenon, the specific qualities of which cannot be derived from a general psychological regularity. The latter only indicates the reason why no style is eternal and cannot for all times satisfy the demands of the aesthetic sense. Thus it illuminates only the *negative* side of the phenomenon at hand, but it does not explain its positive side, i.e., why in place of the old style there emerges this rather than that new style. That this new style is opposed to the old one does not yet fully determine its specific peculiarity, for opposition based only on negation is not unambiguous and can acquire various forms. Everything depends on how, from what point if view, this opposition is conceived; and this viewpoint may be different. For example, the painterly style of the High Renaissance is opposed to both the Early

Renaissance and the Baroque styles, but in a different way and in different respects, and so on.

Marxism recognizes the significance of individuality to the creation of art. Every individual grows out of his social environment. But only the artist who is an individual is capable of expressing his impressions, experiences, and thoughts in an artistic form and imparts an aesthetic value to his creations.

Furthermore, explaining the changing of styles in this way touches only on the *periphery* of artistic life rather than on its essential core. If someone is only looking for new, exciting, sensational thrills that would totally preoccupy him and let him forget the monotony and emptiness of everyday life, then, of course, a traditional style will bore him and won't give him the range of potent jolts he is looking for. But such a vacuous desire for novelty can arise only in a viewer or listener to whom a work of art is nothing but an entertainment on a par with any other effective amusement. On the other hand, if the creative artist himself or a real art lover is dissatisfied with the established style and seeks something new, then the reason in this case must be something else. This shows that the style no longer satisfies the aesthetic demands that arise from a newly emerging *Weltgefühl* and sense of life.

4. The Relation of the Artist's Individuality and Creativity to the Cultural Environment

An artist is inspired by what excites him and provokes a live response in him. By no means all aspects and manifestations of a thing, no matter how valuable they might be objectively, stimulate and attract him equally. He responds only to what he feels an affinity for and what is in tune with his sensibility. And since artists differ in their sensory receptivity and the way they perceive impressions, they express and work up their experiences in different ways. A painter reflects things as he sees them in the surrounding world; a composer manifests the way he hears things.[52] An artist's style always grows out of the way his *individuality* (i.e., his sensibility and mentality) interacts with his *environment*.

If the artist does not impress upon a style the seal of his personality, there is no originality in his art; it becomes superficial; and it does not go beyond imitation or merely technical production. In this regard everything that's original in art is subjective, born of the creator's subjectivity; but is just this subjectivity that secures the objective worth of what he's created.

This can be explained as follows. The aspect that the creator embodies in his work heralds certain aesthetic values inherent in the sensible world. But this aspect isn't given to him directly; it doesn't coincide with the impression he gets, but he has to discover it, to extract it out of what he has experienced; and this he can do only if he totally gives himself over to the experience animating him. Furthermore, aesthetic values can be realized only in an individual form. The problem that an artist works out by creating is always

concrete and cannot be solved according to some general rules or norms (like a problem of mathematics can), even when the artist follows the formative principles of some already perfected and settled style. In every style chosen there are various different possibilities of implementation, and only the individual taste, temperament, and character of the artist determines which possibility will get realized. In a word, real art is always *original*,[53] and this originality emerges only when the artist's personality actually converges with the world of aesthetic values (aesthetic reality). Therefore, every work of art offers or expresses something new—regardless of whether it features elements of a new style or just variations of a style already well-established. In any case it "persuades" us by virtue of its inner necessity and artistic veracity (genuineness), and concurrently allows us to feel that the artist has found a way of expression consonant with his individuality. Only to the extent that he discovers himself does aesthetic reality reveal itself to him.

An artist isn't just an artist; he's also a member of certain collectives (nation, class, family, club) and in some way participates in their life. Living and acting in that environment he evinces an attitude towards issues of morality, cognition, and other cultural matters. In devoting himself to artistic creativity he doesn't cease being a human being concerned with economics, ethics, and so on. Within the personality there mesh together all those aspirations, inclinations, and desires that flowing out into external acts separate from each other and acquire objective forms that belong to different spheres of cultural development. Therefore it's clear that the general structure of the personality with the whole of its inner nature manifests itself to some extent in all these objectifying acts. And since in those individuals that belong to the same collective or the same cultural circle this structure is roughly the same, it follows that the objective culture they create has certain structural features in common. So it's no wonder that in works created by both the individual artist and groups (schools) of artists there usually manifest themselves certain essential qualities that characterize other cultural spheres as well, even though, perhaps, none of the latter has had a direct influence on the creation of art.

But even in cases where such an influence is really there it can present itself only *through the subject himself* and *via* his mediation; and this influence will be positive and stimulate artistic creation just in case the external stimulus arising from that other sphere, upon returning to the subject's interiority, loses its objective form, dissolves in the personality's subjectivity and upon dissolution acquires a new objective form corresponding to the nature of art. If the initial form of the motive is not transformed into pure subjectivity, then its artistic transformation won't be perfect and there'll remain in the work of art traces showing its dependence on a factor alien to aesthetic being. For example, a certain moral idea may be represented by one or another symbolic form. But if this form is designed to represent this idea alone so that only this idea determines the work's

composition and without it the form lacks a self-determining aesthetic significance, then art loses its autonomy and is subordinated to principles alien to it. An abstract idea is never equivalent to a concrete image and can never encompass all of its significance and plenitude of content. That's why such an idea can never play the principal part in the process of aesthetic development.

But even when one type of art spurs on creative work in another, the mediation of the subject's manner of feeling is necessary in order to achieve genuine artistry, for the artist must not only change his technical repertoire in adjusting to his new material but also immerse himself into its singular expressivity when, for example, transforming a literary subject into an image of painting or sculpture or when transferring from oil painting to engraving. If this is the case, then the internal cause of historical changes in style lies, again, primarily in the peculiar activity of the artist himself and in his relationship to the world of forms.

In fact, having mastered the organizing elements of style, the artist at the same time acquires the perceptual habits based on them and the appropriate way of working the material. Inevitably a certain habituation or automatism enters into his creative work. As long as the artist controls this automatism, as long as the perceptual and compositional schemata and the acquired technical skills serve only in aid of realizing his artistic ideas, then they are an indispensable foundation for artistic creation and his work reaches its goal, i.e., it expresses what the artist has actually experienced and developed in the depths of his soul. But as soon as the habitual schemata and the technical means begin to control the artist and to assert themselves on their own, they obscure the aesthetic reality for him and hinder the selection process so necessary for creation; i.e., they do not permit the artist to distinguish the things that he himself has experienced and perceived from those that he has just externally taken over from others or from his own earlier works. In that case art inexorably ceases to be alive, original, and effective, turning into a dry academism or superficial technical virtuosity. If the artist begin to feel this negative effect of automatism and to realize that he cannot give shape to his ideas using the means of the style he has been accustomed to, he will try to eschew his customary schemata of representation and to search for new ways of expression. Such searching prepares the ground for a new style to emerge. For this it is not enough, of course, that he negate the elements of the old style and replace them with anything whatsoever. Not everything that's new and unusual is artistically original. If an artist is just looking for novelty, if he prizes the new only because it is new, he thereby shows that he is lacking in true creative originality. A new style emerges only when the artist develops and embodies in his creations a new, aesthetically valuable aspect of things and phenomena, an aspect that stems from his own personality and suitably expresses his unique sensibility and mentality. Only on the basis of

such internal motives can one understand the historical change and shifting of styles from an *aesthetic* point of view.[54]

5. The Relation of the Development of Art to General Cultural Development

What conclusions can we draw from these considerations? They show that the organic connections between art and other fields of culture and its dependence on the general direction of culture do not abolish the autonomy of art; and also that the method of analysis that emphasizes the connection of art with science, morality, economics, politics, and philosophy is not inconsistent with the formal analysis that seeks to elucidate the inner structure of works of art. On the contrary, both methods of analysis have an objective grounding in the nature of art and actually complement each other. We should not forget that artistic form is not just an arrangement of certain sensible elements; it is an *expressive* and significant form in which a certain way of feeling and perceiving life is given a concrete embodiment. In artistic perception not only is a certain object developed, but the attitude and world feeling manifested in it are experienced.

Consequently, artistic forms developing according to their internal regularity *eo ipso* reveal the possibilities of expression intrinsic to them; i.e., the artist's vital attitude toward himself and the surrounding world. This is why in analyzing the change and development of artistic forms one simply cannot leave out of the picture the role played by the function they signify. To be sure, this parallelism should not be understood in the strict sense that the general spirit and direction of culture asserts itself equally clearly and explicitly in all spheres at the same historical moment and everywhere reaches the same degree of advancement. The life of culture and its creator, man, is a very complex process, which is affected by such a multitude of crisscrossing and intertwining factors that it cannot be squeezed into a strictly rational scheme. In the sphere of art, too, there is no exact parallelism between its separate branches; even within the framework of a single kind of art not all of its elements (e.g., the tectonic and ornamental moments in architecture) develop at the same tempo and rhythm. The universal tendencies of culture and the relevant issues they raise might, for example, be more favorable to art or sculpture than to painting or music: they might speed up or slow down the progress of one or the other kind of art. Or, a certain form transplanted to a new environment (ethnic, social, cultural) might all of a sudden blossom and flourish or, applied to a new material, acquire unexpected possibilities of improvement. Or the emergence of a powerful creative personality diverts the form's development into a new unanticipated track. There are many such complications affecting and shifting the evolution of forms, and they cannot all be anticipated a priori.

Besides, neither philosophy nor science (psychology, physiology, and anthropology) has thus far succeeded in explaining the structure of human psychophysical nature and the interrelations among its various manifestations to such an extent that it would be possible to indicate precisely how the same tendencies have to objectify themselves in different spheres of culture and to what degree the manifestations of one sphere can be comparable to those of another. All attempts up to now to explain how the unity of culture manifests itself in its various branches have been rather hypothetical and often depend on questionable or superficial analogies or illegitimately simplify the structure of culture by subordinating it to schemata that suit only this or that sphere or just one determinate epoch (Oswald Spengler, Max Dvořák, etc.).

What is truly valuable in these constructs derives from a certain felicitous insight rather than any close analysis of the facts. It is especially important to note that no cultural epoch features only one strictly determinate style. At best one style or some variety of it predominates and most adequately meets the current aesthetic requirements. Culture at a certain time is usually characterized by more than one creative tendency. Hence its relation to artistic expression isn't strictly univocal, and it can find expression in different stylistic ways. Thus periods of artistic evolution are not laid out in a continuous line and do not follow in succession in one definite direction. This process of evolution is usually *polyphonic* and marked by the coexistence of several stylistic directions. After all, during any given period artists of different ages and belonging to different generations may be active; and each generation is distinguished by its own understanding of life, its own world-feeling, and conceives and solves the problems confronting it in a special way. Thus artists of the same age, even if they are working in different fields, have quite a bit in common. On the other hand, the same style changes a bit when it is taken over by another generation of artists who adapt it to their pressing tasks.

Art can be affected by other areas of culture only in the sense that they provide it with a certain subject matter or appropriate means of representation and working techniques. But how the composition of the art work is determined by the manner of representing and by the use of technical means—this is up to the art itself. Still such an account of the relations of art to other fields of culture does not yet give us a complete answer to the question we are investigating.

Upon closer examination of the manifestations of a certain culture, we discern that different branches of it not so much act on each other as exhibit a certain *parallelism*, i.e., an affinity of regulative principles and tendencies. Thus the chief ethical values of the ancient Greeks—moderation and the harmonious cooperation of all psychic forces under the tutelage of reason—are much the same as underlie their art. This similarity also applies to the theoretical elements determining the static structure of Plato's and Aristotle's philosophical systems. Or, to take another example, the rationalism of the

17th c. not only predominates in philosophy (Descartes and his school) and the sciences, but lends a special quality to contemporary poetry (in France) as well. Certain features of Baroque style (dynamism, unboundedness of space) find an echo in the sciences, philosophy, mysticism, etc. With reference to this structural family resemblance of separate spheres of culture we may speak of a unity of culture or of its common spirit (soul), which is to some extent preserved in all its different forms.

Oswald Spengler, placing this idea at the foundation of his philosophy of culture, ascribes to this cultural soul a metaphysical significance and sees it as a superindividual entity which, just like a true individual, is born, matures, reaches its peak, then declines, grows old, and dies. Other thinkers substitute for the soul of culture such similarly metaphysical constructs as "national spirit" or "racial blood" and assign them a decisive role in the historical development of culture. Nevertheless, the analysis of cultural phenomena has no need for such metaphysical hypotheses. That each culture is something like an organic unity wherein the parts depend on the whole is directly evident from the structural affinity (just indicated) of the separate areas of culture; but this objective unity of culture (manifesting itself in all of its creations) is not autonomous but depends on the inner unity of the subject creating it, a unity comprising both the physical and the spiritual existence of the subject. This inner unity, although appearing in various forms of its objectification (in science, morality, art, and the social and political structure), is not identical with their totality but grounds that totality and can be directly apprehended and experienced only by an individual personality.

6. The Historical Changing of Styles and the Theories Explaining it

Now let us briefly describe the conclusions to which recent art history has come in examining the historical changes that style has undergone.

A. The Styles of Youth, Maturity, and Old Age

It has been observed that in the case an individual artist his style typically does not remain the same throughout his life but changes considerably depending on whether he is young, grown up, or old. This generalization is valid for artists regardless of the period or movement to which they belong.

In his youth an artist's style has not yet crystallized. This is the *Sturm und Drang* period, in which the artist is experimenting and seeking a form appropriate for his sensibility and frame of mind. He easily submits to foreign influences, is apt to swerve between extremes, and is not yet able to master and marshal the creative impulses gushing out of him.

The second, mature, period begins (at about 35) when the artist, having found both himself and a distinctive way of expressing himself and having become highly skilled not only at articulating his creative ideas but also at

working them out, attains to a true mastery. His style becomes clear and firm and his composition achieves richness in content, harmonizing opposites and clearly bringing out the formal structure of elements and parts.

At about 60 there occurs a new turning-point in his creativity: the style of seniority sets in. The artist is much less excited by the variety and richness of the surrounding world; he turns his attention back on himself and concentrates on his inner life, striving to record his deepest and most secret spiritual experiences. Spiritualizing his forms, he diminishes their clarity and self-sufficiency, merging them into a unity that manifests a more profound symbolic meaning. Therefore, the style of old age is, in general, less accessible to others and more difficult to imitate. It reflects the psychical loneliness of an aging artist.[55] Of course, this schema of an individual style's development applies only to those cases when the creative personality's age periods coincide with stages of inner development, when old age does not imply a stagnation or weakening of creativity.

But can this schema also be applied to style taken as a superindividual unity created by an entire epoch and several generations? Doubtless every style based on a certain structure of expressive forms not only gradually changes, but also develops; realizes the potentialities implicit in it; and, having reached its apogee, usually petrifies or degenerates into playful virtuosity. Then, its creative force spent, it gives up its place for another style. Thus a number of theoreticians look upon style change as an organic process, comparing it to the life of a plant that grows, blooms, and whithers. This analogy, however, is rather superficial and describes the life of a style only to the extent that style is a process defined by certain limits; but it totally ignores the fact that style is, in essence, a *historical* phenomenon, i.e., one that does not recur in the same form (as a plant or animal does) and one whose development and fate is contingent on human spiritual activity that is not entirely controlled by purely organic regularity.

But even the above-mentioned schema of an individual's spiritual evolution cannot be directly applied to the historical life of a style. In any case, it would have to be substantially changed. Although every new generation of artists builds on the achievements of earlier ones and strives to preserve and improve on them, it has to start everything from scratch, i.e., acquire personal experience, since knowing how to mature and grow old can in no way be passed on to others. Therefore, it would be a mistake to think that the final stage in the development of style would be marked by a special spiritual wealth and bear the seal of ancient wisdom.

B. The Archaic, Classical, and Baroque Stages in the Evolution of Style

However, as far as may be judged from the evidence of art history (especially that of the West), in the historical evolution of just about every style three

main periods may be distinguished: the *archaic*, the *classical*, and the *baroque*.

In the *archaic* period there occur the earliest attempts by artists to apply the elements of a new style to the material being worked on. The artists have not yet mastered all the technical means and are still feeling their way to the intimated world of new forms. The possibilities the artists realize are rather limited; the composition is purely static with an uncomplicated plan that often ends with a simple collation of elements or parts; the forms are poorly differentiated, the organic (human) figures immobile or, if moving, then rigid.

However, these qualities of an archaic style do not mean that the works executed in it are of poor aesthetic quality. Within the limits of its possibilities and goals, this style can attain to an unquestionable perfection and expressiveness of form.

A *classical* style already shows sovereign command of its means of representation and makes use of them with ease. The problems it sets for itself and solves encompass the principal possibilities for the realization of its forms. The composition is differentiated, and all its parts are dovetailed in a harmonious balance. Its overall character is static in the sense that the work is a self-sufficient, consummate whole, and that which is dynamical in it does not lead beyond the composition but finishes in it and finds an appropriate counterweight in the opposing dynamic elements. In this sense not just the art of antiquity but romantic and gothic art had its classical period and went through it not by imitating ancient Greek art but by realizing its own proper structural possibilities.

A *baroque* style is characterized by dynamism. Not only do its separate forms and elements have a dynamic nature, but the composition as a whole is dominated by a dynamic tendency, which spills over its limits. This changes not only the system of the structural elements, but also the relation of the work to the space surrounding it. In other words, the composition is *open*, not *closed*. It is not placidly self-contained in itself, like a classical composition might be; it does not limit itself to the space which it takes up or represents, but breaks out into the surroundings and draws the latter into its relationship of elements. Form, it seems, is inhibited by its being limited and defined, and strives to overcome this without ceasing to be form. The composition (especially in painting) is, as it were, just an excerpt of a wider totality which itself is not depicted but is represented by that excerpt (fragment). At the same time the general dynamic tendency of the composition dismantles the independence and static balance of the main structural parts. Their coordination disappears and allows its place to be taken by subordination, one central moment or a massive oneness of totality (in architecture).

With the open form characteristic of the baroque imagination come two other distinctive qualities, namely, a tendency toward *painterliness* and a very rich *expansion of the decorative moment*. Uniting closely with the

surrounding atmosphere, the bodily form appropriates its effects, which enrich it and somewhat "change" it. Contrasts of light and shadow, their nuances and gradations acquire a crucial importance for the aesthetic effectiveness of the forms. Because of this they partly lose their strict definition and clarity and, it seems, move, change, and merge, thereby not only gaining in dynamism but also in expressiveness (emotional tonality). Therefore, the baroque imagination is inclined to emphasize and highlight the forms' *symbolic meaning*. Its expression is often pathetic or inspired by a mystic mood, sometimes also by a certain lyricism. Finally, in a style's baroque period there also occurs a blooming of ornamentation in its most luxuriant forms. Ornamentation (especially in architecture) becomes the essential moment of composition. Its structure astonishes in its variety and complexity, and by virtue of its agile rhythm and ceaseless variation augments even more the dynamism of the composition, even replicating it in all of its constituent parts. Organic human and animal forms are also incorporated into the structure of the ornaments and subordinated to the rhythmic diffusion of that structure (the clearest example being provided by the late gothic—*gothique flamboyante*).

Thus we see that the terms "archaic," "classical," and "baroque" may be used in a twofold sense. Usually they denote definite periods in the history of Western architecture and representational art (the archaic and classical periods of ancient Greek art or the Renaissance period, following the example of antiquity; and Western art of the 16^{th}–17^{th} centuries). But they also describe, as we have just seen, those stylistic periods that are undergone by each of them, if only historical circumstances allow it to develop more or less freely and independently. That's why, for example, we can distinguish within the Gothic style its archaic, classical, and baroque periods. This shows that the development of styles exhibits a certain regular periodicity not contingent on the individual characteristics of the historical periods, and that even across the most diverse styles there are periods that to some extent share a general artistic direction (intention). Thus when the work of artists belonging to a later period is influenced by the work of artists belonging to an earlier period, the former often quite instinctively select those artists that belong to an analogous period.

C. Is this Schema Associated with the Predominance of a Specific Art Form?

The periodicity of stylistic development just mentioned throws light on another aspect of the life of artistic forms as well, i.e., on how they are affected by the interrelations among various different art branches. The baroque imagination, as we have seen, accentuates the painterly quality of forms and their combinations, i.e., those attributes that are best displayed in, and suitable for, painting. Therefore, it is no coincidence that, in the history

of Western European art, painting played the most important role precisely the period during which the so-called Baroque style was predominant. The art of antiquity (in its archaic and classical period), by contrast, showed a predominance of architecture and sculpture. Hence it was conjectured that the inner evolution of a style is, in general, determined by the ordering tendencies that dominate in its various periods and that these tendencies give a priority, by turns, to one or another branch of art and its principles of composition: either architecture, or sculpture, or painting (tectonicity, plasticity, painterliness). This scheme of stylistic evolution is confirmed by the fact that architecture is the oldest form of art, for which sculpture and painting were at first just means of decoration and from which they gradually separated, becoming independent branches of art.

However, it is very doubtful whether this scheme encompasses the art history of all epochs and nations. It, perhaps, accurately describes the evolution of West European art, where, for example, painting is initially dominated by a plastic or linear style (Heinrich Wölfflin), and a true painterly way of representation appears only later, with a painterly influence becoming evident only in the later phases of architectural and sculptural styles. But looking at prehistoric and primitive art we see that here it is *ornamentation* (applied art) that is the first to emerge and to achieve a high degree of excellence and variety—at a time when in the other areas of art just the first and unsteady steps are taken. Therefore, one should not look upon ornamentation as an appendage to other kinds of art; it is a distinctive branch of art that develops to some extent independently and strongly influences other branches (an example is its impact on architecture in Arab art).

D. Does this Schema Apply to the Development of Music and Art?

Finally, this schema takes into account only representational art, i.e., that artistic activity which forms or depicts space and spatial things and phenomena; it totally ignores poetry and music, whose environment is time instead of space and which are not at all younger than architecture. Of course, there does exist a connection between representational art (sculpture and painting), on the one hand, and music and poetry, on the other. Dance and dramatic performance mediate between these two groups. Nevertheless, this connection is not as close and organic as that between the separate branches of representational art. And since poetry and music do not handle spatial phenomena and thus depend on other organizing elements, their stylistic affinity to the style of representational art is not as clear and explicit. As far as poetry is concerned, its influence on representational art is, on the whole, much greater than is the converse influence of representational art on poetry. This, for instance, is very evident in the Middle Ages when, especially in the reliefs and frescoes, the *narrative* way of depicting—telling an epic or dramatic story through a series of successive images—takes shape. In this

case the effect of poetry (and language in general) on representational art gives it a temporal moment that is alien to its nature.[56]

The connection between poetry and music is much closer. At first poetry leads and music (just like it does a dance) accompanies it, just accentuating the rhythm and enhancing the emotional expression of the words or motions (gestures). But as soon as music begins to realize all the possibilities inherent in its nature it loosens its dependence on poetry or dance and embarks on its own path; even in those cases where it combines with poetry (in song and opera) it compels the word to adjust to its rhythmic and dynamic structure. Only at the end of the Middle Ages does it become totally independent in Western Europe and soon acquires a place in spiritual culture that can be compared to that of other branches of art. In this respect the historical development of music differs from that of poetry, representational art, and architecture: as a self-sufficient art it is much younger than these latter.

Yet in spite of all these differences it seems that in the evolution of both music and poetry one can rather clearly make out an archaic, classical, and baroque phase. In any case here we find in the mature art, after the periods of primitive forms, something akin to the opposition between a closed or strictly regular form and an open or looser form. This is especially noticeable in poetry, when we compare West European classicism with the *romanticism* that replaced it.[57]

Even though the content of the concept of romanticism is by no means identical to that of baroque style, formally romantic works show qualities typical of that style. Thus in French classical poetry, which was an example to other Western European literature as well, everything that distinguishes the poetic attitude and its verbal expression is emphasized and highlighted. The metric schema is strictly adhered to. The word order is exceptional. There is ample use of poetic periphrases (metonyms, metaphors, abstract nouns) and decorative epithets. Phrases close to spoken language are avoided. The logical connection of expressions and their objective meaning are everywhere clear and well-defined. The verbal depictions (similes and metaphors) are also clear and accurate and can in part be realized in plastic images.

In romantic poetry the meter is freer because it is adjusted to the melodiousness of spoken rhythm and the emotional mood expressed by it. The lyric poetry of the romanticists comes close to the folk song and even consciously takes over its style. Hence the language is much simpler, everyday and often does not eschew folk expressions. It uses metaphors that we might say are *impressionist*; they highlight that which is unexpected and momentary, characteristic of this individual situation, something that usually is not noticed but nevertheless gives the mood expressed a special vital color. Their objective meaning often remains, so to speak, in the background, and the poetic intention is directed to the overall emotional tonality of the things or events compared. The topic itself is not sharply defined; the connection of images and thoughts is loose and often incomplete; and the composition of

the entire work is fragmentary. What is expressed in words is reminiscent of what is not and, possibly, cannot be, but which nevertheless gives the poet's words their real meaning. Thus all poetry becomes explicitly *symbolic*.

In music, too, we find a similar opposition between the classical and the romantic style. To the romanticists, emotional (dramatic, lyric, or pathetic) expressiveness is what is primarily important. Therefore, they renounce the rigor of classical form and do not religiously keep to the symmetry and balance of the separate parts; the themes are no longer developed in a logical order, and individual motifs are not tied together but alternate freely; and the rhythm, too, is less constrained and follows the dynamism of the changes in the mood expressed. Thus *"linear" polyphony*, where every voice unfolds virtually independently (counterpoint, canon), gives way to *vertical polyphony* (harmony), where the leading role is assigned to one voice, the melody, while the others make up its changing, harmonious environment. The harmony becomes richer and more varied; "chromatism" increases; and all this shows up music's "painterly" moment and its color potencies. This end is also served by various instrumental shadings and the addition of new-sounding instruments to the orchestra's polychromatic palette. At the same time the decorative side of music gains prominence, too. The whole composition acquires a fragmentary, improvizational character. It testifies to what is behind it and becomes a symbol.

E. Constitutive Elements of Representational Art: Tectonicity, Plasticity, Painterliness, Ornamentality, and their Interrelations

But even if it is possible to distinguish an archaic, classical, and baroque phase in the stylistic development of all branches of art, these categories do not suffice at all for an explanation of the inner logic of this process, since that depends above all on those general *constitutive* conditions that determine the specific nature of an art branch: on the environment (space or time) in which the art work is realized; on the material which is being worked on; and on the way it is worked on (the technique in a wide sense). These conditions, however, coincide only partially in the different forms of art; it is their specific differences that are decisive. It is only within the framework of the possibilities envisaged by the constitutive conditions that the formative elements of a style could develop. Thus it becomes clear that for architecture and representational art the most important problem is that of *space* or, more precisely, the problem of representing the relation of space to bodies and appearances.

What might the organizing principles for representing space and spatial things be like? The simplest way of ascertaining them is to analyze those essential qualities which characterize the different space-forming arts: the *tectonicity* of architecture; the *plasticity* of sculpture; the *painterliness* of painting; and the *ornamentality* of decorative art. But these principles do not

exclude one another but can be coordinated; in fact, they often intermingle. Art styles differ mostly by what principle (or tendency) they accord the principal role to. Since representational art and architecture are directed to vision and vision is characterized by optical, motor, and (indirectly) other impressions, the formation of space and material, too, is determined by the interrelations among these perceptual elements.

A more thorough discussion of this issue belongs to the special theory of representational art. We will limit ourselves to just a few remarks. The features of constitutive tectonicity, as they are understood in architecture, are roughly as follows.

(1) A building is three-dimensional, but for an observer its situation in space is first of all determined by the horizontal and vertical coordinates: the building stands or lies on a foundation and rises upward. Depending on which coordinate is emphasized, the building either *stands* or *lies*.

(2) A building is a body having mass and weight. Hence the vertical and horizontal coordinates indicate the mutual relations of the mechanical forces in the building, i.e., the balance between the weight (tractive force) of the upper layers, on the one hand, and the firmness and cohesion of the lower layers opposing it, on the other.

(3) Yet a building not only is a combination of material masses, but also envelops and shapes the interior, which determines the function of the whole. Therefore, the external structure of the building must correspond to its interior structure, and the various aspects of its exterior must to some extent also reflect the plan of the interior. In general, as a tectonic work the building make an aesthetic impression to the extent that its whole outer and inner structure is vivid, directly perceivable.

(4) A building is an objective, somewhat scattered totality that depends on a tectonic composition whose parts are joined following the principle of coordination or of subordination; and it is also a shaped space.

From this it can be seen that the perception of a tectonic creation is not composed of just purely optical impressions (lines and expanses of color) but that these optical impressions merge with others that complement them: motor, muscle, tangible impressions or mental images (partly non-objective) that allow one not only to apprehend the size, distance, and depth of the visible object but also to feel the interaction of the mechanical forces as well as the mass, weight, and firmness of the material. Lines are not abstract geometrical items; they have a direction showing the thrust (up, down, and so forth) of the forces' action, and together with the surface planes and their geometric relations they represent the distribution and balance of the masses. Thus tectonicity is based on a rather complex perception of impressions and, compared to other phenomena of representational art, has, perhaps, the greatest share of rational moments in it.

The term "tectonicity" can be used in a wider sense, which is suitable not only for architecture but also for other branches of representational art. This

expansion of the concept is possible because a building's objective unity is, aesthetically speaking, not the most important moment; this unity is based on the vivid (phenomenal) unity of the composition. This is clearly manifested in the architecture itself, when the tectonic composition is constituted by a group (combination) of buildings or encompasses and shapes an entire town. In this case the architect is concerned not only with the outer and inner structure of an individual building but with the grouping and distribution of buildings within a certain plane; in other words, with the formation not of a unit but of a certain portion of space and the bodies contained within it. This generalized meaning of tectonicity (understood as the shaping of space and its material contents) is valid for sculpture, painting, and decorative art, too; it acquires one or another specific character in accordance with the area to which it is applied and comes somewhat nearer to tectonicity in the narrower sense. For example, a sculpture is impossible in the absence of a certain tectonic skeleton. It needs both a foundation to stand on and an opposition of situational coordinates. The sculpture itself shapes not only bodies but also the portion of space which it occupies.

Moreover, tectonicity can characterize even a two-dimensional (flat) composition (e.g., a drawing), if it looks like a finished totality which has a base, clearly extends upward and to the sides, and whose parts are grouped in accordance with an explicitly expressed plan. That is why tectonicity in painting is associated with a linear way of representation, since it is precisely lines as means of shaping that enable a clarity of the distribution of compositional elements and give their forms an objective definition. However, tectonicity in the indicated sense is also compatible with a purely painterly way of representing; i.e., combinations of color and contrasts of light and shadow and their nuances allow a painter (even if less explicitly) to create not only a plastic composition giving rise to an impression of bodily masses and their materiality but also to order the represented space according to a certain tectonic plan (e.g., Paul Cézanne). A composition gets further away from strict tectonicity when it has no foundation or when the directional contrast "up-down" becomes irrelevant, i.e., when the proper point of observation requires someone to look at the composition not from the side but from above (e.g., a carpet or floor composition) or from below (frescoes on a ceiling or vault). Tectonicity disappears entirely together with plasticity when the painter represents not things in space but the optic impressions they give (colors and their shades, transitions and contrasts of light and shadows): then the empty space surrounding the things turns into an illuminated accumulation of air and the things become phenomena having neither mass nor weight (e.g., the paintings of Claude Monet and other impressionists).

In this case the composition is atectonic and its plan is not obvious, not thematized, somewhat hidden. Architecture can not only be coordinated but also organically conjoined with sculpture, painting, and decoration; in that case statues, frescoes, and ornamentation are not independent but perform, in

addition to their decorative function, a tectonic one by emphasizing the analysis of the building's planes, the rhythmic structure of its elements or the effective direction of the mechanical forces. Where the decorative means are not subordinated to the tectonic plan but unfold independently they disrupt the tectonicity itself (e.g., in Arab and Georgian architecture where the ornamentation covers up the building's structure and even distorts its forms).

Plasticity is essentially connected with a certain tectonicity. Plastic creations also have the following essential characteristics: (1) extension in three dimensions; (2) corporeality (massiveness); (3) a foundation on which they are based; (4) an opposition of horizontal and vertical direction; (5) a clear delineation of bodily forms (hence the perspective is linear, too); (6) an outline in curved lines (since sculpture primarily represents human and generally organic forms); (7) where the sculpture is a relief or connected to architecture, a relation to the background (plane) from which it arises and to the section of space that the tectonic environment affords it; (8) a leaning of plasticity toward a certain kind of painterliness, i.e., with the kind of body surface modeling that allows the free play of light and shadows, but only insofar as this painterly moment highlights the vividness and effect of plastic shapes. As soon as the lighting effects become independent and no longer obey the structure of bodily forms, the sculptural work loses its true plasticity and gets closer to being a painting. In its psychological make-up the perception of plasticity does not essentially differ from that of tectonicity; it is composed of the same elements; perhaps only the motoric and kinesthetic sensations on which the perception of movement and vital forces is based are more explicit. The difference depends primarily on the structure of the elements that determines the dominant of the perception (*organic corporeal image*).

As to *painterliness*, this is by no means dominant in all painting, as even here tectonicity and plasticity can be of decisive import. Generally speaking, pure painterliness appears in the later phases of the development of painting. At first the method of painting is linear; colors do not form the shape of things but only cover planes defined by lines. Besides, painting can be satisfied with two dimensions, i.e., the projection of bodies onto the plane, and this can be given by the line contours. In this case colors act on their own, by virtue of their natural qualities (brightness, purity), their nuances, contrasts, and mutual harmony, without in any other way forming the stereometricity of bodies and space. This purely *polychromatic* painting is especially suited for purposes of decoration and approaches the ornamental style of applied art. True painterliness emerges only when colors, light, and varieties thereof create space and bodies in three dimensions. The qualities of colors are augmented by their spatial values. Linear perspective is replaced or supplemented by *air perspective*. The opposition between empty space and bodies weakens or even disappears.

Things in the air mass lose their materiality and turn into creatures of colors and light. That is the *impressionist* way of painting, which reproduces only the purely optical impressions of the sensible world and renounces the help of all subsidiary motoric and tactile sensations, i.e., of just those sensory elements that give the optical image a thing-like nature. Space loses its geometric definiteness with its strict opposition of dimensions and becomes a pure environment of light and colors. It would be a mistake to think, however, that by removing materiality impressionist painting thereby abolishes all dynamism and movement. The latter merely get another, somewhat softer and more subtle, character: it is the light itself that in suffusing the colored mass of air radiates and vibrates.

Moreover, ever since painters began to use improved oil paints, the *technique of painting* itself became an important formative factor in composition. Oil paint is not only certain colors but a special material that in covering the canvas in thicker or thinner layers changes it in such a way that it appears to have all kinds of material qualities. Traces of hand and brush movements acquire the function of lines and delineate the bodily surfaces and contours of things. Concurrently the colors themselves obtain a special vivacity and an array of novel nuances. Only this technique enables the painter not only to capture the momentary flavor and variability of optical impressions, but also the limitlessness of space as well as the unity of the illuminated air mass with sensible things. This makes it clear that painterliness, rather than abolishing tectonicity and plasticity, only changes then and as it were lifts them to a higher plane.

Ornamentation occupies an altogether separate place in fine art. It is not essentially different from architecture, painting, and sculpture. What's most important about it is that it doesn't produce self-sufficient works of art but performs an auxiliary function with respect to other branches of art, architectural works, and items and implements of practical life—that is, it decorates them. Without affecting the thing's main structure (determined, perhaps, by purely practical needs), ornamentation differentiates and accentuates one or another part of it (or the entire surface) and thereby acquires an independent aesthetic value, enhancing the artistic impressiveness of the object as a whole. Consequently, the origins of ornamentation are closely tied to commerce and, generally, to applied art (the embellishing of tools, utensils, the human body, and clothing).

Given the purpose of the ornament (its auxiliary aesthetic function) it's clear that its purest and simplest form has no independent object-related value, being just a combination of lines and geometric figures that repeating themselves and obeying principles of rhythm and symmetry alter and enliven surface of the thing being adorned. Still, the structure of the ornament is not incompatible with meaningful motifs (for example, organic animal and human forms) being introduced into its purview nor with the ornamental composition also acquiring a third (depth) dimension. What is important is

only 1. that these meaningful motifs (elements) submit to the general rhythm and structure of the ornament and 2. that the depth of the composition be limited to the background and a parallel front plane; in a word, that the composition have the main characteristics of a relief, even though its elements be full sculptural shapes. Thus, the constitutive parts of an ornament can be self-standing art works—pictures, statues, even entire architectural complexes (such as the ornaments of an edifice or rows of edifices surrounding a mountain, in the style of the so-called *gothique flamboyante*). On the other hand, the ornament can be part of any fine art or architectural composition and, in addition, accentuate its tectonic or plastic structure. Wherever it has the dominant role or overwhelms the tectonic or plastic structure on which it is based, the style itself of the art work becomes *ornamental*.

F. Theories Recognizing the Evolution of Art as a Process in One Direction

Only upon getting clear about the concepts of tectonicity, plasticity, and painterliness can we hope to answer settle the issue as to whether these concepts are suitable for characterizing the historical evolution of architecture and fine art and for determining the regularity or periodicity of this evolution. In our times (20th c.) there were many attempts to give this question a comprehensive answer, but up to now they haven't yielded an unchallenged result, although they perhaps justly bring out one or another characteristic feature of representational art. This is so not only because the concrete historical material on which theory must be based is extremely extensive and has not yet been sufficiently investigated, but also because the main concepts (categories) of art theory lack logical clarity and distinctness. We shall therefore indicate only the most important of the developmental schemata that have been proposed.

First of all, a review of contemporary theories of art's evolution shows the advisability of distinguishing between two major conceptions that are partly opposed to each other but may, with a certain qualification, be combined. According to one, the historical development of representational art and architecture, although it asserts itself in the most diverse and frequently opposite styles, is a unitary process proceeding in one definite direction. According to the other, what this process lacks is precisely continuity and singularity of direction; it is characterized rather by its constant fluctuation between two polar opposites so that there is a periodic alternation of incompatible styles.

The first conception is formulated in different ways, depending on what features of artistic evolution are held to be the most characteristic. According to some researchers, that feature is the alternation of the dominant art

branches, and this allegedly proceeds in accordance with a certain specific order (at the very least, in the history of European art).

In the prehistoric period, *ornamentation* (as a type of applied art) predominates. It deals with the *plane*; in other words, it confines itself to the simplest aspect of the problem of space. In the art of the ancient Greeks ornamental art slowly yields center place to *plastic art*, which deals with three-dimensional bodies but limits itself to the individual space (*Individualraum*) occupied by a separate figure. Since the later Hellenistic and Roman culture period the principal role falls to *architecture*, which is concerned not with the creation of separate figures (bodies) but with the management of complex material masses in a circumscribed part of space. The predominance of architecture lasts until the Renaissance, when *painting* acquires decisive significance for all artistic creativity. It is just in the modern age that painting determines the problem of dealing with space in its broadest sense: it represents not only separate bodies or groups of bodies but also their relations to the surroundings, the space that encompasses them (*Allgemeinraum*). Thus the historic development of representational art is characterized not only by a certain definite change of predominant kinds of art but also by the fact that the conception of the problem of space widens and deepens. Since the dominant art branch puts its stamp on other kinds of art, too, it sets the general style of art for that period, which thus tends to be *ornamental, plastic, tectonic*, or *painterly*.

It may be doubted, however, whether this schema accurately represents the evolution of fine art or architecture. It is especially arguable whether the plastic style came before the tectonic one. Some investigators hold the view that the process went just the opposite way, i.e., from tectonicity to plasticity; according to them, architecture is an older type of art from which sculpture and painting breached off later.

At least the evolution of European art suggests that the painterly way of representing (in the sense indicated) emerged later than the tectonic or the plastic. Keeping in mind the origin and initial steps of representational art, this is understandable. The drawings and moldings made by children and primitives are schematic; they show only the general shape of the thing or animal and its most important parts, since it is just this shape (form) that distinguishes one thing from another and allows to recognize it. But a thing's form (outline) results from a certain abstraction, one already inherent in the initial perception and emphasized by the act of re-creation. This emphasizing is helped both by the means of representation and by the movements made in drawing and molding. This is one important moment determining the style of representation. The other, closely connected with the first, is the *objective* (*object-like*) nature of the shape: the prototype of the represented object is a *solid body*, which is not only visible but also tangible and clearly distinguished from the surrounding space. Therefore, the motor sensations associated with vision are essential for that method of representation which

uses lines, planes, and their mutual relations, as are the haptic elements conjoined with these sensations. Where these motoric and haptic elements determine the structure of the image being created, the creation will be *linear* or *plastic* (a flat drawing or a clear bodily image of three dimensions), and characterized by a certain abstraction and thinglikeness.

As we have seen, however, a method of representation is also possible that eschews all haptic and motor elements and bases itself on purely optic impressions. What concerns it is not the thing itself with all its sensible qualities, but only its *visible phenomenon*. This purely painterly way of depiction emerged later than the linear or plastic way, for it can be applied only where there is a clear difference between the thing and its purely optical appearance. In other words, it is based on a higher degree of cognitive differentiation and on a shifting of attention from the things themselves to their merely visual manifestation.[58]

Proceeding from the indicated difference between haptic and optic elements in the visible image, *Alois Riegl* offers the following schema of the development of fine art. At first, in Egyptian art, the haptic moments is predominant: the artist creates artistic images in a plane without shaping the space itself. In the art of the ancient Greeks, the significance of the optic moment grows: it merges with the haptic moment in harmonious unity, and the way of representation becomes plastic. The decisive break occurs in later, Roman art, where form is no longer dependent on the plane and things are depicted in a unitary space around them. But only in the new ages does art finally renounce the objective conception of space and learns to represent space as a peculiar limitless and incorporeal reality. This insight was achieved when the optic way of representation that brings out the distal image and depth of forms gained ascendancy.

But this new way of handling space exemplified by the optical way of depicting is associated with yet another of its qualities, viz., the *direct* and *momentary unity* of the image. The perception of a purely haptic image takes place in time, i.e., it consists of a series of perceptual acts that succeed one another and are constituted into a unity by being realized in a motion. A purely optic image, by contrast, is one that appears without the eyes moving and is perceived at once in a single moment. In representing three-dimensional objects and their spatial relations, the act of visual perception will encompass the entire composition only if the point of observation is unitary, i.e., if it is chosen in such a way that it enables the spectator to grasp at once the whole spatial structure of the object and its constituent parts. Therefore, the passage from the method emphasizing the haptic-motoric elements to the purely optic one can also be described thus: a multitude of observation points are replaced by one central point of observation. In this sense *Boris Wipper*[59] somewhat emended Riegl's schema by dividing the historical evolution of art into three epochs corresponding to three distinct ways of representing and perceiving.

In the first epoch embracing the art of ancient Egypt, Babylonia, Assyria, and the so-called Aegean art, the motor (haptic) moment is decisive. In looking at a work of art, the spectator moves in such a way that corresponding to each new object there is a new point of view. The viewer and the things represented are all in the same (real) space. This is clearly shown by those compositions where the spectator looks from above on a flat, horizontal plane extending below him.

The second epoch, in Wipper's opinion, is represented by ancient Greek and Chinese art. Its way of representation is mixed; he calls it motorically optic. The strengthening of the optic moment is manifested by the search for a unified point of observation: the space represented is kept strictly distinct from the real space of the observer; it is projected onto a vertical plane, and the depth of the picture (the differences in the distances of the depicted objects from the spectator) is indicated by perspectival intersections. But the motoric moment has not yet stopped acting, since the perceptual act requires moving the eyes. The perspective, too, is not yet unitary and often distorted, as evidenced, for instance, by the use of the so-called "reverse," as evidenced, for instance, by the use of the so-called "reverse" perspective.

Finally, in the third epoch, which begins in Western Europe in the 13–14th centuries, the purely optical way of representing gains full ascendancy. The discovery of linear and air perspective allowed the artist so to arrange his composition that it could be entirely encompassed in an eyebath and the space represented appeared a unified totality.

This schema is akin to the conception worked out by *Erwin Panofsky*. According to him, each work of art harmonizes within itself certain oppositions. The most important of these is that of *form* and *plenitude* (*Fülle*), which opposition, becoming more concrete, unfolds into three pairs of opposition. These are the oppositions (1) of haptic and optic elements; (2) of the figurative values of plane and depth; and (3) of the compositional values of coordination and subordination, i.e., the opposition of one alongside the other (*Nebeneinander*) and of one inside the other (*Ineinander*). Differences of style depend on how these pairs are combined one with the other and how the members of each pair relate between themselves: does one dominate the other or do they exist in harmonious balance?

For example, in the *stereometrically crystalline* style the haptic values dominate; in the *painterly* style it is the optical ones; and in the *plastic* style they counterbalance one another. The first style tends towards flat composition in which the elements are aligned one next to the other and forms clearly distinguished. The second style, in contrast, brings out the values of depth and merges the forms of separate things into an indivisible unity. Applying this schema to the development of representational art from antiquity up to our own age, it turns out that it begins with a stereometrically crystalline style (Egyptian art) and ends in a purely painterly one (impressionism). Or, alternatively put, initially a purely abstract form

dominates, which, as it develops, allows its opposite, plenitude, to take on an ever greater role until the latter, finally, gains the upper hand and subordinates form to itself (Edgar Wind).

Without going into a more detailed critical evaluation of this conception, we will mention only this much: if form is here opposed to plenitude, then it is thereby emphasized that pure form can be created only with the help of *abstraction* and giving up the plenitude that distinguishes the world of sensible phenomena. And it is only by diffusing and differentiating that form ceases to be abstract and becomes capable of more or less encompassing the variety of concrete phenomena. But the richer the form, the closer it gets to concreteness, and the less it manifests itself as pure form, the more it unfolds and reveals itself in the content it shapes. Thus the painterly way of representation best satisfies the conditions of plenitude.

G. Theories Grounding the Evolution of Art in the Periodic Alternation of Styles

Let us now look at theories according to which art does not move forward in one definite direction but is characterized by a rotation of the same mutually opposed formative elements. The contraries in question do not just describe one or another historical style; they lie in the very nature of representational art and correspond to two distinct ways of perceiving and representing the sensible world. For this reason they appear in all phases of artistic evolution in such a way that when one of these contraries has gained predominance inevitably the other begins to manifest itself and gain strength in turn. What then are these contraries?

To mark them the champions of the periodicity theory make use of much the same concepts that researchers who uphold the unified linear direction of art's development use. The only difference is that the former remove from their schemata any reference to that middle or mediating moment in which the two opposed tendencies are equally strong and counterbalance each other. Moreover, one schema differs from another by what type of art is taken into consideration first: architecture, plastic art, painting, and so on. Thus the historical development of art is described in terms of the periodic recurrence either of the haptic and optic way of representation, or of the plastic and optic way of representation, or of the plastic (linear) and optic way of representation, or of the tectonic and atectonic way of representation, or of the mechanic and organic way of representation, or, finally, of the static or dynamic way of representation.

From what has been said it is already clear that there really is no categorical and unbridgeable opposition between the *periodically polar* and the *linear* interpretation of art's evolution. On the one hand, the periodic alternation of opposed styles does not occur in such a way that one style disappears whenever the other emerges; usually there are transitional forms

between them. Furthermore, if artistic creativity periodically returns to the same formative tendency, such a course of development does not mean that the very same plastic or painterly style recurs. What appears is just a style formally similar to the earlier one, and what is new about it (in terms of realizing those formal principles) at least partially depends on the opposite style which it replaces. In other words, even the regular alternation of opposed styles does not negate a certain common line (direction) of artistic development. All concrete evolutionary processes are so complex that, in general, it is impossible to explain them on the basis of just this or that principle. This applies to the historical life of art as well.

Concluding this discussion of the problem of art's evolution, we should emphasize once more that all of the conceptions mentioned here do not lay down the lawlikeness of that process in the strict sense of the word but only bring out the main tendencies that manifest themselves in the internal evolution of art. In addition, these conceptions first of all take into consideration representational art and architecture and can only be partially applied to music or poetry (e.g., the contrast between classicist and baroque styles). In order to describe the historical evolution of the latter two, other categories that correspond to their special nature are needed. And, in general, it must be stated that it is possible concretely to elucidate the inner development of a certain style only within the confines of each separate type of art, i.e., with reference to the constitutive conditions of each type and how they are used by the given style. In this way, however, only the ideal schema of the style's evolution, i.e., the possibilities inherent in its nature, can be outlined. The actual development does not coincide with this schema, for it is only the concrete historical situation in which style asserts itself and which depends on the interaction of various factors that determines which possibility gets realized and how far that realization corresponds to that style's ideal essence.

H. In What Sense Can We Speak of Artistic Progress?

Keeping in mind what was said about the inner evolution of style it becomes clear in what sense we can speak about the *progress* of art. Having a peculiar structure, each style is defined by certain aesthetic potentialities or possibilities inherent in it. It has its special dominants, its structural elements, its compositional (formative) principles. Usually it is associated with a certain technique of *handling*, *shaping* or *working with* the material at hand. The historical circumstances in which arises poses for it the specific problems that it has to solve. Therefore a style's development means that it progressively unfolds its potencies, i.e., realizes its inbuilt possibilities by meeting the challenges that arise for it with those means that the style's inner structure and typical technique make available to it. The more fully an artist uses a certain style's potentialities to embody his ideas and the more

consistently he fulfills its formative demands, the more perfect will his creation turn out to be from a stylistic point of view; of course, an art work's unconditional aesthetic value depends, in addition, on its originality as well: the artist must reveal a new and individual perception of this joint task and realize it in a correspondingly individual way. But the power of even this evaluative criterion (based on style) is limited and cannot in every case determine the aesthetic value or disvalue of a work of art; it indicates only a necessary condition and starting point for an aesthetic judgment. The final judgment in every specific case is given only by *direct perception*, the accuracy and truthfulness of which depends on the aesthetic sensibility and artistic sophistication of the judging subject.

Yet this judgment loses all significance when it is used to compare works of different styles and cultural epochs, for differences of style are *qualitative*, not *quantitative*. Being founded on different formative elements and a different conception of artistic goals, different styles don't have a common measure that would allow them to be compared aesthetically. To claim that the style of the High Renaissance is more valuable than the Gothic style or that classicist poetry fulfills aesthetic requirements better than romanticism is to assign universal objective significance to what is merely subjective taste. Every style, understood as a certain way of artistic representation and expression, is *suit generic*, incomparable, and in this sense has an independent, unconditional value. Therefore, there is no progress in the history of art in the sense[60] that each new style means a new step forward and is more valuable than the preceding styles. A new style only realizes new and independent aesthetic potentialities that in no way cancel the value and significance of any other styles.

Different styles can be compared and their possibilities can be evaluated only in a certain shared respect, for example, the technological aspect. The technique of one style may be more advanced than that of another in the sense that it makes available to it a greater quantity and variety of representational means. But this doesn't mean that technological advancement *eo ipso* increases the aesthetic value of the art work. Within the context of its possibilities a technically more primitive style can be no less flawless than a style using more advanced technical means. The evolution of a certain general problem of art can also be analyzed in a way similar to our analysis of the development of artistic technique with a view toward comparing what one or another style has contributed to a solution of that problem. Thus we have seen that many theories attempting to explain the course and direction of representational art pay attention first of all to the way that different epochs and styles conceive of and solve the problem of representing space: is the composition based on a simplified aspect of space (the plane), or is space represented geometrically (a plastic image of bodies), or is space taken as a purely optical phenomenon (a painterly image of bodies), or does the artist, finally, look for a compromise formula among

these different ways of depicting? Comparing different styles in this respect one can conclude that one of them solves the space problem more consistently or comprehensively than does another. Nevertheless, such a judgment is not purely aesthetic: it concerns only certain general structural qualities of the style rather than separate, individual instantiations of it and thus is based on theoretic abstraction and analysis rather than a direct aesthetic perception, which is essentially individual, concrete, and subject to an immanent criterion—the immediate persuasiveness of a work of art.

Hence the viewpoint of the art historian does not coincide with that of the spectator appreciating the art work's beauty. What matters for the latter is only the unconditional aesthetic value of the work, whereas the art historian is primarily interested in such questions as which style the given work exemplifies, how the ordering principles of that style are realized in it, and what place that work occupies in the general development of that style or that artist's output. Needless to say, in the final analysis even the art scholar relies on a direct, intuitive impression. But his analysis goes beyond the confines of the direct perception and elucidates those predominant creative tendencies that the work of art embodies.

PART VIII

THE RELATIONS OF BEAUTY TO OTHER CULTURAL VALUES. THE ROLE OF ART IN CULTURAL LIFE

1. Introduction

Beauty is a unique cultural value that depends on special laws. But the autonomy of beauty is no hindrance to its relations to other values of culture; these mutual relations can even be essential to the manifestations of beauty and its realization in human life. Since the same human being who creates works of art and appreciates natural or artistic beauty is also a subject of moral, epistemic, jurisprudential, social, and economic life, it is obvious that his attitude toward the areas indicated must also affect his views on beauty and the art that he creates and, conversely, that his artistic creativity must have an influence on all the other aspects of his life. Culture, after all, is one, and all of its branches continuously interact. This is evidenced no less by the origin of art than its whole further development as well. Explaining these real relations of art to other areas of life is a concern of the history of art and of culture in general. Aesthetics, on the other hand, is concerned with another fundamental question: If art is a self-sufficient value, then how should we look upon its relations to other self-sufficient values? And how is the evaluation of beauty and its creation in art related to those demands that are put upon man by morality, law, cognition, and so on? Do all the fundamental values that underpin man's cultural life constitute a harmonious system or do they evince essential, insurmountable contradictions?

The historical reality of art does not give a clear and univocal answer to this question. On the one hand, a religious mood and moral feelings associated with it have throughout the ages inspired many a poet and artist to create works of the greatest beauty. On the other, all the representatives of the church and the prevailing morality ceaselessly struggle against unlimited artistic freedom and demand that artists renounce any subjects that do not fit with the truths of their religion and morality. We need only recall the negative attitude of many a church father against the poetry and visual art of antiquity, or the rampages of the iconoclasts against ecclesiastical paintings in the Byzantine Empire, and, in general, all those persecutions and restrictions that artists had to endure at the hands of guardians of strict religion and morality. It seems that here there surfaces a principled opposition of religion and morality to art. Artists are in favor of a full and unstrestricted autonomy for art. The representatives of religion and morality, by contrast, agree to respect that autonomy only to the extent that it is compatible with the precepts of church and ethics. To be sure, the conflicts raised again and again by the issue of art's autonomy in human cultural life depend primarily on a certain conventional understanding of morality and

religion that eventually changes; but in analyzing this question more deeply we cannot just leave it there, because behind these controversies that at first sight seem to have only a relative, historical significance there often lies a more profound significance, not dependent on just the particular period.

Another question that must be addressed concerns the relation of art to truth. A contemplative mind-set is common to both aesthetic perception and theoretic cognition. This fact gave rise to the view that aesthetic perception is a special form of knowledge. Now it cannot be doubted that aesthetic perception contains a certain cognitive moment. Art seeks the truth even as science and philosophy do. Yet wherein lies the difference between aesthetic or artistic truth and theoretical truth? The difference between them is not just quantitative, as the rationalists believe, but qualitative as well. This can be seen from the fact that art does not relate to reality as science does. Theoretical knowledge is concerned to perceive reality as accurately as possible. To art such an accurate correspondence to reality is not essential; it can even renounce it entirely. But what then does artistic truth mean, if it does not coincide with theoretical truth?

We cannot fully elucidate here the problem of the relations of beauty to other autonomous values, and will limit ourselves to an examination of just two questions: 1. What is the relation of beauty to the ethical sphere, starting from the nature of art and the main stimuli for its creation? 2. In what sense is truth not only a theoretical, but also an aesthetic value? Delving into these questions will throw some light into the significance of art for cultural life in general.

2. Beauty and Morality

A. The Relation between the Aesthetic and the Ethical Viewpoint

We saw that beauty encompasses the whole sensible world and all of its visible and audible manifestations. There is no such phenomenon in which vision or hearing could not find an aesthetically valuable aspect. Natural beauty appears in all of nature and in all areas of human life. Art expands the sphere of beauty even further by including in it beauty's opposite—ugliness. In this respect the world of beauty has no strictly circumscribed and invariant borders. It is only limited somewhat by those phenomena that destroy the contemplative attitude so essential to the perception of beauty, i.e., phenomena arousing instinctive disgust or some other real emotional reaction (fear, outrage, and so on).[61] But even this limit is conditional and variable, for negative human reactions to external impressions are not constant; they depend not only on individual fluctuations in sensibility but also on social customs and conventional viewpoints.

Given this universality of beauty within the limits of the sensible world, it must be admitted that it is neutral with respect to the opposition of morality

and immorality. Morality strictly distinguishes between good and evil. It strives toward the good, and negates and refuses evil. It cannot unite with its opposite or use its methods without losing its purity, its unconditional value. Therefore, every attempt to determine from a moral point of view what is permissible and what is impermissible for art would destroy the autonomy of beauty and suppress the freedom of artistic creation. Let us develop this thought a little further.

An aesthetic object (an instance of natural beauty or a work of art) is not an object of theoretical knowledge, not a unity of objective sensory impressions, but an expressive object conveying a certain mood or vital attitude and arousing in the perceiving subject an appropriate response. That which an aesthetic object signifies and expresses can have a positive or negative value, morally speaking. But not everything that is aesthetically meaningful affects the sphere of morality directly. Thus no one will judge an architectural work, a building, from a moral perspective, although they will perceive its aesthetic expressiveness. Similarly, neither an ornament nor pure music without a connection either to words or to a program can be assigned a moral significance if the first is musically and the second is ornamentally conceived (i.e., in accordance with what they directly mean) without putting into the conception any extraneous moments. And the same is to be said about representational art if we restrict ourselves to its sensory and formal basis, e.g., color harmony, color variety, rhythm of lines, or musicality and dynamism of language. Hence a moral view on a work of art is possible only where the latter has a certain determinate objective significance and where this significance constitutes an essential moment in its aesthetic structure. But even in representational art the moral viewpoint cannot always be applied. A landscape or still life in painting or an objective description of nature in poetry does not give rise to a direct moral response in us. Nature acquires a moral significance only in man and through his mediation. To be sure, beauty is accessible, of all living beings, only to man, although the world of beauty is not limited to what is human. Moreover, within the limits of human life that which is aesthetically significant does not coincide with that which is morally valuable. What matters to ethics is only a human being's inner attitude and the conduct flowing therefrom. Whether this attitude manifests itself sensibly and what this manifestation looks like is of no importance to morality. Aesthetic contemplation, by contrast, notices and values this sensibly accessible expressive manifestation—regardless of whether it consists of actions (motions), gestures, words, mimicry, or facial features and bodily structure and form. Of course, the direction of the artistic intent may vary. It may emphasize either essential marks of humanity or register what is typical for a certain group of people or throw light on a human individuality in this or that concrete situation, or allow an ideal of beauty to shine through. In all these cases man is presented as a being capable of moral conduct.

But the kinds of beauty just indicated are "open" with regard to morality, i.e., they encompass manifestations both of good and of evil in man. We might say that they give ethical being only an outer form, which does not essentially determine its content, namely, its positive or negative value, but shapes it as material in accordance with its own necessity yet in such a way that the internal (non-aesthetic) structure of that material is left untouched.

B. The Neutrality of the Aesthetic Attitude toward Ethical Values

This relation of beauty to morality may be explained from the other side too—with respect to the special nature of the aesthetic attitude of consciousness. As we have seen, the aesthetic mind-set is contemplative in nature. The act which predicates beauty to an object does not depend on the subject's willful intentions and is not determined by any individual or superindividual (e.g., ethical) interests. In this respect aesthetic perception is akin to theoretical knowledge. But it differs from the latter in that contemplation here does not remove all feelings and emotions but touches a human being's "I," his personality, and compels him to respond vibrantly to the object's expressiveness (the mood or emotional intention embodied in it). Thus aesthetic perception relies on an emotional perception which is nevertheless disinterested, not practical. Herein lies the wonderful uniqueness of the aesthetic attitude—it gives our emotional life a form that associates this life with pure contemplation and seals it with a special hallmark.

To understand this better we should keep in mind that there are as it were two distinct "I's" lying within the human personality: the small one and the big one. The *little "I"* is man's psychophysical individuality, which lives and acts in a certain environment and is motivated by its on-going vital interests. Its existence is limited in respect of space and time. On the other hand, man is the only living being capable of abstract thought and reflection (self-knowledge). This capacity enables him to overcome the limits of his individual existence; rising above himself, man is able to look at the world and himself from the side and from above. Out of ideational thinking, out of reflection there arises man's great "I," which encompasses in his thoughts the whole world and thereby itself becomes a microcosm in which the macrocosm is reflected.

The *great "I"* is contemplative, it philosophizes about the essence of being, its original elements, about man's purpose, and the meaning of his life. Nonetheless the great "I" is connected with the little one and cannot entirely break off from it. But their relations are not uniform. Either the great "I" pays no attention at all to the concerns and problems of the little "I" and uses the latter's capabilities only as means to encompass the cosmos conceptually. Or it takes the whole world of the little "I"—not just what he perceives with his senses but all that he experiences inside in responding to the significant events of his life—takes all of it out of his life's practical, day-to-day sphere

and lifts it up onto the plane of ideality. In the first case, what emerges is theoretical knowledge; in the second, it is *aesthetic perception* and the *artistic creativity* arising therefrom. The contemplativity of the "I" not only isn't interested in the practical employment of knowledge, but also neutralizes the actual significance of feelings and emotions for the little "I" and gives them an objective, antiindividual value. In this sense art and the whole aesthetic world are *ideal*. Everything that man does, everything he experiences, everything about which he rejoices or agonizes comes alive here and appears in a totally new light—*sub specie aeternitatis*, we might say. These emotive echoes that the aesthetic picture of life evokes in the subject's soul aren't alleged feelings, as many an aesthetician claims, nor just images of feelings or their illusions; the aesthetic excitation is a true feeling, sometimes surpassing in its intensity even those emotions with which we react to events of reality, but it is also a feeling that is not connected with the subject's actual existence and his vital (practical) needs.[62]

C. Example: Tragicality

To illustrate this essential quality of the art world we can use tragedy as an example. Its theme is the destiny of man, the inseparability of suffering from man's nature, particularly in those cases where humanity's most valuable traits are manifest—a theme, in other words, that touches on the entire problematics of ethics. It would seem that ethics should have the last word here.

But if we delve into those theories that treat of tragicality from an ethical point of view, it appears that they circumvent the very essence of that phenomenon. Precisely those tragedies that world literature recognizes as the most perfect examples of tragicality cannot be interpreted in this way. If it be said that a tragic spectacle pleases us in virtue of satisfying our moral sense by showing the triumph of an idea (the tragic hero has transgressed and has to expatiate his guilt through suffering and death), then the question arises, How can this interpretation be checked and verified?

A careful analysis of tragicality gives the following answer: a tragic fate may correspond to this schema, but, on the other hand, it may not; in any case, the essential characteristics of tragicality do not depend on it.

A tragic conflict does not always end in victory for the idea of justice. There are cases where the tragic hero dies, and his death does not in the least restore the moral order. Similarly, it may be doubted whether every fateful demise of a hero may be viewed as a just and deserved reward for a transgression he has committed. It is precisely from the perspective of justice that it can neither be understood nor justified that all tragic heroes usually receive the same punishment, death, although their transgressions are not on the same scale and of equal weight. Moreover, a tragic denouement can give us genuine moral satisfaction only in cases where the wrongdoing is

objectively recompensed and the victory of morality is subjectively certified in the hero himself; i.e., if he dies having undergone an ethical change by showing remorse for his misdeed and calmly awaiting his fate.

But even these moments are not typical for tragicality, and a tragedy in which they are not manifest is no less tragically effective for lacking them (*Oedipus Colonnus*, *King Lear*). It would also be a mistake to claim that a tragic hero can only be a morally positive character, or at the very least one in whom virtuous tendencies and aspirations are stronger than non-virtuous ones. Both literature and history feature many examples of tragicality that contravene this rule. In any case, that which makes us feel sympathetic towards a hero's personality is often not the explicitly ethical goodness of his character.

A strictly ethical point of view toward tragedy cannot be supported by Aristotle's theory of catharsis (κάθαρσις), either. This term is ambiguous and may be interpreted in one of two ways. On the one hand, in speaking of a washing away of passions, Aristotle may have in mind the effect that the tragic spectacle has on the viewer, i.e., he may want to show the consequences of that spectacle for the spiritual mind-set of the spectator. Or he may want to characterize the tragic impression itself and the changes that its emotions undergo.

An examination of Aristotle's theory of art and its historical circumstances suggests that the first interpretation is more credible. In arguing against the rigorist Platonic view demanding that tragic art be banished from the ideal state, Aristotle attempts first of all to call attention to the positive influence of tragedy on human ethical attitudes. This is how his theory of catharsis was understood by his later commentators and followers. Thus, according to the Stoics, catharsis is just a certain comforting of the spirit or conditioning habituation. They thought that watching a tragedy, by evoking in the spectator the emotions of fear and compassion in an attenuated form, would enable him to get inured to these emotions and thus attain to that calmness of spirit that is tantamount to perfect virtue. Clearly, this interpretation is totally unconcerned with tragedy's artistic essence and treats it just as a means of fostering man's morality.

Much closer to the whole spirit of Aristotelian philosophy is another interpretation, suggested in the 19th century by the famous philologist *Jakob Bernays*. In his opinion, Aristotle borrowed the term catharsis from ancient medicine to denote any medication or method of treatment that healed or at least alleviated an illness. Aristotle ascribes an analogical palliative effect on human emotional life to *music* and the *art of tragedy*. Expressing certain feelings or emotions music excites a similar response in the listener. But since in music this emotional expression is ordered according to a certain regularity, listening to the rhythmic progress of the melody effects the same ordering in the listener's feelings, and they become more tender and ennobled.

Tragic art affects man similarly, for here too the spectator, immersing himself into the tragic play, must subordinate his emotional reactions to the artistic order governing the tragedy. What does such an explanation of catharsis mean? For Aristotle, who in this question as well is representative of a typical ancient way of thinking, form in art is based on measure, i.e., the same element of moderation that determines virtue and distinguishes it from any kind of extremes (vices). Therefore we may think that Aristotle, as already indicated, truly has in mind the moral influence of tragic art on human feelings. It is an art that tempers the emotions aroused in the viewer by giving them an ethically valuable moderation. But if the ennobling effect of tragedy is contingent on its artistic form, then it must manifest itself first of all in the aesthetic impression the spectator gets from the tragic action and not just in the traces it leaves in his soul. In other words, catharsis must have not only an ethical but also an *aesthetic significance*.

But what must the latter be like? This aesthetic significance cannot be elucidated purely psychologically (for example, by claiming that the artistic form of tragedy, by taking control of the viewer's spiritual attitude, facilitates the appearance and course of certain specific emotions—fear, compassion—and thereby gives them a pleasing nature), for then it remains unclear why and how an facilitated course of emotions can make them nobler.

It is important that catharsis essentially changes the meaning and value of emotions. But this alteration of their quality or, using a modern term, their sublimation, can only be understood with reference to the contemplativity of the aesthetic attitude, to the fact that it elevates the emotions onto an ideal plane and severs them from a direct connection to the subject's (individual's) actual personal exigencies. Of course, Aristotle himself has not yet brought to light and formulated precisely the essential peculiarity of the aesthetic attitude. But interpreting his theory of catharsis in this sense we are perhaps not diverging from the principal direction of his philosophy. Let us not forget that Aristotle accords the highest value in man's spiritual life to *pure theory* (contemplation). On the other hand, he aligns poetry to philosophy, stating that poetry, too, is interested not in what really was or happened (as history is), but in what *can* be, what characterizes the general structure of being and life. Consequently, actual reality-as-it-is and its practical interests and exigencies are neutral with respect to it. The sublimation of emotions means that in virtue of their subordination to the contemplative attitude they lose their actual personal interest and enable the spectator deeply to feel that which in the hero's life and fate is truly human.[63]

Of course, if Aristotle's theory is explained in this way, catharsis no longer remains just a feature of the *tragic* impression; the viewer or listener, insofar as he is devotes himself to true aesthetic contemplation, is similarly affected by other kinds of art as well. But wherein then lies the specific quality of tragicality? Perhaps describing it requires a certain ethical criterion?

Aristotle mentions two emotions that tragic art excites and "cleanses": fear and compassion. Compassion contains that feeling of sympathy which enables us to take part directly in what the people in the drama live through and experience. This sympathy, says Aristotle, is particularly lively and deep, (1) if the hero's character is average, distinguished by neither exceptional goodness nor exceptional badness, and (2) if his personality itself and his life circumstances command our attention.

The first point makes it clear that even for the tragic character, according to Aristotle, a purely moral criterion is not decisive. In truth, artistically impressive and dramatic is precisely that personality in which the positive and negative qualities characteristic of human nature explicitly assert themselves. On the other hand—and that seems to be the message of his second point—the situation itself in which the hero acts must be dramatic, i.e., such that would allow the hero clearly to show the traits of his character, since what in concrete reality determines human fate and the essential peculiarity of that fate is the human being's character and the circumstances of life in which he finds himself. The relationship between these two factors gives rise to the tragic action.

If Aristotle in his *Poetics* repeatedly emphasizes that the most important moment in a tragedy is the action itself, then he thereby not only wishes to note the general characteristic of dramatic poetry but also to emphasize the special significance of tragic action. And this action is significant because it creates and resolves a situation (conflict) in which there arises a question about the meaning and worth of the man's life and which decides his fate (to be or not to be).

Keeping this in mind one can more accurately understand the rule repeated by almost all aestheticians, viz., that the tragic hero must have a certain grandeur or nobility of character. In this case, too, it would be a mistake to think about an excellence specifically ethical. What is crucial is the following: do the psychological capacities of this man and his attitude toward life permit him to get involved in such a fateful situation and having entered it to grasp its decisive significance for his destiny. Only in such a case can a man's perdition be tragic. Where his destruction is accidental, where it hangs only on external circumstances and is not associated with the man's personality, the deeper layers of his existence, there tragicality has no place. In order for it to emerge, a certain *depth* of personality, an *inner vital capacity*, is necessary.

Of course, this is a positive quality, and perhaps even the foundation of all other values in life. But even so it is not an ethical value in the strict sense of the word. A man's aspirations themselves, the goal that he endeavors to reach, the passion that drives him, the idea that he is serving—all of this may not be worthwhile from an ethical point of view. The only thing that is important here and that can become tragically significant are the actually manifest spiritual capacities (potencies) of a person and the efforts he puts

into his actions. Consequently, even sacrifice doesn't show that the good for which man is ready to die is morally valuable; one can sacrifice oneself for the wrong idea, but the sacrificial act itself does not, on account of that, lose its unconditional significance. But tragically is not always associated with sacrifice. A tragic personality can be someone who does not keep his promises, who loses a crucial battle by not choosing the path that would allow him to display his highest capacities. Hence, a tragic action need not end in the physical death of the hero—he can perish, though staying alive, by losing the most valuable thing in his personality.

Thus it's becoming clear that tragicality cannot be explained merely subjectively by what is experienced and lived through by the tragic hero or by the viewer of the tragic action. It is an *objective* phenomenon inherent in humanity itself, in the spiritual nature of man and his situation in the world. But if Aristotle in his definition of tragedy emphasizes primarily the subjective side, i.e., its salutary effect on the viewer (the catharsis), he is in this respect merely following the common tradition in ancient philosophy that always associates beauty with virtue. Nonetheless the subjective aspect of tragicality is inseparably tied to its objective aspect and positively depends on it.

Those emotions that the tragic spectacle excite in the spectator—compassion and fear—are *intentional* and determined primarily by the object toward which they are directed. Therefore, Aristotle's theory of tragicality may be explained by appeal to objectivity. And in truth, the spectator's fear and compassion are aroused by the hero's misfortune, his sufferings, his fateful end. However, the tragic *significance* of these feelings depends not on the misfortune or the sufferings, but on the fact that the hero himself is to *blame* for his fate that he has brought on himself through his actions. This circumstance, it appears, justifies those theories that ascribe to tragicality a purely moral significance.

Even so, *tragic guilt* is special and does not necessarily stem from moral dereliction. This was noticed by Aristotle when he observed that the hero's fate arouses compassion if his sufferings are undeserved and the misfortune occurred because of a mistake. But if this mistake is not a simple (and accidental) error, responsibility for the fateful actions falls on the tragic hero. Thus it seems that he is *not guilty and at the same time guilty*. This peculiar dialectic of tragicality was first correctly emphasized by *G. F. W. von Hegel*. The hero is guilty in that he himself, by his inner attitude and by his behavior, gives rise to the tragic situation. On the other, he is not guilty of the fact that his personality is such and not otherwise and that the circumstances and course of life make the tragic conflict *inevitable*. Or, in other words, the conflict arises out of the hero's personality and its relation to the surrounding world; it arises because precisely that which is valuable in his personality cannot be separated from his human frailty and limitation and provokes resistance from those around him. Thus the tragic hero's fate is marked by a

certain *necessity*, but this is not the blind necessity of the physical world dependent on the law of causality and on the accidental concatenation of external circumstances, but a *meaningful* necessity through which the singular order of the human spiritual world is manifest. This order is one of *negative teleology*. This means that those people who are capable of using the highest human values (possibilities) meet up with—at the fateful hour and in their environment or even within themselves—opposing forces such as not only prevent them from reaching their goals but also turn their actions towards those goals into methods of self-destruction. In this respect the tragic hero's fate is not accidental but set for him, as the deeper, essential reasons for his fate lie within him and his relations to the surrounding world.

Negative teleology gives tragicality a certain *mysterious meaning*. It seems that just when man succeeds in manifesting his real (most valuable) powers, some higher, supernatural power interferes in his life and pushes him toward misfortune and perdition. The ancient Greeks explained the riddle of tragicality by saying that either the gods were jealous of human happiness and potency, or else that they punished man for his excessive pride, his attempt to surpass his limitations, his given measure of possibilities. Why does this negative teleology rule in human life? Our analysis contents itself with just calling attention to the existence of this phenomenon and showing how deeply it is rooted in the whole problematics of human life.

The close connection of tragicality to human destiny can also objectively be explained in the following way. Good and evil (taken in the broadest sense of any cultural value) are in reality intermeshed to such an extent that as soon as one of them starts to get realized in some way, the other rears its head. Evil, being a purely negative element, can acquire real power only by making use of the forces of good or mimicking them. Good, on the other hand, in its concrete historical manifestations always remains somewhat imperfect, one-sided, and limited. Having gained ascendancy in human life, the good at the same time underlies and justifies the evil that inheres in its imperfection and acts not only as a creative but also as a destructive power. In other words, there is a certain contradiction at the heart of man's historical existence, a contradiction between what the good must be and what at every given moment it actually is. Or, using Hegel's terminology, those historical aspects through which the unconditional idea of good is realized are always relative and do not correspond to its unconditonedness. Out of this contradiction there arise the crucial conflicts of human life—conflicts pitting not only good against evil but also good against good.

In society the decisive voice generally belongs to the average man, who keeps to the prevailing opinions and readily yields to the influence of lower inclinations (especially jealousy). Thus society usually resists every independent personality endeavoring to bring to fruition a new and perhaps higher conception of the good. In this way there arises a struggle between two different aspects of the good in which inevitably the forces of evil

participate, too, thus helping to destroy the personality that dared to oppose itself to the set social order. Hegel convincingly illustrates the beginning and resolution of tragic conflict with the example of Socrates's fate.

Socrates was the creator of a new and higher morality. Grounding morality on knowledge (the knowledge of oneself and of the good), he proclaimed the inner autonomy of the human personality. But the search for truth and the highest good is associated with doubting, and this doubt first of all affects traditional morality and perturbs it non-rational foundation. In addition, the theory of man's inner autonomy, recognizing reason as the sole criterion of truth and morality, negates that system of morality and religion which is based on the authority of society and state. In this respect Socrates's ideas, insofar as they were directed against the reigning morality, had something in common with Sophistic teaching, and the defenders of the traditional order could only look upon Socrates as their enemy, as an ally of the Sophists who was leading young people astray and destroying the foundations of morality and religion. Thus it would be wrong to think that the reason for his tragic fate was just the viciousness of his enemies. The real reason was a confrontation between *two opposed conceptions of morality*, a confrontation arising out of the inner dynamism of spiritual life. The example of Socrates's destiny shows especially clearly that a purely moral criterion does not suffice to explain tragic guilt and the tragic fate arising therefrom.

Conversely, one should not conclude from this example that only a personality representing some high idea can be a tragic hero. A man may be impelled towards a tragic conflict by a powerful passion that completely overwhelms him, or by a vital good that he regards as his supreme value and toward which he directs all his psychological energy (honor, power, liberty, and so on). In a word, for tragicality just one feature is essential, namely, that in man's attitude toward life there be something *unconditional*. What the stimuli or motives for this attitude are is of no decisive significance as long as they do not cripple his humanity,[64] for true humanity is inseparable from the appearance of unconditional values. On the other hand, when the latter brush up against the circumstances of real life, a tragic denouement becomes inevitable. Thus it may be said that the tragedy of human destiny is the tragedy of the good itself: under the circumstances of real life it cannot unfold and develop without provoking a resistance and reaction from evil that is supported by the forces of good itself.

Having gotten clear on the objective foundation of tragicality, we can understand better why the hero's sufferings acquire a positive value for the spectator and give the aesthetic impression arising from the tragic spectacle its special depth and persuasiveness. The crucial struggle with outer and inner foes that is bestowed on a man in a tragic situation brings to light what is truly significant in his life and what motives underlie the whole of his spiritual attitude and behavior. The man has to decide to which of the conflicting values he will accord primacy, sacrificing all the others. But every

sacrifice is connected with suffering, and the *sufferings* of the tragic personality, i.e., why and how he suffers, reveal the actual resources of his humanity. This shows that not every suffering is tragically significant and can be evaluated positively. In all cases where suffering is inflicted on a being incapable of self-determination (e.g., a child) or where it destroys the vital elements of humanity (e.g., mental disease), it is horrible and awful but cannot give rise to a tragic impression. It acquires a positive value only to the extent that it is *meaningful*, and it can be made meaningful only by the individual himself through his free determination and inner attitude towards the misfortune that has befallen him.

This also grounds the *subjective* significance of *suffering* for the tragic hero. By forcing him to concentrate and turn his attention on his inner depths, suffering allows him to get free of his blinding illusions and to understand better himself, his real essence, the ineluctable demands of life, and the inevitability of his fate. In this case the hero's sufferings end in a catharsis ethically understood, in a certain inner cleansing upon the self-disclosure of his real, authentic humanity. The catharsis of the tragic hero can morally affect the spectator as well. But this is just a secondary moment, not characteristic of the aesthetic impression itself.

From an aesthetic point of view the image of a suffering personality is significant just to the extent that it manifests a true humanity not overshadowed by anything else. We must remember that the aesthetic significance of a tragic spectacle reveals itself only to a contemplative attitude of the spirit, a special attitude which, even if it does not suppress, like a purely theoretical analysis does, all emotive reactions of the subject, nevertheless takes away from them any practical urgency and disrupts their connection to the individual's vital needs and interests. Hence the hero's sufferings depicted in a tragedy are as it were *neutralized*; they do not touch our active "I" and lose that real persuasiveness on account of which we try to avoid or remove them in reality, regardless of whether they befall us personally or someone that is close to and loved by us.

Of course, in a tragic spectacle they do not cease being sufferings, they can move the spectator deeply and excite in him a vivid response; yet all these emotional reactions (sympathy, compassion, fear, etc.), to the extent that they enter into the aesthetic impression, remain within the confines of the "ideal" plan and do not connect with the spectator's real situation.[65] Only torment removed from all ties to reality can acquire aesthetic value and constitute the foundation of the so-called "tragic" satisfaction.[66] Otherwise one might think that this satisfaction has its source in a hidden and sophisticated cruelty.

Thus the example of tragic art cogently confirms Aristotle's thought that poetry (and, we might add, art in general) is in a certain respect close to philosophy. The knowledge inherent in aesthetic perception penetrates to those depths of the world and human nature that escape the view of practical

ethics; therefore it enables us to understand such manifestations of humanity that cannot be evaluated by the usual criteria of morality.

D. Art and Tendentiousness

If an analysis of tragicality shows us that art, even when it treats a morally significant subject, must preserve its freedom and autonomy, this doesn't mean that it must be neutral with respect to other cultural interests and values. The slogan *l'art pour l'art* (art for art's sake) is wrong if it means to say that art is self-sufficient and that it thrives best when it is turned away from everything that is important to man in practical life. Such an "aestheticism" narrows art's horizon much to much, limiting it only to what directly attracts our senses (eye and ear) through its impressiveness or wonderfulness, or to what gives us pleasure by exciting the outer layer of our psyche. Having cut itself adrift from real life, art inevitably becomes superficial, degenerates, and turns into an entertaining *game*. It not only loses contact with its deepest sources of inspiration but also is no longer able to re-create everything in the sensible world that is vivid and significant,[67] since the sensible form, or structure, itself cannot be separated from whatever it expresses. He who is insensible to the vividness of forms won't be privy to the inner secrets of their structure.

Thus a close relation to the totality of cultural life is characteristic of art. What's more, not even a certain *tendentiousness* is incompatible with its nature. Nearly all of the greatest works of art are filled with an ethical, social, or philosophical pathos, resulting in their extraordinary educative and formative influence.[68] Thus moral ideas and feelings can stimulate an artist's creativity just like any other subject can. Whether the tendency inherent in them is compatible with the requirements of art depends on how it relates to the art work's composition. If their tendentiousness is made into the main principle determining the composition in such a way that it just illustrates a certain general idea, then not only does the work of art lose its aesthetic value but the tendency itself stays unconvincing, unjustified, and leaves an impression of artificiality. The main job always has to be done by the concrete artistic idea (project). Only if it grows naturally out of the represented situation or course of events will the idea recommend itself spontaneously to the viewer or reader and become an inseparable, essential factor (moment) in the aesthetic impression. In other words, the effective appropriateness of a tendency can be certified only by the artistic worthiness and truthfulness of the work itself.[69]

E. Art and the Love of Being

Although the moral criterion cannot be applied to art, it must nevertheless be recognized that there is a certain inner relation between art and morality.

Only this should not be sought in the constitutive principles of art and morality (as is usually done when beauty and virtue are compare), but deeper—in that human attitude on which the possibility of both art and morality is founded. In truth, the purpose of moral action, formally speaking, is the betterment of the world by implementing good and eliminating evil. But this activity is possible and meaningful only if all the values through which virtue is manifest are *values of being*, i.e., if *being itself is recognized as a positive value* to which primacy over non-being is granted. If the value of being is negated, good would disappear or it would become identical with non-being. All the pessimist philosophies, if truth be told, negate not the value of being itself but the value of that empirical being with which human life is associated; and they negate it because they deem the evils associated with it essential and irremovable. Thus the nirvana of Buddhism (and Schopenhauer) is not absolute (pure) non-being, but rather a form of being that fundamentally differs from empirical being and can be attained only with a radical denial of the latter. That it is natural for man to value being and life positively also emerges from that doctrine (characteristic of ancient philosophy and especially platonism) according to which there are various degrees of perfection of being and which sees the cause of imperfection in the non-being that intrudes into being.[70] Therefore we will probably not be far wrong if we say that the love of being is a necessary condition for the validity of all values, regardless of whether being is identified with the earthly existence of man or it is believed that perfect being is realized only in another world beyond the limits of empirical life.

But this same love of being also inspires the creation of art. Embodying beauty in its works, art not only "transforms" empirical reality but also creates new forms of being, a new world of aesthetic values. True creation is impossible unless the artist gives his work everything that he's got and fully throws himself into the nature of the object he aims to represent. And this immersion into the singularity of the sensible world can spring only from the love of being.

Now this love (of being) is the source of both the idealistic and the realistic approach to art. *Idealistic* art seeks with its means of stylization to illuminate (change) the represented world in such a way that in its structure and separate parts there comes to the fore everything that gives them simply an unconditional value (from an aesthetic,[71] ethical, and religious point of view). What it aims for flows from the same spiritual mind-set that, firmly trusting in the indestructible power of virtue, endeavors to position the whole of human life on a new and more perfect foundation. *Realistic* art, it seems, is considerably more modest; it does not presume to surpass or perfect reality, but seeks diligently to recreate it, not eschewing even that which is slight, unbeautiful, banal, and sordid in it. Yet such an attitude doesn't show at all that the realistic artist's source of inspiration is not the same love of being. It just manifests itself differently here; it flows from a different disposition. It

may be said that realist art is more forgiving and tolerant than the idealist one; it affirms and cherishes reality such as it is and knows how to envelop in an aura of beauty even that which in life is dark and shabby. In this respect realistic art is closer to real life, it can embrace and change even things that idealistic art despises. This is especially well shown by the major role that is played in realistic art by comicalness, especially its highest form—humor.

F. Example: Comicality

Talking about comicality in the field of art first of all brings to mind comedy, which is contrasted with tragedy. The former is considered a light-hearted art that makes us laugh and entertains us; the latter is a serious or noble art that makes us sad and thrills us. Like all contraries, comicality and tragicality have something in common and can occasionally come in contact with each other and even merge. Yet it is doubtful whether comicality can be explained from its relation to tragicality not only because the forms and ways of manifestation of the former are, in comparison with the forms of tragicality, much more various, but also because comicality is often grounded not just on the objective state of things itself but also and primarily on the mental attitude of the perceiving subject. Comicality can be consciously, deliberately created; tragicality, by contrast, does not depend on the human will but is a matter of fate. Furthermore, the field of comic manifestations is much wider. Only a human fate can be tragic in the strict sense of the word, but a comic impression can be made by animals and even non-living things.

Just like tragicality, comicality is not confined to art. Its primary source is life itself and, in particular, its social system, mutual relations among people, and their relations to the surrounding world. In analyzing the peculiarity of comicality and its special significance one must, keeping in mind its dependence on subjective factors (the mind-set of the subject), pay attention not only to the inner structure of the phenomenon itself but also to the spiritual atmosphere in which it emerges and flowers.

In looking at the simplest and most primitive cases of comicality we notice that children and uneducated people find funny and laugh at everything that is marvelous, unusual, unexpected, in a word, anything that stands out by its appearance from the ordinary course of day-to-day impressions and clashes with it. Of course, being marvelous (strange) and being comical are by no means the same. The former is a much broader concept that embraces, besides the comic, other thrilling impressions (the sensational, the dramatic, the tragic, and so on). But the initial undifferentiated expressions of comicality do not yet differ from impressions of marvelousness, hence marvelousness must be regarded as a foundational moment of comicality, too. As to the specific quality that is peculiar to all occurrences of the comic, that depends on what it is that surprises us about a certain thing, phenomenon, action, or event.

A comic impression is made by something that appears not to the purpose, does not correspond to its real nature or function, fails to live up to its promise or achieves the opposite effect, ascribes to itself an underserved value or significance, and so on.[72] How much the views of philosophers—from Plato and Aristotle to the Romantics and even contemporary aestheticians—on the essence of comicality might differ, when we analyze more closely how they describe its objective side (the comic object itself), we see that they all have in mind, and sometimes clearly highlight, just this quality of comicality. Even *Henri Bergson*'s theory, which by his own lights is supposed to deviate from the traditional understanding, not only does not conflict but essentially agrees with this assessment. According to Bergson, you get a comic effect wherever creative powers rigidify and become automatic or at least start to resemble an automatism controlled by laws of mechanical (lifeless) inertia and unconscious habit. A *mechanization* of life is inevitable every time man's attention to *reality* weakens and he cannot deal with an existing situation or adjust to its defining circumstances. That's why, Bergson thinks, an absent-minded person is typically comical. Thus in his theory, too, comicality is conceived as a certain peculiar inappropriateness or unsuitability: life is not, or does not seem to be, such as by nature it should be, or seems to be; it takes on the shape of its opposite (an automatic, lifeless mechanism). Only one may seriously doubt whether one can, as Bergson thinks, explain all manifestations of the comic by the rigidification and mechanization of life. There are cases where this phenomenon creates no comic impression, where the appearance of automatism in vital manifestations is well-grounded and purposeful.[73]

But this description of the funny object highlights only one essential moment of comicality that is insufficient to explain the whole phenomenon. The inappropriateness or pointlessness of some object is usually judged negatively by us and creates an unpleasant impression. How can we reconcile this with the undeniable fact that everything that's comical attracts and entertains us, and is recognized by all normal people as a positive, satisfaction-giving phenomenon? This question is answered by aestheticists in different ways, and it would be hard to say what these answers have in common. In critically evaluating them we must say that even though they give quite a few noteworthy indications, none of them manage to solve the problem and to explain what comicality means to man; for the question just raised touches precisely on the vital significance of the comic moment.

To throw light on that significance we must consider not only the individual comic experience but also the overall vital situation or atmosphere that allows it to emerge and manifest itself. This is clearly shown to us by an analysis of even the simplest comic events or phenomena that occur to us every day. These draw our attention by their marvelousness or strangeness, i.e., their unusualness, unexpectedness, or their disruption (in one way or another) of the normal course of daily life. But such an event or phenomenon

will seem funny to us only if it doesn't directly impinge on our current needs and interests, doesn't disturb the work we are immersed in, or doesn't prevent us from carrying out an urgent plan. For in those cases it won't have a comic effect but probably just "piss us off."

This shows that everyday life consists of two spheres. One, the narrower one is centered on our practical or active "I" and embraces all the objects and phenomena of the surrounding world that are somehow connected with our current interests and aims. The other, the broader one, envelops the first one and constitutes a kind of *background* for our current life; to it belong all those things and phenomena that at a certain time enter upon the horizon of our consciousness but have no direct connection to our existing needs and activities. We may call the first the *actual* sphere of life and the second the *neutral* (non-actual) one. The borders between them aren't constant; they change, of course, with every alteration in our interests and needs. What's more, they often intersect or cross over, since the same object may belong in one respect to one sphere and in another respect to the other one. Still the difference (opposition) between them always remains and determines our attitude to the world around us.

In the sphere of actual everyday life, the principle of practical purposiveness rules: everything is judged according to whether it helps or hinders the satisfaction of on-going needs. That type of comicality for which inappropriateness and the disruption or distortion of the normal course of events acquires a positive valuation, has no place here. On the other hand, not only when we're relaxing but also when we're working, if the work goes smoothly and doesn't require too much exertion or concentration, we tend to welcome every impression that, while not touching on our interests, injects into ordinary life something that's unexpected and unusual and thereby disturbs the monotony. Clearly, it is the *neutral sphere* that is hospitable to such impressions.

This is the sphere to which we are generally or at the present moment indifferent but which nonetheless can amuse us by satisfying our curiosity, our thirst for thrills and excitement, and similar cravings. It is only within this sphere that a man can look at things as if from the side, observe their progress, and understand them as being just a show that touches merely the surface of his soul, doesn't reach deeper, and demands nothing of him. In a word, only with respect to the neutral sphere can there emerge that mind-set that makes man into a practically disinterested observer and that in favorable circumstances gives rise to both aesthetic and theoretic (scientific) contemplation.

Among these amusing and curiosity-awakening impressions there definitely belong the comical ones, especially those primitive, simple ones arising from an inappropriateness that not only does not annoy or anger but actually entertains us—in that it makes life livelier and more diverse,

allowing us to forget the tedious uniformity of everyday existence. Let us explain this with an example used by Bergson.

We see a man walking along on the street. Suddenly he trips and falls. Why do we find this funny? According to Bergson, that's because during his fall his body's natural, organic motions become mechanical ones depending only on his weight, i.e., motions inappropriate to the nature of his vitality. If that man, says Bergson, hadn't fallen but had unexpectedly sat down in the street, his behavior wouldn't have been comical, since in that event his motions wouldn't have lost their organic character.

But it is doubtful whether we can agree with this explanation of Bergson's. Such a happening can be even more comical if it substantially diverges from that man's usual behavior and is incompatible with the actions that might be expected of him. Of decisive significance is the *concrete situation* in which the funny event and all the circumstances surround it appear to the observer. If, for example, a child falls or sits down in the street, that may not provoke laughter at all because a child's naiveté or inexperience justifies in our eyes the way it behaves or the unpleasantness (fall) it experiences. But when this happens to a mature and possibly corpulent adult who is able to walk unhurriedly in a dignified manner, then the effect will be comical, since a sudden fall or sitting down in the street jibes neither with his normal, customary movements nor with behavior suitable in a public place. But this incident will cease being funny as soon as we notice that the person in falling broke his leg or seriously hurt himself: then the whole scene transfers from the neutral to the actual sphere of our interests, and we can no longer remain uninvolved observers. A neighbor's misfortune arouses our compassion and demands that we come to his assistance.

That the comic tendency is not just a passing caprice but an instinctual thing is shown by the behavior of children; not only are they attracted by everything that's unusual, strange, and funny—they themselves love to create such effects by "horsing around" and "acting crazy." The livelier and more active the child, the more explicit this tendency is. It can assert itself either *negatively* or *positively*. Either the child fools around and engages in pranks that one way or another interrupt or hinder the routine activities of life and work (like being mischievous in school), or it does something whereby it deviates from the usual and executes a certain project or reaches some goal in an unusual, curious way (e.g., walking on hands, writing with the left hand, talking in a made-up, cumbersome language). In the latter case a certain creative ability begins to assert itself, one from which under special circumstances art and a variety of art forms may develop. One does something not in the simplest but in a roundabout and untried way.

In general the opposition between these two ways of acting can be described as follows. A human being's everyday life (family and societal) as well as his regular occupation and actions that satisfy his physical and psychological needs all proceed according to the usual, tradition-bound

patterns, which just in virtue of their usualness answer to the principle of economicality, i.e., enable him to reach the goal of all his actions with the least exertion of force. In this sense that order is, all else being equal, *purposive and rational*. The tendency that is opposed to this usualness and gives rise to comicality does not adhere to the principle of economicality and thereby negates the purposefulness and rationality of the usual way of doing things; it either hinders the latter from taking its course or substitutes for it a more circuitous method for attaining the same goal. Hence it looks positively on what from the viewpoint of everyday practicality is not to the purpose, irrational, and even absurd.

We may note that this new attitude emerges independently of the demands of both practical life and external circumstances, and arises from a spontaneous inner impulse. Usually it does not disrupt the usual pattern of life or disrupts it only temporarily (as the pranks of children and adolescents might do) and may even harmonize with it, as it applies only to life's neutral sphere or what, even in the actual sphere, is relatively unimportant. This shows that comicality, even though it is opposed to the prosaic, first of all asserts itself on the plane of, and within the limits of, the prosaic itself and remains closely tied to it.

Only if we do not lose sight of these circumstances in which comicality emerges can we understand both how what is purposeless, irrational, and meaningless can attain a positive value in human eyes, and how comicality reaches its highest degree precisely where the purposiveness of normal behavior, for accidental reasons or deliberately, turns into its very opposite, a *negative purposiveness*, so that the process ends by returning to its point of departure or by leading to a result opposite to what was expected.[74] Moreover, the vital situation in which comicality originates not only grounds all the features that are usually enumerated in characterizing its nature, but also permits the critical evaluation of things that other theories of comicality misdescribe or that distort its true nature.

(1) Thus Bergson and other philosophers emphasize that laughing is associated with a certain *lack of moral sensitivity*; only someone indifferent to what's happening is able to laugh. (2) Johannes Volkelt claims that our attitude toward a comic object is marked by the fact that we *refuse to take it seriously*. (3) Therefore, a comic spectacle or impression is like an entertaining *game* to us in which we indulge only when relaxing and which is incompatible with the serious and important tasks of our life. (4) Since the comic object foresees no duties for us, in having fun with it we feel we're free and *not hindered* by anything. (5) This free play, according to Volkelt, is pleasurable for the additional reason that in comparison with the comic object's frivolousness we feel our unconditional superiority. (6) Other philosophers associate the pleasurableness of comic impressions with man's *egoistic inclinations*: the pettiness of a comic personage makes us feel good precisely because it humbles him in our eyes and thereby allows us to value

our own self more highly. According to this theory, the positive tonality of the comical springs from our malicious joy at another's misfortune.

In truth, as long as what's happening remains within the neutral sphere, i.e., doesn't affect our real, will-engaging interests, moral sensitivity is not brought into play. We are indifferent to the reality of the comic object, to everything that belongs to its independent existence. That reality is just an image giving us pleasure and in this respect substituting for a game. It is above all because of this that we don't look at it seriously, i.e., as a phenomenon touching on our vital needs; the valuelessness of the comic object is only a secondary circumstance affirming and consolidating the uninterested (neutral) mind-set. This attitude of consciousness also grounds the liberty that allows us to "play" with the object, i.e., to highlight at our discretion those of its features in which its comicality seems to manifest itself especially clearly. On the other hand, for this same reason, i.e., because comicality originates in the neutral sphere, it has no necessary connection with a sense of superiority. To have a conviction about one's superiority is impossible without a comparison, but that which belongs to the non-actual sphere and to which we are indifferent affords the observer no comparison with his own personality or situation. But if so, the pleasurableness of a comic impression cannot be associated with malice in the strict sense of that word, since this emotion arises only in the actual sphere, i.e., in the context of such phenomena or events as in one way or another satisfy our personal interests. We take malicious joy in another person's misfortune or deficiencies when we are unfavorably disposed towards him. But only a person who doesn't concern us and whom we don't know personally can appear funny to us.

Nevertheless it cannot be denied that in a certain respect the comic feeling is associated with malice. A comic scene, as we've seen, entertains us with its negative purposiveness, disrupting the familiar course of daily life. In virtue of this it satisfies that instinctive inclination that rises up against the established order and welcomes anything that replaces it with something unexpected, unusual, and contradicting its orderliness. In this respect the emotion of comicality contains something malicious, but this malice is directed against the everyday order itself and only indirectly affects the funny thing or personage (insofar as he represents and executes the order). In other words, this is a *non-egotistical* or *personally disinterested* malice, to which therefore no positive or negative moral value can be assigned. Of course, the comic emotion can be infiltrated by a truly egotistical malice, when the person giving rise to the latter is for one or another reason not likeable or intolerable to us. And often derision is used to belittle one's enemy or take revenge on him. Still, although envy, hatred, antipathy, and harm often are those stimuli that impel us to notice and call attention to what is comical in other people's character and conduct, the essence of comicality does not depend on them and can asserts itself independently of them.

However, the quotidian situation that is described by the contrast between the actual and the neutral sphere is suitable only for the explanation of the simpler (more elementary) cases of comicality. Its higher forms can appear only if the subject's attitude towards both comicality and the situation underlying it changes in a certain way. This change manifests itself primarily in that the neutral sphere of life expands to such an extent that it comes to embrace the actual sphere, too. This is helped by the fact that the boundary between them constantly changes. What is actual at one moment loses that actuality at another and passes over into the neutral sphere (e.g., remembering something that was experienced). In addition, with human consciousness growing ever stronger, observation "from the side" takes on an ever greater importance—not only for theoretical knowledge (science) but also for practical and societal life as a whole. Only disinterested observation of this kind enables human beings to understand more thoroughly the circumstances of life and of human relations; to judge accurately the possibilities inherent in any situation; and to draw out from it everything that is of value and significance. Thus the *contemplative* or observant attitude of consciousness is gradually formed, a mind-set that in favorable circumstances takes control of the actual sphere, too. Man then begins to look upon his human existence itself as a spectacle; he achieves an inner freedom fettered by nothing, which enables him to rise above the limitations of his individuality and to "play" at will with life's adventures and to laugh at everything that is lowly, contradictory, and comical in it. This is that "divine" irony through which man, according to the romantics, reaches the pinnacle of his spirituality. Within it there lies, of course, a dangerous temptation—to which the romanticists not infrequently succumbed—of regarding the holiest and noblest of objects as playthings providing them with an occasion to demonstrate their wit.

On the other hand, this attitude awards man a real freedom with respect to his own self and opens his eyes onto life's deeper levels and their hidden significance. He is no longer content with funny incidents of everyday life and their negative teleology but seeks to find in this unporpusiveness, even absurdity, a deeper meaning and insight into connections between events that usually escape people's eyes. Thus there arise the higher forms of comicality where the negative moment (unpurposiveness, absurdity) acquires a special weight and a positive value just because with its help and in virtue of it the truly significant and essential is manifest. Comicality ceases to be just an object of playful amusement; a serious, telling, sometimes even tragic face shines through the comic mask. The most important kinds of this "serious" comicality are *wit* (paradox) and *humor*.

Wit flourishes particularly in the field of language. Availing itself of the similarity between things or phenomena which the ambiguity and metaphoricity of words help to highlight, wit places alongside each other things that belong to entirely different levels of reality and at first blush seem

to have nothing in common. But, looking more closely, we see that in comparing the seemingly incomparable a new aspect of the object unexpectedly reveals itself, letting us grasp its true nature and significance more deeply—and nonsense turns into a significant truth.[75]

Of all the varieties of comicality it is perhaps *humor* that has the greatest significance for life and art. It not only helps us cope with all the nuisances of ordinary life that stem from external circumstances, our own mistakes and inadvertencies, or the ill will and incivility of others, by diverting our attention to what is funny about those unfortunate events; it also constitutes an essential quality of the *nobility of spirit that under the most difficult of circumstances does not lose* its inner freedom and can discern in them something to laugh at. The stronger a human being's independence from external circumstances, the better his sense of humor and the greater his sensitivity to life's humorous aspect. Such behavior in the face of reality is incompatible with scorn for the world and an ascetic turning inward; it is available only to someone who affirms and appreciates real life in spite of its imperfections and who discerns even in those imperfections something that is worthwhile. Therefore, true humor, i.e., one that is not indifferent to life's seriousness, cannot be separated from love and humaneness.

That is particularly clear from the way true humor regards *weaknesses* of human *character* and depicts them in art. For Bergson, the comicality of characters constitutes the main form of comicality on which all its other forms depend, since gestures, mimicry, actions, and even events appear funny to the extent that they reflect a stiffening and automatization of human vitality. Yet automatism differs from authentic creative vitality by its immutability: its manifestations are typical, i.e., they are constantly repeated under similar circumstances. Consequently, in Bergson's opinion, not individual human qualities, but only what characters have in common, i.e., certain character types (the miser, the grudger, the gambler, and so on) can be truly comical. According to this conception, comicality comes from within, from the center of life, from character, and then spreads out to the periphery.

But if our analysis of the provenance of comicality is closer to the truth, then it spreads precisely in the opposite direction—from the periphery to the center. The sphere in which it originates is the neutral everyday sphere, which affects us only through its exterior, sensorily directly perceptible layer. And only insofar as man's interior (through gestures, mimicry, actions, words) manifests itself in this superficial layer can the character itself become comical. When we observe from the outside a man's behavior we first notice and directly perceive his general attitude, the overall tenor of his actions, gestures, and words (his cleverness, cowardice, miserliness, irascibility, and so on). Therefore, that type of comedy that is concerned to emphasize the external, directly affective comicality of events and situations is best suited for the depiction of *types*, i.e., characters whose actions are determined by one dominant character trait.

But as soon as we start taking an interest in the comic personage himself, he ceases to be just the representative of a type: there arises before us his whole *personality*, and what is funny in him turns out to be inextricably linked to his individual fate, the whole peculiarity of his personal life. And having evinced an interest in his personality, we, too, or rather our attitude as readers or viewers, changes. We no longer disinterestedly observe and delight in a comic spectacle, we explore and delve into the character's interior, we probe his human nature and investigate why it evokes a response in us. And having given ourselves over to the rhythm and flow of his life, we descry in another light the features that make him so comical; we perceive their significance and inner connection to the whole state of his personality and way of life. In a word, deep humor (in the sense indicated) is inspired by a love of man and life (being): in bringing to light reality's imperfections, contradictions, and quirks, it throws such a—transforming—light on them that reality, such as it actually is, appears justified to us and to possess a positive value. Such is the humor of an Anton Chekhov or especially of Charles Dickens and other English authors.

It goes without saying that to this form of humor life's *tragic aspect* is not alien; it can even merge with it into a *tragicomical* unity. The most characteristic example of tragicomicality in world literature is Don Quixote. His life adventures and fateful end portray the tragedy of an idealist dreamer who, seeking to attain his goal, looks at everything through the eyes of that ideal, does not see the true visage of reality, and does not understand what is ordinary, trivial, and simple in it. Seduced by his own illusions, he loses touch with reality; therefore all his noble ideas and deeds not only do not succeed, but end in a denouement that turns him into a farcical personage and totally crush his beautiful dreams. But this comicality of Don Quixote and all of his weaknesses (lost sense of reality, desire for honor, etc.) do not detract from the tragic significance of his personality. It only gives that tragicality a singular color by showing that in real life nobility often goes hand in hand with its extreme opposite.

But is love of being (life) in truth an essential factor in the higher and deeper forms of comicality? Isn't hatred often a powerful stimulus for bringing to light the funny frailties of human beings? Doesn't it stimulate our insights, doesn't it enable us to mark precisely the most important (and hidden) vices of our enemy and poke fun at them in the form of a caustic pamphlet or derisive satire? We can answer this question by raising another: Can a pamphlet or satire not only neatly hit the mark but be profound and significant if it does not arise from an extraordinary sensitivity to genuine human moral values? And is that sensitivity possible without a love of morality, even if this love is unconscious and unacknowledged? Where hatred does not grow out of mere animal instincts or offended self-love, it is tied by mysterious bonds to love.

3. Art (Beauty) and Truth

A. The Problem Formulated

Just like aesthetics confronts the question of it's the relation of art to morality, so it cannot eschew the question of art's relation to truth. These questions cannot be answered in the same way. Of course, art can represent both what is true and what is untrue or fails to correspond to reality in the same way that it represents both positive and negative phenomena, morally speaking. But even that which is false or immoral must be represented *truthfully*. In other words, the manner of representation must satisfy the requirements for truth. But what are they? Art does not copy reality. This is acknowledged even by those aestheticists who subscribe to the theory of imitation (e.g., Aristotle). Art selects that which is essential in, and characteristic of, reality and goes with the artist's aesthetic idea.

But even this answer does not explain the relation of art to reality. How, if it were true, would one justify that manner of representation which makes use of methods of stylization and thereby essentially changes the picture of reality? Or what would it say about fantastic art (fairy tales), creating an entirely different world altogether in which the main laws of reality no longer function. Clearly, a theory unable to do justice to the significance of these types and forms of art or even denies their legitimacy condemns itself. But if it is not the purpose of art to depict reality, then, it seems, truth cannot have the same significance in art that it has in the fields of cognition and practical life.

This conjecture seems plausible also in virtue of the fact of there being such forms of art to which correspondence to reality cannot be applied at all. Only representational art can imitate nature; in the case of neither music, nor pure ornamentation, nor architecture can such an imitation be an organizing principle. It cannot be so for music and ornamentation because their works have no determinate objective significance at all. And even though architectural works and arts and crafts do have an objective nature, they carry out ideas that are not based on imitating nature and satisfy practical needs of man himself.

With respect to these kinds of art it may even be doubted if the criterion of truth applies to them at all. On the other hand, even here we speak not without justification of a certain musical work's true or false pathos or of the authenticity of an architectural style. From this it follows that the question of the significance of truth for art cannot receive a general answer without us first becoming clear about the relation of the different kinds of art to reality. This question first of all concerns representational art, whose connection to reality is unquestionable. If it should turn out that a certain truthfulness and truth is an essential moment of the aesthetic values themselves in this kind of art, then, perhaps, we will be able to judge about the relations of other kinds

of art to truth. Then we will gain an answer to the question, In what sense must artistic truth be distinguished from scientific and practical truth?

B. Theoretical Truth

The starting point for our analysis will be concept of theoretical truth. Practical truth doesn't essentially differ from it; it's only that practical truth is content with a lower degree of accuracy—that degree which suffices for handling life situations and reaching practical goals. Thus there's no need to talk about it separately.

In the theoretical sphere we distinguish between *formal* and *material* truth. The former does not concern itself with the cognitive relation to its object, to the cognized being itself; it is only concerned with the *logical* structure of cognition in determining its inner (immanent) unity and coherence. Cognition satisfies the formal demands of truth in case all the judgments that form the foundation of a certain science constitute a unified system, i.e., are connected in such a way that the denial of one of these judgments means that conclusions following from their totality inevitably leads to contradictions. Only deductive sciences based on a strictly defined axiomatic system correspond to this ideal of formal truth.

Material truth determines whether cognition corresponds to the cognized object. This correspondence should not be understood as a similarity (a representation of the object). It only indicates that the object or a certain aspect of it (one or another quality, or the lawfulness of its structure) is apprehended the way it is (appears). Formal truth guarantees the correctness of thinking and logical relations among thoughts. It is independent in the sense that it can be analyzed and tested without regard to material truth. But the truth of the elements (axioms) of a deductive system can be evaluated only by directly appealing to the very state of affairs that they represent or by determining the correspondence of their consequences to the data of experience (the facts). Hence, the correctness of *cognition* itself (not only of thinking) is grounded in material truth. Finally, even formal truth has its material foundation: cognition can make use of the logical structure of thinking only insofar as it is anchored in being itself.

Nevertheless, if we wish to ascertain whether we can find in the field of art something analogous to the formal and material truth in cognition, we must compare art with the corresponding form of knowledge. Just like art gets realized in works of art, so cognition attains an objective form in judgments (assertions) expressed in words.

However, judgments clothed in language feature yet a third aspect of truth: the verbal expression must correspond not only to the evident state of affairs, but also to the intention of the speaking subject. In other words, one must consider not only the objective meaning of the assertion, but also its *subjective intention*: do the words really express what the subject had in

mind. Since this aspect of truth concerns not the logical form of the assertion, but its truth, we shall call it the subjective moment of material truth and distinguish it from its objective moment (the assertion's correspondence to reality itself). Let us see now whether these three aspect of truth can be applied to art.

C. The Formal Truth of Art

In every work of representational art we will find three principal moments or factors determining its aesthetic value: (1) the purely *sensory form* that it presented to us, i.e., the totality of all the sense impressions out of which the image is constituted; (2) the *objective significance*, i.e., what it depicts or represents (in painting or sculpture) or what it indicates symbolically (in poetry); and (3) its expressiveness, i.e., the mood or emotion which it manifests. The sensory form is the foundation both of objective significance and of emotional expression. Both of these appear only in that sensory form but relate to it differently. Emotional expression (mood) is connected with the sensory form indissolubly. The sensory form's aesthetic value is directly proportional to its emotional expressiveness. By contrast, the sensory form's objective significance is not a necessary condition of the form's aesthetic value. The form can be aesthetically effective independently of what it means, of its subject. This is evidenced by all forms of art that are primarily decorative and also by that type of representational painting that is closest to pure ornamentation. But even in those cases where the objective significance plays the role of the dominant and contributes somewhat to the shaping of the sensory image, it has to accommodate to the demands that arise from the composition of the sensory elements themselves. To a certain extent this applies even to poetry, where the objective significance is usually dominant.

In poetry the subject determines the sensory order (composition) of the work not so much by clearly defined objective images or accurately expressed thoughts as by a mood that permeates the work and merges with the rhythm, sonority, and musicality of the words. It might be said in general that what unites the objective meaning and the form of its sensory embodiment into a living organic unity is an emotional background (mood) common to both. Thus it must be acknowledged that theoretical analysis, in emphasizing the independent value of the sensory form for representational art is not carried away by abstractions far from artistic reality but throws light on all that is inherent in aesthetic perception (intuition) itself and even constitutes its basis.

The sensory form of a work, as opposed to its content or objective significance, is what justifies talking about a composition's formal beauty. That art work is formally *correct* which meets the requirements of purely sensory beauty, i.e., in which all elements constitute a unified, directly apprehensible totality and all the material used enters the compositional

structure in such a way that no part can be taken away or altered without destroying the aesthetic effect of the whole; i.e., where all the main elements of the composition are harmonized in such a way that one supports and accentuates the other. In a word, the totality of all the requirements related to the sensory structure of the work can be reduced to the following general formula: an artistic composition is sensorily grasped in a unity of diversities that manifests itself in the inner harmony of the work as well as in the opposition (contrast) and balance of its parts.

Whether a compositional structure is static or dynamic depends not only on the kind of art that the work is an example of, but also on the style that determines it. And since style is what fixes the totality of the means and structural elements the artist uses to carry out his idea, the unity of the style and the consistency of its implementation are also part of the formal truth of art. Style is also affected by the appropriate use of the material being worked on in highlighting its sensory values as well as by the technical means used; these put a stamp of their own on the inner structure of the work. All these moments likewise enter into the area of formal truth—and here the important thing is only what speaks to the ear or eye directly.

In short, formal truth in art is nothing other than the unimpeded or undistorted realization of aesthetic values on the purely sensory level of the composition. From this it becomes clear that the criterion of formal truth is equally valid for all kinds of art since it concerns only the sensory foundation common to them all. This is a purely internal (immanent) criterion, one that separates the aesthetically valuable from the non-valuable; it is not concerned at all with the relation of the aesthetic to the real. In this regard it is perfectly analogous to the inner criterion of logical truth.

Nevertheless, for cognition formal truth is but a means to ascertain material truth, since cognition is above all concerned with correspondence to reality. How the formal correctness of art relates to reality can be explained only after an analysis of the sense in which the criteria of material truth might be applied to it.

D. The Material Truth of Art

The Subjective Aspect

Every sentence is accurate and true (with respect to the subject) if it unambiguously expresses just that thought or idea that the speaker has in mind. The same is to be said about works of art. Here too, in judging works of poetry, painting, sculpture, etc., the question arises, Does the realization of the artistic idea fit the idea itself? Has the problem that the artist set himself to solve really been solved?

The artistic idea can be gathered directly only from the work itself. It has to show us emphatically that the creator's intention was just exactly that and

nothing else. If this cannot be detected in the work itself, if in order to grasp the artist's intention one must avail oneself of extraneous means or indications (such as titles, captions, verbal explanations), then the problem has not been solved and the work of art either does not express what it is supposed to express or it realizes the creator's intentions imperfectly, unconvincingly, inartistically. In the latter case the work is aesthetically inexpressive, i.e., it sins against artistic truth or cogency. But if it embodies an idea different from the one suggested by the theme or ascribed to the work by the author, this is no reason to judge the work negatively. It only shows that the artist's work is not based on the idea that he himself thinks is motivating his creativity or that might be expected from him in view of the subject he has chosen. Thus in High Renaissance and Baroque paintings there are quite a few that depict religious subjects (the Madonna as well as Old and New Testament scenes) and that seemingly are intended to awaken religious moods, yet the impression they leave is non-religious and the subject serves to implement a different idea, e.g., to accentuate the beauty of a human body and face or to reveal the expressiveness of certain gestures and poses.[76] Thus one may not always rely on the explanations that the artists themselves give for their creations. What is embodied in a work may not coincide with the idea consciously envisaged by its author. For better or worse, all works of art are subject to Goethe's dictum that an art work's meaning is determined solely by what it actually depicts or expresses. Consequently, all those manifestos and appeals proclaiming a new conception or direction of art remain empty words until the work of those artists themselves convincingly demonstrates what is valuable and original in it.

However, one must distinguish here those creations that are completely independent from those that are intended for an antecedently envisaged objective purpose. In the first case artistic freedom is constrained only by the inner possibilities of the chosen art branch; whereas in the second, the artist's idea (plan) has to accommodate itself to the designated purpose of the creation (e.g., decorative painting or works of architecture) and thus the appropriateness of the composition to this task constitutes an essential aesthetic moment of the work.

For instance, the most exquisite ornament, if it does not harmonize with the style of the building or overshadows its architectural forms, is artistically unjustified and destroys the building's aesthetic unity. Here we are thinking not only of the work's formal composition but also of the emotional expression (mood) it embodies. But where the emotional moment is accorded decisive significance the issue of artistic truth appears in yet another aspect. The emotional attitude that inspires the artist's creativity asserts itself in the created work and thereby becomes objective, ceasing to be just a subjective state of its creator and acquiring material form. Yielding to a contemplation of the work we are first of all concerned not with the creator and his idea but with the expressiveness of the creation itself. And this expressiveness

depends not only on the adequacy of the creation's objective form to the mood expressed in it, but also on the genuineness of the mood that is expressed. In these cases the subjective aspect of material truth coincides with the objective one, which we will now analyze.

The Objective Aspect

The Genuineness of Emotive Expression

Embodied in external manifestations (gestures, mimicry, or words), a feeling may fail to correspond to the object or situation that engenders it—if, for example, the expression does not reflect the emotional state required by the meaning of the scene depicted or if, on the contrary, the expression is exaggerated to an extent that is not motivated by the subject. The reason for this may be the technical inability of the creator to depict the manifestations of inner life (as, e.g., in primitive art). But often the failure may lie in the fact that the feeling expressed (objectified) itself is not genuine, not authentically experienced, and the artist does not grasp the means of expression appropriate to it. Thus the representation is based not on the feeling itself but on an artificial imitation and a vague sense of what the expression should be like. Such an inauthentic, falsified emotionality shows up either in an artist's using of clichés to express certain emotions or in his offending against the unity of the mood represented, i.e., his not choosing the appropriate tonality. In the former case, the expression of feeling will be lifeless, abstract, and ineffective; in the latter, it will cease being convincing the moment one or another false gesture or word shows us that the feeling expressed pretends to be something it is not.

That's why it is crucially important for the objectification of feelings in art that their expression be *immediate*, *direct*, and *naïve*. Wherever the life of emotions is interfered with by reflection that takes over their expression, there's always the danger they'll be embodied distortedly or subjected to alien objectives. Hence the aping of an alien style cannot, generally speaking, fail to be noticed. Even in a fastidious re-creation of the whole formal structure, the absence of authenticity or originality will be noticeable one way or another insofar as the style does not grow out of the emotional attitude associated with it. Thus the greatest obstacles that, for instance, artistic acting must overcome arise from the fact that the actor must not only get a feel for his role but positively *re-embody* himself in it so that all his actions flow from his portrayed character's nature in the actual circumstances that the character finds himself in. Otherwise his gestures, facial expressions, and words will seem artificial and deliberately affected in order to produce an outward effect.

This makes it easy to understand why the great Russian actor and director *Konstantin Stanislavski* was especially concerned with developing his young

students' *emotional memory*, i.e., their ability truly to experience the feelings associated with the scene being acted out. The actor must first of all bring that scene back to life in his mind; then the feelings caused by it will arise spontaneously; and, finally, these feelings will issue in the suitable gestures and actions.[77]

What has just been said about the objectification of feelings and authenticity of emotive expression may be applied, *mutatis mutandis*, even to those art branches in which no definite objective significance (subject) is at issue, e.g., music. Here emotional content is associated only with the formal composition itself. Since every mood and every feeling has its own tonality, its peculiar tension, and its special dynamism, here, too, a fakery will reveal itself in one or another transgression against the internal structural qualities of the appropriate emotion.

The Reality of Objective Representation

Let us return to representational art and attempt to answer the question, In what sense is it possible to demand from an artistic representation that it be realistic (correspond to reality) with respect to the subject? In analyzing this question it will perhaps be convenient to go by the plans or aspects through which the depicted object appears in works of art.

(1) The simplest case is where a separate object is represented in a certain natural position (e.g., a figure that sits, stands, or moves performing a certain action) in a way that emphasizes not the real-life significance of that position but its immanent (inner) expressiveness and the emotional values inherent in its contours. spatial form, organic structure, and so on. Sculptural, and to some extent painterly and choreographical, subjects are of this kind, since the representational methods of these art branches allow the artist to highlight, and as it were lift, the visible (external) shape of the represented object out of its surroundings and make it into something valuable in its own right (e.g., the pose of a figure or group of figures, a still life, an interior, etc.).[78] The chosen aspect has to be characteristic of the object and its actual position so that it explicitly reveals how the object really is in just this position, how the pose or motion depicted is reflected in the forms and relationships of the whole body and its separate members. Because the subject here is kept apart from all real-life connections and individualizing historical circumstances (with respect to time and place), it acquires an *ideal* and thus a *general* or *typical* significance.

But this typicalness cannot be reduced to a certain definite type that alone represents the subject's essence or "idea." The typicality of an image not only doesn't do away with its concreteness and its individual qualities but actually manifests itself only through their mediation.[79] The "essence" of a subject harbors unlimited possibilities of realization that find embodiment in the most various concrete images. (For example, the natural positions or poses of

a human body—sitting, standing, running, and so on—vary with its physical constitution, age, sex, mental condition, etc.). In general, what gives an image its aesthetic effectiveness, its special sensory intensity and contentfulness, is just that aspect of the subject that reveals its peculiar "phenomenal" nature (essence). "Phenomenal" here means not the abstract idea that comprises the scientific understanding of the object but its nature that directly appears in the sensible world.

(2) The abstract (in the sense indicated) way of representing almost imperceptibly changes into one similar to it in those cases where the composition lays stress on the special life-related significance of the subject (birth, death, infancy, old age, work, rest, sleep, and so on) and thus becomes somewhat symbolical. At the same time the emotional tonality of the subject strengthens and deepens; however, its "generality" remains constant as only those moments *generally* significant for human existence and nature's vitality are emphasized and highlighted.

(3) Much narrower and more concrete is that plan of depiction in which the subject represents what is typical of a certain historical period or of a certain actually existent group of people (nation, social stratum or class, etc.). This plan is closer to historical reality, since here the decisive role is played by those features and qualities that characterize the peculiarity of precisely the period, country, or nation in question and thus determine the special emotional content of the subject.

(4) Finally, the representational plan can be individual in the sense that the subject concerns a certain definite personality (or interrelated personalities) whose distinctive appearance the artist seeks to immortalize in a statue or portrait or whose individual life and destiny he seeks to celebrate in a historical picture, novel, or drama. These individual moments provide rich nuance to the emotional tonality of the whole work.

Yet this plan is not equally available to all kinds of representational art since their typical means of representation are not uniformly suitable for rendering the subject more concrete and unique. In this respect *poetry* offers the broadest array of possibilities. The special nature of language is manifest in the fact that (1) the word is a sensory symbol separating and highlighting one or another quality of the object and that (2) the temporal sequence of words (sentences) can represent both the coexistence of things and the progression of events. It is this that allows poetry to portray fully the subject's individuality in terms of time, space, and content.

Sculpture and painting offer far fewer possibilities, since they can preserve only one definite moment and recreate only the subject's external (visible) image. Only insofar as this momentary visible image can be individualized through gestures, facial expressions, and the situation surrounding them, can a real (historical) personage or event be represented. Hence a painting or sculpture never will be strictly unambiguous in the sense of being *just of one rather than of another* similar personage or event. In

other words, the immanent meaning of an image will not be fully equivalent to its historical sense. The latter can be accurately gathered only with the help of additional explanations or from historical information the viewer already has in his possession. Since the initial perception of the image, too, already is an act of the understanding, the boundaries of the immanent meaning are not constant and get wider or narrower in accordance with the intellectual level and sharpness of the viewer's mind. Thus these supplementations that the viewer's knowledge and experience bring to the perceived image organically coalesce with its direct meaning and in this way correct and individualize its objective sense.

Nevertheless all these "supplementations" enter into the aesthetic impression just in case they are justified by the direct image itself and its aesthetic structure. Thus we see that the representational plans indicated differ in their *intention*, which can cover a wider or narrower sphere of perception. In each case that aspect of the object or objects is selected which best corresponds to the envisaged intention and which, guided by that intention, either better generalizes or better individualizes the subject. But no matter how different these plans that serve as the foundation of the artistic representation are (and we have discussed their differences only in general terms), they all are distinct from reality itself, i.e., they represent those ways of perception that arise from man's physical and psychical nature. In this sense, and for the indicated cases, it is indeed proper to claim that representational art, even though it does not copy reality, meets the requirements (norms) of truth; i.e., it embodies and thematizes (or objectifies) in its creations those essential aspects of reality that inhere in the very structure of the sensible world, since all of the understanding of reality that is accessible to man is founded on the differences within that which is common, typical, and individual.

Partly related to the differences in the just described plans of representation is another "dimension" of perception, even though in its essence it is independent of them, to wit, *depth*. Not everything in the world of phenomena is equally easily observable. There are deeper layers in it that only a sharp and experienced eye can espy and whose vital significance is revealed only to a sensitive soul able to respond in resonance to its mysterious rhythm and tonality. But it is in just these layers that what is uniquely significant and essential in life is to be found. The perceptual habits and entrenched associations rooted in practical life usually allow us to grasp the phenomena of existence only schematically and superficially, while the things that lie in their depths most often elude our eyes. By calling up and making evident these submerged features the artist reveals to us life's deeper meaning. Therefore the depth of the artistic conception is an essential moment of artistic truth.[80]

What is Fantasticality?

If representational art satisfies the requirements of truthfulness in the sense that it brings out and throws light on aspects of objects inherent in reality itself, then the question arises of how to reconcile this understanding of artistic truth with everything that is fantastic in art, i.e., with such a handling of a subject that seems willfully to alter the structure of reality. How can one justify the type of stylization that radically changes the shapes and relations of objects, subjecting them to an abstract ornamental composition? From the great variety of kinds of fantasticality and stylization we will chose for discussion a few exemplary cases.

Let us start with the altering of animal forms and proportions (the unnatural lengthening or shortening, the thinning or thickening of the whole body or its separate parts; the enlarging of some and the diminution of others; and similar things). At first glance it might seem that in this way the artist is subjectively distorting or deforming the shapes of animals. Nonetheless a more careful look reveals that these deformations of shape have an objective basis, i.e., they just accentuate and make plainer changes in animal forms that we observe in reality. The limits within which the forms and proportions of animal species may change are rather wide and permit an unlimited variety of sorts.

These sorts aren't accidental; they're based on features of the organism's physiological nature. Thus changes in human shape can be classified according to certain constitutional types (e.g., the classifications of Ernst Kretschmer or Rigaud), each of which is distinguished by its own expressiveness. To this we may add various sickly bodily distortions (e.g., hunchback, waddled, bowlegged person, etc.) or injuries (cripple, cross-eyed person) that likewise considerably change human appearance and expression. The artist can use this and by emphasizing or even exaggerating this abnormality impart an extraordinary vividness to the image or obtain a comic effect, as in a caricature.

In addition, an affinity among different organic species allows the artist to compare one form with another (say, a human being with an animal creature) and thereby show off an especially distinctive trait (for example, cunning, agility, stupidity, etc.). Even fantastic forms, for example, centaurs or mermaids, arise from these direct, momentary impressions that on account of their vagueness or unclarity[81] are grasped not according to the dictates of reality but according to an eye-catching similarity to other things or phenomena. Thus a realistic prototype for the centaur is the nomadic horseman who seems to have grown together with his horse into a single organism. Where such fantastic forms "work" (are expressively plausible), the artist as it were supplements the organic world with shapes that actualize forms of life unused by nature.

In other cases a bodily form is included in an ornament, becomes a constitutive element of it, and is adjusted to its structure. Such a stylization of a figure ignoring its realistic form is possible because the dominant here is not the figure's corporeal quality but the purely formal significance of its contours. And if the figure is subordinated to a decorative composition, then the demands of material truth cannot be applied to it with great strictness; the stylization of the figure is artistically justified to the extent that it meets the demands of formal truth (in the sense indicated previously).

Different still is the fantasticality where the spatial and temporal relations of real things or phenomena are changed, or where certain natural laws cease operating; in a word, where impossible things happen. Fairy tales and legends, as well as paintings that depict them, are full of such miracles.[82] If we wish to discover the real basis for this type of fantasticality, it must be remembered that what matters for representational art is not only what truly exists (this is a matter for science), but also what *appears* to people and what they *imagine* to be there; in other words, the material worked on by art includes not only phenomena of the sensible world, but also the images with which the *imagination* complements and alters the impressions gotten from the external world. And the imagination is not bound by the strict definiteness and necessity of reality. Although the imagination uses the material provided to it by reality, it manages and processes it guided by its own special principles, which are much more liberal and permit the embodiment in reality of impossibilities (i.e., miracles); for example, arbitrarily changing the duration of events, making the most faraway places closer, combining images without regard to real connections and causal relations, identifying non-identical things, and so forth. The free play of the imagination is particularly stark in daydreams and dreams, where it is unhindered by the censorship of reason that removes anything incompatible with the conditions of reality. In short, artistic fantasticality does not consist of deliberate falsifications or willful fabrications—it grows naturally out of a human being's life, which is conditioned in equal measure by objective and subjective reality (the subjective picture of reality).

If truth be told, the boundary dividing the latter is conditional and inconstant. Perfect objective truth is an ideal which cognition strives to approach but which empirically it never reaches. For this reason even in the scientific worldview vetted by reason there always are some elements of *mythology*, i.e., elements arising out of a subjective, fantasy-based interpretation of the real world. And myths are by no means just empty fabrications; they are attempts by primitive peoples to explain the order of reality, attempts based on the experience available to them.

Let us mention one more example. In fairy tales people communicate with animals as their equals, as creatures that behave, think, and feel like human beings. Now this conception of animal (and even plant) life is not utterly unmotivated. It is grounded in the proximity of primitive peoples to nature,

especially organic nature. Interacting with animals in one or another way, hunters and peasants so immerse themselves in the latter's environment and gain such a feeling for the peculiarities of their ways that they build no less close connections with these animals than they do with other people. Since in animals much more than in people, typical features substantially outweigh individual ones and thus are much more noticeable, animals are well-suited to represent character types and to serve as illustrations for proverbs with an ethical message.

An analysis of these examples leads to the conclusion that fantasticality of whatever sort is aesthetically effective and plausible only insofar as it is well-motivated. This motivation may be of several different kinds, but it is always based on reality itself, on this or that plan or aspect of life. A fantasticality that has no relation to reality is impossible; but if it disregards the inner structure of life and the forms of perception characteristic of it, it cannot be aesthetically significant (with respect to material truthfulness).

In fact, in depicting things, phenomena, and events, art selects from reality one or another vivid aspect of it. But this manner of depicting originates beyond the limits of art in real life itself, and it depends on human interests and views, on a human being's attitude toward the surrounding world. A human worldview is always perspectival, and the images that comprise it show only this or that aspect of objects.

Now significance accrues to that aspect which represents a certain plan of life, a certain essential way of perceiving the world. Let us stress once more that the reality that art depicts is not reality in the theoretical-scientific sense but reality as it is understood by a living, concrete (historical) human being and as it gets reflected in his consciousness under various circumstances of life and in various periods of culture. Hence the difference between fantastic and realistic art is relative and depends on people's thinking, on how they understand and define reality. Not just any divergence from reality may be deemed to be fantastic. That description fits an art work only if it radically changes the structure of the world which under the existing cultural circumstances is recognized as *realistic* (corresponding to reality). Moreover, *realism* in art is opposed not only to fantasticality but in a different sense also to *idealism*. And this opposition must be discussed in more detail, since the terms comprising are not univocal.

The term *idealism* is used in both a wider and a narrower sense. In the wider sense art always is and must be idealistic since it "de-realizes" the objects it depicts by lifting them out of the relations of the real world. In the narrower sense, only that art is idealistic which calls attention to and highlights the valuable (in one or another respect) characteristics of its subject. The directions of idealization may differ according to the selected criterion of evaluation. Thus in classical Greek sculpture or High Renaissance painting that criterion is the ideal of beauty. Fairy tales attract and awe the naïve listener by depicting their heroes' power, wealth or their

moral and physical perfection that enables them to overcome all obstacles and their enemies' evil designs.

In Homer's epic poems the idealization is somewhat different. The gods are humanlike; they surpass humans by their nobility, power, and immortality, but morally they do not essentially differ from them: gods have the same passions and feelings that humans do; they love, hate, and get angry and quarrel like humans do. Their humanness also manifests itself in their lack of omnipotence and their having to submit to fate … that mysterious superindividual force that determines the progress of all events and human destiny as well. Heroes also represent different types of character and reason … yet these types—and here the extraordinary artistry of Homer's way of depicting comes into its own—do not remain general, undifferentiated schemata, but attain individual features that manifest themselves in the hero's behavior and are attested to by others' responses to his actions. Furthermore, Homer's idealization is strictly immanent and does not reach beyond the limits of human life. The deceased are only powerless shadows fated to dwell ingloriously in the underworld (ayda). The immanence of Homer and the classical Greek style also partially explains the fact that fantasticality here plays a relatively minor role. It is rather moderate and first of all serves to depict the power of the gods and the grandeur of natural forces. Idealization here is consonant with a certain realism: the world as artistically represented is close to real life; the latter's structure and all of the essential relations between humans and phenomena are preserved. In this regard Greek art is radically different from the poetry and art of the (Assyrian, Indian, Chinese) East, where everything is fantastic, gigantic, irrational, inhuman (many-headed, many-eyed, many-handed divine and demonic forms with their beastly appearance). Here the manner of representation pays no heed to the real structure of things and phenomena; the symbolic significance of the figures takes precedence over the connection of their sensible forms to reality. The artistic intention is that of symbolic expressiveness, which is indifferent to the forms of reality and aims above all to express man's emotional attitude toward life's most important phenomena.

Fantastically often consorts with realism, for example, in Romantic literature (the Tales of Hoffmann); here the action takes place simultaneously on two levels in such a way that some events belong to both and thus acquire a double meaning. One level is lower and represents the plane of everyday life where an average human being is guided by the usual viewpoints and commonplace values, and thinks, feels, and desires like everyone else around him. The other is higher and accessible only to some people, those who have great spiritual insight and understand life's mystery and the supernatural forces controlling it. These people get revealed to them the deeper, symbolic significance of certain events that don't mean anything special to others, who therefore do not even notice them.

This romantic fantasticality arises from a certain interpretation of life grounded in inner experience. For the course of life is not always of the same intensity and depth. Usually man is immersed in his practical affairs and lets himself be carried along by the current of familiar events; therefore he grasps events only superficially according to the usual settled schemata. But occasionally, in a flash of understanding, he raises his head above the stream—and the whole world, including his own existence, appears to him in a new miraculous light, so that even the simplest happenings begin to speak to him in a strange language that afford him an inkling of the real meaning of the puzzle of life.

These examples permit us to reach the conclusion that fantastic art depends on the same criterion of material truth that governs the non-fantastic art which is closer to reality. Only we must take this criterion in the wide sense alluded to above, namely, that the foundation of any artistic composition, even the most fantastic one, must be a certain structural plan or way of perception significant for phenomenal reality. For phenomenal reality is everything that appears, and is manifest, to man in his outer and inner life. But since art, in calling separate attention to, and isolating, individual plans and structures, thereby not only "purifies" them, i.e., sets them free from everything insignificant, but also advances their intrinsic morphological directedness (tendencies) toward a certain ideal limit (for example, the ideal of beauty; ideal geometric forms; and so on), it *ipso facto* distances itself from reality and can give body to such forms as aren't being realized in reality itself. Therefore, art has access not only to those possibilities that for empirical and accidental reasons (because of reality's "imperfection") are not exemplified in reality but also to those that transcend the confines of real possibility. This is exactly the respect in which artistic creativity manifests itself, but it is a creativity that never loses its connection to reality.

Taking to heart everything that has been said here about the material truth of representational art, we can grasp more deeply the truth in Aristotle's opinion about poetry's nature: poetry, in his view, is more philosophical than history since it depicts not what really happened but what *can happen*. What's decisive in poetry is not exact correspondence to reality, but the direct credibility of the image; therefore, that which is impossible in reality but is nevertheless credible, artistically speaking, takes precedence over that which is possible (corresponds to reality) but not credible. In these words Aristotle clearly formulates the difference between real and artistic reality, for what he says about poetry holds for representational art in general. From what he says it follows (1) that the purpose of art cannot be deemed to be an exact copying of reality; (2) that the criterion of artistic truth is the plausibility of the created image, which, as we tried to show, depends on its correspondence to reality's essential structures or perceptual plans; and (3) that aesthetic being belongs to the sphere of ideal possibility. The first two theses were sufficiently explained earlier; now it remains for us to clarify the

third. Only when we have done that will we be in a position to answer another important question, which arises when we analyze the nature of the artistic (aesthetic) world: In what sense can one speak about aesthetic reality?

Aesthetic Reality

Indeed, what does it mean to say that the world of art, the aesthetic world belongs to the sphere of possibility, if every art work (aesthetic image) is an individual thing perceived "now" and "here" and in this sense "exists"? Is Aristotle's intention thereby to indicate that artistic creativity is based on the imagination, which is unconstrained by the necessity of reality and can freely adjust and connect the images created? This gives rise to a further question: How should we more precisely define the sphere of artistic imagination so as to distinguish it, on the one hand, from reality, and on the other, from the scientific sphere, where imagination also plays an important part?

Moreover, from the activity of the imagination itself it is not clear why it is crucial for art that the images be objectified, or realized in the objective world? Hence let us try to discuss this question without appealing to the concept of imagination.

Indicating that poetry portrays what can be, Aristotle compares it with philosophy or theoretical science in general, for to the sphere of possibility belong all general concepts and all general relations between things or phenomena. That the judgment "Every S is P" is valid for reality means: "If something is S, then, necessarily, P," and it is also admitted that there really are and can be such S's, since the concept S is gotten from experience with the help of abstraction. In the same sense the plans and structures of reality portrayed in art are general and show us how things are and can be.

However, the analogy of art with science goes further. Theoretical knowledge does not confine itself to calling attention to the possibilities inherent in reality, i.e., the connections and laws that govern it. Having isolated one or another structural moment of reality, it also explains the possible inner changes of that moment without regard to whether something corresponds to these changes in reality. For example, the analysis of real (Euclidean) space can determine other possible spatial structures obtainable by changing one or another axiom of Euclidean geometry or moving on to varieties of higher degrees. Similarly, representational art can go outside the boundaries of real possibility when it works on the selected reality plan according to an ordering principle that corresponds to its structure.

On the other hand, in comparing the relation of science and art to the sphere of the possible, an essential difference appears. The theoretical intention of science is directed to the possible itself; it thematizes it, makes it a self-sufficient object and in this way determines that ideal sphere of being which comprises only pure possibilities and which is represented by general concepts and conventional signs (in mathematics). But science is not

concerned with the realization of these possibilities, and it uses this realization only as a means for the representation of general (possible) structures. And since every realization of possibilities is *ipso facto* an individualization, for science everything that is merely individual is insignificant.

For art, on the other hand, possibilities are significant only to the extent that they are exemplified in individual images; in other words, only a realized and individualized possibility acquires aesthetic value. Consequently, only art, not science, is capable of creating a special realistic world that can be compared to genuine reality. This aesthetic world, of course, does not coincide with the sphere of possibility determined by the sciences, since the realization of aesthetic images takes place within the limits of the sensible world; therefore, art can make use only of natural symbols or equivalent linguistic ones.[83] All that is accessible only to abstract thinking is alien to art. Thus the fact that art perceives and realizes possibilities in the form of individual images and that these images belong sensory being or at least are inextricably connected with it (in poetry) determines art's essential difference from theoretical science. From this it becomes clear that art and science are not related to reality in the same way.

To be sure, in virtue of belonging to the sphere of the possible both rise above the real determinations of space and time and do not depend on the connection of real circumstances. A law of the natural sciences or mathematics is uniformly valid everywhere and always. Likewise the aesthetic significance of an art work is not contingent on where and when it was created nor on who perceives it and under what circumstances. Nevertheless art, unlike a theoretical science, does not remain within the sphere of pure possibility but goes outside its boundaries and realizes the intended possibilities—so that the images it creates are similar to reality and seemingly imitates (recreates) it. All that the world of art lacks is true reality. Hence it is often characterized as *appearance* (*Schein*) and even as an appearance giving rise to the *illusion of reality*. The theory of "illusions" was comprehensively discussed in Konrad Lange's book *Das Wesen der Kunst* (The Essence of Art).[84] But a more thorough analysis of the phenomena of art shows that this theory distorts or mistakenly interprets them.

(1) First of all this theory would be applicable only to representational art: painting, sculpture, and action drama. It would be harder to apply to poetry that is read; for then one would have to think that the images arising in the mind take on the form of hallucinations. And if illusion is held to ground the aesthetic effectiveness of even those kinds of art in which nothing is represented, as in music, pure choreography, ornamentation, and architecture, then such an account turns out to be baseless.

(2) Furthermore, an examination of unreal (illusory) factors in sundry branches of art readily discloses the fact that their significance is by no means unvarying and that the remarkableness of a work of art does not all

depend on whether they play a larger or smaller role in the artistic composition. In painting they get the dominant role. Not only the dynamism and vitality of the depicted phenomena or forms, but their corporeality and surrounding space are unreal; sculpture, by contrast, handles real material and space. In drama the characters acting in it are real people, and on stage real space merges with the represented spatial elements (theatrical scenery) in an organic visible unity. Finally, it must be remembered that we may look at an event in nature or in real life purely aesthetically and delight in it in the same way as in a work of art. In these cases the aesthetic impression is not based on any "illusory" factors.

The object of delight means only that it really exists in the aesthetic plan. And if it is said that "this landscape is reminiscent of a Ruysdal" or that "this lighting is Rembrandt-like," then the point is not at all to suggest that this sight gives rise in us to an illusion of a picture or, in other words, that there occurs here, as Lange says, a "reverse" illusion to the effect that nature is looking like a work of art—the point is that this real image corresponds to an art-like way of seeing and composing. From this it emerges that if the aesthetic moment is essentially the same in all branches of art regardless of their specific peculiarities and if it in the same way determines natural beauty, too, as we have tried to show here, then the special character of aesthetic reality cannot be explained by appeal to such elements as are characteristic of only certain kinds of art. Aesthetic reality must be ascribed to architecture, music, and other kinds of non-representational art in the same sense in which it is ascribed to painting, sculpture, drama, and poetry in general. The artistic and generally aesthetic attitude, it must be emphasized, is directed only to that which appears or manifests itself; whether the impression received does or does not correspond to reality is immaterial to that attitude. In other words, aesthetic being is *neutral with respect to reality*. Thus if art is characterized by saying that it creates an appearance of reality, the limits of the aesthetic attitude are trespassed and a criterion is applied to art that is alien to it.[85]

Nonetheless this neutrality with respect to reality in no way prevents the art world from having its special weight, from convincing—and acting on—us in a way analogous to reality itself. This *verisimilitude* of aesthetic reality is grounded on (1) the formal truth of art, giving every work of art an inner harmony and unity; (2) the material truth of art, in virtue of which art works embody and emphasize certain significant plans or structures of phenomenal reality [86] (objective and subjective); and, finally, (3) the *vividness* (expressiveness) of art, since the "possibilities" it realizes consist not only of images but encompass all the reality experienced by, i.e., they objectify the dynamism of life and its emotional background.

We already saw that the aesthetic world is not just an object of theoretical contemplation; it embraces and engages all of our personality while still rising above all our on-going practical interests and aspirations. In other

words, in the aesthetic sphere feelings and emotions can be *objective and practically disinterested.* If we follow traditional psychology, this seems to be impossible and self-contradictory, since feelings and emotions are by their nature subjective and inseparably intertwined with the real needs of our "I." Therefore aesthetic theories are usually inclined to regard as a constitutive moment either only the contemplative side of an aesthetic phenomenon or only its emotional side. In the former case aesthetic perception is considered to be a special form of cognition and likened to the theoretical point of view (e.g., the aesthetics of Arthur Schopenhauer). In the latter case aesthetics is subordinated to ethics (beauty gives rise to righteous feelings that ennoble man or decisive significance is attached to satisfaction (a feeling of pleasure) that attends the subject's emotions and feelings arising from the object's influence). That is to say, either championing the objectivity of the aesthetic phenomenon aesthetics renounces its emotional content; or speaking up for the latter it denies its objectivity, i.e., explains it solely on the basis of the actions of subjective factors.

However, if we hold fast to the description of aesthetic phenomena themselves and do not try to squeeze them into the framework of an antecedent theory, we must acknowledge that there is a third alternative, which, it seems, is adequate to reality, namely, that there can be an emotional perception of the object which is neither practical nor personally interested. Our emotional reaction to the vitality or emotive tonality manifest in the object does not prevent us from maintaining a contemplative attitude toward that object and from subordinating to it the mood with which the object has infected us. This indeed is what the *aesthetic outlook*, the aesthetic devotion is like; it reveals to us the objective, superindividual meaning of emotional experiences. Neutralizing the object's real and subjectively relevant import, man draws attention to the objective aesthetic values inherent in it. This holds both for plastic art and for those kinds of art that are not based on some objective theme; for, as we have repeatedly emphasized, aesthetically meaningful and valuable are not only the individualizations of the objective structures themselves, but also the non-objective moments that combine with them and through which a certain vitally significant tonality or dynamism asserts itself. In this respect music, ornamentation, and other non-plastic forms of art are each distinguished by their own distinct verisimilitude and aesthetic truthfulness.[87]

PART IX

HISTORICAL SURVEY OF AESTHETIC THEORIES

1. The Aesthetic of the Ancient Greeks

A. Introduction

If we wish to analyze comprehensively a certain scientific or philosophical problem, we must not only examine the phenomenal field in which it emerges, but also look at its historical development, at the theories that have tried to solve it one way or another. After all, any new theory can be fruitful just in case it utilizes everything that its predecessors have achieved and explained. Therefore, an investigation of aesthetic questions also requires a certain historical orientation. We will not endeavor here to review and evaluate critically all the theories of aesthetics created up to the present time but will only indicate the most important periods in their historical development and identify the principal viewpoints that determine the course and direction of this process.

Aesthetics as an independent science explaining the essence and nature of beauty and aesthetic values emerged rather late, much later than the other main disciplines of philosophy (logic, theory of knowledge, ethics, philosophy of nature). There are several reasons for this. Partly the advance of aesthetics was hindered by the difficulties that we mentioned in the introduction, namely, a certain non-rationality of aesthetic phenomena. Partly it was due to the fact that an aesthetic problem is not so closely connected with the most important or pressing issues of cultural life as, for example, ethics, epistemology, or the philosophy of nature is. Of course, with the emergence of the speculative interest the singularity and significance of beauty could not have disappeared from a thinking man's horizon. But because beauty—whether of a human being, or of a thing of nature, or of a work of art—usually shows up in things or phenomena that are significant to humans in other and more pressing respects as well (since beauty as a rule is a value accompanying other values that are closer to life's immediate needs), it is understandable why the earliest thinkers tried to explain beauty in terms of those phenomena that it accompanied, and why attention was directed not to the *essence* of beauty, but to its *significance* for one or another facet of cultural life.

This is convincingly attested to by classical views on beauty. Ancient Greek culture is justly held to be one in which art and the aesthetic moment in general were especially important and influential. One would expect, therefore, that aesthetic speculation would have flourished in that environment. Yet the truth is that the philosophical discussion of aesthetic problems in antiquity lagged considerably behind the burgeoning of art and

the development of aesthetic taste. We may go so far as to say that the aesthetic tradition of antiquity somewhat impeded the emergence and growth of independent scholarship in aesthetics, and this effect persisted even during the Middle Ages and later. It may be that just because the aesthetic moment was organically fused with all other manifestations of culture it was so difficult to isolate beauty among them and to focus on the special uniqueness of its nature.

B. Kalokagatia

The ancient Greek ideal was *kalakogatia*, in which morality is inseparably bound up with beauty. The spirit must find an embodiment as perfect as possible in a material element and must itself must acquire a certain corporeality, blending with the body in an indivisible unity. The ideal man must be ethical and beautiful, i.e., his inner moral qualities must find suitable expression in his external appearance and behavior. Only then will he be a worthy representative of his fatherland and family, and achieve a true *eudaimonia* (full happiness), that is, be able not only to manage properly his own life but also to fulfill all his social and religious duties. Kalakogatia is based in elements of measure, harmony, and eurythmia that fix the proper embodiment of the soul and thereby underpin bodily discipline and the ability to execute the aspirations and projects of the spirit. This ideal grew out of the practice of living and was shaped by general cultural prerequisites. Thus it is understandable why, in trying to grasp the essence and meaning of beauty as it was implicit in kalakogatia, the Greek philosophers first of all noticed its practical and vital significance.

C. The Sophists. Plato

As far as we know, the first to become interested in aesthetical issues were the *Sophists*. Some of them said that the word "beautiful" applies to everything that is useful, purposive, and, in general, is fitting to what it was designed for (for example, the most beautiful eyes are those that see the best). Others accentuated the subjective side of beauty and its sensory nature. Beautiful is that which gives pleasure and is liked by our eyes and ears.

However, usefulness, purposiveness, fittingness are *relative* concepts. If they determine beauty, then its value is secondary and dependent on that purpose and norm which a beautiful object must achieve and meet. But what that purpose and that norm might be remains unclear. The second description, reducing beauty to sensory pleasure, does not throw light on its nature either, as it fails to indicate whether the pleasure is caused by the structure of the object itself or by the individuality of the perceiving subject's taste.

The inadequacy of all these relativist definitions of beauty was exposed by Plato (for example, in *Hippias Major*). Following the heuristic method of

Socrates, he calls for a definition of the very essence of beauty, its special general foundation. The answer is given by his *theory of ideas*. Ideas are the perfect archetypes for all things, and on these archetypes depend their being and nature. One of these ideas is distinguished by an extraordinary translucency, and this is the idea of beauty, which is manifest in all things that appear beautiful and are perceived by the most tender sense organ, the eyes. Upon meeting a beautiful thing and recognizing in it a replica of that beauty that was seen in the other world before birth, man's soul is overtaken by an extraordinary joy; it seeks by all means to get closer to this thing and interact with it. By deriving the beauty of things from the idea of beauty, Plato overcomes the relativism of Sophistic conceptions and recognizes beauty's absolute and self-dependent value. This, of course, is a major step forward. Still, the idea of beauty, as understood by Plato, is unsuitable for vindicating autonomous aesthetics.

Ideas, according to Plato, constitute a separate world of unchanging being, a world that rises above the sphere of sensible things and is accessible only to pure thought. Consequently, the idea of beauty, too, is a supersensible element. Bodily beauty, on which kalokagatia is based, is just its imperfect resemblance, the lowest degree of beauty, although it does urge the soul to rise up to the higher, insensible manifestations of beauty (that of virtue and science) before finally attaining to the highest level—the idea of beauty itself. And this idea, according to Plato's theory, fully coincides in content with the idea of goodness. In this way Plato, too, proclaims the unity of beauty and goodness which lies at the foundation of kalokagatia. Moreover, in this unity, goodness enjoys priority. It is the idea of the good that determines the significance and value of the idea of the beautiful.

This is especially evident in Plato's views on art. He does not recognize such a thing as freedom of artistic creation. Artistic creativity must be guided by those ethical projects that are executed by the ideal social order (the ideal state). The task of art is to stimulate moral education, to awaken in citizens the love for proper conduct, and to display to them those ideal examples that they should follow.

What's more, the criterion of beauty in Plato's philosophy is not only its correspondence to goodness (morality) but also its correspondence to reality, the true being. Art cannot compare itself with cognition, which is based on thought, since art does not go beyond the confines of the sensible world, does not reach up to the very prototypes of being, the ideas, but is satisfied with producing resemblances of those sensible things that themselves are but imperfect likenesses of ideas.

Such an evaluation of artistic creativity proceeds from the intellectualist tendency of Platonist and ancient philosophy in general, according to which man's essence and value is determined by reason, the capacity for thought. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to think that in Plato's theory beauty wholly dissolves and vanishes into the ideas of goodness and truth (true

being). In merging with them, beauty *ipso facto* gives the latter two its own special color. The principle of harmony, which according to Plato is based on the internal balance of the soul and the moral order, is of an aesthetic origin and even in the field of ethics does not lose a certain aesthetic character. This is why Platonism has not ceased to influence the aesthetic views of even later times.

D. Neoplatonism. Aristotle

Neither Aristotle's philosophy nor Neoplatonism bring anything essentially new to Plato's conception of beauty. *Neoplatonism* only formulates more precisely and expands more consistently the principles offered by the Academy's founder (Plato). He believed that there is no separate idea on which the beauty of things depends. Beauty is present in the essence of every idea. It consists of creative forms that being embodied in matter order it and give it beauty. But sensory beauty is not independent; it only symbolizes a supersensible (spiritual) beauty which is identical with goodness. Wherever matter is not subdued by form and not dependent on it, the lack of beauty, i.e., ugliness, appears.

Aristotle is more interested in the special questions of aesthetics and touches on the general principles only incidentally. Like Plato, he acknowledges that a certain orderliness determining the harmony and size of a thing's parts constitute a necessary condition of beauty. He justifies this thesis by the claim that only in this way can a thing be conceived as a completed whole. And although he observes in another passage that beauty can manifest itself in unmovable things, while goodness can be found only in actions, he does not differentiate beauty from other values and likens it in Plato's manner to moral goodness and to truth.

The satisfaction that we get from, say, works of painting and sculpture depends, in his view, not on the nature of the represented object but on the similarity of the image to the object, that is, on the fact that we *recognize* in the former that which it represents; for in painting we like even such things as in real life arouse disgust (monsters, cadavers, corpses). Therefore, aesthetic satisfaction, according to Aristotle, is a purely intellectual affair. He understands artistic creativity in a similar way; for him it is born of the imitative instinct.[88]

Clearly, such an intellectualist conception cannot do justice to the creative significance of the imagination. For Aristotle, poetry differs from history in that it portrays not what actually happened but what *can* happen according to necessity or accident. If so, the object of poetry coincides with that of scientific knowledge; for science, too, gives us knowledge about that which is possible, i.e., which is general and not contingent on individual determinations of time and space.

Yet it seems that Aristotle himself senses that there is an essential difference between scientific cognition and artistic representation; thus he emphasizes in his *Poetics* that the subject of an art work can be something that is impossible in reality. What is crucial, however, is that the thing or event be represented in such a way that it should appear credible to the viewer. In other words, decisive significance accrues to the *manner of representation* rather than to the object's correspondence to reality. This way of understanding poetry, recognizing as it does the special function of the imagination in artistic creation, can in no way be reconciled with a consistently developed theory of imitation. It also bears mentioning that Aristotle, just like Plato, has a negative view of the depiction of ugly things. If beauty is tied to goodness, then lack of beauty is attended by evil. In depicting unbeautiful things, the artist arouses in the viewer an inclination to follow negative examples, which contravenes the pedagogical function of art. Ugly subjects can be permitted only to the extent that they serve as a means to highlight their opposite, the value of true kalakogatia.

Medieval philosophy showed relatively little interest in the problem of beauty and added nothing essential to Plato's and Aristotle's conceptions. It was only after the Renaissance that certain new aesthetic currents emerged; they, although adhering to the ancient tradition, develop one or another of its motives and thereby prepare the ground for the appearance of autonomous aesthetics.

2. Rationalist Aesthetics in France and Germany

A. Boileau. Buffon

We shall discuss here only the three most important ones: the rationalist aesthetics in 17th and 18th c. France and Germany; the English aesthetics distinguished by its psychological nature; and the one represented by the Italian thinker Giambattista Vico.

Rationalist aesthetics is based on *Descartes's* philosophy, which claims that reason, the capacity to think, is the essential property of the human soul. The highest value, on which all others depend, is the truth to be found in reason itself.

Reason is the creator of all culture; it establishes all the principal norms that are valid not only for knowledge but for other areas of culture as well. Hence, from the ethical and aesthetical points of view, too, only what fulfills the requirements of reason can have value. The conclusions that follow from this view of art were very clearly formulated in *Nicolas Boileau*'s book *L'Art poétique*, wherein it is stated that *rien n'est beau que le vrai* (nothing is beautiful except the true).

Now, the true is everything that is natural, i.e., agrees with the nature of reason. If beauty essentially coincides with truth, with rationality, then it is

governed by the same criterion as is the foundation of true knowledge: it must be *clear*. Applied to poetry, this criterion means that poetic language acquires aesthetic (artistic) value insofar as it accurately corresponds to the idea expressed.[89] A beautiful form drapes its content like tight clothes, which do not hide, but clearly delineate the body's contours.

In his thoughts on style *Georges-Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon* goes so far as to say that the highest level of artistry is achieved by the simplest and most general way of formulating thoughts. Clarity and rationality is the solo measure of aesthetic taste. Just like all men's reason is the same, and the truths innate to it are eternal and unchanging, so the ideal of beauty is universal and uniformly valid for all times. Therefore, it is possible to lay down certain general rules which artistic creativity must observe and which must determine the aesthetic form of a work of art; the artist's job is not to discover new truths but only to provide the most fitting form for the truths that have been discovered.

V. Leibniz. Baumgarten. Sulzer

But if beauty is founded on the form that art creates, we cannot avoid the question: Is the clarity and fitness of artistic form connected with its picturesqueness? This question becomes especially delicate for all those branches of art whose means of representation are not universally significant words (like in poetry) but sensory materials (colors, hard bodies, sounds, et al.) accessible only to the senses. According to rationalism, there are two kinds of knowledge. One of them is perfect, certain, and clear; it is realized by pure thinking with the help of distinct, perspicuously analyzable concepts. The other is imperfect, unclear, confused, and consists in sensory knowledge (perception and imagination). But how can beauty manifest itself in sensible form if it is acknowledged to be a positive value, a perfection?

This is a puzzle that *Leibniz* and his successors *Wolff* and especially *Baumgarten* tried to solve with the help of their *monadology*. Being, according to Leibniz, is comprised of an unlimited number of closed substances called monads, which differ among themselves by their degree of perfection, i.e., their ability to represent or be conscious. Each monad reflects the entire world but the clarity of their sense-images is unequal; that clarity corresponds to the given monad's degree of perfection. Man's nature is constituted by a hierarchical system of monads in which the lower ones depend on the most perfect one (i.e., the most conscious). Thus man has access both to pure thought and to sensory knowledge. Since the world that God has created is not chaotic but a cosmos ruled by harmony and meaningful orderliness, the objects of knowledge can be not only separate objects but also the necessary connections that join them together into a harmonious unity. They are perceived in two ways: by pure thought and by the senses.

In the first case there emerges scientific knowledge of harmony and lawfulness; in the second we obtain aesthetic knowledge (of beauty). The satisfaction that accompanies the perception of beauty is purely intellectual. As Leibniz puts it, "music gives us pleasure, although its beauty depends on relations of numbers and on the counting of those strokes and vibrations that recur during certain intervals of time. Moreover, this counting which takes place in our soul is not noticed by us. It is the secret arithmetic exercise of a soul that knows not how to count (*exercitium arithmeticae occultum nescientis se numerare animi*). Of the same kind is the pleasure that the eyes find in proportion. The liking that issues from other senses can be derived from similar causes, even though the explanation will not be as definite." Ugliness, by contrast, is nothing other than an indistinct perception of disharmony.

This theory of aesthetic perception is coordinated with Leibniz's view on the creation of art. To each image in the soul there corresponds a certain striving: clear and distinct concepts are matched by a conscious and rational will, and to unclear and unconscious aesthetic ideas there correspond similarly vague strivings to embody the perceived forms of harmony in the external world. The latter is the artistic instinct, which is common to all people but which is especially powerful in artists.

These thoughts of Leibniz dispersed in various of his writings were amplified and systematized by Wolff's pupil Baumgarten, who became famous in the Age of Enlightenment mainly because he gave *aesthetics its name* and showed this new science a special place in the system of philosophy. His theory may be briefly summed up as follows.

If there are two kinds knowledge, there must be two different disciplines investigating them. Supersensory knowledge, proceeding in virtue of abstract concepts, is the object of *logic*. Sensory knowledge is investigated by logic's sister, "inferior gnoseology" (*gnoseologia inferior*), otherwise known as "science of sensitive knowledge" (*scientis cognitionis sensitivae*), which coincides with aesthetics or the "theory of liberal arts" (*theoria liberalium artium*). In describing aesthetics this way, Baumgarten has in mind not sensory knowledge as a whole, but the perception of *sensory forms*. To aesthetic knowledge understood in this way he ascribes perfection, i.e., perfection not with respect to matter but with respect to *form*. Poetry, which interested Baumgarten the most, is described by him as *oratio sensitiva perfecta*, i.e., as speech based on sensory images and distinguished by perfect form.

These ideas were expressed in his first work, *Meditationes philosophicae* (1735), and later expanded in his *Aesthetica* (1750–1758), which remained incomplete. Baumgarten doubtless deserves credit for calling attention to the concreteness of beauty and its sensory nature and for clearly distinguishing it from goodness, which is also a perfection but does not manifest itself in sensory form. On the other hand, he does not stray much from the

intellectualist tendency in aesthetics, for he holds sensory cognition to be a lower kind of knowledge that merely prepares the way for the higher (conceptual) knowledge. The aesthetic viewpoint takes up a middle position in our perceptual development; it is that transitional stage through which knowledge passes as it rises out of the darkness of sensory impressions up to the perfect clarity of pure thought. *Ex nocte per auroram meridies*.

Another rationalist we will mention is *Johann Georg Sulzer*, who proceeding from Leibniz's and Baumgarten's principles elucidates the nature of the aesthetic interest. According to him, we get satisfaction from everything that encourages the soul's inborn activity, that is, seeking knowledge, and allows it to asserts itself freely and unimpededly. Thus the soul is affected by those objects that rouse the cognitive capacity by the variety of the images or ideas that these objects contain and thereby facilitate the perception of these ideas by indicating the rule or order according to which their variety can be reduced to a unity. In short, the source of the aesthetic interest and the ground of beauty is everywhere the same: it is a certain unity of varieties, although its forms or manifestations may be very diverse. It can appear either directly to our senses (to the ears in the form of music, to the eyes in the form of paintings, sculptures, and buildings), or to our imagination (in the form of poetry), or to our reason (in the form of beautiful thoughts or theorems).

Sulzer, of course, succeeded in calling attention to a critical moment of beauty (unity of diversity), yet this moment by itself does not suffice to distinguish the aesthetic interest from other purely intellectual forms of interest.

3. The Empiricist Aesthetics of the English

A. Shaftesbury

A totally different direction is taken by English aesthetics. Although it, too, does not lose contact with the tradition of antiquity, it resolutely renounces the intellectualism of Plato and Aristotle and turns its attention first of all to the *emotional* side of aesthetic impressions. At the same time the method of inquiry changes. The starting point is not the structure of the aesthetic object and the way it meets the requirements of reason, but the state of the subject caused by the aesthetic impressions; for it is just with this subjective side that the practical capacities of beauty are connected, its ability to excite man's soul and to affect his behavior. The representatives of English aesthetics were influenced by empiricist philosophy, especially that of John Locke. Hence, they were concerned not so much to explain aesthetical facts as to describe them more accurately.

The first English thinker to evince an interest in aesthetics was the *Earl of Shaftesbury*. He followed in the footsteps of ancient philosophy (especially

Platonism). Beauty, in his view, derives from the harmony of parts, which manifests itself in both the external (physical) and the moral world. This harmony is *natural*, i.e., it corresponds to the real order of nature and the innate function of man. That is why beauty coincides with truth and virtue. But man can realize beauty only when the inner concentration of the soul gives rise to an enthusiastic striving toward the ideal which enables him to feel his unity with the universe and merge with its harmony. Hence the great importance of art for culture: it educates man and kindles in him the love for beauty and virtue.

Following Shaftesbury, Francis Hutcheson likewise grounds aesthetics not in reason but in feeling. The sense of beauty, as of virtue, is primary, and it cannot be derived from associations and from custom (as Locke thought). The ability to feel harmony (the unity of diversities) is innate to man in the same way as the ability to see or hear. But the most important quality of the sense of beauty is that it has nothing in common with utility or practical purposiveness. The latter could dominate the world even if there were no beauty. But only beauty assures true blessing as it exercises man's virtue by accustoming him to non-egotistical interests.

B. Home and Burke

The subjectively emotional nature of beauty is even more explicitly emphasized by Henry Home in his *Elements of criticism* (1761) and by Edmund Burke in his *Inquiry into the origin of our ideas on the sublime and the beautiful* (1756). According to Home, the aesthetic emotion differs from others, and especially from the passions, by its *tenderness*, i.e., by the fact that it excites our soul only moderately and is not accompanied by any desires yet still refreshes and energizes psychical life. It is an emotion caused first of all by physical motions and processes of a peaceful and easy sort, and by any objects whose form and outer appearance may be readily grasped.

Still all these phenomena and objects are but the external cause that allows the aesthetic emotion to manifest itself. There are cases where it emerges without any outward cause. The close connection between emotions and the dynamism of physical phenomena is particularly striking in expressive bodily gestures. Every emotion tends to manifest itself through certain bodily and facial gestures, and conversely, the perception of other persons' expressive movements gives rise, in our soul, to appropriate emotions. Thus in the aesthetic emotion, too, there is a certain feeling of *sympathy*, which brings us closer to other people and plays a huge role in social life. This makes clear the significance of art, and especially drama, for ethical education.

In addition, Burke attempts to explain the physiological ground of the aesthetic emotion: it is a certain pleasing relaxation of the nerves and muscles. In this regard beauty is opposed to our sense of the sublime, which

is caused by objects that amaze us with their greatness or power and which is attended by a straining of the muscles and nerves.

Critically evaluating the views of these English philosophers, we must note that none of them succeeded in creating a systematic and plausible theory of aesthetics that would elucidate the main characteristics of beauty. Nevertheless, in Shaftesbury's, Hutcheson's, Home's, and Burke's writings we find a series of valuable remarks and observations that were used by later theoreticians and especially Kant. The most important of them are as follows: (1) essential to aesthetic impressions is a certain *emotive* coloring that depends on how closely they are related to organic (especially, kinesthetic) sensations; (2) this emotive nature is what distinguishes aesthetic impressions from acts of cognition; on the other hand, these impressions coincide neither with simple (egotistical) emotions nor with the moral sense, even though they have an affinity with the latter in that they are not selfish and not limited to the activity of the will or of the instincts; (3) the aesthetic sense (taste) must be recognized as an independent and original factor of psychical life not to be derived from other phenomena or capacities.

But this subjective conception of beauty faces two invincible objections—in that fails to make clear the following: (1) Where does the objective nature of beauty, as evidenced by its just appearing in the objects themselves, come from (for just remarking that everyone's psychophysical organization is the same is not enough)?; and (2) In what way does the aesthetic emotion differ from pleasure, since the qualities whereby Hutcheson, Home, and the others describe that emotion are in part applicable to other sorts of pleasant feeling as well?

4. The Aesthetics of Kant

These questions were raised and answered by *Immanuel Kant's* theory of beauty, which marked a decisive turn in the development of aesthetics. In his system aesthetics not only becomes a separate philosophical discipline but also acquires a certain autonomy in that the independence of its object and its singular value is clearly grounded by general principles. Beauty is characterized, according to Kant, by three constitutive properties.

The first is as follows: *a thing of beauty arouses a disinterested liking*. "Disinterestedness" is not a lack of interest, for everything that is liked, including beauty, engages and draws our interest. It is a special kind of *mental attitude*, which allows us to grasp the object's value without regard to its relation to our own vital and practical interests or to the demands of morality. In this way the aesthetic liking is distinguished, on the one hand, from all positive moral emotions, and on the other, from all those feelings that issue from the satisfaction of any physical or psychological needs; in other words, it differs from pleasure, i.e., the emotional reaction with which an organism responds to an external impression, as well.

The disinterestedness of aesthetic perception testifies to the autonomous value of beauty; at the same time it marks that perception as a pure way of looking or contemplation. If that is so, we must show how aesthetic contemplation differs from the theoretical outlook. This is done by the second determination of beauty: *a beautiful thing is an object of universal liking without the mediation of a concept*. This means that an aesthetic judgment in which the predicate "beautiful" is ascribed to an object is characterized by universality and necessity just like a theoretical judgment is. It is equally valid for all subjects.

But in the domain of knowledge this universality is based on the concept to which we subordinate the perceived object by applying one or another predicate to it; consequently, we take it to be an instance of a general relation or law. In an aesthetic judgment, by contrast, the determination of beauty is ascribed directly, immediately, without the help of a concept. On what then is its necessity and universality based? This is explained by the third constituve property of beauty: *that object is beautiful which has a purposive form not connected to the idea of purpose*. In other words, the structure of the aesthetic object is teleological. All its elements and parts are organized in such a way that they seem to have a purpose embodied in the object's overall appearance.

Now where a goal is realized it is distinct from the means whereby it is realized. But it is just with respect to the aesthetic object that this distinction fails to hold: the goal coincides with the object itself, i.e., with the individual unity of its form. In this respect the aesthetic object resembles an *organism*, where the whole also governs the relations of the separate organs and parts, and determines their harmony and function.

If the first determination of beauty governs its subjective conditions, i.e., the mind-set that conditions the perception of beauty, then the second and third determinations apparently bring out the objective side of beauty, i.e., the nature of the aesthetic object itself. But since that nature is not based on an objective concept and at the same time exhibits a certain purposive structure, the direct object of aesthetic perception can only be the concrete sensory form (structure) of the object perceived. Hence one would have guessed that the next task for Kant's aesthetics would be to explain and to define more precisely this objective base of beauty. However, the subjectivist position of Kant's epistemology did not allow him to recognize the objectivity of beauty. Objectivity can be warranted only by a priori concepts of reason, the categories. And if the perception of beauty is not mediated by concepts, it cannot be objective. The valuableness of the aesthetic object can be based only on the subject's liking, i.e., a certain *subjective state*. Yet what causes this liking is the object's purposive structure, its fitness for the capacity of knowledge. And since, according to Kant's theory, knowledge of the sensible world depends on two powers of the soul, namely, the productive imagination and reason, the impression of beauty, in his opinion, arises from

the harmonious interaction of these two faculties. But this interaction, although purposive, i.e., favorable for knowledge, nevertheless is not guided by the intention to know; it does not seek the goal of knowledge. Hence it may be characterized as a *free (purposeless) and harmonious play of the knowledge faculties*. Such a description of beauty, to be sure, considerably deviates from the path delineated in the first three determinations. It again moves Kant's aesthetic conception closer to the rationalist view on beauty, which the philosopher had renounced,[90] and at the same time seemingly destroys the autonomy of aesthetics, for that autonomy can be based only on the nature of the aesthetic object itself, i.e., its peculiar objectivity.

The considerations that force Kant to accord a subjective nature to beauty do not flow from an analysis of the phenomenon of beauty; they arise, as already mentioned, from that peculiar understanding of objectivity that is connected with the general idealist bend of Kant's philosophy. Likewise, only systematic considerations can explain why Kant describes beauty as a symbol of moral goodness. In his view, aesthetics must mediate between theoretical and practical philosophy, since beauty, in virtue of its purposiveness, proves that natural phenomena can satisfy the demands of reason and realize in the empirical world the principles of morality (i.e., the autonomy of practical reason).

However, in order to clarify the essence of beauty another question arising in Kant's aesthetics is much more significant. How exactly are we to understand that mediation of concepts which, according to Kant, distinguishes theoretical knowledge from the perception of beauty: is that mediation possible only in judgments that determine the object with the help of a concept, or does it condition all the perceptions of the object's objective significance? Kant apparently, takes the latter view because he draws a strict distinction between *free (freie)* and *dependent (anhängende)* beauty.

The first manifests itself only in the object's sensory form or structure and is not contingent on whether it has or doesn't have some kind of objective significance (for example, an ornament, a harmonious array of colors or lines, a harmonious chord). The second, by contrast, is ascribed to the object only taking into account its conformity to its meaning or function. Only free beauty is a pure aesthetic value; the dependent one is not self-sufficient because its criterion is not the sensible form of the object itself but a certain idea either derived from experience (e.g., the idea of an organism's "normalcy") or determined by moral elements (e.g., the ideal of human beauty).

But if beauty can asserts itself as a self-sufficient value only where its perception does not depend on an object's objective meaning, aesthetic autonomy must be attributed only to those branches of art (such as ornamentation and pure music) for which a non-objective subject suffices. Clearly, having constricted the boundaries of the aesthetic sphere to such an extent, Kant is unable to handle the problem of art and to explain the

peculiarity of art's aesthetic value. The element on which free beauty is based must be equally valid for dependent beauty as well.

Still, these deficiencies do not touch on and negate the most important idea of Kant's aesthetics, namely, that the basis of beauty is the sensory form of the object, a form available to pure contemplation. The entire further evolution of aesthetics gives testimony to the fact that only a development of this principle allows one to highlight and to explain the special and autonomous essence of aesthetic being.

5. Vico

A separate place in the history of aesthetics belongs to the Italian *Giambattista Vico*. He is especially famous for his *Scienza nuova* (1725), in which he attempts to explain philosophically the whole of human history; this, in his view, unfolds in three main phases or epochs. In the first, man is still close to animals; his horizon is limited to present sensory impressions, and his activities are entirely confined to meeting bodily needs. In the second phase, there appears the independent activity of the spirit; man attempts to understand and explain the meaning of his life, the order of the surrounding world, and his own relations with it. But his thought still takes place in the sphere of sensible things; therefore, he is able to grasp and express general thoughts only in the guise of *images* clothed in sensory corporeal form. Thus, in this phase the imagination awakens and takes hold, the original, spontaneous faculty of the spirit whose creativity manifests itself in language, myth, art, and the entire whole world of symbols and images that at the dawn of culture determine man's conception of life. Finally, in the third period, the *rule of reason* sets its seal on man, who in setting himself free from the shackles of sensuality starts developing pure (abstract) thought and creating scientific and philosophical knowledge.

This schema is to be understood not only in a historical but also in a more general and ideal sense. It not only describes how the evolution of humanity really happened but also delineates the three main stages of spiritual life that continuously recur and are represented by different types of individuals and branches of art. What art expresses through visible and audible creations reason expresses through a system of abstract concepts. Imagination and reason differ both in their way of acting and their creations, and cannot substitute for one another. Hence we cannot judge creations of the imagination by the norms appropriate to reason. In contradistinction to rationalism, Vico, by emphasizing the peculiarity and self-sufficiency of the imagination, rightly appreciates the special role of art in human life and thereby opens the way for an autonomous aesthetics.

The aesthetic views of 19th century German idealist philosophy develop under the direct influence of Kant, even though they deviate considerably from his main points. What concerns Schelling, Hegel, and Schopenhauer

first of all is not to analyze the nature of beauty or to ground an autonomous aesthetics but to answer the following questions: What is the meaning of beauty to man's life and to the existence of the universe (cosmos)? And what is the role of aesthetics in the philosophical system? Answering these questions ought to elucidate the essence of beauty as well.

6. German Idealist Aesthetics: Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer

The aesthetical outlook of these thinkers is marked by its *constructive* character. They attempt to derive beauty from its metaphysical (absolute) element which is at the root of their systems and pay much less attention to the analysis of aesthetic phenomena. Whatever the significance and depth of their ideas about the metaphysical origin of beauty, the function of art, and the sources of artistic creativity, their contribution to a scientifically oriented aesthetics based on an investigation of the phenomena of beauty themselves is relatively slight and principally concerns one or another specialized issue of aesthetics. We discussed the merits of these ideas at some length when analyzing the metaphysical significance of beauty; now we will briefly indicate their general features.

F. W. J. Schelling puts the Absolute (God) at the basis of his philosophy. It is the all-inclusive, indestructible unity in which all of the oppositions and differences of being coincide and merge. The Absolute manifests itself in three fundamental potentialities, each of which unfolds the former's essence in its own special way, namely, through nature, human life (the field of morality), and the world of beauty. This third potentiality crowns the being of the universe; it harmonizes and unifies the oppositions inherent in the first two potentialities: the *necessity* predominant in nature with the *freedom* of the moral will, on the one hand, and the unconscious forces of nature with the *consciousness* (rationality) of humanity's historical life, on the other.

All this is well exemplified by the process of artistic creativity, which obeys a certain necessity (inspiration not being at the subject's discretion) and at the same time allows the artist to attain to the highest degree of freedom arising from the depths of the subconscious while still executing the projects of a conscious will. In drawing together philosophy of nature and ethics into a harmonious whole, aesthetics (philosophy of art) tops off the whole system of philosophy. Moreover, the relation of beauty to nature and morality gives us a hint about beauty's unique nature. Since beauty is not a separate part of the Absolute but the potentiality of its whole essence, the idea of beauty as embodied in one or another finite thing (work of art) unfolds in that thing the infinity of the Absolute as well. Hence the embodiment of the idea of the beauty of the sensible world and of works of art is nothing other than the manifestation of infinity in the shape of a finiteness, and this manifestation is available only to the highest organ of

knowledge, *intellectual intuition*. This being so, we can understand that every true work of art (produced by a genius) is *symbolic*. It means more (i.e., the infinite) than it is (a finite thing).

Related to Schelling's aesthetics is the conception of beauty advanced by *G.F.W. Hegel*. In his system, art belongs to that third phase of the dialectical process in which the absolute spirit turns back to itself, i.e., becomes conscious of itself as the absolute subject limited by nothing else and drawing the whole of being into itself. This phase in turn unfolds in three degrees that passing dialectically from one to the other realize and complete the spirit's self-consciousness. In the first degree, the spirit knows itself in sensory form, i.e., the objectified creations of the imagination; in the second, it knows itself in its inner subjective life, which is governed by images; finally, in the third, the spirit's self-consciousness acquires the form of pure thinking, i.e., one which conjoins in itself perfect subjectivity and perfect objectivity. The first degree is represented by art; the second, by religion; the third, by pure philosophy. Thus beauty, according to Hegel, must be conceived as the appearance of the absolute idea in the guise of the sensible and the finite. A work of art is perfect (truly beautiful) inasmuch as it gives the idea an appropriate outer form, i.e., one capable of receiving and expressing the incompleteable content of the idea. In this way Schelling, Hegel and all their successors, following purely systematic considerations, drift away from Kant's position (based on an analysis of the phenomenon) and again move back toward Plato's conception of beauty. Plato's influence is even more evident in *Arthur Schopenhauer*'s aesthetics. He construes aesthetic contemplation as a view of ideas that conceives them as the prototypes of those forms or shapes in which the original element of all being—unconscious will (desire for being)—objectifies itself.

7. The Formalists. Fechner

Having surveyed 19th century German aesthetics until 1870–1880 and evaluated its achievements, we must acknowledge that it did not succeed in surmounting the unclarity contained in Kant's concept of the aesthetic form. Kant rightly observed that the aesthetic impression is based on the object's sensory form or structure. But analyzing the function of aesthetic form he could not avoid the question: How does the form relate to that which it signifies and expresses, i.e., its objective significance and emotive tonality? Kant attempts to answer this question by distinguishing dependent beauty and free beauty and subordinating the former to an entirely different criterion of valuation not depending on form

Nevertheless, in radically setting one kind of beauty against the other, he made it impossible for himself to justify their basic unity and to elucidate the inner connection between them. Thus Kant's theory of beauty splits into two self-determining parts based on utterly distinct principles and criteria, an

aesthetics of pure form and an aesthetics of objective content. Kant's successors try to eliminate this dualism and solve this problem in one of two opposite ways. Some ascribe crucial importance to the objective significance (the content or idea) and regard the sensory form as an external means of realization that is aesthetically neutral and acquires value only insofar as it allows the content (idea) to assert itself. Others, on the contrary, confine the sphere of beauty to pure form and eliminate from aesthetics everything that cannot be derived from the object's formal structure.

Thus, formalistic poetry was especially valued by *J. F. Herbart* and his pupils: beauty, in their view, was determined by the relations among an object's parts or elements. The opposite camp was made up by all representatives of idealist philosophy: Schelling, the Romanticists, Hegel and his disciples, and later *R. H. Lotze*; for them the foundation of beauty lies solely in the object's contentfulness and the ideas therein. The dispute between the formalists and their opponents did not yield fruitful results, mainly for two reasons. Both sides based their aesthetic views on a priori metaphysical positions which they neglected to support with a deeper analysis of the aesthetic phenomena themselves. In addition, the relation of form to content remained unclear and was differently conceived by different philosophers (e.g., Herbart ascribes to form even the relations among non-sensory elements).

Hence it is understandable that the reaction (manifested in the latter half of the 19th c.) against a priori metaphysical constructions made itself felt in aesthetics, too. With the ascendancy of positivism in all branches of philosophy it seemed that only the methods of natural science could guarantee an indubitable accuracy and certainty to philosophy. The first to apply the inductive method to aesthetics was *Gustav Fechner*. In his work *Vorschule der Ästhetik* he maintained that scientific aesthetics is to be created not from *above* but from *below*; i.e., only observations and tests on the conditions and factors affecting aesthetic impressions can elucidate the true nature of beauty. In other words, aesthetics must be treated as a special branch of empirical psychology that investigates the nature and causes of the aesthetic interest. In this field research must start from the simplest facts, since in psychology as in all the other natural sciences complex facts can be understood only from the elementary processes that constitute them.

In approaching this task Fechner first of all tried to ascertain by statistical methods which simple geometric figures and relations of lines are most pleasing to the spectator (for example, symmetrical distribution of lines, elongated quadrangles the length of whose sides is 2 : 1, and similar things). The results of these experiments allow us, in Fechner's view, to formulate those basic laws on which every aesthetic impression depends. They are as follows:

(1) The law of the *aesthetic threshold*: the aesthetic impression depends on the intensity of the excitation which in turn depends on the force of the

irritation itself and on the sensitivity and attention level of the perceiving subject. (2) The law of *aesthetic gradation*: the impression is strengthened by the interaction of two different sorts of irritation. (3) The law of *unity of diversities*: an aesthetic impression is caused only by an object the unity of which corresponds to the diversity of its elements. (4) The principle of *absence of contradictions*, according to which the aesthetic object should contain no inner contradictions. (5) The law of *clarity*: an aesthetic impression arises only in case the principles determining it are objects of clear awareness. (6) The law of *association*, stating that the aesthetic character (coloring) of the object depends not only on its sensible qualities but also on the associations prompted by its appearance.

It must be admitted that the results of Fechner's aesthetic investigations are rather meager. Although the psychological significance of his laws cannot be denied, they are totally insufficient to provide a foundation for aesthetics, since (1) they are equally valid for both aesthetic and non-aesthetic impressions (with the possible exception of the third law); (2) they do not explain the difference between the aesthetic interest and sensory pleasure; and (3) they are based on the erroneous view that a complex impression is but the sum of the elementary impressions constituting it.

8. Contemporary Aesthetic Theories

A. Theories Proceeding from the Art Work (Object)

Nowadays there is a great variety of aesthetic theories in which so many different tendencies and viewpoints intersect and overlap that is very difficult to arrive at a unitary, systematic classification of them that would fully explain their specific differences and reciprocal relations. Almost all theories begin with an analysis of artistic beauty and regard natural beauty as a secondary or even derivative phenomenon of aesthetics. Artistic reality, as we've already indicated, is determined by three factors: (1) the work of art, (2) the subject perceiving it, and (3) the subject creating it. Thus perhaps the easiest way of orientating ourselves in the variety of contemporary aesthetic theories would be to classify them according to which of these three factors they assign the decisive importance to: the work of art, the perceptual act, or the creative act.

The first viewpoint, starting from the beauty embodied in the work of art, tries to find the basis for aesthetics in the *object's structure* itself, which it supposes to determine both the creative and the perceptual acts; that is why it emphasizes the objective significance of aesthetic values. The other two viewpoints, on the contrary, by emphasizing the activity of the perceiving or creating subject, tend towards the subjectivist vindication of aesthetics. Nevertheless, these three viewpoints do not destroy one another and can be variously combined. After all, in aesthetic reality the objective and subjective

moment are closely related: on the one hand, beauty belongs to the object itself and inheres in its very nature; on the other, beauty is not a purely physical property contingent on the object's material constitution or on its relations to other bodies. Beauty can be accessed only by a perceiving and evaluating subject taking up a special attitude of the spirit. Hence, a subjectivistically oriented aesthetics must to some extent take into account the objective side of beauty even as an objectivist aesthetics cannot completely deny the significance of the subjective factor. Consequently, theories of aesthetics can only be divided on the basis of which of these tendencies, the objectivist or the subjectivist, is the predominant one.

Those favoring the first approach assert that aesthetic values in the strict sense lie not in the artist's experiences and intentions but in his work which no longer depends on its creator and speaks for itself. Therefore the true foundations of aesthetics can be ascertained only by analyzing the sensory nature of the object (work of art) itself and the order which brings the elements of that nature into a peculiarly effective objective unity, a unity that "works." If so, the means whereby the creative intention is executed as well as the material in which it is embodied acquire a commanding significance for aesthetics, since the aesthetic elements of one branch of art must essentially differ from those of another branch. And only upon clarifying these regulative principles of the separate branches of art can the aesthetic investigator hope to discover a common aesthetic foundation for all art.[91] To the extent that artistic form is regarded as an object whose structure and regularity are accessible to cognition in the same way that the nature of other sensory phenomena is, objectivist aesthetics tends towards *rationalist formalism*, according to which the emotive moment of beauty is just a secondary consequence and dependent accompaniment of form. The most notable representatives of objectivist or formalist aesthetics in Germany are A. von Hildebrandt, Oskar Walzel (in part), Heinrich Wölfflin, Erwin Panofsky, Paul Frankl, and several other art historians with an interest in aesthetics; in France, they include Etienne Souriau, Henri Focillon, Raymond Bayer.[92]

B. Phenomenological Aesthetics

A separate place is occupied by so-called phenomenological aesthetics, which is represented by *Moritz Geiger*. Following the method of Edmund Husserl, it refuses to explain phenomena from certain subjective or objective principles, limits itself to its accurate description, and on the basis of that description attempts to elucidate their common nature and significance. At the moment phenomenological aesthetics has not yet gone beyond the stage of preparatory analyses.

C. Theories Proceeding from the Perceiving Subject

Until the second half of the 19th c. and the beginning of the 20th, aesthetics was dominated by a view that based beauty on the perceptual act of its perceiving subject. Perhaps the most famous here is F. T. Vischer's, T. Lipps's, and J. Volkelt's empathy theory (*Einfühlungstheorie*), which explains aesthetic values on the basis of the emotive reaction that certain objects evoke in the subject and that he then "objectifies," i.e., transfers to the object itself. Thus the impression of beauty arises from the subject's experiences and his unhindered spiritual and vital activity; the object's contribution is limited to its providing favorable circumstances both for that special emotional state to manifest itself and for that state to acquire the objective form of that object.

Though the empathy theory is essentially purely subjectivist, still it is consonant with a certain objectivity insofar as it recognizes 1. that the object is beautiful just in case it fulfills the requirements of the subject's nature and 2. that through the act of empathy the subject directly experiences the universe's vital phenomena and even merges with them (W. Basch). Varieties of this subjectivist aesthetics depend mainly on whether the decisive moment of beauty is held to lie in those experiences that relate to the object's *content* (its objective significance) or those that arise directly from the perception of the object's sensory form. In the first case aesthetic value is ascribed to those impressions which manifest something that is *significant* to human beings (J. Folkelt). In the second, special attention is paid to the *physiological* ground of aesthetic impressions and attempts are made to explain them on the basis of those stimulations that excite the senses in a purposive way suited to their nature, thereby causing a pleasurable reaction of consciousness. According to this conception, we find beautiful those things or phenomena to which our whole organism reacts in a sonorous response—so that a maximum of excitement is accompanied by a minimum of fatigue (e.g., H. Spencer and G. Allen in England, C. Henry, J. M. Guyau, and others in France).

D. Theories Proceeding from the Creative Subject

But if aesthetic experience is not just a passive inner event, if it is based on a certain perceptual act replete with feelings, then it has affinities to the *creative act*; for in perceiving the art work and delighting in it, the spectator or listener, even if only imperfectly and in a foreshortened way, repeats and re-creates that act which the artist himself executed in creating the work. This is why certain aesthecists believe that the starting point for aesthetics must be the initial creative act. They point out that any stronger excitation on the part of the subject tends to express itself in motions of the body and even acts of creating, and that the way of expressing oneself and its result (the creation) depend on how the subject conceives what he has experienced. According to

this theory, beauty is nothing other than an expression arising out of the subject's inner activity and realizing the images corresponding to his way of feeling. This is the road taken by some neo-Kantians (e.g., H. Cohen, J. Cohn) as well as the Italian B. Croce, who takes up an extreme position: aesthetic creation, in his opinion, ends with that act of the spirit that creates an image in consciousness (intuition), whereas the embodiment of the image in one or another material is just a purely technical and aesthetically speaking neutral action. Others, on the contrary, maintain that the creative intuition is necessarily tied to the act of realization and gets its aesthetic significance only thanks to it (e.g., E. Delacroix).

E. Metaphysical Aesthetics

But the subjectivist aesthetics which bases itself on the experiences of the perceiving subject can also be interpreted metaphysically.

This is the way the impression of beauty is explained by *H. Bremond* and *J. Segond*, who were influenced by the philosophy of Henri Bergson. For them the aesthetic experience is akin to prayer, a religious state that permits man to communicate with something beyond the world of appearances and all conceptual knowledge. But this experience does not depend on the subject's discretion; it arises for him as a demand, as a cry from the depths of being and it affects him not so much through the art work's objective meaning as through its directly perceived stirring quality that is associated with its sensible form. In this way this theory is not far from the objectivist aesthetics that emphasizes the decisive significance of the sensible form.

F. Sociological Theories

There is yet another way to understand the subjective ground of beauty, provided that we acknowledge that the act underlying aesthetic values ultimately depends not on the separate individual but on society, on the social environment that forms the artist's taste and his way of feeling and that determines whether the work created is successful, whether it satisfies the artistic requirements prevailing in that society. And these requirements flow from the desire to obtain interesting and in that respect pleasing impressions that excite man in a way that any game does; these requirements vary as society's interests, aspirations, and its living conditions vary. Hence all aesthetic values are conditional and are valid only for a certain cultural epoch or a certain social group. Moreover, the technique of art is also conditioned by existing social circumstances. This positivist and relativist theory subordinating aesthetics to sociology is represented in France by the school of Charles Lalo and Emile Durkheim.

The sociological position is also upheld by *Nikolai Chernyshevsky*, for whom, just like for *Vissarion Belinsky* earlier, the most important question

was, How does art relate to social reality? Basing himself on Ludwig Feuerbach's anthropological materialism, Chernyshevsky criticizes the idealist aesthetics of Schelling and Hegel; against it he advances the following theses: (1) Even though it differs from man's practical interests, aesthetic satisfaction is not opposed to them and frequently relates to them; (2) Beauty is ascribed to anything that creates the impression of a life form close to the human; (3) Just as life takes precedence over art, natural beauty surpasses artistic beauty; (4) The most object of art is man; the purpose of art is to emphasize whatever is significant and worthy of attention in man's life, i.e., in his interaction with his environment; (5) In representing reality the artist at the same time evaluates it, i.e., declares his attitude towards the phenomena of life. It is on this that the moral significance of art is based.

G. Marxist Aesthetics

Though Chernyshevsky emphasized the importance of art's social role, only *Karl Marx* and *Friedrich Engels* clearly showed that art, just like science and other forms of spiritual culture, is a result of the life and development of society. Art grows out of man's economic activities, his production, and having matured it not only satisfies practical needs but also gains a certain independence. Every successful work of art in turn fosters sensitivity to beauty and stimulates further artistic creativity. Aesthetic taste and art styles change in tandem with changes in the economic and social system; they always express the views or interests of the dominant social group or class. Whenever that class is in decline, the art it creates degenerates. In the social class struggle art is a powerful weapon, which can serve the interests both of the revolution and of the reaction. The socialist order, eventually changing the bourgeois order throughout in the world by revolution, will create a new art, too—one that will embody proletarian ideals of beauty. The content and form of an art work constitute an indissoluble unity and determine one another; in the historical process a new content hits upon an appropriate new form. The social significance of the content (progressiveness) also increases the aesthetic value of the creation.

Marx's and Engels's instructions on issues of aesthetics were developed, on the one hand, by *Georgi Plechanov*, and on the other, by *Vladimir Lenin* and his followers. To the latter the decisive role in the formation of aesthetic taste, and of art itself, is played by social and economic factors, whereas Plechanov, in addition, emphasizes the biological foundation—man's innate sensitivity to rhythm, harmony, and so on.

PART X

THE CLASSIFICATION OF TYPES OF ART

1. The Problem

Aesthetics cannot avoid the question of correctly classifying types of art. Now it is not concerned with a classification guided by just practical considerations of convenience, one marking obvious external similarities and differences; it demands and seeks an aesthetically justified classification of kinds of art that brings out their inner affinity, on the one hand, and the aesthetically significant features of each kind, on the other.

It can scarcely be claimed that so far attempts at a systematic delineation of the arts have been completely successful. Often they have been based on general systematizing or metaphysical rather than aesthetic considerations, or they have been too one-sided. But there is no need to review all of these attempts and criticize them. Using their positive achievements, we will approach the task from a point of view suggested by the fundamentals of the aesthetic theory presented in the preceding chapters. There the main points were briefly as follows.

(1) The justification for a classification of kinds of art must lie in the work of art itself. Its qualities depend, as we have seen, on the manner of realization; on the material in which it is embodied; and on the means with which this embodiment is accomplished. That's why kinds of art have to be distinguished first of all on the basis of the means and material used. (2) This one approach to the problem, however, is not yet sufficient, for a classification must consider not only what separates one art form from another but also what connects them and ensures the oneness of art. But the latter derives from the fact that each work of art is an object of aesthetic perception and has the structure of an aesthetic object. And the main varieties of this structure or its variations in the separate art branches can best be explained by paying attention to (1) how the art work relates to the perceiving subject, i.e., how it appears to him in the aesthetic perception and reveals its aesthetic values; (2) what significance—an objective or non-objective one—is embodied in the work of art; and (3) how the work relates to the real world: does it represent something or doesn't it; is it related to reality essentially or has it just an indirect relation to it? Further analysis should show that these viewpoints are important for clarifying the issue of the art system.

2. The Relation of the Art Work to the Subject. Optical and Acoustic Impressions: Their Difference

The aesthetic object's relation to the subject manifests itself through the aesthetic perception which from the subject's side may be described as a special devotedness to the object. This means that the object comes up against the subject as something independent that affects the subject and commands his sensory attention, totally filling his field of consciousness in such a way that the object's image and all its sensory (formal) values appear with the utmost clarity. Aesthetic devotedness differs from the scientific in that here the distance between subject and object is not so clear and well-defined. In affecting the subject, the object infects it, forces him to enter emotively into its (the object's) inner life and dynamism. The subject's relation to the object becomes especially intimate; in this sense it may be said that in the aesthetic perception there occurs a certain merging of subject and object. Both of these moments are essential to the aesthetic perception and thus determine the aesthetic effectiveness of each work of art. But they do not assert themselves uniformly; and this lack of uniformity depends on the sensory form in which the object appears.

Art objectifies itself in two areas of sensation: vision and hearing. Moreover, it makes use of kinesthetic impressions. But these do not constitute an independent sphere of objectification; they acquire aesthetic import only to the extent they conjoin with optical or acoustic impressions. All other sensations go into aesthetic perception only indirectly, upon the mediation of vision or hearing. Therefore, the qualities of aesthetic perception vary in accordance with whether it is based on impressions of sight or those of hearing and how these connect with kinesthetic data.

In general, visual images are regarded as the normal type of sensory impression, one in which the sensory structure manifests itself most clearly, since it is they that basically determine the appearance of the external world. Nevertheless, a closer look reveals that structurally sensory impressions show great differences between each other.

In the visible world the object of perception stands before the subject as a self-sufficient thing or process. It is clearly separated from the subject, and is situated in a different place. Therefore the subject in devoting himself to the object must display a certain activeness; he must, so to speak, conquer the distance separating him from the object not only by adjusting his eyes to the remoteness but also by keeping in view the contours and lines that define its shape or the movements and changes it undertakes or undergoes. This devotedness reaches its highest degree of tension in an inner or occasionally even outward imitation (mimicking). It is precisely this kinesthetic (motoric) moment that allows the visual image to unfold and at the same time enables the subject to empathize with the object and get infected with the vitality and dynamism embodied in it. He thus responds to the perceived image with

"echoic" feelings. In any case, the basis of visual aesthetic impressions is a clear external image of something, regardless of whether it has or doesn't have an objective significance.

Acoustic impressions are different in character. A *sound (tone*) belongs to the external world, just like a visual image does, and in that sense is objective. On the other hand, it is not a constitutive moment of the external world to the same extent that an image is. It is only a special phenomenon arising out of the thing or process that is not related to the object as closely as are its visible or tangible properties. Although it expands in space, it does not occupy a phenomenally delimited place. The spatial moment is important only for the practical (biological) significance of sound as a means of orientation; from an aesthetic point of view it is not significant. In this way a sound (tone) appears to be something *non-objective* and *non-material*, even though it is physical.

This ties in with another important quality it has: it sounds not only outside us (our body) but inside us, in our ears, as well; a clear distinction between what happens outside and inside vanishes in this case. It is as if the sound penetrated into our interior and forced it to resonate accordingly. This is evidenced by the fact sounds and tones are much more closely connected with organic (interior) sensations than are visual impressions. Recent observations and experiments have shown, moreover, that air vibrations, which are the physical basis for sounds and tones, are picked up not only by the ear, but also by other parts of the body (especially in the chest area) and that these "vibratory" sensations are marked by a certain differentiation that allows even the deaf to apprehend to a certain extent the structure of a piece of music and even to enjoy it. In this case the vibrations are felt by the subject even though they do not turn into sounds. But even a normal person can directly notice the similarity and close connection between vibratory sensations and sounds in certain special cases, e.g., the lowest organ tones. From this it can be seen that there is a certain specific qualitative analogy between air vibrations and its psychical equivalents. Of course, it would be an error to explain the characteristics of acoustic impressions on the basis of their physiological conditions. Still this analogy is significant in that it shows that psychical life, too, knows phenomena that can only be described as *resonant* or *echoic*.

It is to be emphasized that in social life the most effective and flexible means of human communication is sound. What gives it priority over other means is not its semantic meaning—for the auditory sign (the sound) can be replaced by an equivalent visual sign (a letter)—but the special expressiveness and suggestivity of its use in speaking, and these qualities depend on the spoken words' phonetic structure. Speech, in its intonations, dynamics, rhythm, and sonority in general, just like bodily gestures and facial expressions, convey the subject's attitude toward a certain situation; and in that situation the drift of the speech may be gotten even by someone who

doesn't understand the objective meaning of the words. The artistic values of poetic language, as was already indicated, are based especially on its phonetic structure. But it is only in *music* that the expressiveness and effectiveness of sounds manifests itself in an altogether sovereign way, because there they do not signify objective meaning but unfolding all the essential qualities of their nature turn into tones.

Hence it is understandable why music is most frequently described as a pure and artistically treated language of feelings. Such a definition isn't false, just too narrow, for music expresses not only human feelings and emotions in the strict sense of the word; it gives objective form to the most various phenomena of life—and even more: it encompasses all the dynamism of the phenomenal world that evokes in us an inner echo. Here it's interesting to recall how the unique character of music was judged by a few of the most important philosophers.

Kant called music an obtrusive (*aufdringlich*) art, for it imposes itself even on a person who doesn't want to hear it; Kant went so far as to doubt whether this "play with pleasant feelings can be regarded as true art." Hegel put music with romantic art where the idea gets precedence over the sensory form in which it is realized. Music, in his mind, stands midway between painting and poetry. It is more spiritual than painting since it renounces pictoriality; on the other hand, it holds no candle to poetry which works entirely with images of the imagination not sensorily realized. In Schopenhauer's aesthetics music takes up a totally separate place. All other art forms represent one or another degree of the will's objectification, i.e., in them the essence of the world is reflected indirectly, with the degrees of objectification (ideas) mediating. Only in music does the will manifest itself directly, immediately. Hence the world of music constitutes an independent sphere that could exist even in case the world based on the will's objectifications ceased to exist.

Although these philosophers conceive and judge music very differently, they appeal to roughly the same features of music that we singled out above. In calling music an obtrusive art, Kant evidently has in mind that quality common to all acoustic sensations in virtue of which it is much more difficult to avoid or evade them than it is visual or tactual sensations. At the same time he means to point out the extraordinary power of music's psychological effect and infectiousness, which even an unwilling subject cannot resist. And what about the spirituality of music so emphasized by Hegel? Well, the thing-related objectivity of visible images is indeed alien to the world of tones, and it is just this feature that makes the world of tones so kindred to man's inner life and gives it a special intimacy. Finally, Schopenhauer explains music's extraordinary suggestivity by pointing to its exceptionally close tie to the dynamism of the will and of feelings, and by radically opposing it to the whole world of phenomena, which is based on the data of looking and touching.

Although this conception is one-sided and unjustifiably separates music from the other arts, it does highlight some essential and aesthetically significant features of it: its immateriality, its affinity to the life of the interior (intimacy), and its special suggestiveness (i.e., its ability to stimulate echoic feelings). These specific features, as we saw, depend on the nature of tones, i.e., in that sensory sphere in which music is realized. Hence the classification of kinds of art must first of all take into account the essential difference between those kinds that transform auditory material and those that transform visual images. To the first group belong music and poetry (insofar as language is made up of sounds); to the second, all forms of the fine arts, architecture, choreography, silent cinematography, etc. This difference is not just superficial; it is based on the aesthetic properties of two groups of art forms. At the same time it recognizes the unity of art and doesn't split it into two completely different parts. For in regard to the aesthetic impression, music and poetry, on the one hand, and all the other art branches, on the other, do not differ in characteristics that the first group has and the second lacks, but they differ principally with respect to which moment of aesthetic perception has the greater weight and the decisive significance for that group: is it the subject's devotedness to the objective item standing before him, or is it the object's penetration of the subject, its conquest of him and its making him resonate in tune with it? Thus, the difference isn't absolute but relative. Neither fine art nor architecture is lacking in suggestive effectiveness and infectiousness, but this moment is subordinated to the contemplation of the self-sufficient outward object. Similarly, the suggestiveness of music does not prevent the structure of the composition from being conceived as something objective and independent.

3. Spatial and Nonspatial Forms of Art

The materiality and thinglikeness of an aesthetic object is inseparable from its spatiality. Therefore we will get the same division of art types if we classify them into *spatial* and *nonspatial* forms.

Music has nothing to do with space (in the exact sense of that word). But for poetry, too, spatiality has no constitutive significance, first of all because the material it processes, language, has no extension. Furthermore, even in those cases where it portrays things going on in space what matters for aesthetic perception is not the spatial image itself but only the intention directed towards it and conjoined with the words.

This division, of course, is not identical with a distinction between *spatial* and *temporal* types of art, for the temporal moment does not coincide with lack of a spatial one. The difference is only that for the group represented by music the temporal moment is essential and necessary. Combinations of sounds and tones can emerge and unfold their aesthetic structure in time alone. Visual images, on the contrary, can be at rest just as easily as in

motion. Therefore, spatial forms of art divide into two groups depending on whether the temporal moment does or does not determine the art work. But even in the case of fine art (sculpture and painting) and architecture, their independence from time can be acknowledged only subject to a certain condition. Though pictures, ornaments, statues, and buildings are *objectively static, subjectively* their aesthetic perception occurs in time, and this subjectivity often has an objective foundation; for example, when a building yields an aesthetic image only by virtue of temporally successive impressions gained from traversing its parts one after the other. In this case the very structure of the work and its spaciousness require its aesthetic perception to unfold in time. In other words, the opposition of temporality and atemporality cannot be the main basis for grouping types of art.

Nonetheless this doesn't mean that that the temporal moment is of no fundamental importance to the system of art. On the contrary, it is that factor which establishes an inner connection among different kinds of art. Wherever art creations are realized by motion, the temporal moment determines their common structural schema; the rhythm and dynamic changes of the motion are those formal components that allow the musical tones to combine with words or spatial images to make up a certain compositional unity. Since these formal components also include a certain emotive tonality (mood), the coming together of music with poetry, drama, dance, or cinematography is not based on just an external harmonization of distinct phenomena, but grows out of a creative endeavor common to both. Needless to say, different branches of art can be tied together only within certain limits, since the structure of each art depends not only on those moments that it shares with others but also on those that are peculiar to it. Thus not every piece of music is fit for dancing or expressive gestures. And the difficulties which opera sometimes faces are due to the fact that the music's dynamism and flow of motifs cannot always be reconciled with the thrust and progress of corresponding actions or events in the libretto.

To the extent that rhythmic and dynamic elements are embodied in static works of art, even painting, sculpture, and architecture have an affinity with artistic creations that unfold essentially in time: after all, a purely spatial rhythm and dynamism may reveal, to some subject potentially delighting in it, a temporal moment. That is why architecture is not infrequently compared to music (and called "frozen music"). Yet this affinity is not so essential and decisive that it could bring these two art forms into a compositional unity.

4. Objective and Nonobjective Forms of Art

Thus the important difference existing between optical and acoustical impressions allows us to divide art creations into two groups that differ considerably with respect to aesthetic perception. This division, as we saw, coincides with another that pits spatial art forms against non-spatial ones.

Music, on the one hand, and fine art (sculpture, painting), on the other, show this opposition most clearly. There is another, no less important difference, that intersects with it, namely the one that distinguishes between *objective* (*thing-related, subject-possessing*) and *non-objective* (*non-thing-related, subject-lacking*) forms of art. Though, when talking about the latter, we first of all have music in mind, it is possible for fine art (spatial art) to lack a subject as well; for example, all of the ornamentation that limits itself to abstract geometric motifs or to agreeable combinations of colors. Furthermore—and this is an extremely important point—in subject-possessing art, too, the aesthetic value connected with the objective meaning of the creation is based on a non-thing-related foundation, namely, that purely sensory beauty of the composition (the worked-upon material) which is usually dubbed the *formal* aspect of the work of art. From this it is clear that the opposition between objective and non-objective art forms is conditional (relative) and leaves room for transitional forms: e.g., in poetry the euphony and immediate expressiveness of the words can overshadow their objective meaning, and in painting a certain objective shape can become an element in a composition lacking a subject.

Still it is no accident that it is precisely in music that non-objective art reaches complete independence and its highest degree of rousing power. This can be understood only if we keep in mind the non-material nature of the world of sounds (tones) on account of which its relation to things appears inessential and superficial, on the one hand, and its particularly intimate connection to man's inner emotional life which is by nature non-objective, on the other. That's why music provides the best explanation of what the *non-objectiveness* of an artistic creation amounts to aesthetically and of how that non-objectiveness relates to objectiveness.

Music is non-objective: this means that it doesn't represent (portray) anything and has no objective intention, as, for example, language does. But it doesn't mean, of course, that it lacks content or meaning. Every musical theme (motif) or phrase is a structure perceived as a unified whole that expresses something. Thus it is both expressive and significant. Yet even though each such theme or phrase is a concrete and fully determinate combination, we can only approximately and indistinctly describe what it expresses: perhaps some kind of a mood or excitation, some vital attitude or mode of action, a certain dynamism of events or phenomena. This is so because for thinking well-definedness is inseparable from objectivity, from objective significance.

Hence it is clear why non-objective being (everything that is dynamic and only felt) acquires a definition only in connection with the objective situation or objective circumstances in which it is manifest. Otherwise put, the meaning of a musical composition is not defined with respect to objective significance; it allows itself to be interpreted in various objective ways and can accommodate itself to diverse images. Therefore, musical significance is

distinguished by a certain *generality* and in this respect can be compared to a *concept*, which also can be realized in different ways in different cases. But this affinity, although significant, should not be exaggerated, for upon closer inspection it is evident that the relation of music to its objective interpretations essentially differs from the way a general concept relates to the concrete instances realizing it.

After all, (1) a concept, being general, is essentially *abstract*. It becomes concrete and individual only in those separate cases that realize it. A work of music (and each of its motifs and phrases) is concrete, individual, and directly grasped by the sense of hearing. (2) Every concept is *objective* in nature. Its content is grasped as an independent object analogously to a thing. The transition from genus to species to concrete instances proceeds by the concept's general features differentiating into more specific and contentful properties. Thus the individualization of a concept begins and ends within the limits of the objective sphere. But when music is explained with words or pictures, there is not just a passage from one way of perceiving to another (from auditory impressions to visual images or thinking in symbols) but the non-thing-related meaning of music is replaced by a definite objective significance; the direct perception of the dynamism and its emotive tonality is supplanted by a picture of that situation or process, a picture in which that dynamism and tonality can manifest itself. (3) The abstractness of the concept suggests that its independence is only derivative, created as it is by thought proceeding on the road of abstraction. Therefore it has objective significance only to the extent that the real phenomena (facts) on which it is based can be indicated directly or indirectly.

The meaning and aesthetic value of a musical work, by contrast, depends not at all on any objective representation of it. It is sufficient onto itself, and it manifests itself fully each time it is performed in one or another way. One can understand it and take pleasure in its artistry without any object-related images arising in the subject's consciousness and explaining the work of music. Its aesthetic value is entirely independent of any capacity it might have to arouse motoric, optical, or any other kind of image. Such images never reside in the musical composition itself; they spring from the internal excitation with which music infects the subject delighting in it. And every psychic agitation tends to express and objectify itself and hits upon that form of expression or objectification that best fits the subject's individuality and the state in which he finds himself.

Everything that has been said of music can be applied, *mutatis mutandis*, to other types of non-objective types art, for instance, ornamentation. Of course, in those that deal with space the non-objectivity of the artistic composition is not as evident as it is in music, for we are always inclined to associate any spatial form with the shape of an "object." Nevertheless, it cannot be doubted that the so-called "formal" beauty of line and color compositions, just like the euphony of language (words), is of a non-

objective nature: it is, in the words of Kant, "free" and not dependent on what the thing means.

Now it just remains to explain why the contrast between non-objective and objective beauty is relevant to the problem of classifying types of art. First of all it shows that aesthetic being coincides with neither the sphere of things or phenomena in which man's practical activities take place nor with the ideal sphere of concepts delimited by thought. It also includes that which has no definite objective significance (and in that respect is not rational).[93] This bears special emphasis in view of recurrent efforts to explain the essence of art on the basis of purely rational elements by claiming that an artistic creation's value either derives from some idea embodied in it or depends on the rational regularity of its structure (for example, the mathematical relations of its parts or elements). Even more important is the fact that this non-rational moment not only is something permissible for art but also has decisive significance for it. For it not only makes possible the existence of non-objective art forms (for example, music) but also grounds the aesthetic effectiveness of those art works that are characterized by a definite objective significance. Keeping in mind that an art work's non-objective significance is associated with its sensory peculiarity, its directly perceivable sensory structure, it must be acknowledged that the strongest aesthetic impressions are born in those layers of the psyche that are directly tied to organic (corporeal) vitality and the dynamism of which we usually are not aware of. Nevertheless this connection between aesthetic experiences and organic processes has so far not been extensively investigated, and only further, closer research will throw more adequate light on it.

In any case, it is only by taking account of the non-objective significance of an aesthetic object that we can understand why there sometimes appears an unexpected affinity between two totally different works of art and why artistic creativity of one kind can sometimes resonate in that of another kind (let us say, poetry in music or painting, and vice versa). An example of this is provided by the paintings of Čiurlionis; as we indicated earlier, not only are they filled with a musical mood but they resemble a musical composition by their very structure.

5. Representational and Nonrepresentational Art

Finally, it is important for aesthetics that art either represents (depicts, portrays) something or creates entirely independent objects to which nothing in reality corresponds. The first group of art forms may even be called *imitative*, for here only that is re-created which does or can exist in reality. Whether this is actually existing, or only imagined, reality, has, as was pointed out earlier, no significance. We must only bear in mind that, in art, "imitation" doesn't mean copying and than an intention towards verisimilitudinous objectivity in no way hampers artistic creativity. This

distinction between imitative and non-imitative art does not coincide with a division of art into objective and non-objective forms. Although every imitative art is objective by nature, not every objective form belongs to the imitative group. For instance, works of architecture, and most artifacts as well, have a definite objective significance yet do not represent anything. In this respect architecture is closer to music than sculpture and representational art are, even though, on the other hand, architecture differs essentially from music in that an architectural composition is adapted to a practical goal which determines its objective significance. Hence non-imitative art can be divided into two groups: one that associates a work of art directly with practical life and another that creates a unique world not dependent on practical interests. The first is represented by architecture; the second, by music.

Nevertheless, it must be admitted that even these two bases of division (the opposition of imitative and non-imitative art, and the opposition of an art depending and an art not depending on a practical purpose) are not so categorical that they would split types of art into two radically different groups. We can only speak of a *dominant* direction (tendency) characteristic of one or the other kind of art. Thus music can exhibit imitative moments as well (e.g., Beethoven's *Pastoral Symphony* or Honegger's *Pacific 231*); these are widely used in so-called *program* music, which associates its themes with a certain objective content. Music can be accommodated to certain purposes of existence or life, especially when it is associated with poetry (for example, church or martial music).

On the other hand, architecture, too, can distance itself somewhat from its tectonic tasks and highlight ornamental values (e.g., the so-called "flaming" Gothic style or medieval Georgian architecture). However, all such deviations in one or the other direction cannot exceed a certain measure and totally overwhelm the main tendency of that art; for then it would cease to be what it is by nature and lose its specific aesthetic value. An architectural work is first of all a building, tower, bridge, and so on, and only upon fulfilling its function it can also have, say, an ornamental significance. Or music, in imitating real noises or sounds, refashions (stylizes) and adapts these imitative motifs to the general essential structure of music pieces. Even when it is associated with an objective theme music must be expressive in purely musical terms.

Similarly in poems the main (dominant) role may be assigned to the euphony and expressiveness of the sounds themselves—so that the objective meaning of the words is somewhat overpowered and subdued. Nevertheless language does not thereby become just an ordered sequence of pure sounds; it retains its syntactic structure as well as a certain objective significance, even if it is less clear and defined. Finally, one more example is provided by choreography. In the beginning, dances (for example, martial, sexual, and other types) re-created certain significant actions. Later the rhythmic orderliness and dynamic expressivity of the motions themselves gained

precedence, demoting the dance's objective significance to secondary importance. Nowadays the first type is represented by so-called expressive and pantomimic dances, and the second type by choreographic forms of classical ballet as well as by acrobatic dances.

Thus we see that in specific works of art representational and non-representational forms continually intermingle and merge together. Nevertheless, the difference between these two forms is aesthetically significant insofar as representation brings a new qualification to the art work's structure and in this way determines the act of aesthetic perception. This is also shown by the fact that in imitative art the problem of aesthetic truth acquires a distinctive significance and that here artistic creativity must satisfy not only purely immanent conditions but also those set by the representative intention.

This is all we can say about the viewpoints that, in our estimation, are especially important for the determination of the general system of art. A more detailed classification can be arrived at only by considering the material that each separate art branch works on and the techniques it uses.

Notes

1. His views on aesthetics are discussed more fully in Part IX, Chapter 2, Section B.
2. It must be observed that similar difficulties are encountered by psychology. After all, introspection, which alone has direct access to our inner experiences, is based on an attitude of consciousness that allows the subject to view the on-going psychical processes from the side; this not only destroys the immediacy of the intuited experiences (emotions, feelings) but also, in part, impedes or changes their course.
3. We will return to this issue in Part IV, Chapters 1 and 2.
4. It should be remembered that in the exact sciences (e.g., geometry and theoretical physics) genetic definition and the genetic method of explanation (construction) play an important part.
5. Articles on art history often present quite a bit of information on the artist's biography, his life circumstances, and so on, but they give no indication of the influence these facts might have had on his creativity or on the formation of his style. Needless to say, such biographical tidbits are quite useless for the purposes of aesthetics and the aesthetic appraisal of art works.
6. But it should be observed that the aforesaid does not warrant the conclusion that pleasure has nothing to do with beauty. In fact, pleasure often goes into the impression of beauty as a moment belonging to the aesthetic object's structure. After all, pleasure, too, has its objective foundation: it is the aptness of the sensory impression for man's psychophysical nature. Just as an instrument tuned in a certain way responds to the sounding of appropriate tones, so do specific nerve centers (e.g., visual, aural) respond in the form of sympathetic excitation to outer excitations received through the appropriate receptor organs. It is this harmony between external stimulation and internal excitation that apparently gives rise to the feeling of pleasure, at least in those cases where, as in hearing and vision, the dedicated nerve apparatus is especially sensitive, and attuned, to structural excitations. In virtue of such a structuredness pleasant impressions have something in common with beauty.
7. It is those kinds of cases that often give rise to illusions as well.
8. All of the phenomena (processes and things) that determine the structure of the external world are either visible or tangible or both visible and tangible. By contrast, the noise that accompanies a certain process or the sound that is emitted by this or that object turns out to be but an accidental phenomenon that might not have occurred at all.
9. But even in those cases where the song developed differently and its primary element was perhaps constituted by the words, the melody of the

song answers not to the meaning of the text but to the rhythmic and melodic characteristics of the words.

10. To be sure, we do speak of the beauty of individual colors, lines, and tones; consequently, it seems, even simple (homogeneous) elements can be bearers of aesthetic value. Nevertheless we must bear in mind the following: (1) Colors, tones, lines aren't totally simple elements: they consist of different qualities that can vary almost independently from one another and relate in various ways (e.g., a color's purity, brightness, saturation; a tone's pitch, color, purity, intensity; the degree of a line's curvature, its thickness or thinness, etc. (2) Those aesthetic values that depend on the just-mentioned color, tone or line qualities rise to prominence only in relation to other such simple elements (or to a certain background). (3) Hence it is hardly possible to isolate a certain tone, color or line entirely from the environment in which its aesthetic value manifests itself.
11. Of course, this doesn't mean that the artist must use and actualize all the components that may belong to the object's structure. Often the composition is based on a certain abstraction and limits itself to the molding (processing) of just one or two components, leaving the others unaffected (for example, in a drawing colors carry no structural weight).
12. Let's say that the following things must be clear and explicit: the contours of the figures; the interior modeling of their bodies and limbs; the perspective, that is to say, the perspectival diminution of things and distances and the deviation of lines going towards the deep; the crisscrossing of objects belonging to distinct planes, the clash of light and shadows, and so forth.
13. Of course, in the experience of the perceiving subject we can distinguish the object toward which the perceptual intention is directed from the subject's reaction to the impression received. This reaction, however, is not merely emotional; it can also assert itself in certain associations of thoughts or images, desires, motions, etc. But all this on no way affects the object perceived and its aesthetic value. On the other hand, the emotive moment coloring the subject's experience is twofold: one describes the state or mood of the subject; the other lies in the object itself and in this sense is *objective*. It alone is essential to the aesthetic impression and determines the subject's emotive reaction, but only if the perception itself is governed by the aesthetic attitude of consciousness.
14. There are cases where the subject transposes his mood into the surrounding world when, for instance, everything that he perceives appears sorrowful or joyful to him just because he himself feels sad or happy. But these cases are clearly distinct from those where the *object itself* (a face, a natural sight, a melody) radiates a certain emotion or mood.

15. The theory of analogy is somewhat suited only for expressive sounds (*Lautgebärde*). I hear the varieties of my vocal intonations and intensity just as I do another person's voice.
16. Vitality is here understood in the broadest sense, encompassing everything that in the external world directly affects the organism and causes it to react one way or another. Whether this effect is caused by living or non-living nature is unimportant for the initial direct impression and does not determine it.
17. After all, real motions, being contingent on the interaction of different forces, transpire almost without exception along curved lines.
18. He takes those signs not as determinations of certain objects but as references to one or another mode of action.
19. For example, one can feel sorry for another person only by to some extent feeling his pain. But my pity is only my "I's" response to that pain and doesn't coincide with it.
20. It should be mentioned that Leo Tolstoy, in his study *What is Art?*, explains the effect of art in terms of "psychic infection."
21. i.e., psychically "preserve" itself
22. That is why, in the words of the famous Russian actor and stage-director Konstantin Stanislavski, an actor's task on stage can be described not in nouns but only in verbs.
23. Its relative, aesthetic sense will be explained below.
24. Of course, material that is unformed (a piece of marble, an array of dots in a plane) can also be called a totality insofar as it conceived as a unity. But in that case the form of a totality only has a subjective foundation (e.g., the figures of the fixed stars in astronomy) or it is based on the spatial limitation of the material. In either case, the basis of the totality is not its objective inner order and thus it lacks determinateness of form.
25. The structural type can be symbolized by the algebraic formula:

    $$S \begin{matrix} a & x \\ b & y \\ c & z, \end{matrix}$$

    where a, b, c.... are the invariable structural moments on which the typical order of the structure's elements depend, whereas x, y, z ... are the variable moments determining the various ways of concretization.
26. If it did vanish, then the concept of form, too, would lose any and all aesthetic significance, since form and matter are correlative, and where there is no matter there can be no question of form, either.
27. To be sure, in a culture-rich environment these impressions of beauty may also be generated by works of art (music, poems, bed-time stories, drawings, etc.) that affect a child's soul from its earliest years.
28. In addition, it should be mentioned that the spread of landscape painting was much abetted by a new oil painting technique discovered in the Renaissance, a technique that enabled a more accurate and more perfect

depiction of the atmosphere and its varieties arising from the influence of light and distance.

29. Of course, a suitable environment can bring organic beauty to the fore and strengthen its effect; still, it does not determine or ground its essence.
30. The question may be raised of whether in recognizing the diversity of ideals of beauty we are not sliding towards aesthetic relativism. This problem will be discussed in the sequel.
31. Herein we have a hint of why apes usually don't appear beautiful to us. On account of their similarity to humans we unconsciously apply to them a human criterion of beauty; i.e., one that by their very nature they cannot satisfy.
32. The way one feels physically is, of course, to a certain extent associated with impressions afforded by works of representational art, but in those cases the feeling is much less intense because it is secondary and only re-creates the impressions aroused by the beauty of real objects.
33. Groos supplemented and improved Spencer's theory first of all by pointing out that the play instinct performs a highly important function conducive to the preservation of animal species: it builds bodily strength, agility, and resistance, as well as the psychological qualities so essential in the struggle for existence. Nevertheless, this function of play does not at all explain its relation to art.
34. In Europe, polyphony most likely emerged in the Middle Ages (12^{th}–13^{th} c.) from folk music. Its earliest traces are to be found in England in the so-called *fauxbourdon*, feast songs that had the form of *canons*. One voice begins the song, after a few measures a second voice enters, then a third, both repeating the same melody at a certain definite interval (a third or a sixth). But the elements of polyphony are already at hand in certain instruments used in medieval folk music, namely, the organistrum (a string instrument) and the bagpipe (Dudelsack, musette); the latter is an inflatable goatskin with several pipes, one of which leads with the melody to the accompaniment of the others univocally repeating a certain lower tone (bass). Originating in folk music, polyphony gradually entered ecclesiastical music, too, where it acquired a different form. The basis of multivocal singing is the so-called *cantus firmus*, i.e., a certain sacred melody sung by a middle (tenor) voice, while the second, higher voice (or two of them) repeat(s) this melody, supplementing it with figurations, or improvise(s) another melody separated from the other by intervals of a fourth or fifth. The further development of polyphony was decisively influenced by the introduction of the mensural system of musical notation, on the one hand, and the establishment of rules for harmonic intervals, on the other. In this way the contrapuntal (*punctus contra punctum*) structure of polyphony emerged; this structure became predominant in the 16^{th} c. and particularly flourished in the Netherlands.

35. Artistic (aesthetic) truth is not identical with theoretical (scientific) truth. See Part VIII, Chapter 3.
36. The same apples to children's' "creations," their way of speaking, and so forth. The fact that their language is full of metaphors and analogies unusual for adults is due not only to the circumstance that children are first of all impressed by the very sensory form of the object but also by the fact that the aspects under which a thing, process, or event appears to them are less contentful than adults' perceptions and thus allow children to associate things that appear quite unrelated and incommensurate to adults.
37. This is the principal mistake in the aesthetics of Benedetto Croce.
38. The synthetic nature of perception is particularly well attested to by *binocular vision*. Although the right and the left eye each perceives a separate image and these images do not completely coincide even when the axes of both eyes are parallel, in the subject's consciousness there nonetheless appears just one image situated in the middle of the two images perceived by each eye separately. And only the merging of both of these images into one affords the latter a certain depth (relief-like quality). This synthetic act forming the sensory perception is based on man's psychophysical structure and is related to the synthesis that fuses various animal movements into one purposive, instinctive action. The difference is only that in the latter case the synthesis takes place over a certain interval of time, whereas in perception it is instantaneous.
39. One of the methods used by experimental psychology to study the activity of the imagination is based on an analysis of the contribution of the imagination toward the formation of the sensory perception. The subject is shown a series of randomly colored patches and combinations of patches obtained by aimlessly splattering a piece of paper with ink or dye, and he is asked what he sees and what, in his opinion, those patches represent. In these experiments the investigator evaluates (1) the frequency of an answer; (2) the reaction time; (3) the factor determining the perception (interpretation) of the impression received: is it the shape of the patches, or their color, or certain kinesthetic sensations?; (4) whether the subject perceives (gives meaning to) the totality of the drawing or just this or that part; (5) what it is that he sees, what content he finds in the picture. These experiments show that the answers vary extensively and that it can be determined from them whether the subject's imagination is disciplined or not; whether it is directed primarily to the outer world or the subject's interior; whether the subject's way of perceiving is active or passive; whether he is capable of concentrating on one object or tends or his attention tends to wander; and whether his reservoir of associations is rich and contentful, and so on.
40. Hence the functional satisfaction accompanying and encouraging the creative process reaches its highest degree not upon the completion of the

work but at the time of inspiration, i.e., at those moments when the artist actually envisages that method of representation that promises to result in an adequate execution of his idea.

41. See his *Essai sur l'emagination creatrice*, Paris, 1990.
42. In what ways a natural language differs from other conventional symbols will be explained below.
43. For example, the canvas and the paint in painting; marble and granite in sculpture; and so on.
44. And that mans taking style as the supreme element that determines the entire artistic composition (its formal and material side). From all that has been said it clearly emerges that stylization is nothing other than artistic symbolization *representation) based on abstracting.
45. Compare this with what has been said about optical metaphors in Nikolai Worobiow's work *M. K. Čiurlionis, der litauische Maler und Musiker* (Kaunas and Leipzig, 1938).
46. See K. Bühler*, Sprachtheorie*, Jena, 1934.
47. The psychology of feelings reveals especially clearly that the atomistic conception is inadequate to the nature of psychical life and cannot be applied to it. Every feeling has a *meaning*. That meaning depends, on the one hand, on its relation to our "I" and our body and, on the other, on its relation to the surrounding world (both real and ideal). It is only these relations that determine the specific character of the feeling and its function in psychic life even in those cases where it has no definite intentionality and its subjective and objective meaning is not consciously recognized by the subject. As soon as we isolate the feeling and disregard its connection with the whole outer and inner situation that obtains, it loses its peculiar character and turns into a random complex of pleasant or unpleasant organic sensations (for example, the qualitative difference between sensory pleasure and aesthetic satisfaction disappears, and so on).
48. It is worth mentioning that it is precisely classical poetry (for instance, Horace, Goethe, Schiller, Pushkin, and others) that not only does not avoid such generality (abstractness) in representation but actually makes use of it as a special means of lyric expressiveness.
49. Thus economics, according to historical materialism, is the basis of all culture. This, however, does not mean that specific attributes of aesthetic being can be derived from people's social and economic relations, or that aesthetic values are determined by economic ones. Such a simplified sociologism would contradict dialectical materialism, which acknowledges that each special sphere of being is governed by its own specific regularity (for example, organic, psychic, aesthetic being, and others).

50. In our times, the means of communication and shipping having much improved, this circumstance is not as important as it was in antiquity or medieval times.
51. The significance of the social environment is correctly emphasized by Marxism, pointing out as it does that the ideologies of social groups or classes put their seal on an artist‘s creative work.
52. In talking about the way of seeing or hearing we have in mind not only the accuracy and perfection of the eye and ear, but also the perceptual act these organs give rise to, an act that selects what is aesthetically expressive.
53. Of course, this originality may be greater or lesser, more profound or less so.
54. The emergence of a new style can, of course, be caused by new practical or technical challenges (e.g., in architecture). Nevertheless, an aesthetically valuable response to the challenge is impossible if the artist has not perceived or discovered one or the other aesthetic aspect inherent in the new manner of composition.
55. See A. E. Brinckmann, *Spätwerke großer Meister*. Here the author throws light on the qualities of the style of old age by analyzing the later works of Michelangelo, Titian, Rembrandt, and Beethoven.
56. This is understandable in view of the exceptionally important role that language plays in human imagination and thinking.
57. To be sure, classicism and romanticism in poetry and music seem to be different, self-sufficient styles rather than different phases of the same style. Yet there is a certain *inner* connection between them. It is not by accident that, for example, in German poetry and music romanticism supplants classicism and that in mature classicism certain romantic elements emerge (i.e., in Goethe‘s poetry and Beethoven‘s music). It should also be remarked that we find something akin to baroque or romantic style in the later poetry of Ancient Greece (its Hellenistic period).
58. A thing’s purely optical image is under normal circumstances—except for distant flat images—always the result of a certain abstracting and taking up of an artificial attitude, since in practical life images of things emerge upon the supplementation of vision with inputs from other senses.
59. In his *Altersstufen der Kunst*, Riga, 1929.
60. Peculiar, for example, to the positive sciences or technology.
61. Of course, the sphere of beauty also cannot admit such phenomena that injure the senses and, in general, are incompatible with their physical parameters.
62. It is interesting to note that basing themselves on the fact that the aesthetic experience is both “closed“ to real life intentions and detached from historical time, which is the foundation of real human existence, the adherents of existentialist philosophy see in art a certain sign of

decadence. Cf. J. Pfeiffer, *Das lyrische Gedicht als ästhetisches Gebilde*. 1931, S. 112–113.

63. The unselfishness of aesthetic sympathy and its affinity to altruistic moral sensibility was correctly called attention to by several 18th c. English philosophers (see Part IX, Chapter 3).
64. Therefore the pursuit of purely selfish goals cannot be the basis for a truly tragic conflict.
65. Let us recall once more that the neutralization or idealization of feelings in aesthetic contemplation does not depend on whether the object itself is actual or only imagined. A similar neutralization takes place when one is aesthetically looking at a real thing or event. What is crucial here is only the subject's frame of mind.
66. To be sure, it is inappropriate to talk here about "satisfaction" in the literal sense of the word. What's at stake here, to be more precise, is a certain sense (feeling) of value in response to the significance of the tragic action. And it's the object itself that in this case determines and causes the quality and depth of that feeling. Not everything that attracts and overtakes us pleasant.
67. Of course, the significance here can be non-objective.
68. It is no accident that works of art (particularly, poetry and music) have often been powerful motors of revolutionary movements.
69. We shall discuss the problem of the truth of art later (see Part VIII, Chapter 3).
70. This view survived in Christian philosophy as well. Compare St. Augustine's thought that "Satan, too, in so far as he exists, participates in the good."
71. The "aesthetic viewpoint" here means that a certain thing enters into an artistic composition not just as its necessary element but that it itself, as the bearer of a certain objective meaning, is an embodiment of beauty. In other words, here beauty is understood in a *narrower* sense as well (e.g., as the beauty of a human being.) In general, the difference between an idealist and a realist style is clearly evident only in representational art, since it has to do with only that facet of composition that is determined by the objective significance of the object.
72. The mountain giving birth to a mouse. The cheated cheat, or tiny causes and huge results. The fool pretending to be a wise man.
73. Cf. the critique of Bergson's theory of comicality found in K. S. Laurila's pamphlet *La theorie du semique de M. Henri Bergson*, Helsinki, 1929.
74. That's why, in Bergson's opinion, comicality is a matter of pure intellect (i.e., one unaffected by feelings). This is also how Schopenhauer understands comicality. But this applies only to a certain kind of comicality (wittiness).
75. Wit in this sense is opposed to *parody*, which, in disclosing a new aspect of the object, cancels and brings to naught the significance usually

ascribed to it (for example, nobility is turned into banality). Yet parody, too, can help ascertain the truth if it shows that the value or significance ascribed to the object is only spurious.

76. Similar phenomena can also be observed in Sts. Peter and Paul church in Vilnius.
77. Compare K. Stanislavskis, *Aktoriaus saviruoša*, Kaunas, 1947, p. 361–416.
78. Such art works can be related to their environment only in the sense of being fitted into it for decorative purposes. But even in this case they do not lose their independent aesthetic value.
79. "Generalizing" or "typifying" a concrete image is possible only because it is taken out of its real-world connections and embodied in a material which either has nothing in common with the *real* nature of the object (in sculpture, painting, or poetry), or at least has no real necessary connection with the image itself (in choreography or acting). Because of this the image becomes independent and acquires an "ideal" or, in other words, a typical, generalized meaning.
80. This fact that the metaphor of "depth" serves to characterize a special objective and emotive significance is not accidental: the metaphor is based on the primary, ordinary sense of the word in which the spatial moment is emotively energized and associated with a certain value judgment. Thus, for example, "deep" is applied to things that are 1. inexhaustible (such as a well) or full of content; 2. filled with mystery and inaccessible to, or not comprehensible by, one glance; 3. hidden in the interior of another thing and especially valuable (gold or silver ore in the hills); 4. at the bottom and serve as a foundation for what is above.
81. The indefiniteness of direct impressions and the similarity of things or phenomena also provide the basis for the so-called "optical metaphors," i.e., images that are ambiguous and can be perceived as objects of different kinds. As N. Worobiow has shown, frequent use of optical metaphors was made by Čiurlionis in order to highlight the symbolic significance of things. (See N. Worobiow, *M. K. Čiurlionis, der litauische Maler und Musiker*.)
82. For example, human beings turning into animals or plants, animals turning into humans, and so on.
83. For in poetic language the sensory nature and structure of the words themselves acquire essential significance.
84. According to Lange, an aesthetic illusion differs from an ordinary one in being an instance of "*conscious self-deception*" (*bewußte Selbsttäuschung*) in that the subject *deliberately* creates and maintains it because it gives him satisfaction. Consequently, an aesthetic illusion is determined by two kinds of factors (moments)—those that give rise to the illusion and those that cancel it. The former are based on the represented content; the latter depend on the form to which the artist subjects the

content and which set that content apart from the surrounding real world. Depending on what it is that the viewer or listener first pays attention to—the work's content or its artistic form—his consciousness is dominated either by the factors supporting the illusion or by those that cancel it. In this way aesthetic contemplation is described in terms of the alternation of two opposite states: the illusion emerging and the illusion disappearing. But if Lange additionally claims that the aesthetic self-deception never ceases to be conscious, i.e., that the viewer subject to the illusion never forgets that it is just an illusion, then, really, we cannot talk in this case about an illusion in the true sense of the word, since it is incomprehensible how one can believe in the represented object's reality if the aesthetic perception necessarily includes such pictorial elements (artistic form), that contradict the illusion of reality? Moreover, when a true illusion disappears, you feel disappointed, but if, for example, you become convinced that a certain thing in a dramatic scene is not real but just drawn onto the stage background, then here the dissolving of the illusion in no way changes or damages the aesthetic impression. Finally, Lange's theory also does not properly explain the nature of the "objective" feelings and emotions entering into aesthetic perception.

85. Only if we keep in mind the independence of the sphere of art and its principled neutrality with respect to reality, can we explain to ourselves the verisimilitude of dramatic acting. The question, Does the actor playing Othello really feel jealous, does he really love the actress playing the part of Desdemona?, can only be answered as follows: he doesn't love and feel jealous the way he does in real life, just as he doesn't really strangle Desdemona on stage or kill himself with a stage knife. All this takes place on a plane independent of, and analogous to, reality, a plane created by an aesthetically (contemplatively) oriented act of imagination. Transforming himself into the represented Othello, the actor playing Othello loves the represented Desdemona; his acting grows out of those echoic feelings and emotions that arise in him as he immerses himself into Othello's part. Though he takes on Othello's way of thinking and feeling and embodies it in his actions, he nevertheless does not confuse or identify them with the feelings and intentions of his own real personality as an artist. Otherwise he would in no way differ from a madman, who thinks he's really Napoleon or the Emperor of China and behaves accordingly. Similarly, a viewer in an aesthetic frame of mind following the action on stage does not fall prey to the illusion that the dramatic action is actual reality. Dramatic acting is only verisimilitudinious, and cannot and should not replace actual reality, from which it is separated by the contemplative mind-set, the foundation of artistic perception.
86. Phenomenal reality is wider than *actual* reality, i.e., all that normal consciousness in a wakeful state holds to be objectively real. The real world (in the sense indicated) is wider than nature because it includes all

the things and phenomena. Therefore, art, too, with respect not only to forms and structures but also to the elements used is not limited to what it gets from nature (for example, the worked-on material in architecture and sculpture, colors in painting, tones in music).

87. From what has been said we can understand what is positive and negative about the idealistic view of aesthetics according to which beauty is nothing other than the sensory embodiment or manifestation of a certain idea. It is correct in claiming that in a work of art an objective or superindividual value is realized; it errs in assigning to this value a purely rational meaning, i.e., in identifying it with an objective idea that can be expressed as a concept in words. What is aesthetically valuable cannot, as we have seen, be confined within the limits of the individualizations of rational, objective ideas.
88. We have discussed the significance of the imitative instinct at greater length elsewhere (see Part V, Chapter 3).
89. Hence, the satisfaction that beauty affords is purely intellectual; the viewer or listener must not only like a work of art but also learn something from it (N. Boileau).
90. In deriving the satisfaction that accompanies aesthetic contemplation from the harmonious interaction (play) of reason and imagination, Kant gives it a purely intellectual nature. On the other hand, by according a decisive significance in aesthetic contemplation to the subjective factor, Kant is following in the psychological tradition of the English aestheticians.
91. The first step in this direction was taken by Lessing, who explained the essential differences between poetry and visual art by the difference in the means of representation these art forms use. Goethe's view on art is also akin to objectivist aesthetics. Artistic creativity, according to him, realizes true aesthetic values only when it is guided by those principles that govern the nature of the object being worked on or, in other words, when the principles of creativity coincide with the inner regularity of the sensible world.
92. Somewhat earlier, in the middle of the 19th c., music was formalistically elucidated by Eduard Hanslick.
93. Logically rational is that concept the content of which is clearly defined; but even with respect to practice rationality is ascribed only to such things and phenomena with which one can deal in a certain well-defined way. The non-rationality of aesthetic meaning that we are talking about here is, of course, only relative—with respect to objective meaning—and in no way prevents the structure of a work of art from being governed by well-defined regular relations (mathematical relations of elements, proportions, symmetry, and others). In this respect music, like architecture, is characterized by a special rationality of structure.

Index

A

Allen, Grant, 249
Aristotle, 168, 194–197, 200, 204, 212, 226, 234, 235, 238
Augustine, St., 272

B

Baumgarten, Alexander Gottlieb, 1, 237–238
Bayer, Raymond, 248
Beethoven, Ludwig van, 262, 271
Belinsky, Vissarion, 250
Bergson, Henri, 22, 204, 206, 207, 210, 250, 272
Bernays, Jakob, 194,
Boileau, Nicolas, 235, 275
Bremond, Henri, 205
Brinckmann, A. E., 271
Bücher, Karl, 29, 123, 124
Buffon, Comte de (Georges-Louis Leclerc), 236
Bühler, Karl, 270
Burke, Edmund, 239, 240

C

Cézanne, Paul, 177
Chekhov, Anton, 211
Chernyshevsky, Nikolai, 250–251
Čiurlionis, M. K., 68–70, 261, 270, 273
Cohen, Hermann, 250
Cohn, Jonas, 250
Croce, Benedetto, 64, 150, 250, 269

D

Delacroix, Eugene, 250
Descartes, René, 169
Dickens, Charles, 211
Durkheim, Émile, 250
Dvořák, Max, 168

E

Engels, Friedrich, 251

F

Fechner, Gustav, 245, 246–247
Feuerbach, Ludwig, 251
Focillon, Henri, 248
Formalists, 245–246
Frankl, Paul, 248

G

Geiger, Moritz, 248
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, 4, 216, 270, 271, 275
Groos, Karl, 118, 268
Guyau, Jean Marie, 249

H

Hanslick, Eduard, 275
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich von, 75, 160, 197–199, 243–245, 246, 251
Henry, Charles, 249
Herbart, Johann Friedrich, 246
Herder, Johann Gottfried von, 123, 127
Herder, Johann Gottfried von, 13–15, 24, 99, 117
Hildebrandt, A. von, 248
Hoffmann, E. T. A., 224
Home, Henry, 239, 240
Homer, 224
Honegger, Arthur, 262
Horace, 270

Husserl, Edmund, 248
Hutcheson, Francis, 239, 240

I

Ibsen, Henryk, 78

K

Kant, Immanuel, 93, 94–97, 240–243, 245, 256, 261, 275
Kretschmer, Ernst, 221

L

Lalo, Charles, 250
Lange, Carl, 57,
Lange, Konrad, 227–228, 273–274
Laocoon, 47, 77
Laurila, K. S., 272
Leibniz, Gottfied Wilhelm, 236–237
Lenin, Vladimir, 251
Leonardo da Vinci, 4, 86
Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim, 4, 77, 275
Lipps, Theodor, 44–47, 48, 249
Locke, John, 238, 239,
Lotze, Rudolf Hermann, 246

M

Maeterlinck, Maurice, 78
Marx, Karl, 164, 251
Mephistopheles, 3
Michelangelo, 39, 68, 271
Monet, Claude, 177

N

Neoplatonists, 234

P

Panofsky, Erwin, 183, 248
Pfeiffer, Johannes, 272
Plato, 168, 194, 204, 232–234, 235, 238, 239, 245
Plechanov, Georgi, 251

R

Raphael, 86,
Rembrandt, 228, 271
Ribot, Théodule, 145–146
Riegl, Alois, 182
Rigaud, 221
Romanticists, 246
Ruysdal, Jakob van, 228
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 92, 123

S

Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph, 75, 243, 246, 251
Schiller, Friedrich von, 4, 118, 119, 132, 270
Schopenhauer, Arthur, 141, 229, 243–245
Schlegel, Friedrich von, 127
Segond, Joseph, 250
Shaftesbury, Earl of, 92, 238–239
Shakespeare, William, 78
Socrates, 199
Sophists, 199, 232–233
Souriau, Etienne, 248
Spencer, Herbert, 118, 119, 249, 268
Spengler, Oswald, 168, 169
Stanislavski, Konstantin, 217, 267, 273
Stoics, 194
Stumf, Karl, 124–125
Sulzer, Johann Georg, 236, 238

T

Taine, Hippolyte, 160–161, 162,
Titian, 271
Tolstoy, Leo, 267

V

Vico, Giambattista, 127, 235, 243
Virgil, 77
Vischer, Friedrich Theodor, 249
Volkelt, Johannes, 207, 249

W

Wagner, Richard, 133
Walzel, Oskar, 248
Wind, Edgar, 184
Wipper, Boris, 182–183,
Wolff, Christian, 1, 236–237
Wölfflin, Heinrich, 248
Worobiow, Nikolai, 270, 273